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Preface 
This publication evolved from a historic conference that met at the 
Elkhorn Inn in Sun Valley, Idaho, from August 17 to 20, 1983. The 
theme of this conference was "Indian Self-Rule: Fifty Years Under the 
Indian Reorganization Act." Participants came from all over the 
nation. They included Indian spokesmen, past and present federal 
policy makers, anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and other 
scholars. An atmosphere of excitement permeated the conference. An 
audience of four hundred people listened attentively to keynote addresses 
and panel sessions that analyzed the h;gacy of the IRA on Indian life. 
The Conference on Indian Self-Rule provided a rare opportunity 
for communication between different groups of people. It was the most 
important gathering of persons to evaluate the Indian Reorganization 
Act since a symposium sponsored by the American Anthropological 
Association in 1953. On each day of the conference keynote speakers 
and panelists carefully examined a different period of federal Indian 
policy which has affected tribaJ progress toward self-rule: (1) the 
Indian New Deal, 1928-1945; (2) the Termination Era, 1945-1960; 
( 3) the policy of Self-Determination, 1960-1976; and (4) the impact 
of the IRA on Indian America from 1977 to the present. 
The Conference on Indian Self-Rule was the ninth in a series of 
summer conferences sponsored by the Institute of the American West, 
a non-profit educational institution founded in 1975 as the humani-
ties division of the Sun Valley Center for the Arts and Humanities. 
E. Richard Hart, the director of the Institute, Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., 
president of the Institute's National Council, and Vine Deloria, Jr., a 
nationally-known author, formulated early plans for the 1983 program 
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that commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act. They were assisted by two former Commissioners of Indian 
Affairs, Louis Bruce and Robert L. Bennett. Members of the National 
Council that played a major role in organizing the conference were 
Floyd A. O'Neil, Suzan Shown Harjo, and Alfonso Ortiz. 
The Institute of the American West obtained financial support for 
the conference from a variety of sources. The following groups and 
individuals deserve special thanks and recognition: the Association 
for the Humanities in Idaho; the Atlantic Richfield Foundation; 
the Gannett Foundation; KWSU-TV of Pullman, Washington; the 
National Endowment for the Humanities; and the Sun Valley Center 
for the Arts and Humanities. Generous contributions also were received 
from Mrs. Damaris D. W. Ethridge, numerous individuals, and an 
anonymous donor. 
A portfolio of limited edition prints by five distinguished Native 
American artists was commissioned by the Institute of the American 
West for the Conference on Indian Self-Rule. It included works by 
David P. Bradley, N. Scott Momaday, Jaune Quick-to-See Smith, 
Darren Vigil, and R. Lee White. Proceeds from the sale of this portfolio 
helped fund the conference. 
Financial assistance from the above organizations and individuals 
made it possible for the Institute of the American West to provide more 
than one hundred fellowships that enabled people from different parts 
of the United States to attend the conference. More importantly the 
Institute was able to bring the conference proceedings to national, 
regional, and local audiences by circulating a news tabloid on the themes 
of the conference, promoting radio and television programming, and 
conducting oral interviews with former government administrators and 
Indian leaders who played a significant role in the past half-century of 
federal-Indian relations. Interviewers were Gregory C. Thompson, 
Kathryn MacKay, Marjane Ambler, and John R. Alley. 
A complete set of transcribed conference proceedings, including 
the oral interviews and other materials, have been deposited in the 
Special Collections Department of the Marriott Library at the Uni-
versity of Utah. These valuable documents will be available for future 
historical research on federal Indian policy since the New Deal. Cassette 
copies of the keynote addresses and panel sessions were recorded by the 
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National Public Radio affiliate KUER-FM 90 at Salt Lake City. These 
cassettes can be purchased from the University of Utah. Selma Thomas 
of Seattle, Washington produced and directed a video for broadcast on 
Public Broadcasting Service stations. Finally, John R. Alley and the 
editorial staff at Howe Brothers merit acknowledgement for their 
assistance in the publication of this book. 
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Foreword to the New Edition 
During the decade following the conference that produced Indian 
Self-Rule, several of the participants passed from the scene. A surpris-
ing number, though, are still living and actively performing many of 
the same roles that they had in 1983. The durability of the scholarship 
in this book is also revealing. Many of the observations made at the 
conference are still in vogue, very much a part of current thinking. 
Continuity in concerns and thought about and by American Indians 
was noted by the participants then, and it is still evident. 
Subsequent scholars have drawn a great deal from this work and 
have quoted from it extensively. Few books have appeared that in-
corporate the range of American Indian voices that this one contains. 
While there are a great number of non-Indian voices in it as well, the 
Indian perspectives predominate. Although the subjects covered within 
the book are today still being discussed in Indian country, there have 
been at least two major changes. One is that water rights, always im-
portant but sometimes overlooked, are now stressed far more than ever 
before. A second, distinctly more current area of concern is the issue 
of American Indian gambling. Gambling involves constitutional ques-
tions and contributes to as well as reflects the changing lifestyle and 
economics of Indian tribes. Attention toward many other topics cov-
ered in Indian Self-Rule has continued to increase. The issue of the 
extent and specific nature of Indian governments' jurisdiction is cer-
tainly one such subject. Jurisdiction is particularly well covered in 
Part IV of the book. The comments included there, made more than 
a decade ago, remain remarkably up-to-date. 
[IJ 
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The uses of Indian Self-Rule have been many. Perhaps the greatest 
number of copies have been sold at colleges and universities as text-
books for teaching American Indian history and culture. Its value for 
that purpose is still significant. The book also achieved a certain noto-
riety because of the varied new source material - the reflections and 
comments of its contributors - it provided on recent Indian history. 
Many of those individuals had been involved with the nuts and bolts 
of Indian affairs during the presidential administrations of Roosevelt, 
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, or Reagan. 
Charlotte Walkup, E. Reeseman Fryer, Robert L. Bennett, Robert 
Burnette, Russell Jim, Rupert Costo, Helen Peterson, and Gerald One 
Feather are but a few of those who participated in the changes brought 
about in American Indian life during the reforms of FDR's presidency. 
In a way, the 1983 meeting represented a final hurrah for many of 
these important historical actors. When they looked back across half 
of a century to tell us first hand what they and their contemporaries 
were attempting and to reflect on the consequences of those actions, 
they provided remarkable documentation of a turbulent time. 
It is important that this book be republished. It is needed in the 
classroom, and it continues to be one of the best sources for first-hand 
observations by American Indians about their own past. 
FLOYD A. O'NEIL 
American West Center 
University of Utah 
Foreword 
Especially when one is young, fifty years-half a century-seems 
like a long, long time. Exactly fifty years before I was born in 1915, 
Abraham Lincoln had just been murdered and the American Civil War 
was ending. The white men's wars with Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, Cap-
tain Jack, Chief Joseph, Geronimo, and many other Native American 
patriots were still in the future. I was eleven years old before the nation 
observed the fiftieth anniversary of "Custer's Last Stand" in an atmo-
sphere something like that of a day of mourning and rededication, 
a 1926 Memorial Day on June 25. I was old enough then to thrill to 
"The Flaming Frontier," Hollywood's super-epic salute (with an inter-
mission) to the martyred cavalry leader at the Little Bighorn, and to 
the white actor, Richard Dix, coated in makeup, playing the role of 
"The Vanishing American" (both films helped to form false and stereo-
typic images of Indians for me and many other non-Indians). Lincoln, 
Appomattox, Custer, cavalry, and Indians, they were ancient history 
to me, visions of long, long before I was born. 
Now we are looking back together at a half century since the 
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 (I was in college 
then), and although to younger people, it must now seem a very long 
time ago, it strangely does not seem so to me. During those fifty years, 
of course, many events occurred and many changes came to Native 
Americans, to Indian-white relations, and to relations between Indians 
and the federal and state governments. But, in many of the most basic 
matters concerning the status and well-being of America's Native 
American population, the more that things changed, the more they 
stayed the same, so that I see the fifty years as a period of compressed 
[3] 
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time in which numerous wheels spun and few, if any, of the funda-
mental issues of Indian affairs of 1934 were solved. 
John Collier, Dillon Myer, William Zimmerman, Glenn Emmons, 
and many others have come and gone. At times, it seems like they were 
here only last week, for the issues over which they contested in the name 
of Indians are still with Indians. Rupert Costo, Barney Richard, Sam 
LaPointe, Thomas Sam, Max Bigman, Joseph Bruner, John Snake, Ray 
Claymore, and many others seem closer to us than the 1930s. Those 
among them who are still alive could be-and in fact, often are-
saying today just what they said in the 1930s. 
Indians still do not possess the same freedoms enjoyed by their fel-
low Americans. Indians still do not enjoy meaningful self-government, 
self-determination, or sovereignty. The Bureau of Indian Affairs still 
lays the dead hand of patronizing (usually smirking) bureaucratic 
authority over reservation matters far beyond the parameters of its trust 
and treaty obligations. Reservation and tribal natural resources and 
other properties are still victimized by theft, cheating, and fraud. Indian 
religion is still not respected and protected. Discrimination and preju-
dice are still rampant in many states. Indian health, education, housing, 
and sanitation are still underfunded and largely neglected. Indian 
unemployment and poverty are still a national scandal. Indeed, even 
the ration system is back--disguised today to hungry reservation victims 
of cutbacks and lack of opportunity as commodity distribution programs. 
The scene is not good, and one must wonder what has happened 
in all those fifty years through which one has lived-years filled with 
zigs and zags in policies, with National Congress of American Indians 
and National Tribal Chairmen's Association resolutions, with National 
Indian Youth Council and American Indian Movement activism, with 
task forces, Bobby and Ted Kennedy educational investigations, and a 
battery of unending studies. There were changes, as stated, to be sure, 
and some were undoubtedly for the good. But which ones, and what 
did they accomplish? 
It is time to ask questions, to seek what Indians wanted and 
expected fifty years ago, twenty-five years ago, and today. Fifty years 
ago, relatively few Native Americans like Rupert Costa asserted the 
right of Native Americans to speak and act for themselves. In those 
days of John Collier and Oliver La Farge, most whites deemed Indians 
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"children" or "incompetents," unable to know what was best for them-
selves. Yes, that was the way it was only fifty years ago, but how many 
whites, including those still in government, continue to think the same 
way today? Less than twenty-five years ago, in Chicago, an Indian 
conference demanded the right to participate with whites in deciding 
policies and programs for Indians. How much has changed since then? 
Today-well, who is in the Indians' driver's seat: Native Americans or 
the secretary of the interior? 
In this book and in the Institute of the American West conference 
on "Indian Self-Rule" that preceded it, it was hoped these fifty years 
would be carefully examined, drawing not alone on the studies and 
perspectives of Indian and non-Indian historians and students, but on 
the memories and reminiscences of participants, again both Indian and 
non-Indian, in the historic events and processes of that era. To assess 
what was good and what was bad, what was hoped for and what was 
frustrated, what was planned and what went wrong, what seemed right 
and what proved a mistake, what should be kept and what discarded, 
all these contributors had to ask-and try to answer-a multitude of 
questions. 
Did the planners and writers of the IRA hold up the promise of 
real self-government, of self-determination and the sovereignty of the 
tribes? If so, where was it killed, how, and by whom? What were the 
roles of the Felix Cohens and of Congress, and how judge them? What 
were the feelings of the tribes about the IRA in 1934? Who were right 
and who were wrong? What were the enduring good and bad things 
about the IRA? 
In later periods, what were-and are--the lasting adverse impacts 
of the termination policy, of relocation, of other events of the late 
Truman and Eisenhower years? How do we assess, from the tribes' 
points of view, the Indian Claims Commission? Then came the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations, the Area Redevelopment Act and the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, the proliferation of non-BIA pro-
grams and "Indian desks" in Washington that brought new funds to 
reservations, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Red Power movement 
and years of activism, the resurgence of traditionalism and the reasser-
tion of Indian pride on and off the reservations. What about the long, 
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torturous travail of contracting, landmark legal decisions, the energy 
crisis, and, finally, Reaganomics? 
The context, too, is broad, for the changes and wheel spinning 
have not only been political and economic. What has happened in 
Indian education and health (contract and tribal schools for instance, 
and the move of Indian health in 1955 out of the BIA for better or 
worse) , to Indian art, literature, music, and other cultural expressions? 
What, indeed, in an age of accelerated Indian assimilation and accul-
turation with perhaps fifty thousand young Indians in white-run col-
leges, universities, and graduate schools, has happened to tribal cultures, 
Indian values, and Indian spiritual beliefs and lifeways? All of these 
are only a few of the areas and subjects worthy of being discussed 
and questioned. 
It is, for certain, a long time, as hairs grey and infirmities appear, 
from 1934 until today. But perhaps with the help of those who lived 
through the last fifty years, we will realize that it was all only yesterday 
and is still very much with us, affecting not only today but tomorrow 
and the next fifty years as well. Our own years, after all, stemmed from 
the days of our parents and are, in turn, bequeathed to the years of our 
children and grandchildren. This is an opportunity to let them know. 
ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR. 
President, National Council, 
Institute of the American West 
When Europeans arrived on the North American continent, they 
found hundreds of tribes occupying a vast and verdant country. Although 
the invaders quickly recognized the wealth of natural resources, their 
religious bigotry and cultural ethnocentrism prevented them from rec-
ognizing the cultural, spiritual, and intellectual riches possessed by the 
Native Americans. For three hundred years prior to the drafting of 
the United States Constitution, Europeans confronted the American 
Indians, usually attempting to expropriate the tribes' territories, often 
fighting them and trying to convert them to Christianity and material-
ism, and rarely, if ever, attempting to understand or learn from them. 
Despite this pattern, during that same three centuries, a foundation of 
law to deal with Indian tribes was built. Though it seems incredible 
to us today, Spanish legal scholars argued whether Indians were human 
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and entitled to some rights just like other people. Similarly, the French, 
British and English were able to establish certain basic codes of law 
that dealt with Indian-European relations. 
By the time the United States Constitution was ratified, the framers 
had quite a history of precedents from which to draw in order to set 
down the method by which the new country was to deal with tribes. 
There were even those among the whites who knew enough to examine 
the Indian experience, as well, before drafting that remarkable docu-
ment. The Iroquois Confederacy, it has been argued, was one model 
that the framers of democracy used. The authors of the Constitution 
could have gone much farther than they did in guaranteeing the rights 
of Indian tribes (the same for other non-whites and females), but they 
did make a start. They concluded that tribes were sovereign entities 
and that they held their natural resources in common. The Constitution 
prohibited states from legislating laws over Indians and reserved for the 
federal government the right to govern Indian trade. The federal gov-
ernment became a trustee for Indian rights and resources. But as Felix 
Cohen stated in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law, "Perhaps the 
most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions 
... is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an 
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers, granted by express 
acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty 
which has never been extinguished." 
In 1984, it will have been one hundred and fifty years since the 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act refined federal policy, legitimized 
removal of tribes from their ancestral lands, and suggested that the 
relationship of the federal government to the tribes was a "paternal 
one." The federal government had a condescending and paternalistic 
attitude towards tribes and committed innumerable unconscionable 
acts against Indian peoples (including the occasional campaign to 
exterminate them), but during the period up until the Grant adminis-
tration, the government, when it did make a formal, honorable effort to 
deal with tribes, signed treaties with them as sovereign nations. Ratified 
by Congress, a treaty becomes the most legally binding kind of agree-
ment this country is capable of making. 
During the first century of federal Indian affairs in the United 
States, a very corrupt and mismanaged bureaucracy, the Indian Office, 
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grew to have considerable autocratic control over tribes' relations. As 
part of a "reform" movement in the 1870s the government decided not 
only to cease making treaties with tribes, but to change the whole course 
of Indian policy. It became government policy to assimilate all Indians 
into what was thought to be the mainstream of American life. Although 
Indians had already lost millions upon millions of acres of land to the 
new republic, pressures were great to take from tribes what had been 
left them through treaties, acts,and executive orders. In the 1880s, the 
policy of assimilation took shape in what came to be called the Dawes 
Act. This piece of legislation, formally called the General Allotment 
Act and passed on February 8, 1887, was to "Provide for the Allotment 
of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations .... " 
In essence, the act was meant to force Indians to cease their tribal ways, 
to become individual farmers on small plots of lands, and thus to open 
the remainder of U.S. Indian reservations to non-Indian use. 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first 
decades of the twentieth century, the government used all of its might 
to force Indian peoples to give up their tribal identity-their languages, 
cultures, arts, spirituality, and knowledge. Even today most tribal elders 
can recall a childhood when Bureau of Indian Affairs officials forced 
them to attend white schools where their native tongue was- forbidden 
on penalty of punishment (often violent). Elders can recall how native 
religion was suppressed and condemned as pagan and backward. 
Indians were warned to give up any thoughts of tribalism and told their 
only chance in the United States was to act like whites. Bureau officials 
demanded that traditional dancing and singing cease. On some reserva-
tions in the West, BIA agents became petty dictators, demanding that 
Indians use passes to visit doctors, leave the reservation, or be out after 
curfew. Pregnant women were forced to dig out the roots of cotton-
wood trees as punishment for playing cards on Sunday. Children knelt 
for hours on wooden rods because they had spoken a single word of 
their native tongue. Religion was suppressed, tribal resources were 
stolen or swindled away, and Indian people lived in scandalous poverty. 
In the early twentieth century conditions on some reservations became 
a blight on the democracy. 
It was exactly one hundred years after the Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Act that Congress enacted the Wheeler-Howard Act, also 
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known as the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The Meriam Report 
of 1928, John Collier's crusading, and Felix Cohen's scholarly legal 
work all helped lead to its passage. The bibliography at the end of this 
publication lists quite a number of additional sources that shed light on 
the years surrounding the passage of the act and on the motivations of 
those who pressured it through. Among those sources are Kenneth 
Philp's John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, Graham Taylor's 
The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism, and Lawrence Kelly's 
new book, The Assault on Assimilation. 
In reading about the IRA, one overriding fact should be remem-
bered. At the time it was passed, the first and most important thing 
about the IRA, to the people who passed it, was that it would negate 
the Dawes Allotment Act. Indeed, the Indian Reorganization Act 
begins, in the first section, by saying, " ... hereafter no land of any 
Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the 
Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall 
be allotted in severalty to any Indian." 
Those Indians and non-Indians who opposed the act and pre-
ferred traditional governments were sharply attacked by Collier and his 
allies. A 1938 publication entitled The New Day for the Indians: 
A Survey of the Working of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and 
sponsored by F. W. Hodge, Ruth Benedict, Ales Hrdlicka, A. V. Kidder, 
Oliver La Farge, Jay B. Nash, and a number of other Collier sup-
porters, charged that opponents of the IRA included 
People who resist any change in the historic policy which succeeded in 
diminishing Indian landholding .... 
Those who resist the assistance being given by the present administration to 
Indians in taking back the use of their own lands and range from whites, 
and preventing further land losses. 
Property holders and local officials who do not want to see land added to 
reservations taken off the local tax roles. 
Those who deplore giving Indians the right to control their own domestic 
relations, customs and the like. 
Those who oppose a policy that looks toward the Indian as a relatively 
permanent, distinct (though not segregated) element in our population 
and culture. 
Those who also oppose giving authority to Indian tribes to assert their prop-
erty rights through independent suits. 
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Those who insist on confusing modern cooperative forms of enterprise with 
Communism. 
Those who dislike a policy which changes government employees from 
masters of Indians to collaborators with Indians. 
And finally, those Indians and whites who have used Indian misfortunes and 
disagreements to collect fees for their own support. 
Under the present regime Indian Service opposition to fee-chasing among 
Indians has constantly provoked intemperate attacks from the racketeering 
interests whose incomes have been jeopardized. 
At that time, in 1938, 189 tribes had accepted the IRA and 77 
tribes had rejected it. Clearly, the administration was attempting to 
force the policy on tribes, whatever their objections. 
The IRA and "Indian New Deal" were part of a broader reform 
movement under the Roosevelt administration, which resulted in such 
environmentally oriented acts as the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act. The 
movement to protect overgrazed lands led to the stock reduction pro-
gram in the Southwest, a program that turned the N ava jos against 
Collier and the IRA and has affected that tribe's attitude towards 
federal programs ever since. 
The Indian New Deal was also supposed to give Indians new 
educational and economic opportunities and to provide tribes with an 
avenue for creating representative and effective tribal governments. 
One of the purposes of this book, the conference from which it resulted, 
and the overall Institute of the American West project is to assess to 
what degree the IRA has helped tribes, during the last fifty years, move 
towards more self-rule. The roots and effect of the later termination 
and self-determination policies also are examined here by some of those 
who are best qualified to discuss the subjects-those who battled against 
termination and for self-determination. 
If we are surprised at the number of about-faces-the twists and 
one hundred and eighty degree turns that federal Indian policy has 
taken in the last hundred years-that is all the more reason to attempt 
to understand the dilemmas facing tribes today. How could it take our 
elected officials more than two centuries to come upon the policy of self-
determination, in "the land of the free"? And yet it was not until 1975 
that Public Law 93-638, the "Indian Self-Determination and Educa-
tional Assistance Act," was passed-legislation designed to give Indians 
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the chance to control more of Indian affairs. Under this act tribes 
began to take over some functions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in a 
process known as "638 contracting." 
The late 1970s and 1980s have brought new problems for tribes, 
or a resurgence of old problems. During the Kennedy and Johnson 
years, a flood of federal funds helped lower the unemployment rate on 
reservations to its lowest percentage in history, but when federal funds 
began to dry up, many of the industries that had been attracted to 
reservations began to disappear. During the Carter administration, 
unemployment and associated economic problems began to increase. 
Under the Reagan administration, unemployment has reached crisis 
proportions. Education and health care have also suffered in the past 
three years. 
Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations have publicly 
stated support for the policy of self-determination, but in the 1980s 
there are a number of fundamental questions about what that means. 
Is health care a trust responsibility of the federal government? Dr. 
Everett Rhoades, a Kiowa physician who was chosen in 1982 to head 
the Indian Health Service, suggested in June of this year that health 
care is a trust respomibility of the federal government. Is education a 
trust responsibility? President Ronald Reagan says, "No." When he 
vetoed an admendment to the Tribally Controlled Community Colleges 
Act, he specifically reported that support for trjbal colleges and Indian 
students was not a trust responsibility. Are tribal governments and 
reservations sovereign? Former Secretary James Watt's publication 
"Preparing Indian Tribes ... for Economic Self-Sufficiency in the 
21st Century" includes a statement affirming the "government-to-
government relationship" of tribes to the federal government, but at the 
same time there are persistent charges that the Interior Department 
will not approve reservation severance taxes or tribal constitutional 
amendments, and that the BIA continues to drag its feet in approving 
tribal economic development plans. 
More important was Secretary Watt's public posture and his 
rhetoric concerning tribes and tribal governments. Accusing tribes of 
"socialism," he said he would like to "liberate" them, but was meeting 
resistance. Ironically, he said, "We have terrible schools on the Indian 
reservations and we've tried to change that. Congress won't." The 
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attack by Watt on tribal governments was particularly unsettling since 
he must be aware that IRA govcrnmcnts were designed by the federal 
government itself and patterned after the U.S. Constitution. His 
rhetoric seemed to include carefully chosen words reminiscent of the 
termination period. When the secretary of the interior first met with 
the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, he reportedly told the 
congregation of leaders, "If your agenda is to play political hardball, 
to get news headlines, if you're going to scream and yell about getting 
someone fired, then why should I deal with you." Sioux leaders have 
charged that Watt's publicizing of eagle killings was an unfair attack on 
Indians, an attack that may have been inspired by Indian leaders' 
criticism of Watt. 
There are other reasons why this administration reminds Indians 
of termination. By law Indians are supposed to be consulted before 
decisions that affect them are made. In late 1982, when the National 
Advisory Council on Indian Education (appointed by President James 
E. Carter) complained that the government was closing Indian board-
ing schools without first consulting the affected tribes, President Reagan 
fired all fourteen council members. The Association on American 
Indian Affairs has added: 
The Association is ... especially concerned about the current Administra-
tion's practice of attempting to use the budget process to settle basic ques-
tions of public policy. Programs that ha\'c been the subject of national 
debate have been terminated, or termination has been attempted, through 
the practice of not requesting monies for them in the President's budget. 
Examples of this include vital programs for Indian tribes in jobs, child 
welfare, health, and schools. 
The President's public emphasis on volunteerism and private sector 
support for reservation industry is also reminiscent of the policies of 
the Eisenhower administration. The Reagan administration budgeted 
money to encourage new industry on reservations, but in amounts no 
greater than Collier budgeted fifty years ago (when populations were 
less and the dollar was worth more) . 
On the heels of his veto of the Eastern Indian Land Settlement Act, 
President Reagan proclaimed "American Indian Day" and encouraged 
Americans to observe May 13, 1983, by engaging in "appropriate cere-
monies and deeds and to reaffirm their dedication to the ideals which 
our first Americans subscribe." The ideals which Indians are reach-
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ing for today include energy independence, conscionable employment 
levels, adequate health care, fair educational opportunities, and political 
self-rule. As United States citizens, Indian and non-Indian, it is our 
obligation to understand these ideals and the issues associated with 
them. (Unemployment on reservations has reached 50 percent, 60 per-
cent, and even 80 percent in some areas, levels which would not be 
countenanced in any other segment of the U.S. population.) 
The contemporary significance of the IRA can perhaps best be 
seen in Alaska today. Native leaders have been struggling, since 1971, 
to survive the consequences of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 
A number of organizations have been formed, including the Alaska 
Federation of Natives and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, which 
was organized in 1977 and which, every three years, brings together 
representatives of Inuit peoples from Alaska, Canada, and Greenland 
in order to defend and preserve the culture and rights of the Inuit, 
as well as the Arctic environment. There are nearly seventy IRA native 
Alaska communities, and another thirty who have requested approval 
of IRA constitutions. The Alaska Federation of Natives, with a grant 
from the Alaska Humanities Forum, recently sponsored a conference 
for Alaska IRA councils. Because native leaders believe that the 1971 
act did not extinguish rights guaranteed under the IRA, at that recent 
meeting a new organization was formed. This new group, called the 
United Tribes of Alaska, has a membership of IRA Alaskan tribes intent 
on preserving those rights promised by the Indian Reorganization Act. 
The battle for sovereignty for Alaskan native communities will not 
end quickly. 
A broad spectrum of assessments of the IRA can be evoked from 
non-Indian and Indian critics. Certainly, from an Indian point-of-view 
the act was inspired, written and passed by whites, without much con-
sultation with Indian leaders. But from the non-Indian point-of-view 
it was a dramatic improvement over the assimilationist policies followed 
under the Dawes Allotment Act. A half century later, the history of 
the IRA, its implementation, and the policies which grew out of it are 
of immediate relevance to current issues. 
E. RICHARD HART, 
Former Director 
Institute of the American West 
Mr. Munnell, author of the Consolidated Chippewa constitution, and 
Mr. Murrell, interpreter at the Chippewa meeting on the Indian Reorganization 
Act, in 1936 or 1937. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Reorganization Act Fifty Years Later 
Kenneth R. Philp 
In January 1984, Francis Paul Prucha wrote an excellent article 
on "American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century" for the Western 
Historical Quarterly. He indicated that historians and other people, 
for the most part, have failed to see American Indians as communities 
that have evolved over time. To correct this problem, Prucha has sug-
gested that scholars should explore in greater depth the recent history of 
Indian-white relations and federal Indian policy. 
According to Prucha, there are several topics that need illumina-
tion. Scholars should focus their research on the accomplishments of 
individual Indians, the urbanization of Indians, the Indian policies of 
other federal agencies besides the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
increasingly sophisticated way that tribes have interacted with the fed-
eral government. Furthermore, we need to look at how Indian groups 
have used lawyers and created tribal mechanisms to better manage their 
destiny, at the economic history of reservation communities, and at the 
contradiction that exists between federal recognition of tribal automony 
and the federal paternalism associated with honoring the government's 
trusteeship responsibility. 
This book addresses many of the issues raised by Prucha. It pro-
vides an assessment, from different disciplinary perspectives, of the 
Indian progress toward self-rule during the years since the passage of 
the Indian Reorganization Act. It is also enriched by the viewpoints of 
Indian people and former government officials who helped formulate 
and administer federal Indian policy. 
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In my judgment, this book will be indispensable to both scholars 
and students who want to learn more about the contours of recent 
Indian history. I also hope that the substance of this volume will be 
carried by a strong breeze out of the halls of academia into the world at 
large. If it is, Indians, federal and state policy makers, and the general 
public should better understand the complex development of Indian 
history and the issues of tribal sovereignty, self-determination, and the 
trusteeship obligation of the United States government. 
It seemed unnecessary to follow the usual format of an introduc-
tion and merely summarize the contents of this book. What follows 
instead is an overview of federal Indian policy since the New Deal. 
It is intended to place the themes of the Conference on Indian Self-Rule 
and this book in historical perspective. 
The fiftieth anniversary of the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt 
provides us with an opportunity to examine an important turning point 
in American Indian history. One of Roosevelt's many legacies was to 
openly repudiate the Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887. This legis-
lation had shattered Indian homelands and created a class of 100,000 
landless people. President Roosevelt not only condemned this tragedy, 
he brought about a fundamental change in Indian-white relations. 
Beginning in 1933, the federal government abandoned its effort to 
assimilate Indians for a policy that emphasized tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination. 
The central purpose of land allotment had been to exterminate 
the Indians' group life and cultural heritage. The federal government 
worked toward this goal by sending Indian students to boarding schools, 
where an all out attempt was made to force them into mainstream 
society. A strategic offensive also was mounted against Indian land. Res-
ervations were opened up to white settlement after tribesmen received 
title to 160 acre homesteads. Between 1887 and 1933, the Indians lost 
over 87 million acres of land under the provisions of the Dawes Act. 
The appointment of John Collier as Indian commissioner in 1933 
reflected President Roosevelt's determination to set Indian affairs on a 
new course. Collier was a well-known advocate of Indian rights and a 
brilliant critic of land allotment. The commissioner believed that the 
land allotment system had violated tribal sovereignty and the vested 
rights that Indians had obtained in previous treaties for the cession of 
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large areas of their traditional homelands. Collier stressed that the 
government had a legal and moral obligation to recognize the bilateral 
contractual relationship with Indians that existed before 1871 when 
Congress had prohibited treaty making. 
Collier honored this legal and moral obligation by restructuring 
federal Indian policy. He was the architect of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934. This legislation offered the Indians a tribal alterna-
tive to assimilation. The IRA set up mechanisms to encourage cultural 
pluralism and tribal self-government, and it increased federal assistance 
for the economic development of reservation communities. 
The IRA was designed to protect and increase the amount of 
land set aside for Indian homelands. It ended future land allotment, 
extended trust restrictions on Indian land until otherwise directed by 
Congress, permitted the voluntary exchange of restricted allotments and 
heirship land to consolidate checkerboard reservations, and restored to 
tribal ownership remaining surplus land created by the Dawes Act. 
The IRA directed the secretary of the interior to initiate conservation 
measures on Indian land and authorized an annual appropriation of 
$2 million for the acquisition of new tribal real estate. 
The major thrust of the IRA was to encourage the process of tribal 
self-government. Indians were allowed to hold positions in the Indian 
Bureau without regard to civil service laws. An annual appropriation 
of $250,000 was authorized to help tribes establish constitutions, bylaws, 
and charters of incorporation for business purposes. Tribal councils that 
adopted constitutions could employ legal counsel, prevent the leasing 
or sale of land without tribal consent, and negotiate with federal or state 
governments for public services. 
Other important provisions of the IRA included federal aid for 
economic reconstruction and education. Congress authorized a $10 
million revolving credit fund to stimulate economic development on 
reservations and an annual appropriation of up to $250,000 for tuition 
and scholarships to increase Indian enrollment at vocational schools, 
high schools, and colleges. The IRA recognized the importance of 
mutual consent in Indian-white relations by allowing tribes the right 
to accept this legislation in a special referendum. 
Officials in the Roosevelt administration implemented other poli-
cies that were directly related to the Indian Reorganization Act. They 
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started economic recovery on reservations by bringing Indians under 
most of the New Deal relief programs and by creating a separate Indian 
Civilian Conservation Corps. Commissioner Collier issued two policy 
statements that guaranteed Indian religious freedom and curtailed mis-
sionary activity at boarding and day schools. And he used the Johnson-
O'Malley Act to provide federal funds for states where Indians had 
enrolled in public schools. An Indian Arts and Crafts Board also was 
established in the Interior Department. 
The Indian Bureau, in cooperation with the Justice Department, 
asked Felix S. Cohen, a legal scholar, to compile a list of statutes, 
treaties, and judicial decisions that dealt with Indian rights. Cohen 
published his research in the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. This 
volume presented legal and moral arguments that defended the concepts 
of Indian sovereignty, political equality, tribal self-government, and 
federal jurisdiction in Indian affairs. 
The ultimate success of these reforms depended on whether tribes 
voted for and made use of the Indian Reorganization Act. A total of 
258 elections were held. They did not apply to the Indians of Oklahoma 
or the Natives of Alaska, who wcre automatically blanketcd in under 
most sections of the IRA in 1936. Over two-thirds of the eligible tribes 
voted to accept the IRA. This represented only 40 percent of the 
Indians who cast ballots, because large tribes such as the Navajos, who 
opposed stock reduction, voted against the measure. Ninety-two out 
of 258 tribes or approximately 36 percent wrote constitutions; 72 tribes 
or 28 percent agreed to draft charters of incorporation for busincss 
purposes. 
There were many reasons why the Indians did not overwhelmingly 
endorse the IRA. Suspicion toward the federal government remained 
strong because of the previous record of broken treaties and promises. 
Many Indians feared that the IRA would encourage segregation and 
increase the power of paternalistic federal bureaucrats over their lives. 
They were more concerned with scttling claims against the government 
and securing federal recognition of their treaty rights than participating 
in IRA tribal governments controlled by the Indian Bureau. 
Indians were disappointed because the IRA did not provide for 
complete self-determination. By 1940, over 60 percent of the employees 
of the Bureau were Indians, but they still did not hold critical policy-
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making positions. Most of the decisions made by IRA tribal councils 
were subject to administrative review by superintendents and the secre-
tary of the interior. The federal government continued to control tribal 
trust fund expenditures, per capita payments, and the leasing and other 
use of tribal property. 
Tribal factionalism made it difficult to administer the IRA. Inter-
nal disunity was caused by wide variations in acculturation, mixed-
versus full-blood rivalry, and religious and cultural differences. IRA 
constitutions frequently led to bitter disputes over who would control 
newly established tribal councils. Many Indians, especially those in the 
Southwest, disliked IRA tribal governments because they threatened 
local village autonomy or traditional ways of running tribal affairs. 
Tribal governments also were the vehicle for implementing unpopular 
conservation measures that led to the slaughter of sheep, goats, and 
horses to prevent overgrazing. 
All of this is not to say that IRA tribal governments were unsuc-
essful. They made significant political progress, and tribal councils 
generally showed good judgment in controlling their resources. Tribal 
councils used IRA loans and tribal funds to purchase land, livestock, 
and farming and fishing equipment. Group action through IRA cor-
porations and cooperatives increased the utilization of Indian resources. 
Over one hundred additional cattle associations were set up, and the 
number of Indian-owned cattle increased dramatically. Agricultural 
production increased fourfold. Tribes also set up trading stores and arts 
and crafts guilds to promote the sale of their pottery, blankets, and 
silver jewelry. 
As impressive as these achievements were, most tribes experienced 
difficulty in developing their reservation resources. The $10 million 
revolving credit fund was too small to permanently end Indian poverty. 
Many tribes were denied access to this fund when the Solicitor's Office 
in the Interior Department ruled that a tribe had to vote for the IRA 
and draft a constitution and business charter before it could borrow 
money. Between 1934 and 1945, Congress funded $4.2 million in loans 
because only 28 percent of the tribes that voted for the IRA decided 
it was worthwhile to draft business charters in the midst of the Great 
Depression. The credit fund revolved one and one-half times, which 
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enabled the Indian Bureau to advance $6.6 million to tribal enterprises 
and credit associations. 
A significant increase in Indian-owned land was critical to the IRA 
policy of encouraging community life and tribal sovereignty. In 1934, 
the National Resources Board indicated that to make the Indians self-
supporting Congress would have to spend over $103 million to acquire 
25 million acres of additional agricultural and grazing land. Congress 
refused to implement this costly recommendation. Pressured by white 
economic interests, it agreed to spend about $5 million under the IRA's 
land acquisition program. 
This money, along with tribal funds and special congressional legis-
lation, allowed the Indian Bureau to purchase 4 million acres of new 
tribal land. Unfortunately, most of this property was submarginal land 
that had little economic value. During the Second World War, Congress 
ended the IRA policy of acquiring more land for tribes. This decision 
and the lack of adequate credit had disastrous economic consequences. 
By 1945, Indian farm families had a net annual income of $501. This 
was only slightly better than 1928 when the Institute of Government 
Research issued its famous report on Indian poverty. 
Another shortcoming of the IRA was that it failed to solve the 
problems associated with land allotted before 1933. The continued 
restrictions on the sale of allotted land under the IRA threatened indef-
inite government supervision over many competent individuals. Indians 
found that it was all but impossible to obtain loans from private sources 
to make improvements on their property. Over 45,000 Indians were 
heirs to 6 million acres of allotted land that had been divided by inheri-
tance into small unproductive parcels. It cost the Indian Bureau over 
$1 million annually to administer this property. The IRA permitted the 
voluntary consolidation of this land into tribal ownership, but most 
Indians refused to give up private control over their real estate. 
Indian political self-determination and economic progress under 
the IRA depended to a large degree on the success or failure of the 
Indian Bureau's educational program. Willard Beatty, the director of 
Indian education during the New Deal, closed boarding schools and 
encouraged Indian students to attend government day schools or nearby 
public schools. He developed a progressive education curriculum aimed 
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at solving rural problems on reservations. Beatty also began a bilingual 
education program to promote Indian literacy. But he found it impos-
sible to retain control over Johnson-O'Malley funds, and public schools 
refused to create special Indian programs in their districts. 
Beatty's innovations in the field of Indian education did not lead 
to increased congressional support. The IRA's $250,000 annual authori-
zation for Indian tuition and scholarships was not fully funded. Only 
a few hundred Indians attended college during the New Deal. More 
importantly, Congress refused to spend the money needed for new 
Indian educational facilities after it closed boarding schools. Conse-
quently, thousands of Indian children were denied an education. And 
no serious efforts were made to train adult Indians in the sophisticated 
administrative skills needed to make the IRA function properly. 
The reconstruction of Indian affairs during the Roosevelt years 
was part of a larger effort to develop a sense of pan-Indianism through-
out the Western Hemisphere. Commissioner Collier believed that 
Indians in the United States needed to collaborate with other tribal 
groups in the New World in their quest for social justice. He hoped 
that international contacts between tribes would lead to a broad cultural 
renaissance and strengthen the Indians' claim to tribal sovereignty. 
On April 14, 1940, representatives of nineteen American republics 
and their Indian delegates met at Patzcuaro, Mexico. The delegates at 
Patzcuaro made recommendations patterned after the framework of 
the Indian Reorganization Act. They suggested that all American 
governments help Indians maintain their separate group identity by 
providing them with needed land, credit, and technological assistance. 
They also signed a treaty that created a permanent Inter-American 
Indian Institute that was required to meet every four years to discuss 
common Indian problems. 
A shift in sentiment away from the Indian New Deal began during 
the Second World War. The war not only disrupted pan-Indian reform 
in the Western Hemisphere, it encouraged a sense of national unity and 
social consensus that led to a renewed emphasis on integrating minority 
groups. More than 40,000 Indians migrated to urban areas to find war-
related jobs. Another 25,000 served with distinction in the armed forces. 
Many of these individuals permanently left their reservations 
because they had become disillusioned with the operation of the Indian 
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Reorganization Act. It had failed to provide enough land and credit 
to support a growing population, and many individuals did not want to 
remain farmers. The IRA also had led to the growth of a centralized 
Indian Bureau to provide expanded social services. This development 
had led to some social progress, but it also contradicted earlier promises 
that the federal government would respect tribal sovereignty and the 
right to self-determination. 
After 1945, Congress responded to the Indians' dislike of federal 
paternalism and their desire to be independent. Indian Bureau pro-
grams were dismantled, and Congress, without Indian consent, passed 
termination legislation that ended federal wardship over several tribes. 
The government also lifted restrictions on more than 2.5 million acres of 
Indian allotments and heirship land. This decision was part of a broader 
policy that encouraged Indians to leave their reservations and relocate 
to more prosperous cities. 
Termination had tragic consequences. It led to the sale of valuable 
Indian land and hampered tribal self-determination and economic 
development under the Indian Reorganization Act. The Indian Bureau 
curtailed the use of IRA credit funds and relied on private enterprise 
to establish industries on or near reservations. Tribal economic develop-
ment languished because the private sector of the economy was unable 
or unwilling to solve the problem of poverty and employment on reser-
vations. Only five hundred new industrial jobs were created during the 
Eisenhower years. This failure helps explain why over 35,000 Indians 
decided to move to urban centers under the Indian Bureau's relocation 
program. Once they left their reservations, Indians were cut off from 
federal services. They also encountered cultural isolation and found it 
difficult to obtain decent jobs or adequate housing. 
By 1960, most Indians were aware that termination had simply 
given Congress an excuse to ignore their treaty rights and end vital 
federal services. During the next two decades, Indian opposition to 
termination intensified. Both Indians and federal officials began to 
reexamine the positive legacy of the Indian New Deal. The presidential 
administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard 
M. Nixon generally followed the principles behind the Indian Reorg-
anization Act. They renewed the federal commitment to tribal self-
determination and the development of reservation economic resources. 
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In 1969, President Johnson created the National Council on Indian 
Opportunity in the Office of the Vice-President. A few years later, 
President Nixon established the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission to study the Indians' unique relationship to the federal gov-
ernment. 
This new direction in Indian affairs was led by Indian com-
missioners such as Philleo Nash, Robert Bennett, Louis Bruce, and 
Benjamin Reifel. These men had begun their careers by working for 
the government during the New Deal. Some of the many policy initia-
tives during their tenure included expanding the IRA credit fund, 
encouraging Indian preference for employment at all levels within the 
Indian Bureau, and working closely with the National Tribal Chair-
men's Association. Self-determination was emphasized by allowing Zuni 
Pueblo and the Miccosukees of Florida to direct Indian Bureau pro-
grams on their reservations. 
Congress also was influenced by the long shadow cast by the Indian 
New Deal. It reaffirmed the concepts behind the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act in several important pieces of legislation. The Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 strengthened the New Deal policy of guaranteeing 
Indian religious freedom and giving tribes jurisdiction over civil and 
criminal law on their reservations. The Indian Financing Act of 1974 
consolidated several loan funds and increased money available for tribal 
business enterprises. The most far-reaching reform was the Indian Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975. It provided 
aid to Indian students and encouraged the Indians to manage their own 
schools. Tribal councils were given a significant role in setting policy 
goals and administering federal programs that affected them. 
Congress did not fund the IRA land acquisition program on an 
annual basis, but it did provide additional tribal land for Taos Pueblo, 
the Havasupais, and the Warm Springs Indians. The Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act of 1971 guaranteed Native American ownership 
of 44 million acres of land and created a $1 billion fund to be used by 
225 corporations set up by village communities. Congress also returned 
several terminated tribes to federal trust status. 
The Inter-American Indian Institute, required by treaty to meet 
every four years, did not receive the attention it deserved from either 
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tribal communities or the federal government. But Indians did under-
stand the international dimension of their struggle for social justice. 
Twenty-three western tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource 
Tribes modeled after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries. Indian activists also presented a resolution to the International 
Human Rights Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, calling on the 
United Nations to turn its attention to the plight of Native Americans. 
Today, the federal government, as it did in the 1950s, has repudi-
ated the philosophy behind the Indian New Deal. Former Secretary of 
the Interior James Watt has labeled Indians as social misfits and char-
acterized their homelands as examples of the failure of socialism. The 
commitment to Indian education has waned with the abrupt closing of 
ten off-reservation schools and President Ronald Reagan's veto of a bill 
allocating funds for Indian community colleges. The Reagan adminis-
tration dismissed 17,000 claims of Indians who had been illegally 
deprived of their rights or property, until it was overruled by a federal 
judge in Washington, D.C. Cutbacks in federal programs have battered 
reservation economies. Since 1980, average unemployment on reserva-
tions has increased from 40 percent to almost 80 percent. The question 
of Indian water rights also has not been resolved. 
Widespread public criticism forced President Ronald Reagan to 
issue a statement on January 24, 1983 concerning federal Indian policy. 
The president repudiated termination and pledged to uphold the Indian 
Self-Determination Act. He admitted that without healthy reservation 
economies the concept of self-government had little meaning. The 
president, however, offered little real hope for the future. Instead, he 
followed the discredited economic policies of the 1950s by insisting that 
tribes would have to reduce their dependence on federal revenue and 
rely on private enterprise to provide money for capital investment. 
It remains unclear how the withdrawal of federal funds and services, 
and cutbacks in Indian education will automatically solve Indian 
social problems. 
Times and circumstances do change, but it is important to under-
stand and appreciate the fundamental historical developments of the 
recent past. For Native Americans, these developments have their roots 
in the Indian Reorganization Act. They include a sincere respect for 
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mutual consent and the bilateral relationship in Indian affairs, rec-
ognizing the value of a pluralistic society, and the need for direct 
federal financial commitment to insure educational opportunity, self-
determination, and the economic well-being of all Indian people. 
PART ONE 
The Indian New Deal 
Winnebago basket makers in front of their home near the Winnebago 
Agency, Nebraska. 
The Pine Ridge, South Dakota, Agency office in 1936. 
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I was one of those who first translated the Indian Reorganization 
Act to our people in Bannock and Shoshone. I have waited fifty years 
to see this legislation work and to see it enforced by the Interior Depart-
ment. Now it seems to me the whole intent of the government was to 
play games with our lives in order to steal our lands and resources. We 
had high hopes at first. 
I am now discouraged. There is no separation of powers under the 
tribal set up. There are no separate judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches of tribal government. For this reason, I believe we were inten-
tionally set up to fail. The checks and balances of these three powers 
are taken for granted in the white man's world. To the reservation 
Indian, these guarantees of freedom do not exist. As an example, the 
reservation Indian has no grievance recourse but to a tribal court. All 
other non-Indian citizens can go to the highest court in the land, the 
Supreme Court. How many of you who live off the reservation would 
like to end your grievance with the city court? 
Back then, we were told to tell our people that our tribal self-
government would be based on a foundation of law. This has not hap-
pened. Lacking a foundation of law, we are now a pitiful people. Our 
tribal governments are now compared to dictatorships in the banana 
republics of South America. 
Who is responsible? The Interior Department has failed to act as 
a responsible trustee. As a result, basic tribal laws are flagrantly violated. 
T he tribal politicians have learned how to be deceitful to be elected, 
to practice nepotism, to outlaw those opposed to their practices, and to 
violate any law they wish to gain their end. 
Edward Boyer, a member of the 
Ft. Hall Shoshone-Bannock tribe. 
Of late years, somewhat of a cult has developed around John 
Collier. He is perceived as the hero of Indian rights, a warrior in the 
struggle for recognition of such rights. He is not our hero. 
Collier was vindictive and overbearing. He tolerated no dissent, 
neither from his staff nor from the tribes. He was a rank opportunist 
in politics, at once espousing and then rejecting one or another proposal. 
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He did not hesitate to use informants and the FBI against Indian oppon-
ents. He habitually tampered with the truth in his dealings with Indians. 
Rupert Costo, Cahuilla, president of the 
American Indian Historical Society 
I think that this legislation [the Indian Reorganization Act} has 
worked out very well for our reservation. We have six council men, 
a chairman, and a chartered livestock association. The IRA revolving 
credit fund enabled many of our younger tribal members to obtain loans 
and get started in the cattle business. In the early 1930s, we did not 
have enough irrigation water. Tribal leaders persuaded the government 
to build a storage dam . .. and we gained access to plenty of water. 
Arthur Manning, Shoshone-Paiute leader, 
former council member on the 
Duck Valley Reservation 
Collier's work as Commissioner of Indian Affairs is probably the 
most impressive achievement in the field of applied anthropology that 
the discipline of anthropology can claim. Collier reversed a policy of 
tribal disintegration that had been accepted as a national goal for over 
one hundred years and established a new political, economic, and social 
status for America's Indian minority . ... 
Collier succeeded in preserving Indian identity from complete 
absorption in the "melting pot" by creating a system of autonomous 
tribal entities within the political and economic superstructure of Ameri-
can society as a whole. He pursued this policy because it offered the best 
chance of preserving Indian tribal identity: Indian "grouphood" as 
he put it. 
WiIcomb E. Washburn, Smithsonian Institution 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Indian New Deal: An Overoiew 
Floyd A. O'Neil 
I plan to discuss the Indian New Deal in terms of four topics: 
origins, founding the New Deal, the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
the end of John Collier's career in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Some 
of the things I will note will be in the form of questions rather than 
answers. A reason for our discussions here is to create a crucible of ideas 
where divergent interpretations may find a proper colloquy. 
The Indian New Deal has become one of those contested areas in 
the interpretation of American history. The participants in our con-
sideration of Indian self-rule will have heated discussions and even 
downright disagreements. But it is hoped, by those of us who were 
fortunate enough to help with the planning of this project, that we may 
also expect to shed some light. It is my personal hope that this work 
will not be known in the future as the dark and bloody ground of parti-
sanship, but that fire may be struck and light indeed shed among 
scholars and friends. 
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment or Dawes Sever-
alty Act. This legislation made the allotment of land to individual 
Indians and the break up of tribal landholdings the official policy of the 
United States. That policy, which dominated the Indian world for the 
next half century, had disastrous consequences. The general public, 
however, was slow in realizing it. The policy was designed to assimilate 
the Indians into the general population and to make them into farmers. 
During that time, farming was still the largest single vocation within 
the United States. 
[30] 
An Overview 31 
To those of us who truly hate to farm, it is almost inconceivable 
how far the philosophy of Jeffersonian agrarianism had penetrated into 
the American psyche. The remnants of that psyche still exist in rural 
America even though the farming population has declined to signifi-
cantly below three percent of the population. Many things were wrong 
with the Dawes Severalty Act. One was that the Indians had been 
moved to the most meager available lands and then simply told to farm 
these lands. Secondly, at the very moment that the United States was 
creating farms and insisting that Indians live upon them, there was 
already an agricultural crisis based on overproduction. Furthermore, 
that over-production was created by the most efficient and productive 
set of farmers in the world. They en joyed, as well, the richest and best 
land the country offered. To expect that the Indian farmer could 
compete in such an economic world, above and beyond simply subsist-
ing, was faulty and short sighted. 
A more important factor than this, and the hardest one for those 
reforming Indian America to comprehend, was simply that most 
Indians did not want to farm. This was especially true on the Northern 
Plains and in the Far West where farming was considered undignified 
and confining. Many Indian people did endure, despite the folly of 
the Dawes Severalty Act. Their success at farming was a monument 
to their ability. 
Another characteristic of the era that lasted from 1887 to 1934 
was the presence of reformers. They were responsible, in part, for the 
passage of the Dawes Severalty Act. These doctrinaire and highly 
motivated reformers were prominent citizens from the East. They were 
invariably dedicated Christian folk. 
Reformers who associated with the churches dominated American 
Indian affairs after the Civil War. The Grant pcace policy, instituted 
in large part by the Quakers, employed honest Christian men as agents 
of the federal governmcnt among the Indians. These men were an 
interesting lot, although the experiment did not last a long time; but 
those who were looking for reform found the Indian Bureau to be a 
remarkably appropriate target. Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century of 
Dishonor was only one small incident in the long road of Indian reform 
that stretched from the Civil War to the time of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act. 
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In 1882, an organized group of zealous, hard-working reformers 
founded the Indian Rights Association in Philadelphia. In certain 
instances, this association did defend and champion Indian rights. 
Nevertheless, it almost seems, when reading the correspondence of 
those remarkable people, that there was an inherent right of reformers 
that had to be taken into account by the federal government. By 1905, 
the commissioner of Indian affairs was one of this organization's 
own, Francis Leupp, which attests to how powerful and influential it 
had become. 
There were a number of underlying suppositions held by the leaders 
of the Indian Rights Association. They were (1) that farming was 
superior to hunting, (2) that alcohol was evil, (3) that idleness was the 
ultimate evil, and (4) that Christianity was a magic elixir that would 
change people and, therefore, the Christian religion should take a very 
strong position in American Indian life and assume a strong proselytiz-
ing stance. Essential to this view of Christianity was the idea that the 
existence of tribes was evil. Therefore, only as individual men who loved 
property and sought it could Indians ever really be assimilated success-
fully into the general population. And, of course, assimilation was 
absolutely necessary. 
Reformers also believed that education would magically bring 
Indians into the mainstream of civilization in the United States. As a 
result, during the period of the Dawes Severalty Act, there was a great 
expansion of the education establishment within the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. Commissioners such as Thomas Jefferson Morgan made Indian 
education one of their leading policies and priorities. 
It is interesting to look back upon that educational system. When 
I was a child growing up on an Indian reservation, the 1930s was con-
sidered, by comparison with earlier decades, a very good time to be in an 
Indian school. Beatings were less frequent, and children of tender years 
were not removed without their parents' consent to Indian schools at 
a far distance. 
The word assimilation was not an abstract, remote concept. Rather, 
it was an active philosophy, with tremendous power to break up families 
and even to take the lives of children. For the death rate of Indian 
children was much higher than that of the general population. Whether 
you read the records of the Indian school at Fort Lewis, Colorado or 
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the Teller Institute at Grand Junction, Colorado or the Stewart Indian 
school at Carson City, Nevada or a great number of others, the sad 
stories of sending the children's bodies home are characteristics of the 
correspondence which have always left me depressed. 
During these very difficult times of adjustment, the American 
Indians protested, but with very little success. So, most of the tribes 
turned inward and went back to their old ways of celebrating cere-
monies and living as nearly as they could the communal life that they 
had known and loved. Many books have described this tragic era. 
By the year 1920, the people of the United States had a change of 
heart about Indian life. This change was caused, in part, by a back-to-
nature movement. The founding of national parks, where people could 
go to be alone and commune with nature, reminded many Americans 
of the lives that Indian people had been forced to give up. 
When looking at the literature of the period, one is always struck 
at how often words such as wilderness, campfire, trail, and forest are 
used in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century America. 
The founding of the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts symbolized this new 
orientation. America had started to think of the West more as an area 
of beauty and opportunity, rather than as an awesome space to be 
seized and subdued. 
At the beginning of the century the American Indian was consid-
ered the vanishing American. But after the founding of the Indian 
Health Service, it soon became apparent that the vanishing Americans 
were not vanishing; for those who administered Indian affairs noted 
increases in population. A burgeoning group of artistic and literary 
American romantics also began to see the Indian in a far more favorable 
light than a generation earlier. By 1920, there was a more modest view, 
a more moderate view, of the American Indian than there had been 
previous to this time. It was precisely in that year that a new man came 
onto the scene of American Indian affairs and life. 
Before I deal with the career and the personality of John Collier, 
it should be noted that he appeared at a time when America itself was 
being transformed. The era from 1887 to 1920 could be character-
ized as a period of certitude. While there were political storms, both 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were progressives, both of 
the parties sought ends that were very similar. There seemed to be a 
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greater unanimity in what society wanted, needed, and honored. This 
was not true for the period following World War I. The nation turned 
its back on the sterner themes. Change was pervasive, but I leave this 
theme to Frederick Lewis Allen and to other historians who have 
described this era so very well. 
But the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and of Woodrow 
Wilson did not die. It was only wounded. Some of the reformers even 
maintained a form of zeal. One of these reformers was John Collier. 
He was a dedicated man whose name and spirit will be honored and 
attacked, praised and villified in this book. 
Most of the time, a leader sees a direction in history and aims for 
that direction. In a few instances, it is almost impossible to see the shape 
of history without the influence of one dynamic leader. Such a case in 
the modern world is Martin Luther. While Collier was no Luther, 
many of the changes affecting American Indians in the near past are 
hard to separate from his profound influence. 
John Collier was an urban reformer with a much wider, more 
comprehensive view of the world than that held by most Americans 
involved in politics during his time. Furthermore, he had instincts for 
reform. His experiences while studying in France and Europe, at 
Columbia University, and in New York City, allIed this Atlanta-born 
reformer to see the world a little differently than most of his contempor-
aries. Collier's early professional life was beset with successes and failures 
that reflected his unique personality. He was a brilliant, impatient, 
caustic, and dedicated man. 
In 1920, Collier made a famous trip to Taos Pueblo at the urging 
of Mabel Dodge Luhan. There, he discovered a utopian Red Atlantis. 
Collier had worked in the areas of the eastern slums, where he came to 
know the difficulty in establishing a community that was responsive, 
embracing, and functioning. He seemed to have found it all at Taos. 
And, furthermore, he had found it with a people who were remarkably 
peaceful, or at least he viewed them that way. Because of his career as 
a reformer in urban areas, Collier had a greater and deeper respect for 
human culture and ethnicity than most public figures of his time. At one 
point, he became involved in a famous fight over a congressional bill 
to quiet the title to lands non-Indians occupied within Pueblo Indian 
reservations. It was no accident that the secretary of the interior, Albert 
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Fall, was a New Mexican and that the bill had been introduced by his 
fellow New Mexican, Holm Bursum. Early in his career with the 
Indians, Collier took the posture that the integrity of Indian life and of 
Indian lands should be absolutely protected. His defense of the Indians' 
land might not have gotten him into trouble with United States officials 
and with other reformers, but his insistence that Indian culture and 
religion should be respected was an issue made of hotter metal. Collier 
was to find out just how searing such a notion could be. 
Collier plunged into opposition to the Bursum Bill with great zeal. 
It was an opportunity for him to gain notoriety. His attendance at the 
November, 1922 meeting of the All Indian Pueblo Council assured his 
place at the center of the fray. He also joined artists and writers who 
signed a protest against the Bursum Bill. One of Collier's most important 
roles was that of propagandist, and he was good at his job. The older 
reformers in the Indian Rights Association were slower to respond, and 
a natural anxiety grew between the old group and the rambunctious 
Collier. That anxiety quickly generated distrust and later generated 
hatred. One should hasten to say that Collier was only a part of the 
opposition to the Bursum Bill, but he clamored to head the movement, 
which he found very much to his liking. 
The defeat of the Bursum Bill was so consumingly a part of his life 
that Collier looked for a way to make the defense of Indians a part of 
his own career. This was accomplished in 1923 when Collier and his 
friends and supporters founded the American Indian Defense Associa-
tion. Even though the organization had a rocky start, due partly to 
Collier's incessant scheming, it was soon a viable organization. The 
influence of that group was to be an irritant to the federal Indian 
establishment in the succeeding years. 
In his position at AIDA, Collier may have found his most appro-
priate role. He was at home as an abrasive, captious critic. He displayed 
these qualities in articles contributed to the surviving journals of the 
Progressive Era such as Sunset magazine. He was als~ appointed to the 
Committee of 100, a committee to investigate Indian affairs. There, he 
did not distinguish himself, and for that matter, neither did anyone else. 
For a new order was needed and an old order held the line. 
As the 1920s progressed, there was a competition, none too friendly, 
between the Indian Rights Association and the AIDA to become the 
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most important single voice in advising about Indian affairs. In terms 
of total power, the Indian Rights Association held the upper hand. 
In terms of moving in the direction that history was flowing, Collier and 
the AIDA were nearer to the path of reform that the nation would 
soon follow. 
One of the issues where Collier was certainly more attuned to the 
mind of America and to the direction America was going than his rivals 
was in the area of Indian religious freedom. Lawrence Kelly's new book 
sheds light on this interesting theme. One might observe that the times 
were appropriate for the issue of religious freedom. The people of the 
United States had revolted from the churches and their control as never 
before. Sidney Ahlstrom wrote of this change in his religious history of 
the American people. 
A greatly diminished hold on the country's intellectual and literary 
leadership was another important sign of change. This meant in turn that 
ministerial candidates were turning to other vocations. Nor were they dis-
suaded from this decision by the assorted hypocrites and boobs that marched 
through Sinclair Lewis's Elmer Gantry. Dr. Arrowsmith's vocation seemed a 
more effective means of saving Main Street from babbittry. Offended as 
much by the obsurantism of the Fundamentalists as by the cultural accom-
modations of the churches, intellectuals, young and old, were leaving the 
church-with H. L. Mencken piping the tune and providing the laughs. 
In the era before 1920, the churches of America were very power-
ful, and in no other operation of the federal government was their 
presence felt more than in the Indian Bureau. All of those who have 
read American Indian history know of the churches' peace policy, their 
school contracts, and their ability to act as an unofficial arm of the 
federal government in Indian country. If one studies the details of maps 
of western Indian reservations, one sees that it was the Christian 
churches who first obtained patents to the land on Indian reservations, 
and in most cases they still own these spots. 
If one looks at the rosters of the Indian Rights Association, the Lake 
Mohonk Conference, and other Indian service organizations, we find 
churchmen and churchwomen involved in these organizations in large 
numbers. As the Indian Rights Association gained power, even more 
church oriented people joined their ranks. These groups had a great 
say about who would be commissioner of Indian affairs and who would 
occupy a great number of other jobs as well. When it came to policy, 
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their hope of Christianizing and civilizing the Indians gave them a 
theological justification for their acts. But this assimilation policy was 
to clash with the more tolerant view of American Indian culture and 
religion that had been adopted by John Collier and his cohorts. 
Encouraged by people such as Herbert Welch of the Indian Rights 
Association, Commissioner Charles Burke moved during the 1920s 
toward crushing Indian dancing and other ceremonials. Collier and the 
AIDA made a concerted effort at thwarting these attempts to bully the 
Indians into giving up their ancient religion and ceremonial practices. 
The Indian Rights Association claimed to have material that sug-
gested that Indian ceremonials contained lewd, lascivious acts, as well as 
other acts of debauchery that would shock the American public. Welch 
and his associates should have investigated more closely before attacking 
these ceremonials as inappropriate for Indian America in the 1920s. 
Welch and his associates were uninformed; they also misinterpreted 
Indian ceremonies. Debauchery and licentiousness were not, as we 
know, at the center of these ceremonies. 
In our examination of this religious struggle, we must consider as 
well the larger issue: did religious freedom exist in the United States? 
Absolute freedom of religion had not existed in the territories of the 
United States since the case of Reynolds vs. the United States, handed 
down in 1879, but in such areas under federal jurisdiction, how far 
could the federal government intervene in Indian religions without 
outraging the Constitution? Collier and his friends had long maintained 
that a literal interpretation of the Constitution was necessary and 
proper, and that Indian religion was to be considered religion in the 
same sense as Christianity and Judaism. 
When I was growing up, I remember the horror tales about various 
agents who attempted to suppress Indian dances during the 1920s. The 
degree of heat and emotion generated in the Indian tribes by the federal 
government's posture was always surprising. 
American Indian policy showed strain as the Coolidge administra-
tion left office. An investigation of American Indian life had produced 
the Meriam Report, which showed just how deplorable were the living 
standards of the Indian people. Its startling revelations prepared 
Herbert Hoover, the succeeding President, to seek better means of 
handling American Indian policy. Herbert Hoover, of course, was a 
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very capable administrator. He looked to those on whom he could rely 
to implement changes that would quell the criticism of the government 
in its dealings with American Indians. 
Hoover appointed Ray Lyman Wilbur, a former president of 
Stanford University, as the secretary of the interior. Charles Rhoads 
was named commissioner of Indian affairs. That Hoover chose men 
whom he knew and respected for these positions is worth noting. It was 
a high priority of Hoover, Wilbur, Rhoads, and his assistant, J. Henry 
Scattergood, to implement reforms that would improve the condition of 
Indians in the United States. The amount of money spent upon the 
Indians increased significantly during Hoover's administration. But 
the Hoover administration was unable to change things substantially. 
Rhodes and Scattergood were both close associates of the hierarchy of 
the Indian Rights Association. In implementing the kind of reform that 
was needed, they were not dramatic enough. They merely laid the 
groundwork for more thoroughgoing reform under a new adminis-
tration. 
One should hasten to the Rhoads-Scattergood-Wilbur-Hoover 
group's defense by saying that the new president, when he came to office 
in 1929, had only a short period of time in which to get his administra-
tion under way. The stock market crash and the ensuing depression 
soon made their roles extremely difficult ones to perform. In spite of the 
depression, they were able to get additional money for Indian affairs. 
And indeed, one might argue that, ironically, conditions in Indian 
America were better at the end of the Hoover administration than at 
the beginning. 
Collier welcomed Hoover's appointments and even indicated that 
he thought they could implement the needed reforms of the Indian 
Bureau, but the period of friendship between them did not last very 
long. Collier once again became an abrasive, attacking critic. The 
Hoover administration, like its predecessor, had to contend with a 
fractious, critical voice that was always aimed at the government and 
its Indian policy. 
After Hoover lost the election in 1932, Franklin Rooesvelt came to 
office with a candidate in mind for the commissioner of Indian affairs 
post. He was Harold L. Ickes, a Chicago man who also owned a home 
in Arizona and whose wife was a knowledgeable writer on Indian topics 
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in the American Southwest. Ickes was an impressive man: he became 
the secretery of the interior. Ickes had known Collier for a long time, 
but it was not a chain reaction that made Collier the commissioner of 
Indian affairs designee in the Roosevelt administration. Rather, it was 
a series of communications to Roosevelt and later to Ickes asking that 
Collier be made commissioner that probably led to his appointment. 
Collier did not have difficulty getting the approval of the United States 
Senate for the appointment. He did have difficulty in getting his name 
approved by Franklin Roosevelt, because many people expressed sup-
port for other candidates. 
The New Deal for the American Indians began before the passage 
of the Indian Reorganization Act. Indian persons were employed to 
improve reservation lands that had been eroded and to work on 
deforested areas. Much of the work was coordinated by the Emergency 
Conservation Work Agency. That agency was more commonly known 
as the Indian C.C.C. It became a truly large program. Over 25,000 
people were recruited from the Indian tribes and were employed prin-
cipally in conservation work. They worked in nearly seventy-five camps 
in fifteen western states. 
The same good things could be said for the C.C.C. and its contri-
bution to Indian families that could be said about the C.C.C. and 
non-Indian families. It reduced radically the number of young men 
who would be forced into vagabondage in those desperate times. 
Although American Indian men did not take up a life as tramps and 
wandering hoboes as often as non-Indians, these were still desperate 
times for them. They found employment in the C.C.C. much to 
their liking. 
Soon after his appointment, Secretary Ickes issued an order that 
ended the sale of allotments and the issuance of fee patents. Collier, 
true to his attitudes about a multi-cultural society in America, issued an 
order terminating the federal program of Americanization for Indians. 
Collier directed that the cultural history of Indians was to be considered, 
in all respects, equal to that of any non-Indian group and declared that 
it was desirable that Indians be bilingual. But his commitment to the 
idea of maintaining and nourishing American Indian culture went even 
further when he claimed that Indian arts should be prized, nourished, 
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and honored. His own administration reflected this, for he was able to 
implement programs to aid Indian art. 
In another action taken by Collier, many Indian students were 
transferred from boarding schools to community day schools. These 
boarding schools often contained a residue of the Christianizing assimi-
lationist philosophy. The commissioner also forbade the officers of the 
federal government to require Indian students to attend Christian wor-
ship service at these schools. With his concept of cultural pluralism 
firmly in mind, he asked Congress to discontinue the appropriations to 
suppress traffic in peyote. Congress obliged him. 
It is interesting, too, that the 1934 Johnson-O'Malley Act was a 
major feature of his administration. The Johnson-O'Malley Act, like 
the Indian Reorganization Act, is still very much with us as operative 
American law. Under the terms of the Johnson-O'Malley Act, the 
federal government could contract with states and territories to provide 
education to Indians who were under federal supervision. The Bureau 
also could contract for medical and social welfare services. 
The Indian Reorganization Aet of 1934 allowed Congress to spend 
$250,000 annually for the expenses involved in organizing chartered 
corporations on Indian reservations. Operated by tribal councils that 
had established a constitution and by-laws, these corporations could 
employ legal counsel, prevent the leasing or sale of land without tribal 
consent, and negotiate with federal or state governments for public 
services. The IRA also created a $10 million revolving credit fund that 
was used to promote tribal economic development. Collier thought of 
the IRA as temporary legislation, yet it is now in its fiftieth year. 
As John Collier and his staff began implementing the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, they ran into many more troubles than they expected. 
One of the difficulties was that the Bureau staff had been built up over 
the past half century. These people, in the main, were firmly dedicated 
to the idea of assimilation. Collier's orders forbidding the assimilationist 
posture confused and angered many within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
There was an additional problem. Some American Indians had 
espoused the idea of being progressive men and women, as they often 
called themselves. Among them was the chairman of the Navajo tribe. 
Collier ran into great difficulties on the Navajo reservation. He found 
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it impossible to get the Navajos to enroll under the aegis of the Indian 
Reorganization Act. Today they still are not organized under the law 
passed in 1934. 
Collier and his men had a difficult time enrolling many of the tribes 
under the IRA. Many Indians were fearful that the establishment of 
an IRA tribal council would be detrimental to their interest because it 
would be controlled by the federal government. A large number of 
people had taken up farming, adopted white ways, and were well on the 
road to assimilation. They felt that this was a step backwards. Indian 
Bureau statistics said that 181 tribes voted for the IRA, while 77 tribes 
rejected it. The number of tribes, however, does not tell the whole story. 
While those who voted for the IRA had an aggregate population of 
130,000 Indian people, those who rejected it had an aggregate popula-
tion of somewhere between 85,000 and 90,000 persons. 
The ratification process was fraught with great fear and difficulty. 
There were struggles between mixed-bloods and full-bloods. There was 
a great deal of lobbying by the BIA and Collier's men for adoption; 
there also was a great deal of covert lobbying against it by the older 
Bureau employees who feared they might lose their jobs. A great num-
ber of the churches and the older reform groups such as the Indian 
Rights Association also worked against it. The lobbying back and forth 
caused this to be a very confusing time. Some of the confusion has been 
reduced by a new book by Graham D. Taylor, The New Deal and 
American Indian Tribalism. 
I lived on an Indian reservation during the 1930s. Even though 
I was a child, I vividly remember the struggle over whether to adopt the 
IRA. When I questioned my father concerning it, he simply explained 
that there was a New Deal for non-Indians and a New Deal for Indians. 
This answer, from today's vantage point, appears too simplistic. 
S. L. Tyler in his History of Indian Policy has listed some of the 
criticisms of the Indian Reorganization Act. It 
was put into effect too rapidly. Neither the Congress nor the Indians were 
adequately informed concerning it nor prepared for it. Bureau personnel 
needed better training for application of provisions contained in IRA, some 
of which were quite foreign to their past experience and to their personal 
philosophy concerning the Indians .... The philosophy of the IRA itself was 
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violated in that the Indians did not playa truly significant part in preparing 
[tribal constitutions]. As a result the meaning of these instruments of gov-
ernment was often quite foreign to them. 
Many good tribal governments were replaced by less capable ones. 
Indian Service administrators conceived of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act as for the good of the Indians. They failed to realize that the 
community life patterns of some Indian tribes were not compatible with 
its principles. Successful programming had to be done at the com-
munity level with Indian participation. Probably because of administra-
tive difficulties some of the education features of the IRA were not 
practiced, such as a tribal review of Bureau budgets. Promise and per-
formance, plans and achievements, tended to be very different. 
There were other problems. The funding level of the IRA was 
never very high. It was hoped that democratic government would 
relieve some of the political struggles within Indian communities; in 
many cases it simply exacerbated them. I am always astounded when 
I deal with writings about Indian factionalism, because fighting in 
Washington, D.C., between political factions, is called politics, but 
fighting over some of the same issues on Indian reservations is called 
factionalism. Perhaps there is more than a smidge of racism inherent 
in our lexicon as we deal with the Indians. 
The Indian Reorganization Act cannot be separated from its chief 
proponent, John Collier. The commissioner was capable of using force-
ful administrative methods that he deplored in other people. For 
example, he coerced some tribes into ratifying the IRA. A long list of 
Collier's indiscretions could be cited. 
But we should not stop until we have had a moment to evaluate 
some of the good things the Indian Reorganization Act accomplished. 
One of the good things that it accomplished was the physical conserva-
tion of Indian land, soil, water, and vegetation. The conservation of 
Indian resources left a salutary legacy for the present. There was an 
overall endeavor to help the Indians go to work. The halting of Indian 
land losses and the reabsorption of certain lands into the reservations 
(even though these have been called submarginal lands, I notice that oil 
and other valuable things are taken from them now) were important to 
Indian reservations then and still will be in the future. 
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Under the leadership of both W. Carson Ryan and Willard Beatty, 
the two principal educators who worked under Collier, Indian educa-
tion improved. Although some argued that moving Indian students out 
of the old Indian boarding schools and into the public schools was harm-
ful, by and large, an increased devotion to the idea of education resulted. 
It is interesting to observe, as I look back over those years, the kind 
of heat that Collier created on the reservations. Those teachers, who 
had worked for their churches and taught at the Indian boarding 
schools, despised Collier almost beyond belief. I had never heard anyone 
accused of being in league with the devil until I heard a school teacher 
claim that Collier was. She was challenged by the son of a tribal council 
member. This student said that his father believed that Collier was a 
good friend of the American Indian. This confrontation seemed to 
send our teacher into a tizzy. 
Those teachers were incredible. I remember one of the hymns we 
were required to sing in the school. It was from an old Protestant 
hymnal, and maybe you will recognize the words. The Indian children 
at the Fort Duchesne School were required to sing it, too. It went: 
Let the Indian and the Negro, 
Let the rude barbarian hear, 
Of the glories of the kingdom ... 
These lyrics did not wash with the Indian students. When they would 
not sing those words, the teacher would become incensed. It was one of 
my first experiences in watching the politics of acculturation at work. 
It was then, and still is, fascinating. 
At this point I should note something. Collier was attacked more 
on issues affecting the establishment and maintenance of an advantaged 
Christian group on reservations than on any other subject. To those 
historians who have attacked Collier for his too rapid change I would 
urge them to modesty. The freedom of religion issue was still very much 
alive in Collier's time. One need only look at the frenzied opposition to 
Indian dances less than a decade before the advent of the Indian 
Reorganization Act to see the power of these Christian churches and 
the Christianization issue that seemed to be inherent in his opposition. 
It is small wonder, that, in 1968, when I was doing a long series of oral 
interviews with reservation people, that I was told by one of the Ute 
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elders to never trust Christians, because they wanted the minds of 
Indian children, were inquisitive about Indian sex habits, and did not 
answer to anybody. 
One should try, as an analyst, to remove that Christian element 
from the opposition to Collier to see how much of it would have been 
left on other than religious grounds. Perhaps this would help us attain 
a better and more moderate interpretation of Collier and his period. 
During the 1920s, Collier took the opposite point of view to that of the 
Bureau, its leaders, and the Indian Rights Association. In the 1930s, 
they took the opposite role and delighted in attacking him in a way that 
indicates an element of revenge. Neither side looks very pure. 
The Indian Reorganization Act should be looked at in another 
way. The Indians of the United States needed a system that had more 
integrity and validity in the eyes of the federal government. One need 
not search very far in the letters in the National Archives from Indian 
people in 1925 and 1945 to see that there was far more familiarity 
between the Indians in the field and the bureaucrats in Washington in 
1945 than in 1925. We should search to see if the Bureau had a less 
paternalistic attitude toward the Indians over whom they held great 
control. 
In recent years there have been complaints that the Indian Reor-
ganization Act was defective. It did not give the Indian enough indi-
vidual freedom. The secretary of the interior and the commissioner of 
Indian affairs also had ultimate control over policy. This has been 
viewed as an unrealistic invasion of Indian rights and liberties. These 
criticisms should not prevent us from carefully defining what we mean 
by the idea of a dependent domestic nation. If that idea describes a 
relationship to the federal government, docs it not imply that the federal 
government has a responsibility? If wardship continues, what does 
wardship mean? 
If this presentation sounds a little too much like I am defending 
John Collier, I am not. There would have been reform whether there 
was a Collier or not, because the policy of allotment and assimilation 
had failed. Furthermore, those who had influenced Indian affairs from 
without-the reformers-and those who saw the Indian as their special 
concern became less and less credible as American society changed and 
they did not. 
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Collier could be petty. Let me read you 'a line or two from a letter 
written to Rupert Costo, who was the official representative of the 
Cahuilla Tribe. This was part of Collier's answer to Costo, who had 
filed for expenses: 
Since you were not authorized in advance by the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs as a delegate, and such requirement is absolutely necessary under 
existing legislation, before you can be compensated and further, since your 
tribe has no tribal funds to its credit from which such allowance can be 
made, the office is not in a position to consider any claim you may file for 
such allowance. 
In other words, if you were working toward adoption of New Deal 
programs you got Bureau money. If you were not, you had to pay your 
own way. 
Scholars have long pointed toward the use of politics to get the IRA 
adopted on Indian reservations, but they had not paid the same amount 
of attention to the opposition and how it came about. Who sponsored it? 
Who financed it? That, to me, would be as interesting a topic as the 
other, and while it has been partly dealt with by several scholars, it cer-
tainly has not been covered to the point of my satisfaction. Church 
records must be examined carefully. We must remember the advice of 
the Ute elder to never trust a Christian. 
W orId War II had a very heavy impact upon the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act and the administration of Collier. Furthermore, in the last 
four years of his administration, he lost credibility as his abrasive per-
sonality alienated more and more people. By the end of his administra-
tion, congressional leaders had abandoned him and his programs. 
The role of Indians in World War II indicated to some congress-
men that the Indians could be integrated into society. As this new view 
of assimilation grew, the old enemies of Collier worked harder against 
his programs. In truth, his programs looked jerry-built and were 
inappropriate to the thinking of the moment. Indian poverty continued. 
Only when Indians migrated to urban areas did their economic status 
greatly improve. 
In recent times there has been an orgy of criticism of the Indian 
Reorganization Act. Some of this criticism has used remarkable amounts 
of presentism. This is both unfair to the participants and bad history. 
Perhaps the New Deal era, Collier, and his men deserve better than 
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they have received. For instance, who has researched the evolution of 
American Indian law in those few years when Felix Cohen worked 
intimately with John Collier? Furthermore, there has been no great 
groundswell in the various tribes of the United States to replace the 
Indian Reorganization Act. Historians, anthropologists, sociologists, 
lawyers, and others have complained about the IRA, in recent years, 
in a way that would have been considered nonsensical in 1940. And, 
in spite of all that criticism, we are examining the first fifty years of the 
administration of the IRA. With such survival in evidence, we ought to 
reexamine the strident criticisms while we reconsider this historic period. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Federal Indian Policy, 1933-1945 
Rupert Costa, Benjamin Reifel, Kenneth R. Philp, 
Dave Warren, Alfonso Ortiz 
Conditions were deplorable on the San Carlos Reservation before the 
Indian Reorganization Act. There was no economic development of any 
kind. I heard about the IRA when the superintendent came to our CCC 
camp and explained the contents of this legislation. I remember that a 
prominent Indian stood up and said, "This is what we have been waiting 
for. The white man has driven us around like cattle for many years. We 
need to take advantage of the opportunity to form our own government and 
run our own business." I think the IRA was the best thing that ever hap-
pened to Indian tribes. It gave them the right to self-government. For 
many years, the San Carlos Apaches held a celebration on June 18 to com-
memorate the birth of this legislation. 
Clarence Wesley, San Carlos Apache leader 
Clearly, the Indian Reorganization Act achieved none of its central 
policy objectives. Foremost among these were the promises of "complete 
economic independence" and "self-determination" for Indian tribes. Indian 
people remain far removed from either goal a half century later. In the 
end, as in the beginning, the IRA was sacrificed to John Collier's own gods 
of "organization"-most particularly in the form of "the help . .. the 
knowledge and the enthusiasm . .. of the expert." Also, it was undermined 
corrosively by the pragmatic assimilationist philosophy of the 1928 Meriam 
Report and its adjunct advocacy of termination. 
Hank Adams, Assiniboine activist and writer 
[47] 
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RUPERT COSTa 
I want to thank the Institute of the American West for the oppor-
tunity to join you in this most important discussion and to express my 
views on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The IRA was the last 
great drive to assimilate the American Indian. It was also a program to 
colonialize the Indian tribes. All else had failed to liberate the Indians 
from their land: genocide, treaty-making and treaty-breaking, sub-
standard education, disruption of Indian religion and culture, and the 
last and most oppressive of such measures, the Dawes Allotment Act. 
Assimilation into the dominant society, if by assimilation we mean the 
adoption of certain technologies and techniques, had already been 
underway for some hundred years. After all, the Indians were not and 
are not fools; we are always ready to improve our condition. But assimi-
lation, meaning fading into the general society with a complete loss of 
our identity and our culture, was another thing entirely, and we had 
fought against this from the first coming of the white man. 
This type of assimilation would be the foregone conclusion of the 
Indian Reorganization Act. Colonialization of the tribes was to be 
accomplished through communal enclaves subject to federal domina-
tion through the power of the secretary of the interior. Now this view of 
the IRA is not held by practically all of the historians who write the 
history of the IRA era. 
The record shows otherwise. All one must do is to read and study 
the hearings held in the Congress, the testimony of Indian witnesses, the 
evidence of life itself, the statements of the Indian commissioner, and 
the practically identical tribal constitutions adopted by, or forced upon, 
the Indians under the IRA. In these constitutions the authority of the 
secretary of the interior is more powerful than it was before the so-called 
New Deal. No wonder the Indians called it the Indian Raw Deal. 
The IRA did not allow the Indians their independence, which was 
guaranteed in treaties and agreements and confirmed in court deci-
sions. It did not protect their sovereignty. Collier did not invent self-
government: the right of Indians to make their own decisions, to make 
their own mistakes, to control their own destiny. The IRA had within it, 
in its wording and in its instruments, such as the tribal constitutions, 
the destruction of the treaties and of Indian self-government. 
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There are those who believe that most of the Indians who opposed 
the IRA were members of allotted tribes who had been economically 
successful with their allotments. This is a simplistic response, and one 
that displays a serious lack of understanding of Indian ~ffairs and his-
tory. Allotments certainly did not originate with the Dawes Act. They 
also were established in treaties. The Dawes Act did, however, force 
Indians into the allotment system, with a guarantee that they would 
have to sell their land, either through taxation or by sheer physical force. 
Those who survived created what they had always wanted, an estate 
for themselves and their children, a type of insurance against being 
moved again like cattle to other lands and the chance to make a decent 
living on their own land. 
The Quapaw of Oklahoma were bitterly opposed to the IRA. 
They said: 
We have a treaty with the United States, describing by metes and bounds 
the size and shape of our allotments, and it states that its purpose is to pro-
vide a permanent home for the nation. And the United States agrees to 
convey the same by patent to them and their descendants, and this is accord-
ing to article 2 of the Treaty of 1833. 
In hearings before the House of Representatives, the Flathead made 
a similar statement. They agreed that the tribe might have the power 
to make contracts through the IRA, but instead of new legislation they 
believed it would be better to insist on sovereign rights and treaty rights. 
On May 17, 1934, in hearings before the Senate, the great Yakima 
nation, in a statement signed by their chiefs and councilmen, said, "We 
feel that the best interests of the Indians can be preserved by the continu-
ance of treaty laws and carried out in conformity with the treaty of 
1855 entered into by the fathers of some of the undersigned chiefs and 
Governor Stevens of the territory of Washington." Now these are only 
a few examples of some of the testimony given by Indian witnesses and 
by most of the tribes. Many refused to even consider the IRA and 
rejected it outright. 
But the commissioner of Indian affairs reported to the House of 
Representatives on May 7, 1934, that "I do not think that any study of 
the subject with all of the supporting petitions, reports, and referendums 
could leave any doubt that the Indian opinion is strongly for the bill." 
He then proceeded with this outright falsification of the facts, saying, 
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"In Oklahoma I would say quite overwhelmingly they favor the bill." 
Both Congressmen Roy Ayres of Montana and Theodore Werner of 
South Dakota disputed those statements. They showed that Collier was 
falsifying the facts. 
During April 1934-, the tribes that had bitterly opposed the IRA 
attended some of the ten meetings held by the commissioner of Indian 
affairs throughout the country. Here, as evidence shows, they were 
subjected to Collier's manipulations. In May, they came before the 
House of Representatives and completely reversed themselves. In fact, 
they gave a blanket endorsement to the Indian Reorganization Act. 
The congressmen, in shocked disbelief, prodded them again and again. 
Finally they asked, "If the proposed legislation is completely changed 
into an entirely different act would you then also endorse it?" The 
Indian delegates, according to many of their tribesmen and tribes-
women said, without any authority of their people, "Yes. Even then we 
would endorse it." In short, at least two of the tribal delegates gave a 
blanket endorsement of the IRA in advance of the final legislation. How 
did this happen? I can tell you how it happened. They received promises 
that were never kept. They received some special considerations and 
they felt the arm of the enforcer ordering them to accept or be destroyed. 
That was Collier's way, as I very well know. 
In California, at Riverside, forty tribes were assembled. All but 
three voted against the proposed bill. Collier then reported that most 
of the California tribes were for the proposed bill. The historical record 
was falsified, and his falsification was swallowed whole by Kenneth 
Philp who also stated in his book that "several mission Indians, led by 
Rupert Costo, agreed with an unsigned three-page circular sent around 
the reservation which claimed Collier's ideas were 'communistic and 
socialistic.''' The implication is that this was a sneaky, underhanded 
job. The truth is that there was a complete cover letter with that circu-
lar, signed by me and my tribe. We were outraged at the provisions 
of the proposed bill. 
It is a curious fact that, in all the ten meetings held with Indians 
over the country, in not one meeting was there a copy of the proposed 
legislation put before the people. We were asked to vote on so-called 
explanations. The bill itself was withheld. We were told we need not 
vote but the meetings were only to discuss the Collier explanations. 
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In the end, however, we were required to vote. And I suppose you 
would call all this maneuvering self-rule. I call it fraud. The Hupa 
Indians of northern California had two petitions on this proposed bill. 
One was to be signed by those supporting it; the other, by those who 
opposed it. In neither case had anyone seen the actual bill, but they 
rejected it on a massive scale on the basis of the explanations alone. 
The Crow rejected the IRA and stated for the record in a letter to 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler, one of the sponsors of the bill, "That under 
the Collier-chartered community plan, which has been compared to a 
fifth-rate poor farm by newspapers in Indian country, the Indian is 
being led to believe that they, for the first time in history, would have 
self-government." But according to the bill, any plans the Indians might 
have for such self-government would have to be first submitted to the 
interior secretary or commissioner of Indian affairs for supervision and 
approval. Self-government to this extent was already accomplished 
through the tribal councils and tribal business committees, which, by 
the way, were organized and functioning long before Collier manifested 
his great interest in the Indians in general. 
Now at these councils, Indians discuss matters they consider of 
vital interest and initiate measures for better management of their 
affairs, but no action may become effective without the approval of the 
commissioner of Indian affairs, or the secretary of the interior. Where 
is the advantage of an almost similar system bearing John Collier's 
name? Can we say that this power of the interior was forced upon the 
commissioner in the final proposed bill? No, not at all. His original bill 
contained not less than thirty-three references making it obligatory for 
the interior secretary to approve vital decisions of the tribes. 
It is a matter of record that in California Indians were afraid to 
come to meetings for fear of losing their jobs if they showed disapproval 
of the Collier proposed bill. On the second day of the Riverside meet-
ings, the Collier enforcers would not allow us to speak, and according to 
one report of an Indian organization, "they almost threw Rupert Costo 
out." Another element of the Collier enforcer policy is found in the 
warning to civil service employees in the BIA by Interior Secretary Ickes 
that they would be dismissed if they spoke out against Bureau policies 
on the proposed bill. All this is a matter of record. It can be shown in 
official hearings, correspondence, and data. 
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A resolution by the senators in New York stated their opposition to 
the bill. It warned that the proposed bill absolutely revoked the right of 
free citizens enacted in 1924 by Congress. The objection was published 
in the Senate hearings on May 17, 1934. The Seneca scornfully dubbed 
the proposed Indian court, which did not pass, as "ridiculous." To this 
opposition was added the position of the Oneida at Senate hearings. 
They said, in a resolution to Senator Wheeler published on April 17, 
1934, that 
The Oneida nation firmly adheres to the terms of the Treaty of Canandaigua 
between our nation, our confederacy, and the U.S. of November 11, 1794, 
that the laws of the U.S., the acts of Congress, and the customs and usages 
of the Oneida nation are the controlling provisions of Oneida basic law, 
and/or the federal officials, the exponents of such basic law and the guides 
for the sachems, chiefs, headmen and warriors. 
And they added this statement: "Any acts of the state of Wisconsin 
through its officers, courts, or legislature contrary to the above arc with-
out sanction of law and repugnant to the nation of Oneida Indians." 
They had some courage then, you know. 
Now let us travel forward in time to the present and sec what has 
happened to the Indian nations that approved the Indian New Deal. 
The Blackfeet fight for water rights is a classic example of domination 
of the interior secretary to the utter damage of the tribe. The federal 
government has ordered a survey of their water resources despite the 
fact that they have already had a survey which gave them their rights. 
The new survey robs them of their water rights. This is a matter of 
record, as well. 
The White Mountain Apache have water, but the state and the 
federal government, with the active help of the federal agencies and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, are still attempting to limit their water rights 
and then erode those rights altogether. The few Yavapai Apache of 
Arizona, in the Orem Dam issue, had finally won their case so that the 
Orem Dam would be built elsewhere than on their reservation. This 
dam would have flooded their entire reservation. I have to tell you that 
this issue has again come up, and the Yavapai must still fight against the 
flooding of their land. This tribe was one of the first to accept the 
Indian Reorganization Act, and this is Dr. Carlos Montezuma's tribe. 
They have not gained one single thing from the IRA. 
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Added to the injustice of interior secretary domination and the 
power of the Bureau of Indian Affairs is the disgraceful corruption exist-
ing in the BIA and other agencies having to do with Indian affairs. 
Agents of these agencies regularly violate tribal laws. Remember the 
Osage roll that was falsified while head rights were actually sold to 
non-Indians. Remember the tragedy of illegal cutting of timber, and 
the illegal trespassing on Indian lands by whites who ran their cattle 
over Indian land. They have been known to even run their cattle over 
Indian cemeteries, as they did in California until we stopped them. 
It takes a little guts, you know. 
Continued corrupt practices go on all the time, and the tribes are 
in a posture of constant vigilance, ready to do battle against the corrupt 
agency representatives and the violation of their simplest rights. Let us 
talk about self-government. Let us talk about self-rule, if you will. Here 
is a very late example. The Ute tribe of the Uintah-Ouray Agency 
recently passed an ordinance setting aside the Hill Creek area as a 
wilderness and cultural resources protection area. The tribe is con-
cerned because non-Indian interests have requested permission from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to develop mineral sites at Hill Creek. 
What do you think happened? The Phoenix area director of the BIA, 
J ames Stephens, has rescinded the tribe's July 14, 1983 ordinance. 
I deeply appreciate and strongly approve the statement made in the 
August 1983 edition of the Institute of the American West's tabloid by 
Russell Jim of the Yakima tribe. He pointed to the lack of specific 
standards of judgment regarding trust responsibility on the part of 
the federal government toward the Indian tribes. He said, in part, 
that until a true definition of trust responsibility is formulated to 
preserve and protect the indigenous people of this land our treaties and 
rights will gradually be eroded, and by that erosion the mainstream of 
society will interpret that we accept the eventual genocide of a people. 
There is a real need to investigate the sources of material on the 
Indian Reorganization Act. I have evidence that John Collier delib-
erately and wantonly falsified records, changed decisions, and made 
inaccurate reports to the Congress. We will investigate it as we are doing 
even now. 
Finally, what of the future? We have survived and we will prevail, 
believe it! The Indians have no other place to go. We have never known 
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any other land. This is our land and with the help of our God we will 
continue to surmount and conquer even the so-called legacy of the 
Collier Indian New Deal. 
BENJAMIN REIFEL 
While I was a boy growing up on the Rosebud Indian Reservation, 
we had the most sickening poverty that one could imagine. Tuberculosis 
was a killer of Indians. The people on the Pine Ridge Reservation and 
at Oglala were eating their horses to survive. Impoverishment was 
everywhere. 
I remember going to Oglala in 1933 as a farm agent. The super-
intendent of the reservation, a gentleman by the name of James H. 
McGregor, looked to me almost as a son. After I graduated from college 
with a degree in agriculture, he recommended that the commissioner 
appoint me to be a farm agent. The reason he wanted me to be farm 
agent was because, in this particular district on the Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion, all of the 1,300 people, except two or three mixed-blood families, 
had conducted their business with a farm agent who was a graduate of 
Carlisle by the name of Jake White Cow Killer. He talked Sioux and 
Lakota in all of his communications with these people. He was a 
member of the village in that area. McGregor wanted someone who 
could speak the language. 
I was only twenty-five years of age, and the old timers would come 
in to have their dances. They could have dances only on Saturday night. 
Bert Kills Close to Lodge came in and said, "I want to get permission 
to have a dance tonight for our group in the village." I had just received 
a copy of a telegram signed by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. It said, "If the Indian people want to have dances, dances all 
night, all week, that is their business." So I read it to him. Bert sat 
there, stroked his braids, looked off in the distance, and he said in 
Lakota, "Well, I'll be damned." The interesting part of it was, if they 
did not have the dance Saturday night, they would have a dance a 
month later, because they felt they were on their own. The Indian 
policemen were not going to police anybody, and it was just too much 
for them to have self-determination about their own dances. 
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Speaking of the benefits of the Indian Reorganization Act, we now 
have more young men and women in universities and colleges. Some 
of them are represented here. When I was in college in 1928, I could 
count the number of Indian students, at least from our reservation, 
on the fingers of your hand. Now they are in the hundreds and up to 
the thousands at universities and colleges around the country. We also 
have community colleges on five or six of our reservations. 
The Flandreaux Santee Sioux Indian Tribe is made up of a group 
of about a hundred families that came into the Dakotas during the 
massacre in Minnesota. They homesteaded along with the whites 
around the Flandreaux Indian School. When the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act was finally passed, they got a leader and they went to us for 
assistance. They accepted the act and drafted a constitution, by-laws, 
and a charter. They also took advantage of the Indian land purchase 
provisions, and they bought farms around there. And then housing was 
made available under a rehabilitation program for the people who were 
needy. They got houses on their forty-acre tracts. Last month, under 
the Supreme Court decision for the Seminoles, they could have bingo. 
So they are now making good money playing bingo, and the state cannot 
touch them. This is because the Indian people have rights under the 
trust responsibility. 
But getting back to the Indian Reorganization Act, there was in 
1934 an Indian congress at Rapid City to discuss the Wheeler-Howard 
bill. Walter V. Woehlke, John Collier, and Henry Roe Cloud, a Winne-
bago Indian, were there. Henry Roe Cloud was probably one of the 
few Indians at the time that had a doctor's degree. I was quite impressed 
with him. Henry Roe Cloud had recently been appointed the first 
Indian to be the superintendent of the Haskell Institute. 
And I remember Rev. Joseph Eagle Hawk, one of the dear friends 
of mine in the community. He was a fine gentleman and a Presbyterian 
minister. Speaking of Indians not having a right to express themselves, 
we held this meeting at Rapid City for three or four days. I took leave 
to go up there because I wanted to see what it was all about. When Roe 
Cloud finished explaining part of the bill, Rev. Joe Eagle Hawk got up 
and said to Roe Cloud: 
You know, when we used to ship cattle to Omaha, Nebraska, they would go 
down to the slaughter house and they had a goat and they would lead a goat 
56 The I ndian New Deal 
through the slaughter. The cattle would follow the goat in, the goat's life 
would be saved, and all the cattle would be killed. I think that is what you 
are, this Judas goat. 
And he said that before the commissioner. I was impressed. 
One of the things discussed at Rapid City was establishing some 
kind of official constitutional tribal government. When I grew up as a 
kid on the reservation, we had general tribal councils. What did they 
talk about when they came together? They passed a resolution asking 
the secretary of the interior, or the federal government, to allow them 
to have an attorney to represent them in their claims. When they had 
any tribal monies in place, the congressmen, about election time, would 
come around and say we will get you a per capita payment. They would 
then get a per capita payment, because at that time our Indian people, 
since 1921, even before that in South Dakota, were entitled to vote in 
the general election. If there was some of the tribal land to be leased, 
the general tribal council would come together and pass a resolution. 
When I was a kid, there was also an old fellow called Chief High 
Bald Eagle. In those days we had an Indian trader store and a post office 
with counters and cages. Old High Bald Eagle was sitting up there with 
his legs crossed. He must have been about eighty or ninety years old; 
he looked like two hundred to me. We were having what we called a 
Scattergood dam constructed not too far away from our home. They 
were having a big tribal council meeting, and someone said to High 
Eagle in our language, "Why are you not up there at that big meeting?" 
He said, "When I was a young man years ago, when things were really 
important, then our leaders got together. But now, when a child gets 
constipated just about August eating chokecherries and it gets so his 
bowels are all stuck up, they have to have a council meeting on it." 
That is about as important as I thought the council meetings were on 
the Rosebud Reservation. That was also true at Pine Ridge. So I was 
impressed with Collier's idea that Indians would get together and form 
some kind of governmental operation where they would democratically 
elect their own people and select their own leaders. 
I was also concerned over the years about the tribal courts. Tribal 
court judges were appointed by the superintendent or the Indian agent. 
There was no appeal from them. Before the Indian Reorganization Act 
came along, I remember my brother was thrown in jail because he lived 
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close to where there was a big fight going on and they thought he was 
a part of it. My younger brother came in where I was working in a store, 
and he said, "Hey, our brother George is in jail." So what did I do? 
I knew the superintendent lived near by because I was a close friend of 
his son. I went over there, and he said, "What happened, Ben?" Well, 
I told him what happened, and he wrote out a little note which I gave 
to Andrew Night Pipe, who was the chief of police. Andrew Night Pipe 
unlocked the door and let my brother go home. That was the sort of 
thing that was going on, and I felt we needed a better judicial system. 
I was really impressed with the original draft of the so-called 
Wheeler-Howard bill. In it was a section where there would be a circuit 
court that would move from one reservation to another. Funds would 
be provided for this court to operate. Under the federal system, there 
would be the right of appeal from the local court just like any other 
court. There would be none of this business that goes on where the 
judges are appointed by the superintendent or the tribal council. The 
revised bill was cut from forty or fifty pages to just about eleven pages. 
The court system and several other things were taken out. 
After the Rapid City meeting, I asked the superintendent for per-
mission to talk about the bill with the people; he agreed. But he felt that 
there was a little red tinge to all of this, because one of the remarks he 
made to me was "I do not mind the little red schoolhouses as long as 
they are not red on the inside." Nevertheless, he was very supportive of 
my going out and explaining this bill. Of course, there were those on 
the reservation who were very opposed to it. And there were those who 
were for it. Think of me, only twenty-five years old, getting up there 
arguing with the old timers such as American Horse. I do not know 
who all the rest of them were. I felt that this was something we 
could support. 
Conditions have improved. Tribal councils have been organized. 
They are fighting among themselves, but as Floyd O'Neil said, this is 
no different than Congress. In South Dakota, some tribal councils 
cannot even write checks, because they are tied up in fussing over who 
is going to be in control. That is no different than in California where 
the governor was not going to make payments to employees. The legis-
lative body would not go along. It took the Supreme Court of the 
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United States or the federal court to order them to make payments to 
the employees. 
When I was a student at Harvard, I took a course from Arthur 
Schlesinger, a history professor. He said, "You must remember, that we 
have spent two hundred years becoming a constitutional democratic 
government." A while back, we celebrated our two hundredth anni-
versary. Our tribal councils organized under the Indian Reorganization 
Act, or even if they are not under the IRA, are trying to develop a 
democratic process among their systems in spite of tremendous poverty. 
If we had 80 percent or 90 percent poverty in the United States, no 
president would last even the four-year term that he has. You can believe 
that. Conditions are better from the standpoint of health, from the 
standpoint of food getting into the families' mouths, and from the stand-
point of getting a little better education. But it is just as bad, if not 
worse, today from the standpoint of unemployment. That is the sad 
aspect of the current situation in the United States. And whether you 
have an IRA constitution and by-laws or not, the 80 percent to 90 per-
cent Indian impoverishment is the same clear across the country. 
KENNETH R. PHILP 
Rupert Costo's remarks are, in many respects, well taken. John 
Collier constantly talked about tribal self-government, Indian sover-
eignty, and Indian rights. But there was always a credibility gap 
between what he talked about and the way he treated individual 
Indians. The original Wheeler-Howard bill, that long forty-eight page 
document, which in many ways was the strongest statement ever made 
by the government reaffirming Indian sovereignty, was drawn up before 
consultation with Indian leaders. Later on, Indian congresses were 
held. Those were not congresses where people just approved of things. 
I do not know of any commissioner that has gone out and held those 
kinds of congresses. They were a reaffirmation of the Indian general 
will. They were very important congresses. 
My assessment of the Indian New Deal has become more negative 
over the years. The policy of termination grows out of many of the 
failures of the New Deal. One of the shortcomings of the New Deal 
was that it did not get widespread Indian support. One of the reasons 
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that occurred was because the Indian Reorganization Act was a white-
imposed reform program. Another reason it did not gain much support 
was because of the success of the policies associated with the Dawes Act 
and the success of the Christian reform movement of the nineteenth 
century. What Collier encountered in the 1930s, contrary to his romanti-
cized image of Indians, was a group of articulate, educated tribal 
leaders. They believed that they could run their own affairs without the 
IRA. When Collier refused to pay attention to these people, they 
organized their own pan-Indian groups. In Oklahoma, there was a 
great deal of opposition to Collier by Christian Indians. They organized 
a group called the American Indian Federation which was very suc-
cessful in opposing New Deal programs. In Alaska there was a group of 
Indians called the Native American Brotherhood. They opposed New 
Deal efforts to create reservations in Alaska. Most of these people 
stressed the individual work ethic, Americanization, and assimilation as 
a valuable kind of thing. 
Somewhere we need to draw clearer lines from Indian opposition 
to the New Deal to the advent of termination. Congress, in many ways, 
was listening to Indians when it began termination after 1945. This 
was what many Indians, from the time of Carlos Montezuma, wanted. 
They called for the abolition of the BIA throughout the 1930s. 
I do not see how one can view the New Deal as being assimila-
tionist. It was assimilationist only in the sense that, if Indians acquired 
economic knowledge through their own tribal businesses and acquired 
political savvy in IRA tribal councils, they would be able to relate better 
to mainstream society. The adoption of white imposed constitutions 
also encouraged the process of assimilation. Collier challenged the 
hegemony of missionaries. Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law stressed Indian sovereign rights. Indian dances were encouraged 
during the New Deal. Collier had a poetic insight into Indian culture 
and wanted to preserve it. 
Collier was not an assimilationist. In fact, he was criticized by both 
Indians and whites for promoting segregation and Jim Crow Indian 
policies. The New Deal stressed that reservations were permanent home-
lands. That is not assimilation. That is something quite different. The 
New Deal began a federal land purchase program to acquire real estate 
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for reservations. If you have assimilation in your mind, there is no sense 
acquiring new real estate for tribes. 
Collier saw the international dimension of Indian social justice. 
He created the Inter-American Indian Institute. He wanted Indians 
all over the hemisphere to get together and meet to reaffirm their sover-
eignty and fight together for social justice. 
I would agree, however, that one can criticize Collier for being 
paternalistic and domineering. His treatment of Joseph Bruner, who 
led the American Indian Federation, was incredible. He treated this 
man with great disdain. Bruner was right in terms of fighting for the 
right of Indians to be consulted and listened to in the formulation of 
policy. His organization, the American Indian Federation, discredited 
itself by joining up with the German-American Bund and other fascist 
groups. I do not think you justify some of the things Bruner did by 
saying that the New Dealers played dirty tricks, therefore, it was justifi-
able for Indians to do dirty tricks. 
DAVE WARREN 
I am going to address the question of the Indian Reorganization 
Act and its implications for culture as it related to educational policy 
and programs. Reform is always attached to the personality and the 
psychological workings of an individual who is willing to take a stand 
in behalf of whatever he believes to be in the just cause. This is not some-
thing we need to dwell on, except that we are dealing with a whole era 
which is built upon the personality of John Collier. It raises all kinds of 
interesting philosophical questions. 
Floyd O'Neil mentioned already that perhaps we did not need a 
John Collier. The simple fact of the matter was that this was the end of 
an era set in motion by the Dawes Severalty Act. It was the opening of 
a new era, which was not only specific to the Indian community but 
general across the country in terms of education. The progressives and 
progressive educationist associations were having their day in trying to 
reform American education to make it more valuable and meaningful 
to the general American community. It is by no accident that we find 
an interesting convergence of the progressive educationists working with 
John Collier, in the person of Willard Beatty. 
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In looking for something to begin with and for us all to consider, 
I wanted to find out what Collier's own view of education was, within 
a general framework of whatever he thought his reforms were all about. 
I found this somewhat lengthy passage which I would like to share with 
you. Interestingly enough, it was stated in 1962. The remarks made 
in bits and pieces throughout Collier's autobiography were more or less 
summarized in this longer statement on what he thought education 
should be. 
The task of education is how to lead the individual into world life, world 
consciousness, from within his own culture, his native personality, his native 
loyalties, how to bring the native selves of the thousands of tribal cultures 
into the world stream, not mutilated, not humiliated or ashamed, but blos-
soming and glad into the full sunlight of this great world and feeding into 
the world's endeavors their devotions and powers which are thousands of 
years old. This is the commanding problem of education, the world-wide 
problem of education. Let the problem not be solved at all, and incalculable 
human heritage will be wasted. The personalities of billions of individuals 
will be thrust into schizophrenia, and devastating social conflicts will be 
brought about. 
In looking at the manner in which this rhetoric was transformed 
into programs and policy, I found some interesting harbingers of what 
we have finally come to accept as an almost normal operating base 
from which Indian education should emerge. It seems to me that 
Collier, through Willard Beatty, was concerned primarily with the ques-
tion of how to develop an awareness of the American Indian and his 
community as part of a larger world. Now, I would also agree with 
some of the debates that are beginning to emerge on what is the proper 
term for Collier's policy. Is it assimilation, or is it acculturation? Assimi-
lation, by definition, would have to end in the total vanquishment, the 
total integration, of the Indian community into the larger socie~y, with 
loss of identity. I think the debates will continue as to what pluralism 
meant or could be attributed to in relation to Collier's perspectives on 
how the Indian community should maintain and utilize its traditions 
and yet deal, as he said in his remarks in 1962, with the reality of the 
larger world. 
Collier's approach to education was unique in two respects, as well 
as in the manner in which these two aspects of educational approach 
converged. First of all, it was through Willard Beatty that Collier uti-
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lized the progressive education movement and its policies. Its philosophy 
was essentially community based, individualized education that dealt 
with experiences. The individual student's perception of what was 
home, what were his society, community, and cultural values, was 
related to the task of learning basic skills. These skills were applied to 
maintain one's cultural system and at the same time to cope with the 
larger world. 
Converging with that was Collier's deep interest and formal efforts 
to integrate anthropology and anthropological perspectives or dimen-
sions into a number of strategies to reform American Indian education. 
He was the only individual within the federal structure that I am 
aware of, even to the prescnt day, that began to look at the source of 
knowledge, whether it is good or bad, accurate or distorted. There was 
a source of knowledge in research and scholarship, especially in the 
Bureau of American Ethnology in his day, which he felt should be 
utilized or made accessible because it was information which existed 
in no other place. It was through Collier's efforts that a unit called the 
Applied Anthropological Unit was established as a liaison between 
the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
It set in motion a whole process in which efforts were made, up to 
the Second World War, to utilize anthropologists and anthropological 
knowledge in two or three specific ways. One was in providing educa-
tion, in-service training if you will, to the existing Bureau of Indian 
Affairs educational establishment in Washington and also to the teach-
ing staff in the field. That effort had varying successes, all very short, 
but it did set in motion, in certain provisions of Public Law 95-561, 
one of the aspects of policy change that we have really not seen realized 
until recent years. It called for full integration and utilization of cultural 
materials and information and of the cultural expertise of community 
teachers. That law was highly modified in its final versions, but an effort 
was made to provide in-service training, not only to teach the develop-
ment of a set of new materials or the utilitization of extant materials 
and research, but also to acculturate and to sensitize the existing teacher 
corps within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
It is interesting to note that as many as 950 teachers were enrolled 
in the in-service and other teacher training programs that Beatty and 
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Collier instigated between 1935 and 1937. Now those programs unfor-
tunately lasted only two to three years. There was tremendous response 
to them. One must keep in mind, too, that off-reservation boarding 
school teachers were asked to attend these programs during their sum-
mer vacation periods. Incentives of all types were offered, including 
the awarding of college credit for many of the courses. 
Without dwelling on the details, some of the questions that I ask 
myself are what did Collier set in motion? What whole new perspective 
did he open on what must be accomplished in order to begin changing 
a system which was literally hundreds of years in formation? As Floyd 
O'Neil and others have noted, this system was greatly influenced by 
both missionary efforts and general mainstream educational philosophy, 
against which, in the latter case, people in the progressive movement 
like John Dewey reacted. 
Finally, one must look at history and, in this particular case, at the 
development of a major era of Indian education, with all of its cultural 
ramifications. This perspective provides a lesson, not only as a study of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or John Collier, but as a continuing study 
and lesson in understanding the culture of bureaucracy and institutions. 
There is no difference in modern efforts to change institutions. There 
is no difference in the same realization that these institutions act and 
react to eras of liberal or conservative tendencies. And where are we 
in this process? I happen to believe that we are in one of the great eras 
of transition and opportunity. 
I also want to mention that the Indian Reorganization Act in its 
educational terms or characteristics ran into what we might expect-
problems for full implementation. I have referred to some of them 
already: a lack of trained Indian personnel, a lack of time to retrain 
existing teachers, and an absolute dearth of educational materials to 
reenforce the summer training programs sponsored by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. The greatest limitations, or the greatest defeat, to this 
phase of the Indian Reorganization Act was certainly the advent of the 
Second World War. Furthermore, we should realize that it would have 
taken literally thirty years, a full generation at least, to implement the 
first stage of change. Time ran out. But the residue and the legacy still 
is within us. 
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Finally, the role that I have had in the Inter-American Indian 
Institute in recent years has shown me an almost classic case of Collier 
utopianism finally coming home to roost in a very practical way. Some 
tribes represented in this room have perhaps benefited directly from the 
fact that there was an Inter-American Indian Institute in the past year. 
Without it, we would have had major problems with Mexico and the 
Indian communities that live along the United States-Mexican border. 
ALFONSO ORTIZ 
One of the things we need to do is to sketch out what kind of 
specific world the Indian Reorganization Act came into. Before we 
can meaningfully make evaluative statements or really dependable state-
ments about what was disrupted, we have to understand clearly what 
was there before. I was not around during the period of the Meriam 
Report and the passage of the IRA. In order to talk meaningfully about 
a period which began a decade before my birth, I asked my relatives 
and friends who were around in San Juan Pueblo, New Mexico, in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s to tell me what kind of world the IRA came 
into. We have all read about the impact of the IRA, but know little of 
the specific reservation situations which existed then as seen from within 
by participants in the life of those communities. 
What follows is a brief report of my findings. I first asked what 
impact the Great Depression had on life at San Juan. The reply, to my 
surprise, was no impact at all. Some of you might think that reservation 
communities were so depressed that the fall in the stock market and 
subsequent economic crash would not have any effect on them. Actu-
ally, the reason was quite different. San Juan Pueblo was not then 
caught up in the general cash economy, as it is now, fifty years later. 
There was really very little need for cash on a day-to-day basis. Sugar 
and coffee and then, occasionally, cheese and soap were the staples most 
often paid for with cash. Each family needed only to have one member 
working seasonally to have enough cash for the whole year. Typically, 
a family sent an older son, or in the absence of an older son the father 
went, to herd sheep in the mountains of northern New Mexico or 
southern Colorado to earn the needed cash. A few young women worked 
as maids on call twenty-four hours a day for well-to-do whites in Santa 
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Fe. They earned, as they were eager to tell me, thirty dollars per month 
and were lucky to get one or two Sunday afternoons off per month 
to go home. A few other people worked for the BIA or in stores in 
nearby Espanola. 
Those families that did not have wage earners traded corn, strings 
of red chili, and wheat in the nearby store for things they could not trade 
for with neighboring Spanish-Americans and other Pueblo Indians or 
which they did not grow themselves. This barter system was the major 
subsistence activity for things you did not have or grow yourself or 
gather or hunt. Otherwise, the people just used the occasions of cere-
monies and festivals to exchange useful gifts, to sell surpluses, and to try 
to take advantage of the occasional tourists, with pretty ears of corn 
done up in braids or with pottery. The pottery that exchanged hands 
between Indian people and Hispanics, as well as anything else they 
made or grew, went in the form of gifts or trade. 
Already, however, the influence of the Anglo-Americans' new 
ways were in evidence in diet and in the relative prestige accorded 
different kinds of food. Those who could eat canned foods were envied 
because it was a sign that they could afford to buy their food, rather 
than grow it or trade for it. In the past half century, this envy of the 
white man's processed food has diminished because worries about the 
high incidence of cancer and other relatively new diseases and their 
suspected link to processed foods have become established in the peo-
ple's minds. 
There was a federal extension agent. He was our version of what 
former Congressman Benjamin Reifel was at the beginning of his career. 
We had a Tewa name for this fellow. It was "he who knows how to 
farm." The extension agent was established in San Juan by the late 
1920s, and he was busy growing things like carrots, spinach, radishes, 
and other foods which the people had not known. And he was trying to 
coax them to grow these new foods, as well, in their fields. 
There were two other externally imposed institutions in the pueblo 
which were not so benign-the Catholic church and the day school. 
The church was regarded as disruptive by those who were not really 
true, completely devout believers. The resident priest regularly told the 
people that, if they did not stop dancing and praying to the sun, moon, 
and stars, they would all go to hell. A half a century later, the people 
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there are still singing, dancing, and praying to the sun, moon, and stars, 
and so far as we know, no one has gone to hell. Everyone knows there 
are no Indians in hell. It is not a place designed for us. 
Indeed if anything has changed at San Juan, it is the church itself. 
Today, the Mass is often said in Tewa by members of the community, 
and the bilingual, bicultural personnel have translated the entire Mass 
and, many prayers, hymns, and proverbs into Tewa. Traditional Tewa 
embroidery adorns the altar. It also often adorns the priest himself, 
replacing the priestly vestments of yesteryear. 
The teachers at the school used less terrifying language, but they 
also told their charges that everything they were, heretofore, had to end 
and that they had to go away to boarding schools and learn to be pro-
gressive like whites. The BIA had not yet begun to distribute clothing 
in the 1920s, but by the 1930s, younger students began to get shoes. 
The fundamental questions about education which we were later to 
grapple with, such as what kind of education, for whom, taught by who, 
to be controlled by whom, were not yet being raised audibly in San Juan 
in the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Oftentimes, an era is best defined by everyday life. The daily life 
back in the late 1920s and 1930s was very different from anything 
known there in the last three decades. In the San Juan of that time, 
people never locked their doors when leaving for the day, as a fear of 
theft was almost nonexistent. The community was truly a community. 
Neighbors looked out for one another's welfare and interests. Children 
could pop into any open door they saw when out playing if they got 
thirsty or hungry. Anyone who denied a gourd of water or a piece of 
tortilla to a kid soon got a reputation as being stingy and uncivil. Ed 
Dozier, the late anthropologist from Santa Clara Pueblo, used to talk 
wistfully about these times because, when he was growing up, he could 
just pop into any home and, without asking, get the gourd from the wall 
and help himself to water and then beg a piece of tortilla if he smelled 
fresh tortillas on the stove. 
Similarly, parents never worried about where their children might 
be during the day. They knew in a most basic sense that their children 
would be safe, no matter where they were within or around the village. 
This little point about parents not worrying about their kids caused 
teachers no end of frustration. They interpreted this permissiveness, 
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at least the culturally insensitive ones did, as a sign that the parents were 
not concerned about their kids. It was a sign of just the opposite. The 
parents cared; they knew in a more basic sense that the children were 
quite safe no matter where they were. 
The community was homogeneous and acted in concert. At night, 
after the day's chores were done, one could step outside and hear the 
music of flutes playing in different parts of the village. This was what 
musically inclined men did after the evening meal, especially in the 
summer when it was likely to be warm inside. They took their flutes and 
sat outside by the door on adobe benches and played. They also played 
for the women to entertain them when the women, in a communal 
ceremony, ground cornmeal. 
There was also enough neighborliness that, when one needed a 
particular kind of medicine but did not have it, he merely asked a 
neighbor or a relative. Traditional medical herbs and other remedies 
were freely given when needed. Ben-Gay, Mentholatum, and aspirin 
were later added to the list of those things that could be given away to 
neighbors and relatives. When a midwife was called in to massage an 
expectant mother, she was paid twenty-five cents or fifty cents or given 
a shawl. When she attended a childbirth, she was paid in food and 
given several braids of blue corn. A favorite method of treating illness 
through the 1930s was by smoking the patient, smoking over the patient 
with someone else's hair, but not the patient's own hair. This practice 
gave rise to a very common insult in those times in Tewa. The insult 
could be translated, "He was smoked with his own hair." This meant 
he was tricked or cheated. To be smoked with one's own hair was 
to be duped. 
The government of that time was very simple, very unpretentious, 
and very straightforward. There was a council of mostly religious 
leaders, elders who worked hard to keep things from changing. They 
appointed the secular officials. They picked men who would be like 
them, carry out their bidding, and uphold tradition when questioned. 
There were no budgets, there was no money, and there were no full time 
employees. By contrast, the present council consists mostly of former 
governors. For a brief time in the mid-1970s, the council at San Juan 
was administering a budget of over a million dollars in mostly federal 
programs, with dozens of employees and a full time tribal programs 
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administrator. This program administrator was paid for by monies 
which had their origins in the old Office of Economic Opportunity. 
As far as religious life was concerned, this was a bad time for Indian 
religion. Everyone said that the dance lines were short because people 
were so desperately poor. They had good costumes for their dances only 
because they were well made at an earlier time. On the other hand, 
there were many more customs then for passing on cultural knowledge 
to the next generation, such as story-telling sessions in the autumn and 
winter months, traditional games, and pilgrimages to get religious items 
such as fruit up in the mountains. 
I am not trying to paint an idyllic picture of life fifty years ago. 
There were also problems and hardships. Hauling wood and water 
were two of the severest hardships mentioned by people, especially in the 
winter. In order to bathe, people had to build fires outside to heat the 
water, because fire pits and corner fireplaces were not adequate for 
heating large quantities of water. The major health problems of the 
time were tuberculosis, trachoma, and cataracts. No one alive then was 
unaware of the great flu epidemic of 1918. This epidemic, for a time, 
killed people off so fast in San Juan that some days the church bell never 
stopped tolling, day and night. 
The most serious recurrent internal problems people recalled were 
domestic quarrels, charges of witchcraft, and land boundary problems. 
Domestic quarrels were mediated by an extended family group, and if 
they could not be settled there, they were referred to the tribal council, 
a move that the family found acutely embarrassing. They did not want 
to go public on things like divorces which were regarded as purely 
internal kinship matters. A favorite taunt of women during quarrels 
was to accuse one another of being promiscuous. The phrase in Tewa 
went like this: "At least I am not being rolled over and over in powdered 
dung." And the return would be: "No one would roll you over any-
where." Witchcraft suspicions were submitted to the consideration of 
the curing society. The council resolved land problems as they arose. 
To conclude on a positive note, the elders remembered fondly that 
their counterparts of the early to mid-thirties received surplus com-
modities from the federal government. These commodities consisted of 
slabs of bacon, beans, cheese, and flour. 
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The last point I want to make is that the pueblos, with the excep-
tion of Jemez, supported the IRA. Only three of the pueblos in New 
Mexico adopted IRA constitutions; they were Santa Clara, Isleta, and 
Laguna pueblos. The Hopi in Arizona also initially supported the IRA. 
But the immediate impact of the IRA was not great, even though the 
Pueblos supported it. I suspect they did so because they regarded John 
Collier as a great and true friend because of his prominent leadership 
and support in the two great battles in which they were involved in the 
decade prior to the 1930s, the fight over the Bursum Bill and the fight 
over religious freedom. They knew Collier well and regarded him as a 
trusted friend. 
The last point is this, younger people who have not yet had a 
chance to study history in any detail may be confused by all of this 
wrangling about whether Collier was bad or sinister in his motives or 
whether he was as good as some people might have you believe. He 
comes across as enigmatic because there is a fundamental contradiction 
in his thinking and his policies. Collier was content to uphold and cele-
brate and honor our expressive life, our cultural life, namely, the arts 
and religion. At the very same time, he was also content to deliver 
our more fundamental freedoms such as sovereignty and tribal self-
government into the hands of the federal government. These two things 
seemed to work simultaneously in his life, and so both things are true. 
There also are some sharp regional differences and they need to be 
respected. The Pueblos could only see the positive side of John Collier. 
In other areas, where Indians had different kinds of experiences, they 
saw the danger clearly of the Indian Reorganization Act if it were 
passed without amendments. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Felix Cohen and the Adoption if the IRA 
Lucy Kramer Cohen, Charlotte Lloyd Walkup, 
Benjamin Reifel 
I wrote two chapters in the early edition of the Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law .... Felix Cohen was attracted to Indian law because he had a 
great feel for the land and the return to the simple life. The Indian way, 
as he read it as a child, had a tremendous attraction for him. . . . Felix 
wrote some papers when he was in college about the Indians and that it was 
likely our notion of democracy came from Benjamin Franklin having been 
ambassador to the Iroquois Confederacy in 1763. 
Mrs. Lucy Kramer Cohen, director of the 
Association on American Indian Affairs 
Felix Cohen was not just a giant in Indian law. Cohen was interna-
tionally known for his work in international law and legal ethics, and is 
today (and this is rare for a person of that era) studied in the law schools 
in jurisprudence, ethics, and courses outside of Indian law. Felix Cohen 
brought a brilliance and resourcefulness into Indian law. It had been 
almost one hundred years since the Supreme Court had given much serious 
attention to Indian law. Cohen went back to the Spanish origins, the 
British origins, and to the great John Marshall opinions. He restated them 
and made it clear that Indian tribes do have powers of governments. 
Charles F. Wilkinson, professor of law, University of Oregon 
[70] 
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Lucy KRAMER COHEN 
Nathan Margold, the solicitor of the Interior Department, drew 
my husband Felix Cohen to the Indians. Margold knew that Felix had 
a very good record of being a legislative draftsman at Columbia Uni-
versity. In 1933, shortly after the New Deal came into effect, he was 
asked to come down and work on legislation that became known as the 
Wheeler-Howard bill. His interest in Indians, like that of most people 
in the East, was very romantic. He was a good legislative draftsman, 
and he took the task that was given to him very seriously. 
We had been married only about a year when Felix was asked by 
Nathan Margold and Harold Ickes, both of whom had been with the 
American Indian Defense Association, to work on the law, aimed largely 
at the ills that the Meriam Report had detailed, that would give Indians 
a New Deal. Felix's one year extended to twenty, and he died still work-
ing to right those wrongs. He appeared and testified against a termina-
tion bill just about a month before his death. 
My contribution, when I finally arrived in Washington D.C. during 
the Spring of 1934, was that of an unpaid volunteer. Since two mem-
bers of a family could not, during the Depression, receive two govern-
ment salaries, my job was to keep track of how various Indian tribes 
were reacting to the specific tentative provisions of the Wheeler-Howard 
bill. I should tell you that I did not come to this task unprepared. 
I had studied anthropology with Franz Boas. I had the good fortune to 
have the service of Miss Jennings, a remarkable young woman, who 
was able to make the most informative, accurate tabulation of those 
tribal responses, which was supplied daily to both Edgar Howard's 
House Committee and Senator Burton K. Wheeler's Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs. Those chairmen, therefore, could never claim that 
they were unaware of Indian tribal reaction. It was a bill that reflected 
the best tribal counsel that was available at that time. 
I attended all of the Senate and House hearings, and I enjoyed 
watching the Indians sitting around the table discussing the various 
provisions in sign language, much to the chagrin of the chairman. It 
was a very good way for the Indians to secretly get a consensus. 
The Wheeler-Howard Act was not rammed down the throat of the 
tribes. It was an effort with many flaws, some of which were inserted 
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by powerful congressional personnel or allowed by supporters in order 
to make certain that some bill would be passed as requested by the 
president. No one would claim that this was perfect legislation. But it 
was a powerful, unbelievable, even noble beginning given the Depres-
sion, the gathering threat of war, and opposition both by Indians and by 
non-Indians who had many ill-gained privileges to lose or who thought 
that Indians were wards of the government instead of sovereign, depen-
dent nations. 
This fifty year evaluation is of monumental importance. I want to 
salute all those who have gone, having given their minds, hearts, and, 
in many cases, even their bodies to bring about some modicum of 
progress in the Indians' quest for social justice. Permit me to quote 
something that my husband lived by. A famous rabbi once said, "The 
day is short and the task is great. It is not incumbent upon thee to com-
plete the task, but neither art thou free to neglect it." That was the 
basis of the work of all the good men who helped with the drafting, the 
passage, and the implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act. The 
great task was begun fifty years ago, and it is now incumbent upon all 
of us, especially the young, to continue it, revise it, better it, and com-
plete it, if such a thing is possible. 
I would like to conclude with something that Felix Cohen wrote 
in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law: 
What has made this work possible, in the final analysis, is a set of beliefs 
that form the intellectual equipment of a generation. The belief that our 
treatment of the Indian of the past is not something of which a democracy 
can be proud. The belief that the protection of minority rights and the 
substitution of reason and agreement for force and dictation represent a 
contribution to civilization. A belief that it is the duty of the government to 
aid oppressed groups in the understanding and appreciation of their legal 
rights. A belief that understanding of the law in the Indian fields as else-
where, requires more than textual exegesis, it requires an appreciation of 
history and understanding of economic, political, social, and moral prob-
lems. These beliefs represent, I think, the American mind in our generation 
as it impinges upon one tiny segment of the many problems which modem 
democracy faces. It is fundamentally to these beliefs and to this mind that 
an author's acknowledgements, gratitude and loyalty are due. 
CHARLOTTE LLOYD WALKUP 
I would like to add something about Felix Cohen. Felix had an 
enormous grasp of ethics and what makes the law really work and what 
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is the basis of jurisprudence. He was a teacher as well as a student of 
ethics. He wrote extensively on the subject and his publications are still 
studied in Ph.D. courses. He taught at various colleges, universities, 
and law schools. In his research he became more and more interested 
in the Indians as examples of the victims of human oppression. He felt 
human oppression very keenly. He traced out the development of 
the principles for dealing with the Indians in the New World, which 
were formulated in Spain and taken over by the British and the French. 
I must say that the British were a little better in acting on those prin-
ciples, perhaps, than the Spanish were, but the principles nevertheless 
were there. He also brought out that, in spite of all our faults, the 
federal government really tried to adhere to the principle of purchase of 
the land, recognizing Indian rights and acquiring them through pur-
chase. Of course, settlers came in and undid the good work, and prac-
tice never quite took the same high road as principles did. 
Lucy Cohen, in all her modesty, has not reported that she com-
piled, after Felix's death, a marvelous book of her husband's writing 
called The Legal Conscience. It has three parts. The first part is purely 
philosophical. The second part is the problems of Indian law looked 
at from a jurisprudential point of view. The third part raised ethical 
questions of various kinds, not necessarily related to Indians. Felix 
Cohen had an enormous breadth of mind, and it was focused, much of 
the time, on the problems of the Indians. 
I came to Washington D.C. in October 1934, having just gradu-
ated from Columbia Law School, to work in the New Deal. I was asked 
by Felix to work on Indian affairs. I continued working in the Solici-
tor's Office on Indian affairs until World War II came along and really 
diminished the effort that was being made to implement the Indian 
Reorganization Act. 
We were asked to read the Meriam Report when we came into the 
Solicitor's Office to work on Indian affairs. It laid out, in cold blood 
and in a very terrifying way, what the problems were that needed to be 
solved. I worked on the drafting of tribal constitutions, which some 
people call "boiler plate" constitutions because of their similarity. They 
all contained material that needed to be in a constitution so that a tribe 
had a clear, basic way to operate without confusion. 
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Surprisingly, everything was done quite fast, and the Indian 
Reorganization Act passed on June 19, 1934. The provisions of the act 
that were dropped were a federal court for Indian offenses and a provi-
sion that would have allowed tribes to incorporate into municipalities 
and a provision that seemed to require allotments to be returned to 
tribal ownershp. Those were the major provisions that created a lot of 
opposition frbm both Indians and non-Indians, who concluded that 
they were too drastic. 
The Indian Reorganization Act had four principle purposes. The 
first and most important part of the act was the prohibition of further 
allotment and the authorization to the secretary of interior to purchase 
more land for both tribes and individual Indians to help undo the 
damage from the Dawes General Allotment Act. A second purpose was 
to recognize and to build up the authority of the tribal governments, 
but only if they were willing to do so. Indian tribes had to accept the 
IRA in a referendum, before any of it applied to them. Then they had 
to vote on whether they wanted to organize under an IRA constitution. 
Finally, if they had the resources and reason to do so, they could incor-
porate for business purposes. And all that was by tribal vote, and 
I might say it was by a majority of the tribal members, not just a 
majority of those voting. 
Rupert Costo's argument that tribal governments were diminished 
rather than strengthened by these provisions does not seem valid. You 
have to remember that before the act was passed tribal governments, 
although they were recognized as sovereignties, were entirely subject to 
the whim of Congress, and Congress could take away any of the so-called 
tribal powers. The beauty of an IRA constitution was that it gave the 
Indians a definite, firm, recognized authority which they could use even 
if some of the authority was subject to the approval of the secretary of 
the interior. IRA constitutions also clarified some of the murky areas 
as to whether or not a tribe had authority over law and order and 
whether or not they could assess fees against people on the reservation. 
The third part of the IRA enabled tribes to equip themselves for 
business enterprise. This was relevant only to those tribes who had some 
assets, and unfortunately, not many tribes had assets. But the assets 
which existed, such as timber, mineral resources, and cattle enterprises, 
could be put on a businesslike basis, with an opportunity to borrow 
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funds from the IRA revolving credit fund. Incorporation also gave 
tribes the usual business authority to sue and be sued, except that no 
judgment could be against restricted Indian land. And, of course, it 
provided the usual protection against liability that a corporation has: 
only the assets of the corporation could be taken, rather than the assets 
of tribal shareholders. Another advantage was that the tribe could give 
its members shares of the corporation in exchange for their interest in 
heirship land. 
Finally, there was the provision concerning education. The IRA 
provided for an annual appropriation of $250,000 for loans to Indians 
to go to vocational schools, high schools, and colleges. It also, inci-
dentally, gave the Indians a preference in employment in the Indian 
service. Furthermore, the IRA stated that tribes retained all of their 
existing powers based upon previous court decisions plus certain other 
powers, such as the right to employ legal counsel and the right to prevent 
alienation of tribal land. 
It is true that tribal constitutions were modeled on other gov-
ernment constitutions. They were modeled that way because other 
government constitutions covered the things that are necessary for tribal 
or government organization. First of all, they defined the territory of 
reservations and who were the members of the tribe. The constitutions 
also defined how elections should be held and whether councilmen 
should be elected at large, represent particular districts within the reser-
vation, or represent particular bands who were parts of the same tribes 
or of different tribes on the same reservation. Most of the constitutions 
had provisions for initiative and referendum, removal from office, and 
election procedure. These so-called "boiler plate" constitutions con-
tained basic provisions that every constitution needs. Insofar as my own 
experience goes, they were all drafted in consultation with the exist-
ing tribal council and reflected what the Indians thought were the 
best provisions. 
I will add a little bit about my own experience in going out on the 
reservations. The Indian Office assigned Ben Reifel to assist me on the 
Sioux reservations and Oliver LaFarge on the Hopi Reservation. What 
would happen was the Indians would have a tribal council meeting. 
The superintendent and I and Ben, if he was there, and other interested 
persons who were concerned with the tribal constitution met together, 
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and we went over what was necessary and needed in a constitution to 
make it work. We also asked the Indians what kind of things they 
wanted to have in it. These issues were talked about and thrashed over 
for days. I spent at least a week on the Winnebago reservation. I was 
nearly lost in a blizzard, but the Indians saved me. On my visits to the 
Sioux reservations we had not only tribal council meetings but we had 
meetings open to the whole tribe. I remember a lot of people in the 
room. We would try to explain the provisions of the IRA. The tribal 
members would then ask us several questions. 
One of the disrupting features of these discussions was the tremen-
dous interest of the Indians in their claims. Repeatedly, people would 
come up to me and say, "Why doesn't the act say something about 
Indian claims and how we can get our claims adjusted?" And I would 
have to say, "Well, that has to take separate legislation." As you all 
know, that separate legislation did come along twelve years later. The 
only complaint the Indians had was that the IRA did not cover Indian 
claims, and they did not say anything about "Oh, you are taking away 
our tribal sovereignty" or "This is going to be just terrible for the tribe." 
BENJAMIN REIFEL 
In 1933, I came on the reservation next to our reservation and was 
assigned to a district where most of the families spoke the Lakota 
language. The superintendent of the reservation selected me off of the 
civil service rostrum for that purpose. We had to talk about the Wheeler-
Howard bill. They had this big Indian congress in Rapid City. It was 
the first time I saw John Collier, the commissioner of Indian affairs. 
Walter V. Woehlke, the editor of Sunset magazine in California, was 
the manager of the meetings, which went on for three or four days. 
I was impressed with the opportunities outlined in the Wheeler-
Howard bill. I thought, "We are going to stop the sale and the loss of 
our lands. We are going to get an educational program so kids can go 
on to colleges and universities and trade schools." The bill also provided 
an opportunity to get some money to buy land. There was a loan pro-
gram to improve agricultural industries. All of this sounded extremely 
exciting to me. I went back to the reservation and started studying the 
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bill. The superintendent was very supportive of my going around and 
explaining this bill in our own Lakota language. 
The Indian Reorganization Act was finally passed in 1934. Most 
of the thousand people in my little district could not speak English. 
All of our business was conducted in the Lakota language. We had old 
school flip charts that were used in the day schools. I went to an old 
commissary, and I found one of these charts on a stand. I put the 
provisions of the IRA on each section. For education, I put a kid with 
a mortarboard and explained in our own Lakota language how much 
money was available. I had all nineteen provisions in this chart form. 
In my district, forty or fifty people were delegates to the general 
tribal council. About ten of them went up to a meeting and they 
explained the IRA. It was not long before I got a call from the super-
intendent saying, "You have got to come up and bring your charts and 
help these councilmen explain the Indian Reorganization Act to their 
people." Joe Jennings, who was assigned by the commissioner of Indian 
affairs in our area, took me around the different reservations in South 
Dakota and North Dakota. 
The IRA is one of the few pieces of legislation applying to anybody 
in the United States that the people could accept or reject. If that is 
stuffing something down somebody's throat, I have got the wrong 
information about what it means to stuff things down people's throats. 
In April 1935, I got a telegram to go to Washington. I was asked 
to be an organization field agent, with headquarters in Pierre, South 
Dakota. I went around to explain the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
of course, some tribes adopted it, others turned it down. I served as an 
organization field agent until I was ordered to active duty in the army. 
During this time, I got acquainted with Felix Cohen. One night 
we were driving to Billings, Montana, from South Dakota. We began to 
philosophize. I said, "Well, American people, you know, are pretty 
decent people." Cohen replied, "You know, the American community 
is made up of wolves and sheep, and the sheep have got to be protected 
against the wolves." It was one of Felix's feelings that we needed to 
protect the Indians' land, their rights, and their humanness. 
The greatest disappointment I had with the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act, and this was not John Collier's fault, was the way the senators 
and congressmen felt about it. They eliminated important parts of the 
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IRA. We have law and order codes, but our judges are not paid any-
thing like they should be with the tremendous decisions they have to 
make. There is no independent judiciary on Indian reservations. The 
court system is the creature of the tribal council. 
As I look back over the fifty years, there is nothing in the Indian 
Reorganization Act that harms any Indian tribe or any Indian individ-
ual who has property. But, as John Collier said, "Even the finest social 
piece of legislation can be made completely useless by bad administra-
tion." We stilI have the IRA constitutions. It is up to the people to 
amend these constitutions and make them useful. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Implementing the IRA 
John Painter, Robert L. Bennett, E. Reeseman Fryer, 
Graham Holmes 
Misunderstanding of the purposes of the IRA was a very big obstacle. 
Where the Indians alread)· had an established traditional kind of govern-
ment, they were afraid they might lose that. And then there was factional-
ism on some reservations between the full-blooded and the half-blooded 
Indians-the half-blooded Indians being more progressive and wanting to 
get on with the job. There was also outside opposition from many church 
groups who thought that this was going back to the blanket and turning the 
Indians back to paganism. 
Charlotte Lloyd Walkup, formerly with Solicitor's Office, 
worked on drafting and implementation of IRA constitutions. 
John Collier established an applied anthropology unit at the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs. It was headed by Scudder Mekeel, a brilliant young 
anthropologist trained at Yale . ... There was a number of people in Con-
gress who thought that the discipline of anthropology had sinister overtones 
and should not be used in connection with the Indian Reorganization Act . 
. . . The applied anthropology unit lasted only about two years. Scudder 
Mekeel provided a rather caustic summary of what had happened to this 
unit. Collier replied that anthropologists had failed to quickly provide 
background material about the contemporary political situation on reserva-
tions so the Indian Bureau could draft constitutions that were not based on 
obsolete accounts of earlier tribal political systems. 
Fred Eggan, anthropologist 
[79] 
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JOHN PAINTER 
Federal Indian policy prior to 1933 was very ethnocentric. It was 
designed to bring about individualism and rapid assimilation of the 
Indian into the mainstream of American life. There were some modest 
efforts to improve Indian education and health. After the publication of 
the Meriam Report, in 1928, considerable strides were made by the 
Hoover administration to rectify earlier neglect, especially in the areas 
of education, the quality of BIA personnel, and, to a lesser extent, health 
care. Even with these efforts, enforced acculturation still was the central 
theme in Indian policy. 
A shift in Indian policy occurred with the appointment of John 
Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs. Collier accented the positive 
attributes of Indian culture and Indian self-worth. Basically, Collier's 
policy was one of Indian self-determination. The Wheeler-Howard bill 
was drafted to facilitate Indian economic opportunity and Indian self-
government. We know that thc Indian Reorganization Act was consider-
ably different than the original Wheeler-Howard bill. The changes that 
were made reflected the prevailing attitude in Congress toward Indians. 
It is important to note that neither the economic crisis of the 1930s 
nor the appointment of Collier brought about a basic change in the 
congressional attitude toward Indians,nor did it bring about an accep-
tance of the notion of cultural pluralism. Most members of Congress 
who were concerned with Indian policy continued to hold ethnocentric 
cultural views for more than a quarter of a century. In doing so, they 
represented their constituents' attitudes. Members of Congress also 
continued to represent the economic interests of their constituents and 
those economic interests often clashed with Indian interests and rights. 
It is also important to remember that congressional committee staff 
members often had considerable power and influence. Albert A. Grorud, 
a staunch critic of Collier, served for over twenty-five years on the staff 
of the Senate committee dealing with Indian affairs. He remained in 
that position until 1956. Grorud was an advocate of rapid assimilation. 
As counsel to the special Senate committee, he largely controlled who 
appeared before that committee. This helps explain the dispropor-
tionate amount of time given in the hearings to opponents of Collier and 
his policy. The infamous 1943 Senate Report 310, which called for the 
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liquidation of the BIA, was authored by Grorud. The senators on this 
committee called Grorud their "chief." He was considered the com-
mittee authority on Indian affairs. Grorud remained in a position of 
power during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the termination bills 
were being drafted. 
The breadth of this ethnocentric congressional attitude became 
apparent in 1947 when the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service forced Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman to draw up 
a list of tribes to be released from federal supervision. That breadth is 
also seen in the reluctance by Congress over the years to appropriate 
funds to carry out the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
When we talk about the implementation of the IRA, one important 
fact often is forgotten. The IRA greatly expanded the activities of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and this was mandated in the legislation. 
Furthermore, the IRA greatly complicated the administration of Indian 
policy and required greater expertise, particularly in the economic 
and legal fields. This is best illustrated in the activities of the Indian 
Organization Division and especially in the activities of that division's 
field agents. 
During July 1935, the personnel of the newly organized Indian 
Organization Division began to assist tribal groups in organizing under 
the IRA. Initially the western part of the United States was divided into 
four regions with a field agent in each region: George LaVatta in the 
Northwest, Kenneth Marmon in the Southwest and California, Peru 
Farver in the Great Lakes region, and Ben Reifel in the Northern Plains 
region. Within a year, Montana and Wyoming were split off of the 
Northern Plains region. Soon field agents were added in Oklahoma and 
Alaska. Very little has been done in the area of looking at the organiza-
tion of groups in Alaska. These organization field agents were initially 
assisted by some at large agents, including Henry Roe Cloud, and long 
time BIA employees such as Oscar Lipps and John Holst. 
Collier charged the Indian Organization Division with the primary 
responsibility of implementing the IRA. The organization field agent 
provided the link between the BIA central office in Washington and the 
Indian tribes and agency personnel in the field. Field agents had to be 
knowledgeable, not only about the philosophy and intent and the provi-
sions of the IRA, but also about all aspects of the Bureau's programs 
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and activities. Their work was largely educational. They explained the 
New Deal Indian policy to tribal leaders, tribal people, agency per-
sonnel, Indian school children, and the general public. These field 
agents initially served as educational resource persons and technical 
advisors to the tribes and to the BIA field personnel during the early 
stages of tribal organization under the IRA. 
Once tribes had established governments under IRA constitutions, 
the field agent assisted tribal leaders in making these units function more 
smoothly. They also advised tribal leaders in establishing cooperative 
organizations for various economic enterprises. Throughout this process 
the field agent often acted as liaison between the tribes and the BIA 
program and technical personnel. The organization field agents initi-
ated educational programs for BIA personnel related to Indian organi-
zation, and they initiated training programs for the new tribal leaders 
of IRA governments. As front line promoters and advocates of Indian 
self-determination, these agents had a lasting effect upon the nature 
and the function of tribal governments, not only during the 1930s and 
1940s, but in the following decades. Their work, along with that of the 
tribal leaders, helped to break down the Bureau's paternalistic approach 
to Indian affairs and brought about a greater acceptance of self-
determination in Indian policy. 
Each field agent made a considerable impact upon general Indian 
policy and the tribes and groups with whom they worked. But the col-
lective ideas of those in the Indian organization unit between 1935 and 
1943 had the greatest impact. As members of the Indian organization 
unit worked together to assist tribal groups, they came to recognize that 
many tribes were facing similar kinds of problems and that tribal leaders 
could better resolve these problems if some vehicle for greater communi-
cation could be established between tribal leaders. From this recogni-
tion, coupled with a very strong belief that a larger role for tribal leaders 
in Indian affairs was needed, came the realization that a viable national 
Indian organization should be created. The field agents, as well as other 
Indian organization personnel, provided the catalytic ideas, inspiration, 
and leadership for what became the National Congress of American 
Indians in 1944. 
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ROBERT L. BENNETT 
Commissioner John Collier, in 1934, held meetings throughout 
Indian country to explain the provisions of the Wheeler-Howard bill. 
Quite a few people at these large well-attended meetings were not fully 
acquainted with the legislative process. Soon opposition began to 
develop to the Wheeler-Howard bill. This enabled the Senate Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs to draft alternate legislation, the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act. Collier was faced with the decision of either accepting the 
Indian Reorganization Act as written by the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs or having no bill at all. He chose to accept the Indian 
Reorganization Act. This placed him in an awkward position with the 
tribes because there were considerable differences between the Wheeler-
Howard bill and the Indian Reorganization Act. His credibility with 
the tribes was in jeopardy because many things that he had stated would 
be in the bill were not in the Indian Reorganization Act. The imple-
mentation of the IRA was clouded by this one fact. 
Indian field agents who worked with the tribes for the purpose of 
implementing IRA constitutions brought with them model constitutions 
that had been developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. There was a 
great deal of feeling among the tribes that they were more or less obliged 
to accept the constitutions which were presented to them. Consequently, 
most of the IRA constitutions were quite similar. 
Collier did not know how effective tribes would be under a consti-
tutional form of government. Therefore, it was decided to insert in the 
drafts of constitutions provisions for the review of the actions of the 
tribal government by the secretary of the interior. The secretary could, 
in this review process, disapprove of legislative actions taken by the 
tribal governments under their constitutional authority. This was not 
a requirement of the Indian Reorganization Act or any regulation. 
It was inserted so the Bureau of Indian Affairs could retain some kind of 
supervisory powers over the actions taken by IRA tribal governments. 
There was also a great deal of misunderstanding because the Indian 
Reorganization Act did not carefully define the sovereign powers of 
tribes. What it did do, in section sixteen, was to provide tribes the 
opportunity to organize governments of their own choosing, but section 
sixteen did not make clear the authority of these governments. The 
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reason for this was because tribes already had sovereign power on all 
subject matters except where Congress had legislated. Congress was 
simply authorizing a process by which tribes could exercise their existing 
sovereign powers. Under IRA constitutions the tribes' sovereign powers 
were usually delegated to an elected form of government. 
Several tribes would not go along with this kind of delegation. 
The Oneida tribe to which I belong is an example. The Oneida consti-
tution still provides that all of the sovereign powers rest with the tribal 
membership. Within the constitution, by a process of amendment, there 
is a provision by which the tribe can delegate certain powers to the 
business committee. There is no broad delegation of powers by the 
Oneida tribe to the tribal government as is the case of most constitutions. 
There are tribes like mine where the power still resides in the tribal 
membership. This power can be delegated to the business committee by 
ordinance of the entire tribal membership. It also can be taken away 
from the tribal business committee without constitutional amendment, 
because it is given to them by ordinance. The tribes can repeal these ordi-
nances without going through any constitutional amendment process. 
As IRA constitutions were developed, there was not a dramatic 
shift in terms of the operations at the agency level. Even though tribes 
ratified constitutions, business went on the same as it always had. When 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs needed something from a tribal govern-
ment to sanction a particular action, it presented the tribal government 
with a resolution in order to get favorable action. This allowed the 
Bureau to proceed as it had before there was a constitution, bylaws, and 
a charter. In that early period, there were very few legislative enact-
ments or policy statements enacted by the tribes that were not written 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the convenience of the federal 
government. 
Many tribes that voted for the IRA never adopted a constitution 
that delegated powers to their tribal government. Decisions are made 
by the entire tribe. The Quinault tribe of Washington, for example, 
does not have a constitution in which the tribal council has delegated 
powers. They have bylaws which set up procedures for the tribal gov-
ernment. Any authority exercised by this government must be obtained 
from the tribal membership. When the tribal membership does act in 
particular areas, its decisions are not subject to review by the secretary 
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of the interior. There is no limitation for these tribes in the exercise of 
their sovereign powers. Any tribal action that does not affect their trust 
property goes into effect immediately even though they are under the 
Indian Reorganization Act. 
Collier wanted tribal members to participate in school board elec-
tions, city governments, and county governments. He felt that they 
needed a process by which they could learn the democratic processes of 
government. That is why he developed the concept of tribal govern-
ments operating under a constitution. It was not his intention that tribes 
would always have governments of their own. His concept was that 
over a period of years, once the tribal membership had learned the 
democratic processes, they would no longer need a tribal government. 
They would eventually participate in all kinds of elections the same as 
the general public. 
Collier also understood that tribes wanted to exist as separate 
entities and would always have trust property managed by the tribe 
with the approval of the secretary of the interior. Therefore, he favored 
the concept of corporate tribal charters. The IRA corporate tribal 
charters were vehicles under which tribes could permanently manage 
their property. Collier envisioned a separate board of directors for the 
corporate charter and a separate elected government for the tribe. This 
was not politically acceptable to the tribal leadership. Consequently, 
all of the charters contained provisions that the governing body of the 
charter corporation is the elected tribal government. 
The only tribe that does have two separate organizations is the 
Seminole tribe of Florida. They have an elected tribal government and 
an elected board of directors for their chartered corporation. This 
worked until bingo arrived. The chartered corporation, which runs the 
bingo operation, has millions of dollars, but the elected tribal govern-
ment does not have any money. This has caused some political confu-
sion. It is not yet clear whether the chartered corporation will appro-
priate money to the government or whether the government will tax 
the corporation. 
Educational problems also occurred after the passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act. In 1948, there was a Special Senate Committee 
on Education that held hearings on Indian education. At that time 
school textbooks were written in both Navajo and English. The chair-
86 T he I ndian New Deal 
man of that particular Senate committee stated that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs was not in business to keep Indians Indians. They were 
in business to educate Indians to join mainstream society. The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs was prohibited from printing any more of these bilingual 
books. Twenty years later another Senate Special Subcommittee on 
Education criticized the BIA for not having printed those kinds of books. 
E. REESEMAN FRYER 
I came here to praise John Collier and not to bury him. He held 
the office of the commissioner of Indian affairs longer than any man in 
history. In my judgement, no more complicated public man than he 
has graced this century. He was a brilliant, optimistic visionary who 
could turn in a single moment to violent pessimism when talking about 
the world outside. He was a mystic, a philosopher, a poet, a reformer, 
and a community development specialist. He was a writer and a speaker 
of beautifully hypnotic prose. John Collier was the tenderest man I have 
ever met and, at suitable times, the most intellectually ruthless man 
I have ever known. I was devoted to him. 
Collier's complex personality was threaded by a single dominant 
conviction. He believed that man's salvation lay in the preservation of 
community. At times he saw in capitalistic society the crass indifference 
where nothing beyond the individual was perceived and the human 
group was nothing more than a contract between self-seeking indi-
viduals. John Collier was frequently accused of being a Communist, 
but he was not a Communist. He was a commune-ist, in the sense of 
community. Sometimes he saw communities, it seemed to me, where 
communities did not exist. 
He discovered Indian communities when he made his first visit to 
Mabel Dodge Luhan at Taos. There he discovered his Red Atlantis. 
Few of us will debate the cultural richness and social beauty of the ideal 
community. John Collier visualized community with synonyms in unity 
and unanimity. However, decisions made on assumptions of community 
when only its social fragments exist lead to bitter disappointments. So it 
was with John Collier. His failure to observe facts led to his greatest 
IRA setback with the Navajo. 
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I believe that Collier saw the Indian Reorganization Act as the 
final kind of community. It was a restraining order on the Congress and 
a salvation of Indianness. The original Wheeler-Howard bill contained 
fifty-two pages of print. It was ridiculed by its detractors for that 
reason. Few congressmen, if they read it at all, realized that it was a 
successor to several thousand pages of Indian law. 
Because of the IRA and John Collier, tribal lands are no longer 
being lost by the process of allotment. The majority of the tribes are 
self-governing, and while functioning with varying degrees of friction, 
each tribe has kept its community intact. These communities were held 
intact and strengthened as long as John Collier was commissioner. 
The provision in the IRA for a revolving credit fund and its subsequent 
implementation was among the important triumphs of the Collier 
administration. He moved quickly to urge the formation of tribal cor-
porations and cooperatives. It is interesting to remember that the first 
tribe to organize under the IRA, to get its constitution, and to form a 
corporation was the Flathead. Their quick victory, thereafter, over the 
robber barons of Montana Power, who had for years held tribal power 
sites in fief, was a triumph that brought chuckles to John Collier even 
in retirement. 
He exalted in the post-IRA emergence of the four Apache tribes of 
Arizona and New Mexico. He had described them before IRA as 
"people sunken in melancholy," "people living in gray squalor at 
the expense of the government," and "idle prisoners in concentration 
camps." Those excerpts presented a distorted description of reality, but 
they were not far from being wrong. During the 1920s, my wife and 
I had a ranch located between the San Carlos and Fort Apache Indian 
reservations. We made frequent trips to both reservations, but we always 
returned sort of depressed by the squalor and the poverty of those two 
Apache groups. They lived then in brush wickiups near the agency. 
We were depressed too by alcoholism. Alcoholism among the Apache 
may still be a problem, but the resorts, the sawmills, the purebred cattle 
herds, and other things that we see today on both San Carlos and Fort 
Apache are examples of Indian enterprise. I think that the comfortable 
homes we see at San Carlos and Fort Apache also are traceable to John 
Collier's implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
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The Mescalero and the Jicarilla of New Mexico made equal strides 
under the IRA. Collier found most impressive the emergence of the 
Jicarilla. Most notable among their achievements was the rebirth of 
community, his kind of community. All of the allotees at Jicarilla but one 
transferred their allotments to the tribe to consolidate their resources. 
Equally important but with perhaps greater social impact was the 
money borrowed from the revolving credit fund to organize a corpora-
tion. The Jicarillas bought out a store from a local trader. They were 
successful in the management of that store. They paid off their govern-
ment loan in five years. 
I will conclude with a discussion of what I think was John Collier's 
greatest failure. The failure that hurt him most was the loss of the 
Navajo to IRA. In 1933, I was a young fellow working in the Soil 
Erosion Service on the Mexican Springs Project. Mexican Springs is 
just north of Gallup. It represented to Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, 
and Collier an ideal kind of total valley watershed situation. They 
wanted to demonstrate to the Navajo what could be done with good 
range management by people for themselves to save the land and to 
develop themselves. Shortly after we got that started, I was transferred 
to Ganado to set up a demonstration area. 
About that same time, John Collier made a great swing throughout 
the country to rally support for IRA. He held about ten meetings. He 
finally came to the Navajo Reservation in February of 1934. I attended 
that meeting as a detached kind of person. I was not in the Indian serv-
ice; I was in the Soil Erosion Service, and I could look at it, I thought, 
with a reasonable amount of objectivity. John Collier made great 
headway discussing the provisions of the Wheeler-Howard bill, through 
the use of interpreters. Finally, he injected, almost extemporaneously, a 
statement to the Navajo tribe: "You have to sell a lot more of your sheep 
and goats." Now this was at a time when the Navajo tribe was so 
desperate for markets that Collier himself was able to arrange through 
one or two of the emergency agencies of government to buy productive 
livestock to help take the load off the range. 
I say all of this because John Collier in his writings has attributed 
the Navajo rejection of the IRA to section fifteen which required the 
practice of conservation. The Navajo associated stock reduction with 
conservation. If you were to go to the Navajo today and ask about E. R. 
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Fryer or ask about John Collier, they will remember both of them in 
terms of stock reduction. Conservation came automatically not to mean 
conservation to save your land, which is so much a part of the Navajo's 
psyche. In all of their ceremonies, they refer to Mother Earth. John 
Collier did himself and the whole conservation movement a great injus-
tice by deciding that the Navajo were lost beeause of the conservation 
portion in the IRA. 
Conservation was not the most important issue. It was introduced 
by Jake Morgan and some of Collier's enemies. The real issue on IRA 
was assimilation. Morgan and other Navajos argued that the IRA was 
detrimental to Christianity. They concluded that it put the Navajos 
back in a zoo. The missionaries and the traders and all of the forces 
who had entrenched interests on the Navajo reservation were able to 
defeat IRA on the basis of the issue of assimilation. I wanted to say that, 
because everything I have read by John Collier-and some of his writ-
ings have such spiritual qualities that its very difficult to follow the 
reality in them-always comes back to this: the issue of conservation 
lost IRA to the Navajo tribe. 
I am glad it did. I think that the Navajos are infinitely better off 
without the IRA. The Navajos have been able to assert, all of these 
years, their treaty. They have none of the constraints of the IRA. The 
Navajos have grown from their own culture to a point where their 
development would probably have been curbed by the constitutional 
provisions of the IRA. 
GRAHAM HOLMES 
To understand the IRA we must look at it in view of the times. 
If you were to look at the IRA and Indian tribes as of today, very likely 
you would come up with something much different than its supporters 
did in 1934. But, in 1934 things were a lot different. Few, if any, Indian 
tribes had legal representation or sophisticated governments of any kind. 
Tribal government had been eroding away for many reasons. Many 
people wanted to see it destroyed immediately. That happened in 
eastern Oklahoma in the Five Tribes area. Tribal governments, after 
statehood, were for all practical purposes abolished. There was much 
more sentiment to completely abolish tribal sovereignty than there was 
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to preserve it. If we look at it from that perspective, we can adopt a 
much more benevolent attitude toward John Collier. 
Before IRA, no general piece of legislation to define the relation-
ship of Indians with their government had ever been enacted. The rights 
of Indians had been defined by numerous court decisions. As some of 
you know, court decisions rest on the facts of the individual case. We had 
to take each individual case and try to fit it to the situations as they 
came up without any clear definition of Indian rights or the relation of 
Indians to tribal governments. It was very difficult to get any kind of 
general legislation enacted then, as it is now. It took someone with the 
force of Harold Ickes and Collier and the administration that existed at 
that time to even propose legislation such as the IRA and get it enacted. 
The IRA did not spell out the terms of Indian tribal government, 
but it did fix forever, as far as I can tell, the rights of Indian tribes to 
have a government of their own. The people at the BIA and the Indian 
tribal leadership, as they understood things at that time, put together 
the best tribal governments they could under the circumstances. So, 
looking at it from that situation, it is difficult for me to find fault with 
the IRA. The IRA was double-barreled. It had provisions for a tribal 
government and for a tribally chartered business enterprise. 
Problems occurred in implementing the IRA on reservations, and 
a lot of the trouble today is involved in that same situation. No political 
organization, so far as I know, has ever been able to run a business. 
No state has been able to run a business, and the federal government has 
never been able to operate a business of any kind very successfully. 
Yet everybody expects a tribal political organization to operate a busi-
ness. If the IRA charters and tribal governments had been as carefully 
pursued as they should have been, it would have worked a lot better. 
I do not think that was Collier's fault or anybody's fault. People at that 
time were not far enough along in the evolvement of people to bring 
that about. 
Tribal business and tribal government is so mixed that it is almost 
impossible to separate. A government ordinarily operates and raises 
capital by levying taxes and by borrowing money and printing money. 
Business works on income from doing business with some commodity or 
something of that nature. A government can spend money and adjust its 
income by raising taxes, by borrowing more money, or by printing more 
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money. The federal government does that all the time, but no tribe 
does any of these three things. And yet they try to spend money like a 
government. A lot of the governmental problems on the reservations 
grow out of that situation. Now, if there was a way to split off the busi-
ness part and have the tribal government tax to raise its funds in much 
the same way that the federal government or the states do, reservation 
government would operate a lot better, and tribes would be able to 
operate their businesses a lot better. 
It is difficult to run the Navajo sawmill, for example, because the 
tribal political entity operates it. A patronage situation exists that leads 
to all kinds of difficulties. The Navajo tribe is not an IRA reservation. 
It does not have a constitution, nor does it have a constitutional govern-
ment. Actually, the tribe operates under an Australian or an English 
system. That creates a lot of problems for the Navajo in their relations 
with the federal government, but the tribe operates very well under 
that system. 
Would that have been possible if we did not have IRA? The tribes 
that did not adopt IRA rode on the coattails of IRA. Tribes have 
drafted constitutions, and the interior secretary has approved constitu-
tions, even though they were not under the IRA. If it had not been for 
IRA, there would not be any tribal government operating with a consti-
tution and now claiming they were better off without IRA. All tribal 
government is tied to IRA, and the basic authority for tribal government 
in dealing with the federal government is the IRA. 
It is hard for Congress to enact legislation if there is a lot of opposi-
tion. All the BIA has to do is defend the IRA, and Congress cannot 
upset it. Congress is not going to pass a law that terminates a tribe 
unless the BIA goes along with it. The IRA has never been materially 
changed, as far as the government is concerned, in fifty years. It may 
never be changed. When people criticize the IRA, they had better look 
at the whole situation, because it did stabilize tribal governments and 
lead to congressional recognition of tribal governments. Once a consti-
tution is made, it is cast in stone. It is there forever, but it can be 
amended. You will not find me criticizing IRA or criticizing Collier. 
The IRA has stabilized tribal government and put the Indian people 
and Indian tribes where they are today. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The IRA and Indian Culture) Religion) and Arts 
Alfonso Ortiz, Oren Lyons, Dave Warren, Francis McKinley 
Collier worked intuitively. He trusted his vlszon of what Indians 
should be doing. Collier thought that all Indians were essentially similar. 
Taos Pueblo was his model for all Indians. This included tribes that had 
almost disappeared in a cultural sense. Collier wanted to put their societies 
and ceremonies back together again. He had, in one sense, an anthropo-
logical vision but it was not the reality that anthropologists found after they 
had studied contemporary Indian groups. 
Fred Eggan, anthropologist 
T he principle thing wrong with IRA is that it is based on the theory 
that the government can make the tribes operate according to Euro-
American ethics. These ethics assume that economic development and 
profit making are the backbone of progress . ... The government did not 
take into account that the Indians had a different way of living. All that 
the older people wanted was a piece of their land to live on the rest of their 
lives. Instead, they were saddled with Christian work ethics . ... The IRA 
destroyed the Indian way of doing things. The manner of handling Indian 
affairs in the old days worked . ... Most tribal elections held throughout the 
country are contested the minute the), are over. In the old days, when we 
selected leaders b)' consensus, there was not that kind of situation. The 
Crow are a good example of how consensus works. They have a general 
council where all the tribal members attend and make their decisions. 
When they come out with a decision, there is nobody to blame, because 
everybody had a hand in it. 
Elmer Savilla, director, 
National Tribal Chairmen's Association 
[92] 
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ALFONSO ORTIZ 
There are many, including me, that believe the most enduring 
contribution that the Collier policies made to Indian life, especially after 
half a century, was to encourage traditional cultural expression. I would 
like to read a couple of sentences from an obituary essay that D' Arcy 
McNickle chose to write about Collier in The Nation just after Collier's 
death in 1968. He quoted Collier on his experience in 1920 after visiting 
Taos Pueblo. McNickle observed. 
Watching the dancers, he [Collier] realized these were unsentimental men 
who could neither read nor write, poor men who lived by hard work, men 
who were told every day in all kinds of unsympathetic ways that all they 
believed in and cared for had to die and who never answered back, for these 
men were at one with their gods. 
It is from this attitude that you can understand why Collier wanted 
Indian people to have religious self-expression, why he wanted to have 
them feel free in the schools to give expression to their Indian languages 
and their native arts and crafts. 
This may be a regional bias, but in the Southwest, from my reading 
of the evidence, the impact of IRA was delayed and it was most 
important really in the area of traditional cultural self-expression. What 
happened with the Collier New Deal policy was basically to give us 
breathing room, to let the dancers, let the arts, come back. The arts 
were not in good shape in the late 1920s and early 1930s. But after the 
Santa Fe Indian School, through the person of Dorothy Dunn, started 
encouraging the art program, there was a tremendous efflorescence in 
Indian art. Granted, latter-day critics have termed it part of the old 
colonialism, because it was Indian cultural self-expression, but it was 
channeled into what the well-meaning teachers of that time considered 
to be genuine traditional Indian art. It was not until after 1962 that a 
new context was provided for a more creative and individualized artistic 
expression at the Institute of American Indian Arts. 
But back in the 1930s there was an outpouring of basically how 
the world looked to the people who were at the Santa Fe Indian School 
at that time. This tremendous efflorescence primarily occurred in tradi-
tional religion and the expressive arts. The councils were still conserva-
tive. They were still religious, and they continued to be, in some cases, 
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to the present time. The approval of the IRA was, if you interpret it in 
political terms, an effort to get the government off our backs so that we 
could go on as we had before. Tribal councils did not want to change, 
except for those three pueblos in New Mexico that adopted the IRA 
constitutions. 
OREN LYONS 
The Six Nations of the Iroquois have taken a very strong position 
with regard to the IRA. We simply have refused to submit to the IRA. 
We got a lot of contrary discussion going because our positions were 
pretty fierce, but we have always been advocates of peace and prosperity. 
Al Ortiz has talked about the process of government by his gover-
nors and the mediation by the families. He has talked about clans, and 
that is our system at home. We have clans and we have clan chiefs, and 
we do precisely what he was describing; but it is contemporary. He was 
talking about fifty years ago; but I am certain that this process continues 
today for the Pueblos, but it has been subjugated by a stronger authority 
-the IRA. 
From my perspective as a member of the Council of Chiefs at 
Onondaga, very often we deal very directly with political questions. 
I think you have to carefully define the difference between law and 
politics, and this is what I do not hear. The IRA is a method of bringing 
in another law to Indian territory. It then activates itself, and it 
becomes the supreme power. So we have not allowed that to happen, 
and I hope we do not. The Council of Chiefs that sits at Onondaga and 
the rest of the Iroquois nations are not paid by the government. Accep-
tance of money from the federal government is an intrusion. The price 
that you pay for this budget is your freedom. If tribes are willing to 
bargain their freedom for money, there is a serious problem for Indian 
people. It is necessary to look into the future. Our council has been 
mandated by ancient law that every decision we come to must reflect on 
the seventh generation in the future. If you have this perspective, which 
I know all Indian nations have, you really are always concerned about 
the future. This is the primary law. If you want to talk law, then there 
really is only one law and that is the natural law. 
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What was it that Collier saw of value in Indian life? What was he 
trying to preserve? You know what he was trying to preserve: it was a 
peaceful community. The United States as it stands today has very little 
community. Indian nations still have community. For them, the most 
important thing is how people are going to live together. If laws are not 
in accordance with natural law, they are going to fail. Indian societies 
contain pockets of information and understanding that must be pre-
served for your own preservation. If you kill off our culture and our 
way, you may kill off your last exit. You may have closed off your last 
way out. 
All the people gathered here have a common goal, and that is 
survival of life. That is one reason I am here-because we are con-
cerned about the welfare of the world, and our Indian people on this 
continent have been given a lot of instructions and understanding on 
how to preserve this. And that is what you are going to lose, that is 
what Collier saw. 
DAVE WARREN 
I think what we are trying to draw out of the study of John Collier 
is an understanding of the effort to bring about change and reform in 
reaction to what the Dawes Act set in motion. But what we are dealing 
with in the final analysis is a bureaucracy, and this is not only the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs. One tends to look at a person as a savior or as a devil 
and expect that the system will follow behind that person. Well, I think 
that at a certain moment, as it comes into power, any new administra-
tion leaves an imprint. But insofar as the kind of radical change that 
John Collier was talking about is concerned (essentially decentralizing 
government and making local tribal governments and tribal communi-
ties the masters of their own destiny), one has to look at the apparatus 
that was supposed to dismantle itself and to allow this kind of decentral-
ization to take place. If you look at the overall theme of the New Deal, 
it was highly centralized government, so there is contradiction in that. 
You have to study the institution itself as much as personality. 
How much do we know of the institutions of bureaucracy that were 
established by IRA within the tribal governments? What kind of char-
acter have they taken on? I have specifically in mind the difficulties that 
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the pueblo of Santa Clara is dealing with in defining what the Indian 
law is in relation to civil rights legislation. The question of defining 
what is tribal membership-who is eligible for certain services that the 
tribal government will allow to be given to the bona fide legitimate 
members-has caused the document called the constitution to suddenly 
take on a life of its own; and people are using that as if it were a sur-
rogate or certainly a new kind of living authority. 
We need to look at Collier, it seems to me, in terms of cultural 
perspectives. Was he fully aware of the implications of using tradition 
and traditional institutions, in other words, the past that lives through 
to the present, as a basis of coping with the reality of the present? Those 
constitutions, it seems to me, were to be enabling devices, instruments 
for the tribal community to begin to see itself as part of or transitioning 
into a relationship with the greater society; but the very organization or 
format of traditional institutions was in and of itself alien. I am speak-
ing of a theocratic form of government, in the case of Santa Clara 
Pueblo, that suddenly had to work with a kind of split between church 
and state. What we are dealing with here is who has the authority, the 
religious authorities or the tribal government called the council? 
I have even heard it said, in talking to some of the people at Santa 
Clara, that maybe we need to draw away from the present issues, which 
are very difficult, and see what started all this conflict. And they are 
looking at and talking about the constitution to determine whether that 
constitution should be retained. If it is retained, how must it be modi-
fied to take into account existing provisions which allow tribal govern-
ment and tribal law to become an instrument of all the people. The 
younger generations, in particular, have come to feel that such provi-
sions create real leverage on their behalf for their equal rights. Now that 
is an extreme position. There is also the question of how these constitu-
tions deal with communal versus equal rights, democratic representa-
tion, and legislative, administrative, and judicial due process. Those 
kinds of fundamental enabling elements perhaps were not dealt with 
adequately or dealt with at all in the IRA period. 
The other part of the bureaucracy, cultural bureaucracy, has to do 
with that human element that must change attitudinally in order for 
reform and innovation to take place. And you find in the case of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and it is no different than any corporation, 
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that there is a way to do things. Ultimately, there is a job at stake: 
if you dismantle yourself, you do not have a job. Yet, ironically, you are 
supposed to be training the very people that you are administering 
services to, to take over what you do. There is a kind of an ethos of 
self-preservation in that culture of bureaucracy as well. 
I suggest, as one kind of wild-eyed notion, that the Indian com-
munity has now gained self-determination in ways that even Collier 
could not have thought about. This has happened because of the 
development of certain authorities and the location of certain resources 
on Indian reservations and because of the role that Indian reservation 
lands play in the westward development of the United States. They 
have taken on tremendous importance in the regional and, in some 
ways, national development of this country. That is not going to last 
forever. The land development business is not local, state, or regional 
development; it is international development. International companies 
are looking at targeting those lands in and around Indian reservations 
as high-yield investment opportunities. They are corporations with 
power and money and the ability to influence state and national level 
governments on their own behalf. 
Now the question becomes (Oren Lyons has referred to it, and 
maybe we are returning to full circle) what is fundamental and what is 
valuable to the Indian community as a basis of its value system and its 
identity? We must also realistically look at what has intervened in that 
system over the years. In IRA we happen to be dealing with what was, 
in some ways, a critical intervention for positive development. That 
did not last long enough to be fully implemented, but it opened the 
doors and set some precedents. It created institutions that we are having 
to deal with, either to roll back or to reevaluate. But what do we put 
in its place? What are those fundamental things called language, cul-
ture, custom, and law that somehow have to be incorporated in the new 
Indian society's government and administrative system? Now, those who 
have been affected by IRA or affected by any number of other outside 
influences for a long period of time are having to rediscover and reinstate 
many things that may not be as integral as what Oren Lyons talks about 
in his own community. 
98 T he I ndian New Deal 
FRANCIS McKINLEY 
I am a member of the Northern Ute tribe, at the Uintah and 
Ouray Agency in Utah. During the last fifty years under the IRA, 
there have been, in my opinion, two tracks that my people have lived 
under, one track being the political bureaucracy, or anything that is 
connected with self-government. The other track has been the people 
themselves, how they have adapted and adjusted, and how they have 
lived their culture; and I think they would live their culture in spite of 
the IRA or whatever else. This is what Oren Lyons was talking about. 
During the last fifty years my people have retained their cultural 
beliefs, but they also have adopted other kinds of values. There exists 
a kind of Indianism among them: they have adopted many of the 
customs of other tribes. As far as my government is concerned, it has 
adopted the trappings of the federal government to get money, and it 
has to abide by federal guidelines that are operative. It has developed 
into an institution that makes its constituents obligated to that govern-
ment. It is the old question that political theorists talk about: is it the 
citizen's responsibility to the state or is it the consent of the governed? 
It used to be said that a Navajo family consisted of a father, 
mother, several children, and an anthropologist. You could say the 
same thing about the Utes. I grew up around anthropologists. In fact, 
I am a subject of some of their writings, and I do not recognize myself. 
I used to sit around listening to anthropologists talk shop. Both Margaret 
Mead and Ruth Benedict were involved, and Ruth Benedict, of course, 
was involved with Collier. Now, I know that they were influential 
among the Indians. They were very influential in the culture both in 
positive and, in some degrees, negative ways. I am interested in examin-
ing what influence those people had. 
DAVE WARREN 
The short answer to Francis's question is that the influence of 
anthropologists did not really last beyond the Collier administration. 
They joined the war effort and never came back together again in the 
Bureau. Both Collier and D' Arcy McNickle were unable to secure 
adequate research funds for the Bureau. Unless the Bureau had research 
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funds, it really could not engage anthropologists to find new ways of 
serving the Indian people. So the influence of anthropology has not 
been that great directly through the Bureau. 
Ruth Benedict was very influential because of her book Patterns 
of Culture. You mentioned Margaret Mead; she too has been influen-
tial, but indirectly, by writing books for consumption by the American 
people. For a long time Patterns of Culture was the most widely read 
book by an anthropologist ever written. It has just been discarded as 
simplistic, and that discrediting has finally trickled down to people who 
used to judge anthropology by Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture. 
But influence like that is much more serious and enduring. 
The 1880s through the 1920s was the era of the Vanishing Ameri-
can, and anthropologists busied themselves buying every artifact, some-
times stealing some, to put them in boxes and sacks to ship them off to 
eastern museums. They also recorded the sayings without any sense of 
directional organization, without any sense that there were systems of 
knowledge and belief; and they just recorded them in notebooks and 
published them willy-nilly. These books from that era read like the 
yellow pages of a telephone book. 
That era was succeeded by another era, which we might term the 
"shreds and patches view" of culture. The "shreds and patches view" 
was a term actually used by University of California anthropologist 
Robert Lowie. This was the view that there was no coherence to the 
cultures of Indian people; they were too primitive. In the post-World 
War II era, anthropologists finally began to formulate the notion that 
these cultures were complex, coherent, highly adaptable systems that 
enabled Indian people to survive. Anthropologists finally began to 
begrudgingly acknowledge that we are going to be around for a while 
and that these cultures, instead of fading away before the advance of 
the white man, were fighting back tenaciously, and then a whole new 
kind of series of questions began to be formulated. A new premise, if you 
will, began to be formulated in anthropology and the other human 
studies focusing on Indian peoples, namely, that these are complex and 
coherent systems. 
Now the techniques of the 1880s through the 1940s were not going 
to comprehend that kind of Indian tenacity or serve a new, broader 
vision. And now, we are in an era where Indian people are formulating 
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a lot of the questions that anthropologists ask instead of just having 
them formulated in the universities. Francis is absolutely right. In that 
era they were being formulated only in the universities, and Indians 
were asked only to respond to the questions that the professors formu-
lated for their graduate students at the universities. Those questions 
were based upon ongoing arguments that existed only in anthropology. 
OREN LYONS 
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of putting the IRA 
and traditional systems together. I mentioned before that there are 
value systems. The IRA-your ultimate source of authority-is James 
Watt at this point. He has a lot of authority over what happens on 
Indian land. That authority was vested in him through the IRA. And 
whoever it is, whoever it comes to be, one of the reasons why the 
Onondaga nation rejected the IRA is simply we did not want to vest 
authority in somebody living some ten states away or in the federal 
government. We will maintain our own authority. 
Our people had a vote on the IRA, and it was rather close. The 
reason why it was so close was because people did not believe in voting, 
but one of the chiefs went house to house at the last minute and said, 
"If you ever vote in your whole life, you better vote this time." They 
overturned the process, and we have survived, and we are in existence 
today. We are recognized by the federal government: we are probably 
the only nation in the country receiving treaty cloth today. 
We could not see putting our system, which was both political and 
spiritual, in one system. The political situation that the IRA would 
institute is a separate American form of government that would allow 
the experts to come from Washington. If you get in trouble running an 
IRA government, you are going to have to go to Washington because 
that is where its authority comes from. When you have your own 
authority and your own power, it becomes harder for federal officials 
to influence what is going on in your council. The values in our system 
and in the system of the United States government are too diverse for us 
to put them together in one place. 
CHAPTER SIX 
The IRA Record and John Collier 
Philleo Nash, Wilcomb Washburn, Robert Burnette, 
Russell Jim, Earl Old Person, LaDonna Harris, Ted Katcheak 
Collier's vision has been realized more than he or most others would 
have dreamed possible in 1934. Indian tribal governments, however arti-
ficial they may have seemed to the Indians who chose them or to the anthro-
pologists who had studied pre-IRA Indian organizations, are now autono-
mous, functioning political organisms, capable of maintaining themselves 
against the power of their white neighbors as well as against the power of 
the states and federal government. In what period of the Indians' existence 
can the same statement be made . .. ? 
Wilcomb E. Washburn, Smithsonian Institution 
The unique events of two generations, culminating in a crisis of poli-
tical necessity, catapulted this man into a position of historic importance. 
He rode to office on the wings of those events. He stood on the shoulders 
of many who had gone before and made himself into a figure of national 
importance and influence. But John Collier betrayed us. His autocratic 
administration and repressive administration damned him before the 
Indians, creating that fault line in historic estimates of Collier and his 
works which finally cast him from his seat at the side of the white man's 
Jesus Christ, where some historians have mistakenly placed him. 
Rupert Costo, Cahuilla, president of the 
American Indian Historical Society 
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PHILLEO NASH 
In 1934, the year of the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, 
I was in a student party doing research on Klamath Indian Reservation 
in southern Oregon. We were told by our teacher and leader, "Do not 
go near the Indian agency, because, if you do, the Indian people will not 
talk to you." This excited my curiosity. The following year I came back 
to see what the Klamath Agency was like. 
During the first full year of the IRA, I was doing research around 
the agency and I attended tribal council sessions. The Klamath Agency 
at that time was small. Many of the old buildings were still in use. 
I was anxious to locate the tribal records that went back to the early days 
of the agency, in the 1870s. I found them in the hayloft of an old barn. 
I spent all of November and December 1935 sorting through the agency 
records. The archives of the United States had not yet been created, 
but I managed to get them into a vault. Wade Crawford was the first 
Indian superintendent. He was one of the very early Indian super-
intendents whom John Collier appointed on the principle that the 
Indian people ought to be looking after their own affairs. Crawford was 
violently opposed in later years and, I think, even then to the IRA. 
I was a young anthropologist. Generally speaking, anthropologists 
have regarded themselves as friends of the Indians and enemies of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. When I became commissioner, Wade called 
on me, and he said, "I never thought I would ever see you behind that 
desk." It was clear that he thought that I had sold-out. I said, "Well, 
Wade, you know, as we get older, we all learn. I learned that this is a 
place where you can do some good, and I am very happy." 
I also said, "Things were not always that good, Wade, when you 
were the first Indian superintendent at Klamath." I reminded him 
of those tribal council meetings where individual members voted on 
whether or not to relieve the timber company of its obligations under a 
cutting contract. At that time, there was bitterness and mild corruption 
on the Klamath Reservation. 
Let me switch the scene. The Indian group nearest to my boyhood 
home was the Wisconsin band of the Winnebago tribe. They had never 
received a chance, as far as I know, to vote for the IRA. One of the first 
things that I did when I became commissioner was to see to it that they 
had an opportunity. It was not too late, even after thirty years. The 
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Winnebagos were desperately poor. These are the people who went to 
Nebraska with all sorts of promises in the 1870s, became disillusioned, 
and drifted back to Wisconsin where they became squatters in their own 
home territory. 
Since 1930, when I first started attending Wisconsin Winnebago 
powwows, I have followed intimately the organization of the Wisconsin 
band of the Winnebago tribe. In the 1930s, they were unhappy, dis-
organized, and poor. Today, they are not too happy and are somewhat 
disorganized, but they have a tribal government, and it is a real govern-
ment. They have elections, and they have different parties or groups. 
I am not going to use the word "factions." Although things are not 
perfect, the Winnebago have gained a sense of identity and organization. 
They feel that they have a future which is quite different from the 
pre-IRA days. 
I do not agree with two observations made earlier about John 
Collier. He did not want to separate religion from economics and 
government. I knew Collier over a period of years: he was not abrasive; 
he was a soul of kindness and generosity and had a very forgiving nature. 
He had to push the IRA through a hostile Congress which was not 
committed to Indian reform. Abrasiveness is in the eye of the beholder; 
sometimes it is in the skin of the beholder. If you are scratched it hurts. 
It seems to me that Joseph Bruner, who liked fascism and joined the 
German-American Bund, received a rather gentle letter from Collier. 
I can assure you that when I got that kind of treatment, as commis-
sioner, I was not anywhere near that polite. 
Furthermore, the economic development programs had their births 
in the IRA. The chartered corporations and the $10 million revolving 
loan program were intended to get the tribes into business for themselves 
and to alleviate some of the terrible poverty. When I became commis-
sioner in 1961, Congress had appropriated only $3 or $4 million for the 
IRA revolving credit fund. This is one of the reasons why Indian people 
have a very legitimate gripe against the way in which the United States 
government does things. Programs are started, and they do not receive 
adequate appropriations. This leads to frustration. You can lay it at 
the hands of an over-organized bureaucracy. All I can say is that it is 
like the old man who approached death. He said the alternative to 
getting old is much worse. The tribes were dying in 1932, in my opinion. 
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WILCOMB WASHBURN 
I would like to elaborate on the apparent contradiction between 
Collier's approach to Indian culture and religion on the one hand and 
his approach to economics and politics on the other. There is no real 
contradiction. The alternative to involving tribes in the context of the 
American political system was not that they would remain independent 
nation-states. It was that they would be extinguished entirely. I do not 
think there would be a single Indian tribe in existence today if it had not 
been for John Collier and the Indian Reorganization Act. People like 
Rupert Costo and others seem to think that the alternative was some 
ideal form of independent sovereignty, which simply was not in the 
cards. John Collier knew this. He was trying to save the "grouphood" 
of the Indian tribes from extinction. The Indian today would be merely 
an individual in the body politic of the United States but for John 
Collier and the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Most of the critiques of John Collier have simply overlooked this 
reality. They judge his work against an ideal standard, on the one hand, 
or against his character, on the other hand. Philleo Nash has contra-
dicted the assumption that he was nasty to people. But even if he was 
abrasive, even if he was mean to his sons, and even if he was contemp-
tuous with people who opposed him, that is irrelevant. If you judge 
what he did in terms of the Indian Reorganization Act, he saved the 
Indian tribes from extinction. There would not have been this turn-
about in Indian affairs without Collier. The American Indians would 
have disappeared as separate tribal entities. 
ROBERT BURNETTE 
I remember John Collier coming to the Rosebud Indian Boarding 
School and exactly what he said there. I felt like we were being fooled. 
I was not allowed to speak my language at the Indian boarding school. 
If we did, we got a whipping. But I did learn one thing: it was how 
to be real feisty and persistent. 
In 1946, I came home fresh out of the Marine Corps. The tribal 
council was not fully operative at that time. There was a credit com-
mittee that approved loans for selected individuals, if the superintendent 
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gave his approval. Once in a while, the tribal council would meet and 
the superintendent would record the proceedings. A big rancher by the 
name of Tom Arnold stood at the door after each council meeting. 
He paid off the councilmen. They each received three dollars to facili-
tate the exchange of tribal land. 
In 1951, I became a councilman. Three years later, I was elected 
chairman of the Rosebud Sioux tribe. The Rosebud Fair was taking 
place, and we had only five Indian dancers that were costumed to 
dance, from all of the Sioux nation in that area. I wondered, Why are 
there only five Indian dancers? What was happening to our culture 
and our religion? 
I went back up to the tribal council hall the next day and looked 
at our Rosebud Sioux tribal code, which comes from the Indian Reo-
ganization Act. There was a law on the books which prohibited the 
Lakota Indian religion, and there was another law that prohibited 
peyote. Members of the tribe received a $360 fine or six months in jail 
for committing either offense. A short time after I became chairman, 
we were confronted with termination and Public Law 280. We fought 
tooth and nail to get rid of it. I realized that this all came from a little 
brown book. It had all the law on the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
our charter, constitution, and bylaws. I quickly found out what IRA 
was all about. 
I soon discovered that there was another book called CFR-Title 
25-Indians. That book really put the harness on us. Not one of the 
eighteen councilmen-and some of them had been on there since the 
beginning of it-knew about CFR. That is how well-informed the 
superintendent kept them. 
I also found out there was an Indian affairs manual, and this 
manual contained the policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. It told 
the employees what they had to do. Being an ex-serviceman, who fought 
and almost died in World War II, it struck home that I was handcuffed. 
I could not get a loan from any bank because I was an Indian. It stirred 
me up something fantastic. So we started a battle that is still going 
on today. 
The Indian people do not have any rights. None of us are able 
to enter a United States district court and settle our grievances against 
our own elected leadership. We spent nine years fighting for the Indian 
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Civil Rights Act. I do not think there is hardly an Indian leader today 
who realizes that Public Law 280 disappeared because of this act. 
The Indian Reorganization Act was a suppressive kind of govern-
ment. This so-called Self-Determination Act is a deadly weapon against 
the Indians. It is misleading practically every Indian leader in this 
country into believing that some day they are going to have an Indian 
utopia where Indians can make their own decisions. That is not true, 
my friends. We have endorsed self-determination, not realizing that if 
we ever attain it there will also be an end to the government's trust 
responsibility; and that is something we need to think about. 
RUSSELL JIM 
Today, the tribes are faced with annihilation and extinction-no 
different than they were in the days of John Collier. The Yakima nation 
did not believe Collier was the one that saved Indian country. He 
does not sit at the right hand of God. But the Yakima nation commem-
orated Collier because of his perceptiveness. 
I fully agree about self-determination being one of the ruses 
brought on by the federal government. Each and every administration 
has contributed in one form or another toward the genocide of the 
indigenous people of this land. For instance, the Yakima nation and a 
few other timber tribes were lured, in 1977, to Billings, Montana. There, 
federal officials said, "Five million dollars will be divided among you 
if you will accept Public Law 93638 in its entirety." The Yakima said, 
"We do not need reforestation, and there are only certain portions of 
P.L. 93638 which we will accept." Within two weeks, that five million 
dollars mysteriously disappeared back into the United States treasury. 
The Yakima nation had a society that was like a government. We 
had unwritten rules and regulations. The formulation of Yakima self-
government was not easily achieved. Self-government such as the IRA 
is government proposed by the main stem of society. In our society 
everything was linked together, and it came from the laws of the 
Creator. Our unwritten laws are passed from heart-to-heart, generation-
to-generation. Whatever the IRA or P.L. 93-638 attempted to do, they 
were intended to assimilate us into the mainstream of society. 
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EARL OLD PERSON 
I came on board as a Blackfeet tribal leader in 1954, but I have 
also acted as an interpreter for the Indian people on my reservation. 
I cannot go along with the idea that someone such as John Collier came 
along and saved us. We have had very strong, dedicated leaders who 
were determined to help our people keep and to hang on to their land. 
These far-sighted leaders also were determined to preserve our beliefs. 
I think the Indian Reorganization Act gave a little more power to 
the government. According to the old-timers, it was brought to the 
people with a promise of self-government and the right to administer 
their own affairs. This sounded awful good to some of our people. But 
the full-blood people fought against the IRA. They were skeptical 
because of the many things that had taken place in the past. 
Many of my people referred to this law as the Wheel-law. And 
they said, "We are afraid of that wheel." Today they talk about this as 
a wheel that is rolling the opposite way. Those old leaders often con-
fronted Burton K. Wheeler. They said, "What about this law? We do 
not see how it is working for us, even though it might be working for 
a few people." The response often was "I thought that it was going 
to work for the Indian people, but it has been administered in a 
wrong way." 
The Blackfeet old-timers have often talked about the vote to accept 
the IRA. They said that it happened when the majority of people were 
not there because of bad weather. Once it existed on the reservation, 
they accepted it. They said, "All right, we are going to have to see what 
it is going to do for us." They were informed that after ten years they 
could either do away with it or change it. The Blackfeet did make 
amendments after ten years, but the people were still against it. We may 
have had tribal self-government, but I do not see where it changed in 
any significant way the previous governments that we had. 
Many of my people have wanted to do away with the IRA. But 
government officials told them, "You must come up with a program or 
something that will replace the IRA." They also said that "Other tribes 
are using it, and we can not do away with it because it is not working 
right for you." 
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We can see that we were not really given self-government. Back in 
the early 1950s, we wanted to sell a small sawmill. We went to our 
Bureau people, and they said, "You can not do it." The Blackfeet people 
responded, "No, we are going to go elsewhere for help." And so, we 
began to make our turn toward meaningful self-determination. 
LADoNNA HARRIS 
Economic development is not working under IRA because our 
instruments of government are inappropriate. We could spend lots of 
money, and it still would not work. We do not have the institutional 
structure to make it work. In reviewing what happened, I would like 
to think that John Collier's idea was great, but when it came to being 
implemented, somebody in the Bureau said, "Okay, what is constitu-
tional government?" And just like they used to do with the old lease 
agreements, someone pulled out an old constitution and passed it around 
the country. The Comanche and other tribes adopted it because the 
Bureau said that is what you should do in order to function. Nobody, 
including the Bureau, understood how it was actually going to work. 
As we became more enlightened and more sophisiticated, we 
realized that this document was not working. We have become mere 
extensions of a federal government in order to carry out federal pro-
grams. We are not governing ourselves in any sense of the word that 
governance means. Right now, everybody is in turmoil. Those first 
IRA instruments of government that we adopted never fit to begin with. 
They did not fit the uniqueness of each of the cultures, and they did not 
work. This is my perception of what happened to the Comanche. The 
Comanche said, "Well, we are going to pass this constitution to get white 
people off our back. Who needs it? We will not use it anyway." 
TED KATCHEAK 
I am going to explain how we view IRA in Alaska. In the past our 
village had a traditional council with no written charter. Decisions were 
made by word of mouth. The people got together in a place called 
Passigook. In the evening, when it cooled down, they sat around and 
talked about the events of the year. They also talked with certain 
people that had made trouble with the village. 
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My village has a charter and bylaws under the 1936 Alaska 
Reorganization Act. Because of that, I am here representing my village. 
I am also the co-chairman of the United Tribes of Alaska, which was 
formed last May. How I interpret the IRA or Alaska Reorganization Act 
in my village is different from the people here in the lower forty-eight. 
The Alaska Reorganization Act is the only thing that is left in the 
village that can speak for the people and protect their land. We really 
do not have a right to our land now, because the Alaska Native Settle-
ment Act extinguished our aboriginal rights and claims. We have some 
people living in my village who have been past ARA council members. 
They still want this act to be in the villages. It is the only tool that can 
work for the people. 
Perhaps there should be an alternative to the IRA. In some areas 
of Alaska, it does not work. It does not do what it is supposed to accom-
plish. The people have a lot of different problems. If you can find a 
meaningful alternative to IRA, I could be happy with some other form 
of self-government. 
PART Two 
Termination 
Omaha Indians at a temporary road camp near the Winnebago Agency 
in 1936 or 1937. 
The Navajo mounted patrol in the 1930s. 
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The Indians were descendants of peoples who knew, before the 
onslaught of a foreign culture, the freedom of the eagle on wing all 
across the North American continent. Under Crazy Horse they beat the 
pants off Custer on the Little Big Horn in a final attempt to preserve it. 
They won the battle but lost the war. They died mercilessly with Chief 
Big Foot at Wounded Knee because they did not have that freedom. 
The 1930s held a ray of hope that they would again see some of the 
freedom reappear with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
The rising tide of expectations for Indians soared into the 1940s. It dis-
appeared in the dark clouds of World War II. 
If Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito were bent on destroying free-
dom, Indians would gladly suffer their sons and daughters to join the 
battle; most of them did not wait to be drafted. The BIA offices were 
moved from the Capitol to make space for personnel needed there to 
prosecute the war. Tribal members left home for far away places to help 
build ships, tanks, and airplanes. At home they endured the effects of 
leaner budgets-no law and order personnel in some places, health 
facilities poorly staffed, if at all-and willingly gave up land for bomb-
ing ranges. All these and more hardships they cheerfully endured. 
The Indians believed that when the dark clouds of war passed from 
the skies overhead, their rising tide of expectations, though temporarily 
stalled, would again reappear. Instead, they were threatened by ter-
mination. After the devastation in Europe, there was the Marshall Plan; 
Japan had its course set by MacArthur. For the Indians, on the other 
hand, there was House Concurrent Resolution 108. Soaring expecta-
tions began to Plunge. Termination took on the connotation of extermi-
nation for many. 
Benjamin Reifel, Sioux, former congressman from 
South Dakota and commissioner of Indian affairs 
Has the relocation of Indian people been successful? The answer 
remains as complex and varied as the different people who participated 
in the program. Unquestionably, those people who took part in the 
process after 1958 (and who generally were better prepared for their 
urban experience) achieved a higher degree of" success" than did many 
of the earlier participants. Indeed, a significant number of Indians from 
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throughout the program's history have «made it" in the white man's 
world, and although many periodically revisit their former reservation 
communities, they remain permanently settled in their urban surround-
ings, successfully supporting themselves and their families. 
Others have been less fortunate. They have been poorly prepared 
to cope with life in the city and have continued to eke out a living in the 
fringe area of the urban environment. Shackled by the realities of city 
life, many of these people exist in a limbo comprised of poverty, welfare, 
and frustration. Of course poverty and frustration also existed back on 
the reservation, but within the tribal communities individuals had the 
security of membership in an extended circle of family and friends. 
There were heavy burdens to bear, but on the reservations the load 
could always be shared . ... 
There seems to be one general consensus about the Indians' urban 
existence. Separated from old friends and family and set adrift in an 
urban wasteland, many of the Indian people have gravitated toward 
new communities emerging in response to the impersonality of city life. 
Often centered around urban «Indian centers," new Indian communi-
ties have arisen in which the shared experiences of city life transcend 
many of the older ties to tribes and reservations. Almost all urban Indian 
people still identify themselves as members of tribal groups, but many 
have much more in common with other urban Indians, regardless of 
their tribal affiliations, than with their kinsmen back on the reservation. 
It is in the cities that the modern pan-Indian movement flourishes. 
Lumped together as "Indians" by whites, many urban Indian people 
have come to see themselves more as "Indians" and less as members 
of any particular tribe. It is ironic, therefore, that the BIA and the 
urban experience have done more to foster the pan-Indian movement 
than all the great chiefs of the past. 
R. David Edmunds, Cherokee, professor of 
history, Texas Christian University 
CHAPTER ONE 
Termination as Federal Policy: An Overview 
James E. Officer 
Thirty years ago this month, on August 1, 1953, the Eighty-third 
Congress put its stamp of approval on House Concurrent Resolution 
108. * With this action, the lawmakers declared themselves disposed, 
as a matter of official policy, to dissolve the special relationship that 
through much of the country's history had bound the federal govern-
ment to the Native American population. Nowhere in the resolution 
do we find any mention of the word termination that has come to carry 
such ominous portent in more recent times. Rather, the tone of the 
document is one of emancipation and equalization: "To end the ward-
ship status of the Indians and to grant them all of the rights and 
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship." 
Although the "whereas" clauses of the resolution state general 
policy, the "resolved" section is more specific. Singled out for mention 
as the first groups to be "freed from Federal supervision and control and 
from all disabilities and limitations applicable to Indians" are the Flat-
head tribe of Montana, the Klamath tribe of Oregon, the Menominee 
tribe of Wisconsin, the Potawatomie tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, the 
Chippewa of the Turtle Mountain Reservation in North Dakota, and 
all of the Indian tribes and "individual members thereof" located within 
the states of California, Florida, New York, and Texas. 
* The full text of the resolution has been reprinted many times. It and num-
erous other documents of major importance in the field of Indian administration are 
to be found in Part II of the book A Short History of the Indians of the United 
States by Edward H. Spicer (Van Norstrand Reinhold Company, 1969). 
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Some of the groups targeted by Congress in its 1953 action had 
enjoyed the questionable distinttion of being similarly mentioned on 
previous occasions. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Civil Service in 1947, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs William 
Zimmerman, Jr. had named the Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Pota-
watomi, Six Tribes of New York, certain of the California Indians, and 
-on a conditional basis-the Turtle Mountain Chippewa as groups 
that with proper precautions might be released immediately from 
federal supervision. In the Turtle Mountain case, the condition imposed 
by Zimmerman was that North Dakota, with federal financial assist-
ance, assume responsibility for the continuing administration of the 
affairs of all Indians within its jurisdiction, including, of course, the 
Turtle Mountain Chippewa. t 
In December 1952, just over five years after Zimmerman's reluc-
tant appearance on Capitol Hill, the Bureau of Indian Affairs provided 
Congress a new list of tribes that it considered ready for emancipation. 
That list, too, included the Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Pota-
watomi, and Turtle Mountain Chippewa as well as groups in New York 
and California; but it expanded Zimmerman's list considerably to cover 
all the Indians of Michigan, Texas, and Louisiana; most of those in 
western Washington and western Oregon; the Osage of Oklahoma; the 
Nez Perce and Coeur d'Alene of Idaho; and several small groups in 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa.:/: Given the length of the list submitted by 
the Indian Bureau in its 1952 report, it might be suggested that Con-
gress in Resolution 108 showed considerable restraint in targeting so few 
groups. While the Seminole of Florida were introduced to the roster as 
a congressional "add-on," the legislators omitted a number of others, 
perhaps-I might suggest cynically-because of the reluctance of par-
ticular congressmen to have their constituents singled out in this fashion. 
Later I shall discuss the actions that took place following the 
passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108, but before doing so, 
I should like to emphasize that the resolution, or one quite similar to it, 
might easily have come ten years earlier. In May 1943, Oklahoman 
t Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, H.R. Rep. 2053, 82nd Cong., 
2nd sess. (1952),161-178. 
:j: Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
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Elmer Thomas, chairman of the Senate Investigating Subcommittee 
and an adversary of John Collier from the beginning of that commis-
sioner's administration, prepared a report known as S-31O calling for 
abolition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Signed by such other senators 
as Burton K. Wheeler, co-author of the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
New Mexico's Dennis Chavez, Thomas's report stated that Commis-
sioner Collier's policies "promoted segregation, made the Indian a 
guinea pig for experimentation, tied him to the land in perpetuity, and 
made him satisfied with all the limitations of primitive life."* 
The full Congress-its attention diverted to the war effort-was 
scarcely in a position to give serious consideration to a dramatic internal 
move such as abolishing the BIA, but the House committee concerned 
with Indian affairs did hold hearings on the subject, to which they 
invited Commissioner Collier. t His appearance provided a public 
opportunity to point out the many deficiencies, distortions, and inaccu-
racies of the Senate report. It also supplied an occasion to place before 
the House subcommittee copies of letters addressed to Senator Thomas 
and signed by himself and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. These letters, 
both undoubtedly drafted by the commissioner, are masterpieces of the 
Collier writing style. * 
Both begin by expressing a certain amazement that a dedicated 
friend of the Indians such as the Oklahoma lawmaker could possibly 
have allowed his name to be associated in any way with such a sneaky 
attack. They go on to outline the basic recommendations of the report: 
closure of all day schools on allotted reservations; closure of boarding 
schools wherever situated; discontinuance of tuition payments to public 
school districts enrolling Indian youngsters; transfer of hospitals to the 
Public Health Service for general, as opposed to exclusively Indian, use; 
transfer of Indian forest management to the Department of Agricul-
ture; immediate liquidation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs; distribu-
tion of tribal funds to member Indians on a per capita basis; and 
* S. Rep. 310, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943). Quotes from this report are to be 
found in John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform 1920-1954 by Kenneth R. Philp 
(University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 208. 
t House Committee on Indian Affairs, Investigation of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 78th Congo (1944), pp. 28-29. 
* Ibid., pp. 30-39. 
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withdrawal of federal protection from all property, both individual 
and tribal. 
Paragraph by paragraph, the Collier/Ickes letters quote from the 
Senate report, pointing out the glaring errors contained therein. With 
respect to the expenses of operating day schools, the commissioner and 
secretary observe that their annual cost is but $408,200, as compared 
with the $2,000,000 alluded to in S-310. In response to a contention 
that the Indian Bureau duplicates the functions of the Federal Division 
of Forestry and Grazing, the Interior Department officials carefully 
point out that there is no such agency as the Federal Division of Forestry 
and Grazing. With respect to the charge that Indians are "tax evaders," 
Collier and Ickes take objection to the notion that the Indian immunity 
from taxation should be classified as "evasion." On and on, page after 
page, the letters highlight and attack the statements of the report. 
It is of passing interest to mention that in the Ickes letter to Senator 
Thomas, there is a reference to "terminating historic responsibilities."* 
This is one of the earliest instances I have encountered where the word 
"terminate" is used in any of its inflected forms to describe the process 
of ending the special relationship between Indians and the federal 
government. Even at the height of its actions to modify or dissolve this 
relationship, Congress carefully avoided employing the term, although 
it was used informally by members of that body, as well as by the 
Indians, the employees of the BIA, and the general public. 
Neither the fulminations of Senators Thomas, Wheeler, and 
Chavez nor the hearings that followed them led to any action such as 
House Concurrent Resolution 108, but the fuss stirred up over S-31O 
and the commissioner's angry reaction to it did have some effect on 
Indian administration in the last years of Collier's term of office. Con-
gressman Jed Johnson of Oklahoma, like his Senate colleague a bitter 
opponent of Collier, used his influence in the House Appropriations 
Committee to trim the BIA budget for fiscal year 1945 by $2,000,000-
a sum that seems small by today's standards, but which at that time 
represented a disastrous cut. t Although Collier, when he resigned from 
his position in January 1945, cited his growing interest in international 
* Ibid., p. 38. 
t Philp, p. 38. 
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affairs as the principal reason for his decision, t it seems not unlikely that 
he was also influenced by his discouragement over the constant and 
often losing battles with Congress and over the dogged determination of 
some of its members to "solve" the Indian problem by doing away with 
tribes, reservations, and the BIA. 
William A. Brophy, Collier's successor, took office in March 1945, 
having established as one of his goals the passage of legislation creating 
a tribunal for hearing and deciding Indian claims against the federal 
government, something Collier had long advocated.* He succeeded in 
this endeavor in the late summer of 1946, thanks to an improvement 
in congressional-BIA relations following Collier's departure and, not 
unimportantly either, to the fact that the policy tide on Capitol Hill was 
running increasingly in the direction of withdrawing the federal govern-
ment from so much responsibility in Indian affairs. The record of 
hearings on the various Indian claims bills considered in the seventy-
ninth Congress makes clear that some powerful legislators believed that 
resolution of Indian claims would remove a major barrier to federal 
withdrawal and, where awards were made to tribes, would help to 
launch them on the way to economic self-sufficiency. Certain attorneys 
who later would become wealthy from fees earned in claims cases did 
little to discourage this thesis, and some openly espoused it. t 
It would be a misrepresentation of the intent of Congress for me 
to suggest that the sole, or even the principal, reason for creating the 
Indian Claims Commission was to clear away underbrush that impeded 
the swift retreat of the federal government from its special responsibili-
ties for Indians and Indian tribes; but it would be equally wrong for me 
to ignore that, for at least a few key congressmen, this was a primary 
reason for supporting the legislation. The late Arthur V. Watkins, who 
entered the United States Senate shortly after passage of the 1946 Act 
and who today is identified both with the commission that it created 
tIndians at Work, Volume 12, No.5, pp. 2-3. In this issue of the publication 
he directed during his administration, Collier includes a copy of his letter of resigna-
tion directed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 19, 1945. 
* Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1946, "Office of Indian 
Affairs," pp. 377-378. 
t H.R. Rep. 1466, 79th Congo (1945), p. 1351; and Investigation of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, p. 16. 
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and with the so-called termination policy, wrote in an article pub-
lished in 1958: 
Completely within the historic policy of Congress in working toward the 
elimination of special controls over Indians is its concept of the role of the 
Indian Claims Commission. The Commission assures legal settlement of 
long-standing claims for redress against the federal government, which many 
Indians believe should he a necessary condition precedent to effective 
decontrol consideration':!: 
In view of the foregoing, I am suggesting that, rather than visualize 
House Concurrent Resolution 108 as something dropped out of the blue 
into the congressional hopper at the beginning of the Eighty-third Con-
gress in January 1953, we view it realistically as the culmination of a 
long and determined effort first manifested formally in the Claims 
Commission Act. In truth, from 1946 until enactment of the amend-
ments to Public Law 83-280 in 1968, Congress took no formal action 
that we can clearly interpret as a retreat from the withdrawal policy 
articulated in House Concurrent Resolution 108. Although the defeat 
of the proposed heirship bills in 1964 signalled a victory for the Indian 
lobby, in that same session Congress directed the preparation of a pro-
gram for withdrawal of all special federal services from the Seneca 
Indians of New York. Two years later, in 1966, the Senate Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs castigated the Indian Bureau for drag-
ging its feet in planning for termination of the Choctaw and the Seneca; 
and Colville termination legislation remained under consideration for 
some time thereafter. Thus, if we are to look at the subject of termina-
tion from the congressional perspective, we must expand our time frame 
to more than just the decade of the 1950s. 
Fewer than six months after passage of the Claims Commission Act, 
the Senate Committee on Civil Service, under the direction of William 
Langer, zeroed in on the Bureau of Indian Affairs as one of several 
federal agencies to be questioned about an excess of employees. Accord-
ing to popular belief in Congress then as now, the BIA is an organization 
bloated with personnel whose salaries and travcI expenses drain off the 
t Arthur V. Watkins, "Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of 
Restrictions Over Indian Property and Person," American Indians and American 
Life, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vo!' 311 
( 1957). 
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vast sums that Congress appropriates for the direct benefit of Indians 
and Indian tribes. 
Commissioner William A. Brophy was called upon to testify before 
the committee not long after it began its inquiry. Being ill, he was 
unable to comply, and it fell to Bill Zimmerman, the assistant commis-
sioner, to respond. Upon the advice of Interior Department attorneys, 
he declined to do so. The Senate countered by placing him under 
subpoena. 
The testimony finally presented by Zimmerman is lengthy and 
detailed.* He began by taking issue with certain drastic recommenda-
tions made by the House committee that three years before had con-
ducted hearings on Senator Thomas's report. He went on to suggest 
that there could be two approaches to reducing the number of Indian 
Bureau employees-one being that of cutting back on the number and 
extent of services offered to Indians; the other, that of diminishing the 
size of the client population through withdrawing federal services 
altogether from some tribes. Zimmerman then divided BIA field units 
into three groups according to the condition of the tribes they compre-
hended: those from whom Indian Bureau services might be immedi-
ately withdrawn if certain criteria were met, those that might be ready 
for such withdrawal within ten years, and those that would require an 
indefinite time span of preparation before attaining such readiness. 
From comments he made to mc during the six months we served 
together on Secretary Stewart Udall's task force, I know that Bill 
Zimmerman was bitter over the use later made of his 1947 testimony. 
He was particularly disturbed that so little attention was paid to the 
four criteria he had proposed with respect to determining the readiness 
of a tribe for termination. These werc its members' degree of accultura-
tion, their economic condition, thcir willingness to end their special 
relationship with the federal government, and the willingness and ability 
of the states in which they lived to assume responsibility for their welfare. 
Based on the events that transpired following Zimmerman's testi-
mony, there seems little doubt that the leadership of the Indian Bureau 
considered termination to be the basic thrust of federal policy. Not long 
after he appeared before the Senate committee, the acting commissioner 
* Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, pp. 161-178. 
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sent a directive to the heads of field units instructing them to pull 
together data from previous surveys of reservation resources in anticipa-
tion of major programs of economic and social development. t In this 
directive, he noted that beginning in 1943, many jurisdictions had 
prepared comprehensive long range development plans. These, said 
Zimmerman, would serve as the basis of efforts over the next few years. 
The objective of the programs, remarked the acting commissioner, 
"should be the eventual discharge of the Federal government's obliga-
tion, legal, moral, or otherwise, and the discontinuance of Federal super-
vision and control at the earliest possible date compatible with the 
government's trustee responsibility." He announced further that certain 
reservations had been selected to begin the effort and that these were 
divided into three categories: those in which the Indians had "pro-
gressed in the use of their resources and in adapting themselves to 
competitive society to such a degree as would warrant the withdrawal of 
the Indian Service in the near future," those "in an intermediate state," 
and those "in need of major rehabilitation continued over a period 
of years." 
In October, 1948, four months after the ailing Commissioner 
Brophy had resigned, the Project Committee on Indian Affairs of the 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment~better known as the Hoover Commission~issued its long 
awaited report. Assimilation of the Indian population was highlighted 
as the major goal of federal policy, and the authors of the report 
observed that, under the trusteeship of the BIA, Indians had lost the 
education and experience necessary to manage their own affairs.:\: 
Late in the spring of 1949, John Ralph Nichols, who had served on 
the Hoover Commission, was named to head the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. He remained in the office only eleven months, but in his annual 
t Circular No. 36575, May 28, 1948, National Archives, Record Group 75, 
Numbered Circular File. Zimmerman refers to this circular in his annual report for 
1948, but states that the date of issue was April, rather than May. He also provides 
additional background concerning reservation economic development planning dur-
ing the Collier administration. See Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 
1948, "Bureau of Indian Affairs," pp. 370-371. 
:j: Charles J. Rhoads, John R. Nichols, Gilbert Darlington, and George A. 
Graham, "Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs to the Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the Government," (October 1948), pp. 54-55. 
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report for 1949, he clearly favored withdrawal of the federal govern-
ment from its special role in Indian affairs as rapidly as the tribes could 
be prepared to take over. He also cited two instances-those of the 
Stockbridge-Munsee of Wisconsin and the Saginaw Chippewa of 
Michigan-wherein tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization 
Act had requested withdrawal of the Interior Department from super-
vision of certain of their affairs. Although Nichols obviously viewed 
these as cases that he would have classified under the heading of "termi-
nation," they much more closely resemble what we today describe as 
"self-determination. ,,* 
Midway through Nichols' abbreviated term, Congress enacted 
legislation transferring civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Agua 
Caliente reservation at Palm Springs to the state of California. t From 
this point on, as an important aspect of preparing tribes for termina-
tion, the legislators would give special attention to matters involving 
jurisdiction. 
Replacing Nichols in May 1950 as commissioner of Indian affairs 
was Dillon S. Myer, who, during World War II, had been director of 
the War Relocation Authority. Myer and Collier had clashed over the 
operation of Japanese relocation centers on Indian reservations some 
years before, and the new commissioner had little love for either Collier's 
policies or his friends. He undertook a thorough housecleaning of the 
Washington office of the BIA, and among those associates of Collier who 
departed shortly thereafter was Bill Zimmerman, who for all intents 
and purposes had run the agency during the preceding three years. 
Much of Myer's attention during his first year in office was devoted 
to restructuring the Bureau and making other preparations for a full-
scale effort to get Indian tribes ready for a drastic change in their 
relationship with the federal government. He felt that one of the keys 
to the success of this endeavor was the creation of a programming unit, 
free from the day-to-day operations of the agency, that could work with 
the Indians in planning for their ultimate release from federal supervi-
* Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1949, "Bureau of Indian 
Affairs," p. 337. 
t Act of October 5,1949, P. L. 322, 81st Congo 
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sion and controP Shortly after the middle of 1951, he had such a unit 
in place. Toward the end of the first session of the Eighty-second Con-
gress, the Interior Department secured the introduction of legislation 
drafted by the program unit and directed toward termination of special 
federal services to the Indians of California and those of the Grande 
Ronde-Siletz Reservation in Oregon. Also introduced were bills aimed 
at the transfer of jurisdiction over Indian reservations to the states of 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, California, Oregon, and Washington.* 
The termination strategy of Dillon Myer included another dimen-
sion beyond those of overall withdrawal programs for particular reser-
vations and general transfers of civil and criminal jurisdiction to the 
states. This strategy involved the systematic dismantling of the service 
structure of the BIA through transfer of its functions to other federal 
agencies, to the states, and to the tribes. The latter effort was well 
advanced before the end of 1951, as Commissioner M yer makes clear 
in his annual report for fiscal year 1952. In that document, the com-
missioner discusses activities planned or underway to accelerate the 
enrollment of Indian youngsters in public schools and to place the 
responsibility for Indian health with "the appropriate state and local 
agencies." The latter goal had been made more accessible, he noted, 
through passage by Congress of Public Law 82-291 that authorized 
transfer of Indian Service hospitals to other agencies and permitted the 
admittance of non-Indians as patients in BIA hospitals in those areas 
where no other facilities were availablc. t The tone of Myer's 1952 
report is more decidedly positive with respect to a major change in the 
federal-Indian relationship than any of its predecessor documents, and 
any history of recent termination policy must take account of it as a 
major research item. 
None of the pieces of termination legislation considered by the 
Eighty-second Congress became law, although the bill to transfer juris-
diction to the state of California made it through the House of Repre-
sentatives. These items were introduced again at the beginning of the 
t Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1951, "Bureau of Indian 
Affairs," p. 353. 
* Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1952, "Bureau of Indian 
Affairs," p. 389-390. 
t Ibid., p. 390. 
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Eighty-third Congress early in 1953, and by that time, the Department 
of the Interior had other bills drafted, or in preparation, for the 
Klamath of Oregon, the Alabama and Coushatta of Texas, the Chiti-
macha of Louisiana, and the Prairie Island Band of Minnesota. Acting 
Commissioner W. Barton Greenwood, in the annual report of 1953, 
observed that termination planning was also well under way for the 
Osage of Oklahoma, the Menominee of Wisconsin, the Colville and 
Spokane of Washington, the Flathead of Montana, and a large number 
of smaller tribes throughout the western states. Greenwood noted too 
that one of the Indian Service hospitals had been transferred to a locally 
organized group, and three others had been closed after arrangements 
were completed for the care of Indian patients in other facilities. 
Furthermore, he mentioned the drastic cutback in the variety and extent 
of BIA services to California Indians as a major move in the direction 
of complete federal withdrawal from that state.~ 
When one takes account of all the developments I have cited to 
this point, it should be clear that House Concurrent Resolution 108 was 
in a sense almost anticlimatic. While it may have put the Eighty-third 
Congress on record in a general way as favoring termination, it was by 
no means the powerful policy document it has often been represented as 
being. Long before its passage, the Bureau of Indian Affairs felt it 
already had a congressional mandate to change its historic relationship 
with Native Americans, and it was moving more rapidly in that direc-
tion than was the Congress. Thus, we must distort the facts somewhat to 
argue that HCR 108 produced a termination policy, just as we must 
distort them to suggest that its repeal~something still advocated by 
many Indian spokesmen~would signal permanent abandonment of 
such a policy. 
What really happened in 1953 and 1954 is that an incubation 
process underway for at least a decade finally hatched some chicks. 
Two weeks after passing House Concurrent Resolution 108, Congress 
directed the birth of the first of those chicks~Public Law 83-280. This 
was the act that provided for transfer of legal jurisdiction over Indian 
reservations to several named states and authorized others to assume 
:j: Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1953, "Bureau of Indian 
Affairs," pp. 24-25. 
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jurisdiction upon their own initiative. By this time, Glenn Emmons, 
a banker from New Mexico, had been sworn in as the commissioner of 
Indian affairs. Himself sympathetic with the policy of federal with-
drawal, Emmons inherited the administrative machinery to implement 
that policy that his predecessor had so carefully put together. 
Major withdrawal legislation affecting particular tribes came out 
of the second session of the Eighty-third Congress in 1954. Among the 
tribes involved were the comparatively large and wealthy Menominee 
of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon-both owners of extensive 
timber resources. Also passed were acts to terminate services to the 
Indians of western Oregon, small Paiute bands in Utah, and the mixed-
bloods of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Approved, too, was legis-
lation to transfer administrative responsibility for the Alabama and 
Coushatta Indians to the state of Texas. Finally, the second session of 
the Eighty-third Congress passed an act providing for transfer of health 
programs from the BIA to the United States Public Health Service. 
Early in the first session of the Eighty-fourth Congress, bills were 
submitted to withdraw services from Wyandotte, Ottawa, and Peoria 
tribes of Oklahoma. These were finally enacted early in August 1956, 
a month after passage of legislation directing the Colville Confederated 
Tribes of Washington to come up with a termination plan of their own. 
During the second administration of President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Congress enacted only three termination bills relating to specific 
tribes or groups. Affected by this legislation were the Choctaw of 
Oklahoma, for whom the termination process was never completed, 
the Catawba of South Carolina, and the Indians of the California 
rancherias. Other withdrawal bills were considered, but by 1958 when 
Interior Secretary Fred Seaton stated that the administration would not 
support legislation to terminate tribes without their consent, much of 
the momentum generated prior to 1953 had been lost. 
In spite of the change in the administration's position enunciated 
by Secretary Seaton, withdrawal programming continued to capture the 
time and attention of BIA employees during all the Emmons commis-
sionership. The Bureau placed heavy emphasis on education, resource 
development, and job training and placement-all services destined to 
make the reservation populations more self-sufficient. The Indian 
Health Service concentrated on providing and expanding hospital and 
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clinic facilities and on improving the quality of water supplies and 
sewage disposal systems in Indian communities. Congressmen who fav-
ored the termination thrust, as well as those opposed or indifferent to it, 
voted increasingly larger appropriations for achieving goals set by Com-
missioner Emmons and his staff. Thus, it is well to keep in mind that 
while the decade of the 1950s produced strong emphasis on ways of 
getting the federal government out of the Indian business, it was also a 
period during which the quality and quantity of services to reservation 
populations were substantially increased and improved. 
One dilemma of federal administrators at this time stemmed from 
the fact that Indian leaders were often reluctant to encourage their 
followers to take advantage of new and enlarged service programs, 
because they felt that if these programs were successful, the advent of 
termination for all tribes would be hastened. The so-called relocation 
program was a particularly good example of this concern. Early in the 
history of its development, this activity came to be viewed by many as 
a deliberate effort to depopulate the reservations and, thus, make it 
easier for the federal government to discontinue its subsidies for main-
taining schools, hospitals, and other social service facilities in Indian 
communities. Rather than encouraging Indians to leave the reserva-
tions, these persons argued, the Bureau should stimulate the develop-
ment of local resources and, in this fashion, create employment oppor-
tunities for Indians within an environment familiar to them. The pro-
gram of off-reservation training and placement did enjoy considerable 
favor with young Indian men and women, thousands of whom availed 
themselves of its services, but it remained under attack from tribal 
leaders until the BIA in 1980 finally shut down its urban employment 
centers. 
The impact of termination programming throughout the decade 
of the 1950s was clearly revealed to members of Secretary Udall's Task 
Force on Indian Affairs during the hearings they conducted on Indian 
reservations early in 1961. Spokesmen for small tribes in the Great 
Lakes area, the Pacific Northwest, the Great Basin, and the state of 
California demonstrated particular anxiety about their vulnerbility, 
feeling themselves too politically impotent to combat the proponents of 
termination. But even the representatives of the larger tribes expressed 
concern about what might happen to them. Impressed by the testimony 
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offered by Indians everywhere they went, the task force members in 
their final report recommended that termination per se be abandoned 
as a goal of federal Indian policy. 
From the beginning, officials of the Kennedy administration found 
themselves confronting termination issues on all sides. The Menominee 
withdrawal program, legislated in 1954, had dragged on through the 
Eisenhower years and was scheduled for conclusion in 1961 following 
Kennedy'S inauguration. Certain conditions remained to be satisfied 
before the Choctaw program, approved by Congress in 1956, could be 
fully implemented. Withdrawal of services to the California rancherias 
demanded continuing effort, there were aspects of the Klamath pro-
gram still pending, and the congressional mandate for preparation of 
a Colville termination program had not been complied with. In addi-
tion, some members of Congress were pushing for termination of the 
Seneca as part of the price for legislation to compensate those Indians 
for lands they had lost as a result of dam construction on the Allegheny 
River. A number of issues related to the transfer of jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations from the federal to state governments also remained 
to be addressed. In short, the spectre of termination did not disappear 
with the change of administrations. 
As if further to emphasize the vitality of withdrawal programming 
as a part of national Indian policy, the comptroller general in March 
1961 published a report strongly opposing the necessity of Indian con-
sent prior to passage of termination legislation and exhorting the Interior 
Department to get busy with drafting bills to terminate those tribes that 
the Indian Bureau had earlier declared ready to "assume their responsi-
bilities."* Senator Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico, the powerful 
chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, was par-
ticularly taken with the recommendations of the comptroller and at a 
private breakfast with Secretary Udall and members of the task force 
late in the summer of 1961 strongly endorsed them. 
Suffice it to say that termination issues were around to be dealt with 
during all the decade of the 1960s, although the tide began to turn 
* Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General of 
the United States, "Review of Certain Aspects of the Program for the Termination of 
Federal Supervision over Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the 
Interior," (March 1961), p. 18. 
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strongly in the Indians' favor with passage in 1968 of the amendments 
to Public Law 280 of which we spoke previously. The decade of the 
1970s opened with repeal or modication of other bills concerned with 
termination, and until about 1978, Congress seemed determined to 
wipe out the record of the 1950s. However, during the past five or six 
years, some congressmen, responding to constituents in various parts of 
the country, have submitted new legislative proposals that remind us 
that withdrawal of the special status enjoyed by Indians is by no means 
a dead issue. 
A former tribal chairman and executive secretary of the National 
Congress of American Indians has suggested that the so-called "self-
determination" policy, if successful, will lead ultimately to severance of 
the special relationship between the government of the United States 
and its Indian citizens. Exploring the implications of that hypothesis 
should be worth some of our time. At the heart of this special relation-
ship is, of course, the trustee responsibility. Treaties have been abrogated 
or ignored, and congressional acts amended or appealed; yet the Indians 
survive and tribal identities remain-due in some measure at least to the 
preservation of a land base through continuation of the trust. 
A valid question to ask ourselves is whether trusteeship-which 
many apparently feel is essential to the social and cultural survival of 
Indians-is consistent with the concept of self-rule, the primary theme 
of our discussion. If the self-rule we have in mind is one that emphasizes 
such notions as "nationhood" and "ultimate sovereignty" in their most 
exaggerated forms, then I suggest that the concepts are not compatible. 
On the other hand, if we are willing to settle for the "limited self-rule" 
concept that John Collier had in mind when he proposed the Indian 
Reorganization Act, self-rule or "self-determination" may not be incon-
sistent with retention of a trust relationship with the federal government, 
although a definition of that relationship in more specific terms than is 
the present case may be required. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 
Philleo Nash, Sol Tax, R. David Edmunds, 
Gary Orfield, Ada Deer 
The termination policy was one of the most radical social policy 
experiments of the twentieth century. It was, ironically, inflicted on defense-
less Indian tribes by very strong conservatives acting under the banner of 
such basic conservative principles as "free enterprise" and dismantling of 
bureaucracies. The idea was to "liberate" Indians from reservations and 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and to force them to become participants in 
what the advocates saw as the superior social and economic arrangements 
off the reservations. This is one of the oldest and most frequently recurring 
themes in Indian policy. When it had been done before through dividing 
Indian lands, through turning reservations over the missionaries, through 
taking children from their homes to boarding schools, the results had been 
damaging and the policies were eventually reversed. When another round 
of conservative reformers took the reins of Indian policy in 1953, in the 
first period of GOP control of Congress and the White House since the 
1920s, the central policy goal was to "terminate" federal protections and 
services for tribes that Congress decided were ready to exist without them. 
The experiment had a devastating impact on the tribes selected, and termi-
nation became the great issue in Indian policy for a generation. 
Gary Orfield, professor of political science, 
University of Chicago 
The NCAI, in its early years, was put in a very difficult position when 
Wade Crawford and other Indian claimants, who lived in Washington, 
breathed down the necks of the NCAI everyday to hasten termination. 
Some of the Menominees also were living in Washington. They pushed for 
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termination. The NeAl was caught up in a terrible conflict. Do you 
fight the government of a tribe that is opposed to the position of your 
organization? 
Helen Peterson, Oglala Sioux, 
former executive director, NeAl 
PHILLEO NASH 
Termination is a bad word, a bad name, and an evil thought. 
Nevertheless, it was with us. We all tend to think of the Congress and 
the \Vashington scene as the primary source of the termination push. 
We also see the Indian Bureau itself, particularly in that helpless flound-
ering period from 1945 until 1958, as being responsible for the policy of 
termination. We are talking about a rather long period, in which House 
Resolution 108 comes up almost as a piece of froth on the surface of a 
very deep undertow. 
What were some of the sources of that undertow? There were 
amazing combinations of people in that drive for termination. The 
liberal establishment compared reservations to concentration camps and 
thought of the Indian Bureau as a manager of prisoners of war. We also 
must include a segment of the Indian people which saw, in their love/ 
hate relationship with the Bureau, an opportunity to get rid of a very 
uncomfortable and, at times, menacing overseer. Finally, we must not 
eliminate greed from the picture, because termination brought with it 
the concept of freedom of property. Who would have been the owners 
if the trust status on Indian land had been completely dissolved? 
There were some interesting thrusts on the other side. One of the 
principal beneficiaries of the federal aid programs for Indians over the 
years had been the state and local governments. They had been relieved 
of very costly obligations for schools, welfare, and roads in the states that 
had large Indian populations. Where termination was effectuated, it 
was not only very damaging to the Indian people but extremely costly 
to the state and local governments. 
The main thrust behind termination was Congress, which had long 
defined the Indian Bureau as the Indian problem. There is a very deep 
problem in the American value system. We non-Indians came as con-
querors. We were greeted with hospitality and we met hospitality with 
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rebuff and force. We are aware of that and we carry this guilt within us, 
but we do not intend to give the land back. Consequently, there has 
to be an enemy. Are we the enemy? That is a very difficult thing to 
admit. Is the Indian the enemy? God forbid! Well, there must be an 
enemy. So, we make the Indian commissioner and the Bureau the 
enemy. We have this love/hate relationship between the Indians and 
the Bureau. 
I served as a member of the Kennedy Task Force on Indian Affairs. 
The task force decided that the only way to cope with termination as an 
issue was to come out against it and then say: "Let's not talk about it 
because it is getting in the way of communication between the federal 
agencies, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian people." This 
did not win us friends in the Congress of the United States. 
I had to be evasive in order to obtain confirmation by the United 
States Senate as Indian commissioner. If I had said, I think that the 
Indian people are entitled to federal services in perpetuity the same as 
any other defined group, such as farmers, labor, and business, you can be 
certain that I would have gone back to my farm much sooner. 
The question was how long would termination last as congressional 
policy. Termination was the denial of Indian culture, the denial of 
Indian self-government, and the denial of tribalism. And this goes back 
to the very earliest days of the republic. 
The Constitution of 1789 gives the executive branch of the federal 
government the exclusive right to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. 
Indian individuals in that same document were denied a position in the 
body politic. Indians not taxed were put in the same category with 
slaves. This tells us something about the basic premises of the interac-
tion between the American people as a whole and the Indian sub portion 
of it. The founding fathers could have created, and they did not, a union 
of states and tribes. Instead, they waffled, and we have confusion in 
which special interests of every kind, well intended and evil, have an 
opportunity to operate. 
The Indian Bureau is the unit of government which is charged with 
buffering this interphase. Its goals have never been clearly stated-the 
undercurrent of goals is what I am talking about. There is a denial of 
Indian personhood and a denial of tribal status. Tribal governments 
are a thorn in the state and federal system. They make the state and the 
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other federal agencies most uncomfortable, especially those in the 
Interior Department other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The Indian commissioner has to fight a continuous battle with the 
other bureau chiefs for the Indian people's share of what is appropriated 
through their agencies. It is a difficult and ambiguous role. It is one 
which I filled for five trouble-filled, but very happy, years, and I can 
tell you I did not leave voluntarily and I never would have. 
SOL TAX 
Termination is part of a basic assumption that all Americans tend 
to make, and that is that the Indians will disappear. This has been going 
on for a long time. Sooner or later, if you put a few drops of glue into 
an ocean of water, the glue disappears. Assimilation was the solution 
for people who had guilt feclings about our treatment of Indians. There 
would no longer be any Indians. 
The remarkable thing that I learned in the 1930s and 1940s was 
that not one Indian I ever knew made that assumption, and yet, when 
the Indians had to go before the Washington authorities, they would not 
deny it. Indian leaders wanted to get things done for their people. They 
also were exceedingly courteous and polite. When I began to learn 
what was going on, the Indians were pleased when I got up before white 
people and said what was really in their minds. 
Indians really do not want to become like us. They prefer to do 
things in their own way. They are willing, as we are not, to let others 
live their own life, but they are not going to change their culture to 
please us. 
Nothing is ever as crystal clear as it seems. The Indians had to live 
too. In order to live, they had a deal with white people. They could not 
avoid, forever, contact with white culture. But the one thing that they 
would not accept was the thought of their own demise and disappear-
ance. They had come out of the earth and went to the sky in their own 
country, and they were not going to be like us. I came to understand 
this difference after living with Indians. 
Before I began to write on this subject, very few people, if any, 
every voiced publicly and in print the idea that the Indians were going 
to be with us forever. When the atom bomb shelters were being con-
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structed and nuclear fallout maps were made, they left out most Indian 
areas. The bombs were not going to drop there first. Instead, New York, 
Chicago, and other places would be destroyed. I told my white friends, 
"If you think the Indians are going to disappear, now they think that 
you are." 
Dillon Myer was the father of real termination. He was in charge 
of Japanese-American relocation. Myer had a lot of anthropologists 
on his staff. He took many of them from John Collier's original collec-
tion of people at the Bureau of Indian Affairs. These anthropologists, 
and others, tried to tell Myer that he should leave the Japanese in their 
camps because the outside world was dangerous for them. 
Myer did not take their advice. It turned out that the Japanese 
got along beautifully when they relocated. For example, ten thousand 
of them went to Chicago and immediately got jobs. It was war time 
and they had no problems. After that, M yer refused to listen to any-
body's advice. Myer was the first man in history to end a federal bureau 
-the War Relocation Authority. That is why they made him com-
missioner of Indian affairs. 
R. DAVID EDMUNDS 
Conceptions of Indians held by the white public are at the heart of 
the problem of termination. The vanishing redman concept is part of it. 
It is untrue, but most whites, especially those who have limited contact 
with Indian people, certainly subscribe to it. In history, it is not so 
important really what happened as what people think has happened. 
Termination and relocation are logical outgrowths of how the 
white majority has envisoned Indian people and how their misconcep-
tions have shaped Indian policy. There is an interesting paradox in the 
history of race relations in this country. The Indian people are the only 
racial minority that whites have generally tried to assimilate. Whites 
have taken great pains to segregate blacks, Chicanos, and Asians. The 
thrust of the black civil rights movement, especially in the 1960s, was 
for a bigger slice of the American pie. Black people were saying, "You 
have held us out long enough. We want to be part of it." Whites were 
saying, especially in the South, "You cannot have it." 
In contrast to that, whites have said to Native Americans for years, 
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"Come on in." Indian people, to their credit, have said, "We do not 
want in." Indian resistance to assimilation puzzles white people very 
much. They cannot understand why Indian people refuse to become 
white. In order to change Indian people whites have designed programs 
to "educate" Indians. The assumption has been that if Indians were 
"educated" they would eagerly accept the dominant culture. 
The question remains, why did whites try to assimilate Indians? 
The answer is based upon the image of Indian people held by large parts 
of the white public. Once white people gained military control over 
Indian people, they began to have guilt feelings, and they created 
romanticized images of Indian people. As whites, through superior 
technology or superior numbers, gained military control, they con-
cluded, "Oh, the Indian people whom we have defeated are very 
brave." This enhanced the white image of themselves. It took superior 
persons to defeat such brave people. After the Indians were under mili-
tary control, they became less of a threat. It was safe to create stereotype 
images of noble savages. 
During the first part of thc twentieth century there were several 
fraternal organizations called the noble lodges of the redmen. There 
were not any Indians in those groups. But they were based upon the 
concept of the noble savage. 
Throughout the rest of this century, whites have believed that 
Indian people are a rural minority even though Indian people have 
moved into the cities in large numhers. From the white urbanite per-
spective, the Indians are a safe minority because they are living some 
place in the West. They also think that Indians are vanishing Americans. 
We know that is not correct. 
This position is not shared by white people who live where Indian 
people are the dominant minority. Obviously, Indian people who are 
living in South Dakota or parts of Arizona or New Mexico do not think 
that they are a favored minority, and they certainly are not. In those 
states the Indian people exert enough influence to threaten the white 
majority. 
The 1950s was a logical time for termination to occur. It was a 
period of great conformity in the United States. Congress went around 
investigating "un-American activities." 
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During this period, federal policy makers and pressure groups 
championed termination. Many of the individuals that favored termi-
nation were well-meaning people. They believed that they were offering 
Indian people an opportunity to join mainstream society. They were 
doing this, not to Indians, but for Indians. The real tragedy is that 
many whites then and now still cannot comprehend that Indian people 
could want anything other than a white existence. This still may be the 
greatest obstacle to Indian self-rule. Today, such people in Washington 
D.C. are a great threat to the Indian future. 
GARY ORFIELD 
As a political scientist, I see things a little differently from histor-
ians, anthropologists, and people who have grand policy perspectives. 
I keep trying to look at the machinery: what went wrong and what 
problems led particular tribes to the termination disaster. Why did the 
federal government adopt such an idiotic policy? It makes no sense to 
dump impoverished tribes on county and state governments without any 
planning whatever. There was not a shred of intelligent economic 
analysis in most of the termination cases. 
It seems to me that we must examine the general political climate 
and social policy at the time these things were adopted. Who was 
controlling the Congress? What does that show about the nature of the 
decision-making process? Why did some of the termination proposals 
go through and some not? The Flathead and Seminole were not termi-
nated . What does that show? Even at the worst times, some tribes were 
able to protect themselves and others were not. What can we learn 
from that? 
We can also learn from the remarkable part of this story, which is 
the restoration legislation that reversed termination. How did that 
happen and why? And what does that show about the probability of 
termination ever happening to anybody again? 
Considered in a broader social policy context, termination was part 
of a general reaction to the New Deal. It came up in the late 1940s, 
when there was a strong conservative movement against New Deal 
legislation, all kinds of emergency programs, and price controls. The 
Congress elected in 1946 was the first Republican Congress since the 
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New Deal. It was elected on a campaign theme, "had enough." The 
first people it chose to diminish the burden of government were the 
people who were least able to defend their government services: the 
Indians were targeted. 
Termination was enacted during the first Congress of the Eisen-
hower administration. We had not had conservative control of both the 
presidency and Congress since 1930, when the Democrats took over 
Congress. These new political actors were very conservative. Termina-
tion was enacted, in part, because decisions about Indians were made 
by the interior committees in Congress. Those committees were loaded 
with conservative westerners, and very few politicians off those com-
mittees cared about what happened in Indian affairs. The cost of learn-
ing enough to do anything about Indian policy was just too much. 
Most of the decisions on Indian affairs are made by a few people on 
subcommittees. Almost nobody wants to serve on those subcommittees, 
because there is very little political mileage to be made. They are lots of 
trouble because Indian affairs are so complicated. 
Conditions were ripe for a general conservative effort to cut back 
government. The Eisenhower administration wanted to turn federal 
aid programs over to the state and local governments. In a situation 
like that the pressure goes out generally, but succeeds where there is the 
least resistance. No federal aid programs were turned over to the state 
and local governments by the Eisenhower administration, because the 
state and local governments said, we do not want them. They were able 
only to cut things that had very weak constituencies such as public 
housing and Indian affairs. 
One reason this legislation passed was that nobody seriously tried 
to block it. When hearings were held on a number of these termina-
tion bills, there was no testimony against the termination. The Indians 
who came testified in favor of the legislation. As far as Congress knew, 
the tribes had given their consent. Members of Congress do not call up 
the tribal council and say, "Did you really sincerely, honestly, actively 
mean to consent to this?" 
Where tribes were terminated, the state governments did not oppose 
termination. The Wisconsin state government and the others did not 
oppose it until after it was already enacted. In Congress it is much easier 
to block something than it is to change something after it has been 
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enacted. This legislation was enacted in Congress through unanimous' 
consent procedures. That means anyone member of either the House 
or Senate could have blocked it. If local congressmen, senators, or state 
governments objected, it did not go through. There was no case in which 
it was imposed on a state government that was unwilling to accept it. 
Another basic problem with termination was an Indian organiza-
tion vacuum. The national Indian organizations were not effective on 
this. A number of tribal governments were forced into giving what 
seemed to be their consent by all kinds of pressure that the subcommittees 
and the BIA exerted. As far as the other members of Congress knew, 
the Indians had given their consent. 
There was almost no serious attention given, even by members of 
the Indian affairs subcommittees, to many of these pieces of legislation. 
At many of the hearings, there were only one or two people present. 
They were usually conservative ideologues who were dedicated to the 
idea of liberating Indians from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They 
controlled the whole process because nobody else was involved with 
most of these tribes. 
There were no monolithic, massive forces compelling Indian tribes 
to accept termination. Relatively small forces happened to have strategic 
control of these particular subcommittees. They faced virtually no 
opposition, in a number of cases. Where they were faced with opposi-
tion, they gave way and did not push that legislation through. They 
were able, by dissembling, to force tribes into thinking that there was a 
mass judgement by Congress as an institution to impose this policy on 
tribes. There was not. If a little multiple choice quiz had been given 
to Congress, 90 percent of the members would not have known what 
was in the legislation. 
The leadership of Congress would not have brought legislation like 
this to the floor if there had been active battles against it. They did not 
have time to consider minor pieces of legislation in full congressional 
proceedings; only a very few pieces of legislation are fully debated each 
year. The leaders had to do it through unanimous consent procedure. As 
soon as tribes actively opposed termination, most of the future bills died. 
Another thing that came out very dearly in the termination story 
is that once a stupid and senseless decision is made it is hard to reverse, 
until a powerful movement comes along. When Congress acts on some-
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thing like this, the bureaucracy mobilizes, goes forward. All the different 
levels of government say, "The Congress has decided. We have got to 
make this work." The fact that it is unworkable does not make a great 
deal of difference until a long period of time has passed. In other words, 
it is very easy to block a congressional decision, but it is very hard once 
it is made to prevent it from going forward for a long time. It is very 
difficult to get the members of Congress who are involved with passing 
a policy and the members of the bureaucracy that helped design it 
to admit that they did something that was really crazy. After termina-
tion was enacted, it developed a life of its own, and it took a remarkable 
process to turn it around. 
The restoration legislation is an example of a rather extraordinary 
thing. Federal agencies, the Department of the Interior, and the key 
congressional committees all admitted that they were wrong. By restor-
ing the Menominee tribe to federal status, they admitted that they had 
spent millions of dollars of federal money in a useless pursuit. 
I have spent a lot of time around Capitol Hill. One of the most 
remarkable lobbying campaigns I have seen was the campaign for 
Menominee restoration. Nobody was safe from Ada Deer and her 
supporters. Members of Congress just gave up. The White House sup-
ported restoration, in part, because Melvin Laird, who used to be the 
congressman representing the Menominee, was convinced by people 
like Ada Deer. He was the counselor to the president as the Watergate 
mess was collapsing around the Nixon administration. I talked to him, 
and I said, "How did you ever get the president to support restoration?" 
And he said to me, "Nixon did not care about that kind of stuff. He was 
just trying to save his skin, so one day I just typed up a notice that said 
the administration supports restoration, and I had the secretary send 
it out." 
The restoration of the Menominee and two other tribes is a very 
substantial achievement. It represents the development of a new level 
of sophistication and lobbying by Indian groups. At the Menominee 
restoration hearings, there was an incredible mobilization of resources. 
There was great unity in the Indian communities. This powerful organi-
zation was able to roll through both houses of Congress, and it got both 
the Interior Department and the Nixon administration to turn around. 
It was impressive and it made a lasting impact. 
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Is termination really dead? I do not think there is any chance that 
the termination of the 1950s is going to come back through Congress 
as long as the tribes are aware when legislation is introduced and explain 
it to their members. As long as national Indian organizations are 
reasonably effective legislatively, we will not get more termination bills, 
unless their is political change beyond any measure. 
We now have the most conservative Congress and most conserva-
tive president since Calvin Coolidge. No termination legislation has 
been adopted in this Congress. There have been many other very bad 
things in Indian affairs, but people should not live in mortal fear that 
new termination bills will be issued. They should keep a watch on what 
is going on, but this should not be a central focus. 
One of the tragedies of termination is that, for a long period of 
time, it has made people turn inward and become defensive in relation 
to the formation of Indian policy in Congress. People have been reluc-
tant to formulate new policies. Termination has created tremendous 
focus on tribal status and land protection, but it has not produced much 
attention to issues addressing the majority of Indians, who live off 
reservations. 
People should realize that termination went through Congress 
because of extraordinary conditions. Tribes, the national Indian organi-
zations, and their supporters completely failed in their jobs during that 
period. They will not do that again. There are people like Ada Deer 
who are watching and would kill anything like termination before it 
began to move through Congress. The same cultural values and the 
same misunderstandings are certainly present in the white population, 
but the same weakness and poor preparation is not true of the Indian 
community today. 
ADA DEER 
I am going to speak as a member of one of the terminated and 
restored tribes. I am also going to speak as a human being, a woman, 
a social worker, and as an Indian. There has been a tendency to forget 
that all of these policies and programs had an impact on the lives of 
people. These policies were not drafted in a vacuum somewhere. The 
moral issue has not been given the attention that it should. We hear 
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a lot about Christianity and the Indians. In my opinion, very little 
Christianity has been applied in Indian affairs. I feel that all of us are 
moral human beings. We know the difference between right and wrong, 
and both Indians and non-Indians need to keep this in mind as we 
proceed to work and live through this next challenge. It is just astound-
ing to me that so few people did testify about termination and that 
there was not a sense of the immorality of this action. I believe that this 
could happen again in other types of legislation and in other types 
of projects. 
The impact on the individual of this termination process has been 
greatly overlooked. I was a college student trying not to be a dropout 
when this occurred. I knew that a major event was occurring with my 
tribe, but there was very little information that was distributed. People 
were confused. They did not understand what was going on. 
Many people, over the years, have said that the Menominee con-
sented to termination. This is not true. For many years the Menominee 
had carried on a suit against the federal government for mismanage-
ment of the trust. They had won the suit. Melvin Laird, who was a 
congressman at that time, introduced through his committee a simple 
appropriations request for a per capita payment. This was changed 
when it got into the Senate. Senator Arthur Watkins felt that in order 
for the Menominee to receive the per capita payment they would have 
to agree to termination. There are many misconceptions about this. 
I do want to state for the record that there was a lot of misinformation. 
People did not understand what they were voting on. In one account 
that I have read, 169 people voted for it, 5 voted against it. Another 
account said that the vote was 169 to O. In any case, this was not 
informed consent. 
All of us in 1983 can say how wrong all those people were then. 
This is 20-20 hindsight. I want to emphasize that it is important to 
understand these events in the framework of the times. Being a social 
worker and an Indian, I feel that it is important to undertake full con-
sultation. This was not done during the termination legislation. It is 
incumbent upon all of us, Indians and non-Indians, that are involved 
in Indian affairs, to pay attention. We must do our homework and 
become involved in the process of consulting with Congress when legis-
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lation is introduced. We also must become involved with the executive 
branch when regulations are written. 
Many people have said that the Menominee tribe was a wealthy 
tribe. There was approximately $10 million in the treasury at the 
time, but the individual Indians were very poor. Termination was a 
cultural, economic, and political disaster. It is going to take several more 
generations for the people in my tribe to recover from the damage that 
was done during termination. The hospital and the roads were closed. 
Our land became subject to taxation. A whole new county, Wisconsin's 
poorest county, was created as a result of this. Health conditions became 
a severe problem. In 1965, there were approximately six hundred 
positive TB tests in a testing of over two thousand Menominees. The 
withdrawal of federal education, health, and other services was indeed 
a severe problem for the Menominee people. 
The Menominee Restoration Act was an effort by the Menominee 
people and their lawyers to secure social justice. We also had the assist-
ance of people such as Philleo Nash and Indians across the country. 
They gave us their support and active assistance. We achieved an his-
toric reversal of American Indian policy. I want to emphasize, especi-
ally to Indians, that they can decide what they want. You do not need 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or any other group telling you what to do. 
You can make a decision and work for it. I want to say to all of you that 
are involved in projects and activities at the community level that it is 
possible to bring about social change. If the Menominee could do it 
with a small group of people, almost any group can achieve significant 
changes. They must work hard and work within the system. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Undoing the IRA 
Clarence Wesley, Graham Holmes, E. Reeseman Fryer, 
Robert Burnette 
One of the problems that we have with the Indian Reorganization Act 
is who manages the trust responsibility. We have to keep worrying about 
the successive waves of federal officials every four years. If adequate funds 
had been awarded under the Indian Claims Commission, the tribes could 
have survived without the IRA. Real Indian self-determination would 
have occurred. The whole problem on Indian reservations is that we do not 
have enough money. Congress refuses to appropriate adequate funds. 
Instead, it spends billions for defense and billions for foreign aid to coun-
tries in Central America. 
Edward Johnson, former chainnan, 
Walker River Paiute tribe 
A radical change in Indian policy was possible without serious exami-
nation of the consequences in good measure because so few members of 
Congress knew or cared about Indian affairs and some of the Indian tribes 
and national organizations were so weak or divided or intimidated by pres-
sure from powerful members of Congress or the RIA that they could not 
or would not fight effectively. The key policy resolution, House Concurrent 
Resolution 108, was passed by Congress in July 1953 by unanimous consent, 
under a procedure that could have been blocked by the objection of a single 
member of either the House or the Senate. The resolution sounded, on first 
reading, like a kind of unobjectionable Fourth of July speech. In the 
Senate it passed without a single word of discussion. In the House there 
were only a few prefunctory remarks supporting the principles. No one 
noted that the resolution required the Interior Department to begin very 
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rapid preparation of policies for ending all federal protections and services 
for a wide variety of Indian groups, including some living in great poverty 
and possessing very few resources. 
Gary Orfield, Brookings Institution 
CLARENCE WESLEY 
The Indian Reorganization Act was fully discussed on the San 
Carlos Apache Reservation. We had CCC camps all over the reserva-
tion. Apache elderly men went around from camp to camp with CCC 
officials. They explained the contents of the Indian Reorganization Act, 
what it meant, and how it was going to help the Indians. 
After a year, a big meeting was held at the San Carlos Agency. The 
tribe overwhelmingly voted to adopt the IRA. At first, seven elderly 
men were elected to the council. Two years later, a younger man was 
selected to serve. While I was up on the mountain working cattle, 
I learned that I was elected. I was also asked tQ be secretary for the 
council. That was the beginning of my career on the tribal council. 
Later on, I became chairman of the tribal council. Ernest McCrea 
was the superintendent at that time. He told us that he still was in 
charge of the agency and nobody was going to tell him what to do. 
So, we discussed among ourselves several issues on the reservation that 
dealt with the control of funds and hiring. I told McCrea, "This is an 
Apache reservation. We have some Indians who want to work, and 
that should be our first concern." Later on, he called me in and said, 
"You have got a big mouth." We did not get along from the start, so we 
had cross words from the beginning. I was still on the council when he 
died across the street. I hate to say this, but that was quite a relief. 
We were without a superintendent for a while until Al Stover came 
from Dulce, New Mexico. He was an entirely different person. He 
believed in the Indian Reorganization Act. He said, "I am here to help 
you do what you want, and you can depend on it." We wanted to have 
a tribal store to create jobs for our people. We asked Superintendent 
Stover about it, and he said, "Why don't you send a delegation over to 
the Jicarilla Apache Reservation and see how they got their tribal store 
started." We went to Dulce, New Mexico, and they gave us a lot of 
information. We also went to Mescalero, New Mexico. They had a 
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tribal store over there too. About a week after we returned, I called a 
meeting that was attended by approximately two thousand Indians. 
I stood up, as chairman, and explained to the people that we were 
trying to establish a store so some of our people could go to work. 
At that time there were six white traders on the reservation. When 
I got through talking, a very prominent individual stood up and told 
the audience that this was the best thing he had ever heard in his life. 
He said our tribal council was on the right track. That was the begin-
ning of our operation. We did not get any money from the bank or from 
the government. We assessed our cattlemen for one year. We raised 
enough money to build a building and hire a staff. The tribal store 
operated until 1964. 
The BIA superintendent, his staff, and the tribal council must 
cooperate to make the Indian Reorganization Act work. We did this 
right from the beginning. The San Carlos Apache tribe celebrated the 
anniversary of the birth of IRA every June 18. We had a big barbecue, 
a baseball game, a rodeo, and dances. We would always invite some-
body from the area office to speak to the people. It was quite interesting, 
and a lot of questions were asked. This went on for a number of years 
until the Apache people lost interest in celebrating the IRA. Then we 
decided to abandon the anniversary idea. 
After Stover retired, the council adopted a resolution. We requested 
that Tom Dodge, who was part Navajo, come to San Carlos and be 
our superintendent. Tom Dodge helped us fight racial discrimination 
in nearby towns. He told us that the way to correct this situation was to 
get involved with white people. We began to attend chamber of com-
merce, Kiwanis, Lion's, Jaycee, and Rotary meetings. I was made a 
member of the Miami Rotary Club, and we worked with these people 
to whip discrimination. We also asked if some of our girls and our boys 
could go to work in various business operations in these towns. We got 
some people jobs and girls were employed by a bank. 
We also created other tribal enterprises. We started a timber 
operation. Because it was a sustained yield operation, we were short of 
lumber after fifteen years. So we had to quit, but it gave a lot of employ-
ment to our people for fifteen years. There also was copper mining on 
the east and west side of the reservation. We contacted a geophysical 
outfit in New York and Toronto, Canada, to do an airborne survey of 
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the reservation for minerals. They found low-grade copper below Mt. 
Turnbull and did some drilling there; but the copper played out, and 
that ended our intention to mine copper. 
There was land south of our present boundary known as the San 
Carlos mineral strip. It had been ceded back in 1896 for mineral entry 
only, but there were twenty-six cattle ranches operating on that ceded 
land. We went to Congress, with the help of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and 232,000 acres of that land was restored to tribal ownership 
in 1969. We have not stocked it yet with any cattle. 
In addition to these enterprises, we were interested in the educa-
tion of our children. We have special scholarships to help the boys and 
girls who want to go to college. In the last school year there were ninety-
nine of our youngsters in college. 
When I left, in 1964, another person was elected. He was a 
Christian who went to church. Instead of having council meetings, he 
would preach. It was under his administration that the tribe went into 
bankruptcy. The tribal store that we built was closed. After some years 
with bankruptcy, we had another election. A young man by the name 
of Buck was elected. He helped revitalize the tribal store. Then, in 
another election, we chose an attorney from the University of Arizona. 
The tribal store once again went into bankruptcy. In addition to being 
bankrupt, the San Carlos Apache tribe was sued by the Internal Reve-
nue Service for over a million dollars. The tribe had failed to pay its 
withholding tax. This was not the fault of the Indian Reorganization 
Act. It was the fault of an individual. We are really in a mess at this 
moment. I do not know how we are going to pay that million dollars. 
By the time they are through with us, the government might take over 
both the reservation and the Indian Reorganization Act. 
GRAHAM HOLMES 
It is necessary to look at the situation that existed at the time before 
discussing the IRA. Prior to 1934, there had been, for a number of years, 
a steady drift away from tribal sovereignty. Assimilation was occurring, 
and tribal lands were lost through benign neglect. John Collier decided 
that it was necessary to stop this because there would be no tribal gov-
ernments and perhaps no reservations in the forseeable future. 
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He set out to get the IRA enacted. Now, to get a bill of this kind 
through Congress is a sizeable undertaking. It is very difficult to start 
at one end of the funnel in Congress and have the same thing come out 
at the other end. You can explain a bill like the IRA to the Indians, 
but by the time it gets through Congress it may be unrecognizable. The 
criticism that Collier did not explain it properly, that he lied to the 
people about it, grows out of that kind of a situation. 
Collier did the best he could under the circumstances. He came 
out with a bill that has stood for fifty years. Without the IRA there 
would have been a steady drift away from tribal sovereignty, tribal 
government, and we would not have reached a point where we could 
even talk about self-determination. 
Many tribes did not adopt the IRA. Most of the tribes that did not 
accept it were involved in local political issues on their reservations that 
did not directly relate to IRA. Anywhere that IRA was the main con-
cern, it was adopted. 
Sometimes Collier's personality was identified with the IRA. He 
was not the IRA, but some people never realized that. At times, he was 
a rather abrasive individual, and he could be obnoxious. But it would 
be remarkable, with two hundred or three hundred Indian tribes, 
if everybody agreed to the IRA. I would be suspicious of it if everybody 
agreed. The people who did not agree rode the coattails of IRA. Because 
of IRA, we have a congressional recognition of tribal governments and 
tribal sovereignty that has carried everybody along. 
Under IRA constitutions nearly everything a tribe does has to be 
approved by the secretary of the interior or the commissioner of Indian 
affairs, but because of the trust relationship and the trust responsibility, 
very few tribal councils have tried to take that provision out. Holding on 
to Indian land has been one of the main problems throughout the last 
century. That is why there are a lot of restrictions in the IRA. The 
trustee can not sell Indian lands under IRA. Since the passage of IRA, 
even the corps of army engineers can not take Indian land without get-
ting an act of Congress. Laws such as IRA protect the weak more than 
they protect the strong. 
Tribes must develop their economies. Unless you can say no to the 
federal government once in a while, you have undone the IRA and 
everything else. Regulations accompany federal money. We do not 
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need to graduate ten thousand Indian lawyers. We need to graduate 
people who know how to explore for minerals, run plants, and develop 
reservation economies. That will make Indians self-sufficient. They 
will not have to come to the federal government for anything. 
The IRA was a good thing. But it had its faults, and it needs 
undoing in a place or two as time goes on. The ability to modify the 
IRA is growing stronger all the time. Tribes that want to amend their 
constitutions can do so. It is a cumbersome process, but constitutions 
are designed to have a stabilizing effect. 
Most Indian tribes seek consensus. They do not like to act until 
everybody agrees. IRA constitutional governments are a different way 
of governing. The majority proposes, the minority opposes, and they 
argue it out. Then a vote is taken. The side that gets the most votes 
wins. Consensus is opposite from that. A lot of the governmental strife 
under IRA-and it has been the undoing of the IRA at times-has 
come over the problem of consensus. 
Under an IRA constitutional government or any other kind of 
government, you are not going to reach consensus. This has affected 
economic development on reservations where time is a problem. Indians 
will act in their own best interest, but you cannot tell when they are 
going to do it. Unfortunately, an appropriation from Congress will 
lapse after one year if you do not use it. The problem of timing also has 
prevented industries from moving to reservations. 
There is no word in the Indian language that translates directly 
to time. If you ask a Sioux what time it is, you ask him how many times 
does the thing strike. The real problem is getting everything related to 
the tick of the clock and the movement of the dominant economy. The 
problem of time undoes some of the IRA. It forces a democratic 
majority rule system on Indian tribes that are not prepared to adopt it. 
Reservations are in turmoil because the paternalistic colonial-
ism that has existed all these years is being changed to promote self-
determination and home rule. If IRA is to succeed, two things have to 
happen. First, we must have stable tribal government. The IRAgave 
us the backbone of that. Second, we must have tribal economies that 
work. If you do not have those two things, you cannot successfully end 
federal guardianship. 
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E. REESEMAN FRYER 
When John Collier tried to introduce IRA on the Navajo Reserva-
tion in 1934, I saw the turmoil that existed. The Navajo defeat of IRA 
was based on the issue of assimilation. It was the battle between the 
assimilationists of the north-the Jake Morgan crowd-and the con-
ventional Navajo of the south. The charges that IRA would return the 
Indians to a zoo destroyed its consideration among the Navajos. In 
retrospect, the Navajo showed a certain amount of prophetic wisdom 
in turning down this legislation. 
After the Navajo had rejected IRA, Felix Cohen came to the res-
ervation. He used his great ability to design a constitution that might 
be presented to the tribe as an administrative action. As soon as that 
happened, there was a renewed fight. Basically, it was a battle between 
those people who had assimilated in the north, allied with the mission-
aries, and the traditional Navajos of the south. 
Putting it in terms of personality, it was J. C. Morgan who defeated 
IRA. He was a brilliantly able Navajo orator. He was the ablest 
demagogue I have ever heard. Morgan could sway crowds with his 
demagoguery. He persuaded the Navajos that IRA had bad qualities. 
He had on his side both the missionaries and traders. The missionaries 
believed that IRA threatened fifty years of Christian teaching. The 
traders saw in the IRA a threat to their permanence and to their finan-
cial investment. So, the IRA was destroyed by people who were con-
cerned with assimilation and their own security and property. 
John Collier never admitted that IRA was defeated by intertribal 
conflicts. He always blamed the defeat of IRA on stock reduction. 
I was at Ganado during this period. I observed that IRA was defeated 
long before the latter part of 1935, when stock reduction finally became 
an issue. Today, stock reduction is still considered the issue that led to 
the undoing of IRA. I suspect that the Navajos will remember stock 
reduction, with all of its mythology, as long as they will remember the 
Long Walk. 
I had one other experience with IRA. In 1948, I was sent to 
Nevada as superintendent. There were eighteen or nineteen Indian 
town colonies, each inside a city, from Reno to Las Vegas to Winne-
mucca. These Indian colonies had separate identities, and they sub-
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scribed to IRA. It is my feeling that, without IRA and its federal 
protection, these Indian colonies would have disappeared. The greed of 
real estate developers and the people surrounding the Indians would 
have completely obliterated these colonies. We would have had some-
thing similar to the outlying slums of Rapid City where Indians congre-
gated in the late 1930s and 1940s without land, property, or jobs. IRA 
saved these little colonies from this fate. 
The Nevada Indians were having trouble then, and I suspect that 
they are having trouble now, not with the concept of IRA as a bit of 
salvation for Indianness, but with their constitutions. These constitu-
tional problems could have been solved by a task force of experts, who 
might have worked with the Indians at their request. Lawyers and 
social scientists could have helped the Indians modify their IRA consti-
tutions in order to protect these tiny colonies against the greed of 
developers and real estate people. 
ROBERT BURNETTE 
There is a tremendous shortcoming in the IRA that few people 
recognize. Collier was so adamant in making sure that the government 
of the United States fulfilled its trusteeship obligation that he left an 
important provision out of IRA. There is no way under IRA to redress 
a grievance should your own tribe refuse to recognize something that is 
legitimate. There is the problem of tribal government accountability. 
That is where the United States is supposed to step in and do its 
job. The federal government has not met this obligation. We have 
turmoil in every tribe, all across the country. We would like to go to 
court and sue tribal officials who are responsible for problems, to make 
them accountable, but we cannot do that. This is the job of the United 
States government, and it has totally neglected to fill the void left 
by IRA. 
For years, I have fought to get the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
the Department of Interior to wake up and fill this legal void. Elected 
tribal officials must be held responsible and accountable to the people. 
Because the people, including council people, are absolutely legally 
helpless we have many lawsuits that add to the turmoil on reservations. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Indian Claims Commission 
Charles F. Wilkinson, W. Roger Buffalohead, 
E. Richard Hart, Edward C. Johnson 
We have had enough experience with the Indian Claims Commission 
Act to know that it has not benefited most tribes. Approximately $800 mil-
lion was awarded through the Indian Claims Commission. If you divide 
the number of acres of land that those particular cases involved, the United 
States government ended up paying Indian people fifty cents an acre for 
the United States of America. The title was quieted, but in many cases it 
is still unsettled. 
We need to pursue further the question of how did the Indian Claims 
Commission Act affect Indian people. We all have some notion that its 
impact was not good. It did not settle anything. And it certainly did not 
provide Indians with the capital to do anything about their economic situa-
tion. In order to have sovereignty and self-government, you also need to 
have economic self-determination. We have never been able to achieve 
that in this country. 
Roger Buffalohead, Ponca, project director, 
MIGIZI Communications 
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CHARLES F. WILKINSON 
The field of Indian law and policy is rife with ambiguities. I do not 
know of a pocket of Indian policy that is more profoundly ambiguous 
than the Indian Claims Commission Act. I want to provide an objec-
tive statement of some of the events leading up to the act. In the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Indian tribes lost most of their land 
to western expansion. Payment was never made to the tribes for tens of 
millions of acres that were lost. In addition, it is clear that when treaty 
negotiators sat down, tribes still had their aboriginal land ownership. 
There is nothing as fundamental in the field of Indian law as the idea 
that Indians had an ownership interest in their aboriginal territory after 
the white people arrived, right up to the moment that they sat down at 
the bargaining table. It was not a full title. They had a shared title with 
the United States. But they did have an aboriginal ownership, a legal 
title recognized by Congress and by the United States Supreme Court. 
It was this title that was the subject of the treaty negotiations, from the 
United States' point of view. Tribes granted away most of their abor-
iginal land at the treaty table. They kept a small part of it, between 
5 percent and 15 percent, as their reservations. 
It is now clear, particularly after the Indian Claims Commission 
proceedings, that tribes often were not compensated adequately for the 
land that they granted away. Unfair bargains as well as trust funds that 
the United States had not administered properly created pressure from 
Indian people for recompence. The recompence could be a financial 
payment or a return of land. Throughout the early twentieth century, 
tribe after tribe sought relief for the lands that they had lost. 
Tribes had no court to go into, because the United States is a sov-
ereign and you can not sue a sovereign until it waives the right not to be 
sued. The United States did not allow itself to be sued until the Court 
of Claims was set up in 1855. But in 1863, there was an express statu-
tory decision that Indian tribes could not sue in the Court of Claims. 
In the early twentieth century, more and more tribes began to press for 
a resolution of their claims. Congress responded by passing a series of 
133 special acts that gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear indi-
vidual tribes' cases. Congress did not rule on these cases. It simply 
waived sovereign immunity and allowed individual tribes to bring suits. 
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The Meriam Report, in 1928, recommended that Congress create 
a more efficient and fair device to resolve old Indian claims. A few years 
later, several tribes urged some sort of claims resolution under the IRA, 
but that was not done. 
The Indian Claims Commission Act passed on August 13, 1946. 
There were various reasons for its passage. Some legislators wanted to be 
fair to the Indians and allow their claims to be adjudicated. All the act 
did was create a court. It did not lead to a specific result. There are 
indications that other legislators felt that it would be part of the termi-
nation process. Their notion was that you had to wipe the slate clean 
by resolving these old claims before you could really get on with termina-
tion. Another more pragmatic factor was a simple desire to get rid of 
the cumbersome device of having Congress pass special acts before each 
tribe could bring a claim. 
The Indian Claims Commission Act did several things. First, it 
only dealt with claims that occurred before August 13, 1946. In other 
words, the Indian Claims Commission heard no claim for a taking of 
land or mismanagement of money that occurred after 1946. The act 
provided that claims that arose after 1946 would go to the Court of 
Claims, if a money damage claim were brought. Secondly, the act 
required that all claims and complaints be filed within five years, before 
August 13, 1951. There was a tremendous frenzy in many lawyers' 
offices to get those claims led. People also flew to Washington to meet 
that filing date. 
The Indian Claims Commission Act was liberal. It was fairer to 
Indians than the existing law required in a number of respects. First, 
it allowed money recovery for all takings of land, no matter what was 
the source of Indian title. Prior to 1946, the courts had found that 
Indian tribes were not entitled to compensation when their aboriginal 
title was taken. This act did grant recovery for takings of aboriginal title. 
It also granted a right of recovery for taking of executive order 
reservations. If an executive order reservation was set up and then 
partially broken up, as many were, you could go to the Indian Claims 
Commission and get recovery for that. Under the law of the United 
States before the Indian Claims Commission Act, a tribe could not get 
recovery for that taking. The idea was that only treaty reservations 
set up by statute were constitutionally recognized under the Fifth 
The Indian Claims Commission 153 
Amendment; land title that was aboriginal or established by executive 
order was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. Only lawyers could 
explain how you get compensated for title recognized by Congress but 
not title recognized by the president of the United States. But that had 
been the law, until the Indian Claims Commission Act made that kind 
of title compensable. 
The act also went beyond existing law in that it allowed for recov-
ery for unconscionable consideration. Often treaties were negotiated 
unfairly and tribes did not receive enough compensation. Under con-
tract law, the tribe would not be entitled to payment for that. Under 
the Indian Claims Commission Act, they were allowed to seek recovery 
for unconscionable dealings. 
There are a few other respects in which the act went beyond exist-
ing law to allow recovery. By and large, it did away with what were 
referred to as gratuitous offsets. During the era of the special acts, before 
the Indian Claims Commission Act, a tribe would go in and get a 
recovery. Then the United States would come in and say, "Okay, their 
land taking was $2 million, but we provided blankets, beads, wagons, 
and educational services. They are worth $1 million. Therefore, the 
tribal recovery has to be offset." These gratuitous offsets were extremely 
important under the special acts. A total of $49 million was awarded 
under the special acts. Of that amount, $29 million was lost to gratui-
tous offsets. Tribal recovery was lowered by about 60 percent. This 
did not happen under the Indian Claims Commission. Generally, gra-
tuitous offsets were not allowed. 
The most fundamental problem with the act, from the tribes' point 
of view, was that it provided for payment in money and not land. That 
moral and economic issue was never seriously debated. Perhaps, it 
should have been. The government could have allowed for money 
recovery and then transferred to a tribe an equal amount of public 
domain land near the reservation. But that was not done. It was a 
straight money payment act. A settlement of $1,800 would buy a nice 
car in the fifties, but it was not the same as receiving a land payment. 
Many Indian people would point to that as the essential injustice of 
the act. 
There are over one hundred dockets that have not been completed. 
These cases were filed between 1946 and 1951, and they still have not 
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been completed after almost forty years. The old Indian Claims Com-
mission that had five judges was abolished in 1978. Its cases were 
transferred to the Court of Claims. Indian people complain that the 
long delays in settling their claims are another injustice. There is no 
other area in the judicial system, even antitrust, where you have delays 
of that magnitude. 
Attorneys' fees are a maximum of 10 percent under the act. 
Because of the big awards that were given-$10 to 12 million being 
common-the claims attorneys, by any standard, have done well. 
Nevertheless, there are some honest ambiguities on this issue: the typical 
contingent fee recovery after trial-and remember that claims attorneys 
receive nothing if their clients do not prevail-would be 33 percent. 
So, the fees under the act are less than the typical attorney-client rela-
tionship. But there are lots of reasons why that is a false point. 
Tribes have received approximately $800 million under the Indian 
Claims Commission Act. Tribes have raised complaints because that 
amount was much smaller than it might have been. When you figure 
the amount of a claim by the value of the land at the date of taking, 
let's say 1850, that value might be very small in many cases. The key 
point then becomes whether you award interest. If you award interest, 
even at 6 percent you are going to multiply that old award many times 
over. What the courts found was that if aboriginal or executive order 
land was taken there would be no interest. For example, in my home 
state of Oregon the Siletz Reservation had some of the richest timber 
land and scenic coastland in the world, but it was an executive order 
reservation. Those tribes on the reservation received a dollar or two an 
acre without any interest to bring it up to the present. 
Today, the Indian Claims Commission Act is cited as a precedent 
for awarding compensation to Japanese-Americans who were detained 
during World War II. It also is touted in some foreign countries as a 
progressive way to approach aboriginal claims. That is ironic because 
many Indian people despise it for some of the problems I have raised. 
As a lawyer, I do not like what the act did to my profession. There was 
a period when all kinds of attorneys spent time on Indian law, but it was 
all on claims. It was terribly important to have lawyers representing 
tribes during the termination era of the 1950s and early 1960s. They 
were not there, because they were working on claims. And remember, 
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attorneys could either file with the Indian Claims Commission or Court 
of Claims for money, or they could go into court and try and get the 
Indians' land back. Normally, if Indians receive payment in the Court 
of Claims or Indian Claims Commission, they can not get the land back 
later. Lawyers had to advise tribes on whether they ought to go into the 
Indian Claims Commission with 10 percent attorneys' fees and an 
attorney willing to take that case, or go off and try to get the land. In the 
latter option, there was no way to pay the attorney fee for a very uncer-
tain case. We went through a long period of time when those decisions 
were being made repeatedly. Now tribes are in a legal, political, moral, 
and economic situation of saying we want our land back. The rejoinder 
is that you have been paid for it under the Indian Claims Commission. 
W. ROGER BUFFALOHEAD 
On December 13, 1984, my son will receive the benefits from a 
tribal claim that our tribe started long before I was born. It finally was 
won in the mid-1970s. He was about five years old when the claim 
was won. His amount of money was put in a trust fund with a 3 percent 
annual interest rate, so he will receive about an eighteen hundred dollar 
check in December. He will probably join the ranks of thousands of 
other Indians who have received such claims since the Indian Claim 
Commission Act was passed in 1946 by buying himself a new car. 
I suspect that the new car will probably be a wreck in two years. His 
tribal heritage will have gone down the drain. 
I have not done a lot of research in the area of the Indian Claims 
Commission Act, except as it affected the Minnesota Chippewa tribe, 
with whom I have had a long association as an historical researcher, 
and also my own tribe. So I feel uncomfortable when talking about the 
basic principles of the act and how it affected Indian tribes on a much 
larger scale, but I do know that the idea of granting claims to Indian 
tribes was something that Indians began to pursue as long ago as the 
nineteenth century. Some of the earliest attempts were made through 
the old United States Court of Claims, which required tribes to get a 
special aet from Congress in order to sue the United States. 
The Minnesota Chippewa tribal people were robbed out of a 
tremendous amount of acreage under the Minnesota equivalent of the 
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Dawes General Allotment Act. It was called the Nelson Act Agreements 
of 1889. The Chippewa brought suit, in the 1920s, for the lands that 
were taken through that agreement. In the mid-1930s, they lost those 
claims. When the Indian Claims Commission Act was passed in 1946, 
they were ineligible to refile on those claims. It has been a difficult 
situation for them. Of course, they could go back and file claims on 
land lost through earlier treaties, which they did, and they won. But, 
by and large, claims to the enormous amount of land that passed from 
their hands into white ownership through the Nelson Act Agreements 
of 1899 were never settled as far as the Minnesota tribal people were 
concerned. It is something that is still a problem in many other Indian 
communities. 
E. RICHARD HART 
There are a lot of problems inherent in claims. They include 
problems with attorneys and witnesses. There also is the question of 
making sure that tribes are fairly represented. 
In dealing with tribal history, especially in the Great Basin and the 
Southwest, where I have done most of my work, one thing is very clear: 
the tribes wanted to have a day in court. They knew that there had been 
unconscionable transactions or takings of land. They felt they still owned 
land that was occupied and used by the United States without their 
consent. It is important to remember that one thing that led to the 
Indian Claims Commission Act was the tribes' persistent determination 
to get their day in court. For example, the Zuni began their claims 
struggle in the 1880s. Every tribal council, every governor, from that 
time until the present, was concerned with the Zuni having a day in 
court and getting some kind of justice. 
Another problem is the question of whether the land was taken. 
That is the question the Western Shoshone are facing today. The 
Western Shoshone had a treaty that was ratified by Congress in 1863. 
It seems to say that a lot of what is now federal land is still owned by 
the Western Shoshone and that it will be owned by the Indians until the 
federal government provides a reservation large enough for them to 
make a living in agriculture. That is the way I read the treaty. If that 
is true, the federal government has been collecting allotment fees and 
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rent on all that land for a hundred years when they should have been 
paying it to the Shoshone. 
There are all kinds of difficulties involved with the way that attor-
neys have represented tribes. For instance, in the Northern Paiute 
claim: the attorneys for the Northern Paiute were told by the federal 
government that they had to represent the Owens Valley Paiute. The 
attorneys representing the tribes had not taken the time to find out who 
all the Northern Paiute were, let alone ever talk to them. They repre-
sented people whom they had never met. They never discussed the case 
with them or gave the Paiute any of their legal alternatives. The attor-
neys made stipulations with the Justice Department without the tribes 
having any input. They determined times of taking without ever dis-
cussing it with tribal leaders, and they stipulated values of land at the 
time it was taken without ever discussing that with tribal leaders. 
The percentage of money awarded was a problem. Most attorneys 
pressured tribes to make quick settlements. They did not go through 
extended court battles, which might have raised the value of the 
Indians' land, because it required expense on the part of the attorneys. 
Attorneys also had something to do with getting tribes to take per capita 
payments, instead of lump payments that encouraged employment or 
economic development. 
Witnesses also have faced problems with the Indian Claims Com-
mission. Expert witnesses came under pressures from the attorneys for 
the plaintiff and pressures from attorneys from other tribes. If two tribes 
claimed that same area and if it could be proven in court that there was 
joint use of an area, nobody got paid for it. That was true for fairly 
large tracts of land. In the Zuni's case, almost all of the land that the 
Zuni claimed already had been awarded to the Navajo. 
Historians and anthropologists have been susceptible to consider-
able pressure because they hoped to keep their work going with tribes. 
They have generally testified favorably for the tribes in court. The 
Indian Claims Commission has had a major impact on Indian historiog-
raphy. The same thing can be said about anthropology. Anthropologists 
and historians who are friends of tribes sometimes have felt that it was 
in the best interest of the case to testify just a little bit differently, so that 
it would look better in court. For instance, you had to first prove in court 
that a tribe was a tribe. In the Indian Claims Commission and the 
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United States Court of Claims, that required a certain level of group 
organization. If you did not testify that there was an organization and 
a cultural people beyond the family unit, the Indians were not entitled 
to seek a claim. 
Another thing that should be taken into account, and this has 
come up in the Zuni case, is that some lands can not be cons cion ably 
taken from tribes. It is unconscionable for the United States government 
or anyone else to take a church away from Mormons or Catholics or to 
take a synagogue away from Jews. The courts would not allow that 
under any circumstances, whatever the justification. In the case of 
many tribes, portions of their lands were and are their churches. This 
land has great religious value to them. It is my belief that for some of 
those lands that title could not have been conscionably taken. 
In the Zuni's case, there is a place that Zunis go after death. It is 
a small lake in southern Arizona. They make annual pilgrimages there 
every six years. This region has extreme religious value. There is no 
excuse for the government's refusal to protect or validate their title to 
that property. 
EDWARD C. JOHNSON 
I can remember many years ago when my great grandmother and 
grandfather talked about getting their Indian money. They never 
received it, but some of us did. The Northern Paiute obtained $5,000 
a piece for their land. That included the Comstock Lode. In the nine-
teenth century, they took close to $1 billion in gold and silver out of that 
mine. Today, with the inflated value of money, it would be worth at 
least $10 to 20 billion. 
And of course, we had anthropologists. The government and the 
tribe each had their witnesses and attorneys. People were interviewed 
to determine that the tribe was there and that this was their area. An 
anthropologist determined that this was our land. We had three sections 
of land that extended from southern Oregon and southern Idaho 
through western Nevada and into eastern California. We got $21 mil-
lion for it. Approximately $18 million came from the area that included 
the Comstock Lode and $3 million from the other two areas. It was one 
of the biggest claims case payments. I think we got $1.29 an acre for it. 
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During this claims case, hearings were held and federal officials 
came out and talked to us. We had an organization called the United 
Paiutes, Incorporated. It opposed the claims case and advocated getting 
the land back. We still have people that advocate getting the land back. 
Others said that we arc a practical people. They concluded that all of 
that land really did not belong to us. Despite the talk about aboriginal 
title, our reservation was here. The land out there belonged to someone 
else. Theoretically, we still own it, but we do not possess it. Since we 
could not prove that we owned all of the land, we could not get claims 
payments for it. If we had a treaty, maybe we could have rallied around 
something and fought for getting the land back. 
The two major Northern Paiute reservations are Pyramid Lake 
and Walker River. They each contain about three thousand acres. 
In 1906 we lost our lake and part of our reservation because someone 
thought there was another Comstock Lode there. The government 
dammed up the river that leads to Pyramid Lake. I guess they wanted 
the lakes, so they have found ways to get the water. 
But we are still here. In fact, we just had a meeting with our 
claims attorneys over various dockets. The government attorneys and 
our tribal attorneys have come to an agreement on our fishery for 
$2.5 million. Of course, the claims lawyers will get 10 percent, which 
is $250,000. I do not know what we will decide to do with the $2.5 mil-
lion for the fishery, which we lost. 
There are other dockets. We have one for trespass on the reserva-
tion and one for mismanagement of our funds. We should have more 
funds coming in until the dockets run out. We are looking forward to 
this money, but I do not know what we will do with it. Almost every-
one wants a per capita payment. The tribal members want a check to 
show that they got their Indian money. The tribe might have frittered 
it away, and the people never would have known that they got their 
claims money. 
We are generally a poor people. Most Northern Paiutes live off 
the reservation or in small colonies. Our people surely could use more 
lands, wherever they are located, but it is not in the "Great White 
Father's" scheme of things to give us more land. We can be thankful 
that we have already got $21 million in claims and another $2.5 million 
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coming down the pike. The attorney really does not tell us much about 
what is going on in these cases. 
A new court has been created to replace the Indian Claims Com-
mission. This tribunal will not bring real justice to the Northern Paiute 
or to any other tribes. The Indian Claims Commission was simply a 
legal way to quiet aboriginal title. The government wanted to pay as 
little as possible for legally taking over these lands. Once the aboriginal 
title has been solved, the government will go on to other kinds of things. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Relocation 
Robert L. Bennett, Philleo Nash, Helen Peterson, 
Gerald One Feather, LaDonna Harris 
Armed with Public Law 280 and House Concurrent Resolution J08, 
the federal government allowed (and sometimes encouraged) state govern-
ments to extend their jurisdiction over the reservations, and withdrew 
federal services from several tribal communities. As part of the termination 
policies, federal officials hoped to disperse the remaining reservation com-
munities and to scatter the Indian population into the general mainstream 
of American life. Since the United States was rapidly becoming urbanized, 
the BIA encouraged reservation people to move to the cities, where the 
assimilation process could be accelerated by the anonymity of urban life. 
R. David Edmunds, Cherokee, professor of history, 
Texas Christian University 
We need to remind ourselves that off-reservation employment goes 
back at least to the Wild West days of Buffalo Bill and Sitting Bull. The BIA 
had been involved in off-reservation employment in a very meaningful way 
at least since 1929 when the first field agent was appointed for that purpose. 
It is also important for us to recognize, as we look at the 1950s, that an 
important part of the post-war planning that took place in the central office 
in 1943 focused on how to provide greater employment off the reservations 
for returning veterans. That was part of John Collier's policy. 
John Painter, professor of history, Northern State College 
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ROBERT L. BENNETT 
The relocation program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which 
later became the employment assistance program, was developed as a 
sort of panacea for the so-called Indian problem. I was in that program 
for several years from the time of its inception. It was a two phase pro-
gram. First of all, it relocated people from the reservation areas where 
jobs were not available to areas where there were jobs. The other phase 
of the program was to relocate people from reservation areas to pri-
marily urban areas, where they had the opportunity to take vocational 
training. 
One of the difficulties with this program was it became a panacea 
for all Indian problems. It also was discriminatory. If an Indian 
family, or an Indian individual, wanted training in a vocational area, 
the government would pay their living expenses, tuition, and transpor-
tation costs and would provide medical training for a period of two 
years. However, if an individual of the tribe went to college and applied 
for a scholarship, all they allowed was his tuition and living expenses. 
His family was not included. If a person wanted to be an automobile 
mechanic, all expenses for himself and his family were paid for two 
years. If he wanted to follow the academic route, the government paid 
only his tuition and expenses. 
Other federal agencies had responsibilities for relocation. One of 
the most important was the Employment Security Commission. It is 
funded by the United States government to provide services for all 
people. The Employment Security Commission funds the state employ-
ment services. My first relocation effort at the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
was to get the states of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska 
interested in securing employment for people living on reservations. 
We worked out agreements with these states to provide services to the 
Indian community as well as to the rest of their citizens. 
Finding jobs in the local area for Indian people was advantageous 
to both sides. Sometimes, I developed employment opportunities for 
which we had no Indian people available. This information was pro-
vided to the local office of the state employment service. They filled 
these jobs with local people if we did not have any Indian people for 
these particular jobs. 
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Indians that were sent to the urban areas encountered many prob-
lems. There was a high return rate. This was to be expected. The 
greatest reason for returning was lonesomeness. People who had lived 
in an extended family relationship were isolated in a nuclear family. 
People also returned to their reservations because they were taken 
advantage of by high pressure salesmen. They fell into the trap of 
installment buying. It was $5 a week for this and $5 a week for that. 
Eventually, they were not able to take care of all these payments and 
installments. 
We had this situation happen on a reservation where I was super-
intendent. It concerned Indian families who could not read English 
buying encyclopedias. I asked one of them: "Why do you do this?" 
They said: "Well, this person came to my house. I let him in my house 
and he was my guest. I could not say no because he was my guest." 
Indians were taken advantage of in that way on both the reservation 
and in the cities. 
It is important to look at the human aspect of relocation. Before 
relocation, many people had unsanitary conditions on the reservation. 
Their houses did not have screens on windows, and they did not take 
care of garbage. When they came back after relocation, they had a 
little higher standard of living. People put screens on their windows and 
elevated their living standard as a result of relocation experience. 
Statistically, the problem might have been a failure. Yet there were 
spin-offs from this experience which were to the Indians' benefit. 
How a policy is administered often determines whether it will be 
successful. To illustrate the point, I will tell you a story about a young 
lady that had two children. She was a single parent. She had arranged 
for these two children to stay with her mother while she went to Denver 
to take a clerical course. Of course, she was on Aid to Dependent 
Children. Because she was a single parent, her relocation had to be 
approved in Washington. We received a letter back stating that this 
individual received $200 a month being on ADC with two children. 
If she went to Denver and learned how to be a secretary, the entrance 
salary would be only $175 a month. She was supposedly better off 
staying on the reservation as a single parent with two children on ADC. 
A relocation situation on the other side was a young lady who was 
the oldest of about six or seven children. She trained to be a beautician 
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in Minneapolis. She eventually found a job, married her boss, and 
demonstrated his line of beauty products throughout the upper Middle 
West. This is an extreme example of a success story, but relocation was 
good for that particular individual. 
In summary, I would say that the relocation program was excellent 
for some people. The mistake was trying to make it successful for every-
body, which it was not. But we did finally get the state employment 
services and the Employment Security Commission offices interested in 
the problem of unemployment on Indian reservations. They also made 
a stronger effort to locate employment opportunities near the reserva-
tions, rather than transport people from South Dakota all the way to 
Los Angeles and other distant places. 
PHILLEO NASH 
Relocation was part of the termination policy followed by the 
Truman administration. I quarreled vigorously with Dillon S. Myer 
about the wisdom of relocation. It is customary for commissioners to 
refer to their predecessors as distinguished and capable individuals. 
So, I will not say anything about him that I did not say to him over the 
lunch table. I told M yer that he was an idiot and that he was going 
to get himself and the president of the United States into enormous 
difficulties. 
Before he became Indian commissioner, Myer had directed the 
relocation of Japanese-American citizens to concentration camps that 
were called "relocation centers." John Collier and Dillon Myer had a 
major disagreement about the way in which the Indian Bureau operated 
the relocation centers for Japanese-Americans that were under its direc-
tion at Parker, Arizona. I had nothing to do with those particular 
things, except that, when I was on the staff in the Office of War Infor-
mation, I had to review Myer's speeches and the releases from his 
office. I found him as intractable as other people found him later when 
he was Indian commissioner. 
So Myer approached Indian affairs as though relocation centers 
and reservations were the same. He viewed Indians on reservations as 
temporary detainees. He sought to end this detention as quickly as 
possible. His policy was a form of expulsion. M yer did not understand 
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the difference between the reservation system and his relocation centers. 
The War Relocation Authority experience was a most inappropriate 
model to follow when he became commissioner of Indian affairs. 
It was a very bad time in Indian affairs. From Franklin Roosevelt's 
death to about 1950, we had a non-managed Indian Bureau. One of 
the things the president of the United States and the secretary of the 
interior have to do is to see that the Interior Department is well run 
like any other government agency. 
World War II had a devastating effect on reservations and on the 
Bureau itself. The front office was moved out of Washington to Chicago 
to make room for important wartime agencies. Large numbers of 
Indians were in the armed forces, and the Indian agencies were stripped 
of personnel. Building programs of every kind stopped. At the end of 
the war, John Collier resigned under the most painful circumstances. 
He resigned while he was in Reno establishing residence for a divorce on 
Bureau time. That was a very serious mistake. 
Bill Brophy, a marvelous human being, was an excellent choice to 
succeed Collier, but he had an acute upper respiratory disease. The 
torrid climate of Washington and the stress of the commissioner's job 
led to a physical breakdown. A short time later, John Ralph Nichols 
was made commissioner of Indian affairs. He lasted eleven months. 
Somebody else had to be found. 
By this time, Oscar Chapman was secretary of the interior. He had 
a great feeling for the vigor with which Dillon M yer had prevented the 
Japanese-American relocation centers from becoming permanent facili-
ties. None of us understood the Indian situation as well as we should 
have. I take my share of the blame. We were looking for a tough bureau 
chief. I was among those who recommended Myer for the job as 
Indian commissioner. 
That gave me a certain claim on Myer's attention. At one of our 
numerous lunches, he said, "I am going to do three things you are not 
going to like." I responded, "What are they?" He said, "relocation." 
I told him, "Do not bother with the other two." The other two topics 
were area offices and the off-reservation dormitories for the Navajo. 
I also said, "Dillon, you are heading for disaster. You are going to bring 
yourself down, you are going to bring the house down, and you are going 
to bring President Truman down with it. I am a faithful and loyal staff 
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member. 1 am going to have to tell him that 1 think he ought to get rid 
of you." That effort was not successful. 
1 worked as an assistant in the White House. 1 begged Harry 
Truman to fire Myer. 1 also asked for the job, which was possibly a 
tactical error. Truman said, "How can 1 respect your judgement if you 
are just looking for work?" The president then said, "What is the 
matter, do you think your job here is done?" And 1 said, "No." He 
replied, "I do not think it is either. 1 need you, so let's put an end to this. 
1 do not have that many good bureau chiefs that I can spare one who 
is managing what I regard as an unmanageable bureau. But if a lot of 
bad things are going on and they are bad enough so that you think 
I ought to do something about it, you have my authority to look into it 
and come back and report to me." That was as far as I got. 
M yer worked from the wrong framework. He attempted to repeat 
his success in the Japanese-American relocation centers. He thought it 
was an administrative coup to deal with Indian reservations as though 
they were detention camps. Everybody knew they were not. This policy 
was bound to face a certain amount of disaster. In the first place, the 
programs were underfunded. M yer's relocation program was essentially 
a one-way bus ticket from rural to urban poverty. 
Relocation was an underfunded, ill-conceived program with a 
negative name. It had an unpopular administrator and one whom 
I failed to dislodge. I finished out my tour of duty at the White House 
and went back to other jobs. Eventually, the voters of Wisconsin 
caught up with me and put me out of office. I came to Washington 
looking for work, feeling very guilty about my part in Myer's appoint-
ment. . I wanted to be appointed as Indian commissioner and undo 
some small part of the damage I had already done. 
It took a long time to get confirmed. The National Congress of 
American Indians and Helen Peterson managed, at a very critical time, 
to get some telegrams sent from Lewiston, Idaho, to the Senate of the 
United States. One of my supporters, a senator from Wisconsin, held 
a sheaf of these telegrams in his hand. He did not say I have here a 
group of papers indicating that somebody was a communist. Instead, 
he indicated that these papers said that all the Indian tribes wanted 
Nash to be Indian commissioner. 
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After I became commissioner, we set up a task force to set policy 
guidelines for the Kennedy administration. The shabby program of 
relocation and expulsion from reservations obviously was no good. On 
the other hand, it was quite clear that it is not right to base a program 
for any American group on compulsory residence. If you generate a 
situation in which there is nothing but dependency and poverty in a 
rural environment, the fact that it is called a reservation does not justify 
saying, "Well, I am not going to help you get out." If you tell people 
they must stay because government programs such as relocation are not 
good enough, then you have made a decision to keep people in poverty. 
On the other hand, if you say, "We do not believe in reservations, 
we are not going to pour good money after bad, and we are not going to 
have tribal economic development programs," then you are again 
making a decision. It says that, if you want to escape poverty, you have 
got to give up your life on the reservation. It was our carefully con-
sidered judgement that a dual program was the only thing that made 
any kind of sense. We favored economic and personal development 
programs for residents who lived on or off reservations, depending on 
their individual choice. 
It seemed that while our economic development programs were 
being established, we needed an escape valve in the form of outmigra-
tion. We decided that relocation or employment assistance did not have 
to be a bad program. We discussed this idea at length and decided that 
instead of buying an Indian a bus ticket, we ought to spend somewhere 
around $4,000 for employment assistance. The assistance ought to 
begin with an indication from a family or individual on the reservation 
that they wanted to leave, an indication of where they wanted to go, 
counseling about what things would be like, and some vocational testing. 
The selection process was very difficult. You can do a lot for a 
two person family with $4,000. You can do something for a three or 
four person family. There are very few government programs that can 
adequately fund relocation for larger numbers of people. Therefore, 
it is necessary to consciously acknowledge the fact that you will take 
younger families and help them make a reasonable judgement about 
where they want to go and what they want to do. It may very well be 
that the best thing is for them to stay on the reservation. But that has 
to be their choice. 
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There had to be a lot of consultation with the community agencies 
concerning the destination point. We had no right to pick those desti-
nations, but it was necessary to make sure that there was generous 
support at the community level when the family arrived. This meant 
adequate job training, schools, community contacts, counseling, and 
housing. 
In the matter of implementing policy, I felt we were victimized by 
decisions that had been made by my predecessors-Dillon Myer and 
Glenn Emmons. We were bound by the great American liberal value 
of non-segregation. Relocated Indians were scattered throughout the 
cities so they could not form neighborhood cohorts. This made little 
sense. Every ethnic group that established itself in America did so by 
creating cohesive neighborhoods that generated their own support. But 
the Indian Bureau could not follow this practice. That would be prac-
ticing segregation. Stupidity has no end under some circumstances. 
Once you have started something like that it is pretty hard to withdraw 
your support. 
One of the things that we had to tell our relocation people was 
"Stop telling Indians that they have failed if they come back to their res-
ervations. Abandon the rule that they only get once chance." I dropped 
out of high school, college, and graduate school. I finally dropped out of 
the Indian Bureau. I do not think that makes me a failure in life. 
During the 1960s adult vocational training and on-the-job training 
was lavishly financed. At least the Bureau of the Budget thought it was. 
College students also were getting more money for scholarships. And 
the tribes were developing on their own. We moved from a $2 million 
level to about a $25 million level in the college scholarship program, 
but that college scholarship program was never provided with support 
in vocational counseling, school counseling, and community develop-
ment counseling. 
Relocation created a generation of street wise people. The Red 
Power movement, the confrontations on reservations, and the occupa-
tion of the BIA building were direct outgrowths of the intimate contact 
that had developed between blacks and Indians in the cities. People 
brought back to their reservations the policies of confrontation. They 
understood the amount of leverage that would be obtained by being 
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bad instead of being good. I cannot be honest with my own feelings, or 
with my own perception of reality, unless I conclude that in the long 
run this was beneficial. 
HELEN PETERSON 
I am concerned about the omission of the National Congress of 
American Indians from discussions of that critical period in history 
between 1945 and 1960. I first became acquainted with NCAI in 1948, 
when it held a convention in Denver, Colorado. It had been founded, 
in 1944, in the same city. There is a picture which appears on most 
tribal council walls of that founding convention. I became executive 
director of the NCAI in 1953. D'Arcy McNickle, Ruth Bronson, and 
Bob Bennett were strong and key figures in the early years of the NCAL 
The NCAI was organized on a shoestring, and it never had much 
money. I was asked to become its director because there was no one 
there at the time. People like D' Arcy McNickle, Ruth Bronson, in par-
ticular, and Bob Bennett persuaded me to leave a very comfortable and 
happy job with the city of Denver and begin working for the NCAL 
It was a job which I knew nothing about. 
I think the connotation of the word "relocation" almost precludes 
a sane consideration of that program. I have been known as someone 
who was very much opposed to relocation. That is not true, because we 
had much more important things to worry about at the NCAL We 
never opposed the program. We felt it was necessary and a good pro-
gram. What upset us was the priority that it had in its relationship to 
other programs. Our concern was that the government needed to spend 
more time developing the human and natural resources on reservations 
and put relocation in its proper place. We should not waste our time 
arguing about relocation when there are really many more important 
issues to examine. The plain truth is that Indians are probably the most 
mobile people in the country. Like all other Americans, they moved 
around the country during World War II. 
We had little understanding of what termination really meant, 
except that it struck terror into the hearts of people. It was complicated 
because a man named Wade Crawford from the Klamath Reservation 
lived in Washington for months at a time. He promoted termination. 
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The carrot was a big cash settlement for individuals. It was a very 
powerful argument that effectively put down the Klamath's opposition 
to termination. 
In the NeAl office we did all we could to support, encourage, and 
back up those people who dared to question termination, but it was 
pretty much a losing battle. The NeAl was in a tough spot. We were 
deeply committed to respecting the sovereignty of a tribe. Did the 
NeAl want to oppose termination even when the people involved 
wanted it? We never really came to a final answer on that question. 
The NeAl mobilized at a convention in Phoenix, Arizona, in 
December 1953. Before that time, its office had been closed. It was 
really in no position to act as a national organization. But we managed 
to raise a little money, and an emergency conference concerning Ameri-
can Indian legislation was held two months later. This conference was 
the beginning of sobering up some of the congressmen. It launched our 
effort to slow down and stop further implementation of the termina-
tion policy. 
There are other ways in which tribes can be terminated though. 
They can be terminated through appropriations. Also, Indians often 
hurt themselves. Differences exist between reservation and off-reserva-
tion Indians. Some urban Indians have tried to undermine their own 
tribal governments by insisting that they have the right to vote in tribal 
elections. It is those tribal governments at home on the reservation who 
are going to ensure the survival of tribes. The words genocide and 
survival are thrown around loosely. They mean many different things. 
If we are not careful, we can be a part of such a movement without even 
knowing it. 
Besides the failure to cooperate with our tribal governments, we 
have a proclivity for being irresponsibly critical of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. It is true that the BIA can always be improved. We have made 
jokes about the Bureau for many years. But the general American 
public now believes that the issue is Indians versus the Bureau. Many 
people do not realize that the Bureau is staffed by Indians. Almost all 
the area directors, superintendents, and division chiefs are Indians. It is 
time to develop training courses and support for these individuals. 
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GERALD ONE FEATHER 
The relocation program had an impact on our tribal government 
at Pine Ridge. Many people who could have provided tribal leadership 
were lost because they had the motivation to go off the reservation to 
find employment or obtain an education. Relocation drained off a lot 
of potential leadership. 
When some of these people returned, they brought back problems 
that they inherited from urban communities. For instance, we have 
established reservation ghettos, which we never had before. Public 
housing is an urban concept that was integrated into tribal planning. 
Once people moved off the reservation to Rapid City and neigh-
boring towns, they established themselves in these communities. They 
also continued to make demands on the tribal government. In many 
cases, they demanded tribal services even though they lived in urban 
areas. This has been a political question that the tribe has had to resolve. 
Where do you draw the line in offering tribal services? 
One important thing did happen. The United Sioux Tribes, in 
South Dakota, contracted for employment assistance. Each tribe put 
money into this venture, which allowed them to run employment offices 
in major cities to help people find jobs and to take care of social prob-
lems that arose from city living This is a necessary service, especially in 
the last few years when unemployment has climbed on the reservations. 
The people who moved to urban areas formed their own Indian 
communities. Indian centers became a focal point for the people that 
lived in cities. When they became organized, these centers allied closely 
with their respective reservation communities. Today, that relationship 
has become more refined. Several weeks ago, a Sun Dance was held in 
San Jose, California. Some of the elders from Pine Ridge were asked to 
go down there and conduct the Sun Dance. This is one example of how 
cultural and religious ceremonies of the tribe have been exported from 
the reservation to an urban clientele. 
Tribal government today is complex. On the one hand, we have to 
deal with resident members. At the same time, we have an absentee 
group that is still pretty much a part of the tribal government. So, there 
is a real urban-reservation connection that has been going through a 
refining process. I do not know where this will lead to in the future. 
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The relocation program provided opportunities, but it also pre-
sented problems for tribal government. People have asked to be termi-
nated from tribal rolls. In some cases, if you are born off the reservation, 
you are automatically not included as tribal members. So individual 
Indians are systematically terminating their membership on the tribal 
rolls. 
LADoNNA HARRIS 
Back in Oklahoma, a group of us got together to organize Okla-
homans for Indian Opportunity. In the process of doing that, we found 
out that more than half of the state's Indians were residing in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma City, Lawton, and smaller towns. We had a consciousness-
raising just from the exercise. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed me to the National Indian 
Opportunities Council because I had raised the issue of federally unrec-
ognized tribes and the point that one-half of our Indian population 
was living in urban areas. We decided to hold hearings around the 
country to make sure that my statement about the large number of 
urban Indians was accurate. We held hearings in Dallas, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, and Minneapolis. I remember going down to Dallas 
and they said, "We do not have very many Indians here. We have about 
2,500 people." I replied, "Oh, I have more relatives from Oklahoma 
than that in the Dallas-Fort Worth area." 
We found out in those hearings that the Los Angeles area had 
the largest Indian population outside the Navajo Reservation. More 
importantly, we discovered that there were sociological impacts that 
evolved from relocation policy decisions. Individual termination was, 
in some ways, more devastating than tribal termination, where you had 
group reinforcement to rely on. People that came straight from an 
Indian boarding school and reservation situation to Los Angeles, 
Detroit, or Chicago underwent severe cultural shock. And there was 
little or no training to help people adapt to their new environment. 
Relocation went hand in hand with termination. It was for budget-
ary reasons that Indian were moved to cities. Relocated individuals 
were no longer eligible for Indian Bureau services. 
Relocation has caused social impacts and repercussions that we are 
still dealing with today. The occupation of Alcatraz was certainly one 
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of those. In fact, the whole pan-Indian movement came out of the 
urban Indian situation. People were saying, we are Indians and we 
want to belong to something. 
If you take people who come from a reservation and put them in a 
detached urban environment, you really have problems. In my opinion, 
that was what Alcatraz was all about. These people were detached from 
their roots. People cannot function well when you detach them from 
tribalism, communal living, and their extended families. 
Urban Indians created an environment they could exist in. The 
pan-Indian movement reflected the need to have group reinforcement 
and a positive self-image. Indians used their imagination to survive in 
urban areas such as Los Angeles. There were basketball teams, church 
groups, peyote groups, and dances. 
When the American Indian Movement and the urban unrest 
started, we were asking people to act rational in an irrational situation. 
In my opinion, people were simply creating an environment that they 
could function in. To me, that is exceptional. One of the reasons that 
Indians have survived is that we have the ability to adapt to those kinds 
of situations. 
Alcatraz was very understandable. It was part of the after effect of 
the policy of relocation. People needed an identity; they needed a tie. 
Relocation violated Indian treaties. Treaties were not made with 
the land. They were made with the people, and the responsibility of 
federal services continues to be the people. Today, we are once again 
being terminated for budgetary reasons. Tribes without federal recog-
nition are being terminated from services that would help them to 
establish their credentials as an organized community of people, and 
all of those programs that urban Indians have fought so hard for are 
being cut away. 
CHAPTER SIX 
The Legacy if the Termination Era 
Larry EchoHawk, Mary Ellen Sloan, Russell Jim, 
Joe De La Cruz, Sol Tax 
I disagree with the statement that termination is not a threat any-
more. Our enemies, if I can call them that, all have learned from their 
mistakes. They have learned over the last twenty years to be more subtle 
about what they want. We are, once again, faced with resolutions from 
national powerful organizations such as the American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration calling for termination of the reservations. I asked leaders of the 
federation, "Why have you adopted this resolution?" And they told me 
frankly that the Indians are getting too much land and water back. It is 
economic reasoning. The machinery also is in place to reduce health and 
other services to Indian people. It is the first move toward present day 
termination. 
Elmer Savill a, director, 
National Tribal Chairmen's Association 
Termination is here to stay. It is going to hit us in the face almost 
every day. We had better be prepared for it. The National Interstate 
Congress on Equal Rights and Responsibilities is the main thrust of anti-
Indianism in this country. It grew out of South Dakota into Montana and 
has spread into seventeen states. It really shocks me that in America we 
can have the kind of racial hatred that this organization espouses and 
brags about. 
Robert Burnette, Rosebud Sioux, former director, NCAl 
The reason that the idea of termination, of cutting off special provi-
sions for Indians and forcing assimilation, recurs so frequently is that it 
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reflects a deep belief that different economic and community organization 
modes are inferior to the American norm. There is the continuing tempta-
tion for policy makers to assume that everything possible has been done to 
help Indians but that it has failed. The only alternative, they say, is to 
stop these paternalistic efforts and force the Indian to be like the rest of us. 
It is much easier to reach this conclusion, all too often, than to face the 
extremely difficult conditions in which Indians have been living and the 
costs of providing a relatively normal range of opportunities to Indian 
people. This is what makes the termination history so important. It shows 
that there is no easy answer and that seemingly easy solutions only make 
things a great deal worse. It was the triumph of the leaders of the restora-
tion movement to prove this to the Congress and conservative political 
leaders. It would be a tragedy if this knowledge were lost. 
Gary Orfield, Brookings Institution, 
professor of political science, 
University of Chicago 
LARRY ECHOHAWK 
I think it is important that we talk about what termination was 
yesterday, what it is today, and what importance it has for us in the 
future. To me, termination has three basic aspects. Back in the 1950s, 
the federal government was trying to escape the responsibility that its 
relationship with Indian people had imposed. Over the years, it had 
wanted more control over the lives and resources of Indian people, but 
there was no justification for that control in the United States Constitu-
tion. It merely gave the federal government the power to regulate com-
merce with Indian tribes. It was through the judicial branch of the 
federal government that the doctrine of guardian and wardship status 
was created. Eventually, the federal government got tired of paying the 
price for being vested with that enormous power. Termination was an 
effort to do away with the trust responsibility, and we see that happen-
ing again today. 
A second aspect of termination has to do with assimilation. In the 
1950s, the government wanted to make the Indian people become more 
like mainstream society. By placing Indian people under the wing of 
state governments, doing away with their tribal governments, making 
them hold their lands as other citizens of the United States hold theirs, 
and having their property subject to taxation, federal officials thought 
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that assimilation would occur. That was not a new policy, but it 
received renewed vigor throughout the termination era. 
The third and most important aspect of termination has to do with 
the attack on self-rule, or the sovereignty of tribal governments. It was 
not only the termination acts that affected particular tribes. It was also 
the enactment of Public Law 280, which swept away the authority of 
Indian tribes in jurisdictional areas. There was almost a complete 
destruction of tribal government for many Indian nations. 
The policy of termination has been repudiated, at least in word, 
by presidential administrations since 1958, but we still suffer the impact 
of termination. The tribes that were affected by the termination acts 
were almost completely decimated economically. I say that because of 
my experience in working with the Paiute people in southern Utah. 
I have spoken with many people who were touched by termination. 
They have bitter feelings toward the government. These people are 
angry because they have not been identified in the eyes of the gov-
ernment as Indian, even though everyone would readily recognize what 
they are. 
Overall, the termination policy was an abysmal failure. We have 
looked at termination as a policy that lasted from approximately the 
mid-1940s into the 1960s. I submit to you that termination has been 
around a lot longer than that, and you can expect to see it in the future. 
Maybe the descriptive word has changed, but the thrust of the policy 
is there. From the time of Indian removal, through the creation of 
reservations, through the enactment of the Major Crimes Act in 1885, 
to the General Allotment Act in 1887, you can see the work of the 
United States Congress in trying to dismantle tribal government and 
Indian rights. 
The actions of the courts in the United States have not been men-
tioned, but they run parallel to termination. In Lone Wolf vs Hitchcock, 
the United States vs Montana, and many other cases, the rights of 
Indian people as tribal governments have been eroded. It is disturbing 
to me to hear that termination is only something of the past. I believe 
we are being set up. We have to be aware that termination is some-
thing that we face today. We have got to be better prepared in the 
future, because the resources that Indian people had are greatly dimin-
ished today. 
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The Shoshone-Bannock Indian tribe was promised, in 1868, that 
they would have a permanent homeland of 1.8 million acres. That 
solemn promise of the United States has been reduced to a mere 500,000 
acres, and twenty years from now I wonder what acreage will be left 
on that particular reservation. And the Shoshone-Bannock are one of 
the luckier groups of Indian people as far as their ability to maintain 
tribal rights and resources. 
The real challenge falls upon tribal governments. No doubt, they 
will have to deal with the United States Congress to ward off further 
termination legislation. But ultimately Indian people will prevail 
because of their own inner strength. I have to give credit to one of the 
draftsmen of the Indian Reorganization Act for introducing that 
thought to the dominant society. In the Indian Reorganization Act, 
John Collier tried to build upon the strength of the Indian people. 
Whether you like the IRA or not, it was a significant reversal of federal 
Indian policy. To that extent, Collier deserves credit. But the Indian 
people are the ones that will provide the final victory. 
MARY ELLEN SLOAN 
I am an attorney from Salt Lake City. I would like to talk about 
my experiences in representing the Paiute, who were a terminated tribe. 
The Paiute are composed of five bands located in southern Utah. In 
the early 1950s, when termination was in vogue, Senator Arthur 
Watkins, one of the primary architects of the termination policy in Con-
gress, looked to tribes in his own state to participate in this federal policy. 
Consequently, the Utah Paiute were selected for termination. 
It is important to examine some of the historical background of 
termination. William Zimmerman developed four criteria to determine 
which tribes should be terminated. They were (1) the degree of accul-
turation, (2) the economic resources upon which the tribes could rely 
after termination, (3) the consent of the tribal officials, and (4) the 
consent of state and local governmental officials. 
A short time later, the Bureau of Indian Affairs undertook a socio-
economic survey of the Utah Paiute. That information was submitted 
to Congress during its deliberation on the Paiute termination legislation. 
The record was very clear that the Paiute did not meet Zimmerman's 
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criteria. The quality of Paiute land was so poor that frequently the BIA 
was unable to find anyone to lease it for grazing purposes. Furthermore, 
there was no informed consent. There were some Paiutes that agreed 
to termination, but informed consent, as we would understand it, did 
not exist. State and local officials also had very little input. They were 
not particularly interested in the Paiute. 
Nevertheless, the end result was that this particular tribe was 
terminated. Because of termination the Paiute lost approximately 
fifteen thousand acres of land through tax sales or sales of land in antici-
pation of being taxed. In addition, they lost any opportunity for federal 
services and other federal benefits. It is very clear that the selection of 
the Paiute for termination was a political decision. It was not based 
upon rational criteria. 
In 1968, the Bureau of Indian Affairs once again did a socio-
economic survey of the Paiute. It confirmed the basic information that 
previously had been included in the legislative record. Their socio-
economic condition was extremely poor. Housing conditions were bad, 
low educational levels common, and tribal income minimal. 
In 1974, after the passage of the Menominee Restoration Act, the 
Paiute began to explore the possibility of restoration for their tribe. 
In 1978, legislation was introduced in the Senate and in the House to 
restore their status as a federally recognized Indian tribe. The original 
restoration legislation would have restored federal services and federal 
recognition. It did not provide for the restoration of land. The bill 
subsequently was amended in the Senate to include a reservation land 
program. It was then sent to the House. The House concurred, and 
legislation was drafted that included a provision for the development of 
a reservation plan, which the Paiute have been working on. 
With respect to the specific impacts of termination, federal services 
and federal recognition were ended. There was also a misconception 
that was very destructive. It was that termination somehow changed a 
person's identity as an Indian. That misconception existed for a long 
time. One of the significant things about restoration was that it put all 
of that aside and restored federal services. 
Federal recognition of the Paiute was extremely important. Since 
the restoration legislation, the Paiute have developed a tribal govern-
ment, adopted a tribal constitution, and participated in federal pro-
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grams such as 638 contracting. These achievements were possible 
because the restoration legislation provided for the application of the 
Indian Reorganization Act. 
There were non-Indian influences on the restoration legislation. 
State jursidiction was an issue. Congress provided that Public Law 280, 
as amended, would apply. There also was a provision that hunting and 
fishing rights would not be restored. 
There have been several pieces of restoration legislation passed for 
tribes besides the Paiute, but Congress has not adopted a general bill that 
would restore all the tribes that had been originally terminated. Con-
gress still requires each tribe to propose its own restoration legislation. 
RUSSELL JIM 
First of all, I would like to clarify the misconception that I am an 
"activist." This play on words, in this borrowed tongue that I speak, 
makes it sound as if I am a rebel. The moral responsibility that comes 
from my heritage prevents me from being a rebel. I have been influ-
enced by elders who told me to be gracious to all people, including the 
transients that have come to this continent. 
The Yakima nation did not accept termination. We were about 
ninth on the list but were never terminated. The Yakima nation also 
did not accept the Indian Reorganization Act. I take exception to the 
statement that if it were not for John Collier, the tribes today w(mld not 
exist. We refused to accept the IRA, but we still exist as a culturally 
distinct people. We speak our own language and practice our own 
religion. It is actually not a religion but a way of life. Everything is 
tied together. 
Termination has been imposed on just about all tribes to a certain 
degree. There has been a gradual erosion of treaty rights by a small 
group of influential people that want to have their own way. The most 
glaring example today of termination and the erosion of treaty rights 
is the issue of nuclear waste. The Yakima Reservation and the Hanford 
Works are only thirteen miles apart as the crow flies. The Yakima 
nation consisted of 12 million acres prior to the Treaty of 1855. In that 
treaty, we ceded to the federal government 10.8 million acres and 
retained 1.3 million acres. It was our understanding that in the ceded 
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10.8 million acres, we retained the right to travel, gather food and 
medicine, and fish in all usual and accustomed places. But because of 
the damage done by radiation to the environment, who in their right 
mind would travel through that area and gather food and medicine. 
Boarding schools are another form of termination. I was sent to a 
boarding school. We were beaten when we spoke our language. The 
plan, as I see it, when I look back in history, was to prevent Indian 
children from learning the day-to-day teachings of their families. 
Instead, foreign values were imposed. 
I would also like to refer to the issue of unemployment. Politicians, 
whether they are running for mayor or president of the United States, 
always stress the need for employment. This imposes a different value 
system upon a food-gathering people. The emphasis on getting a job 
and earning that almighty dollar contributes to greed. It is called the 
"Great American Way." 
The creation of these so-called jobs imposes on the natural re-
sources of tribes. It leads to a form of self-cannibalism. You can observe 
self-cannibalism in Indian country if you look at the Crow's coal, the 
Osage's oil, and the Yakima's timber. In the Yakima case, there was 
mismangaement of timber resources by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
It wanted to cut the timber at an accelerated rate of speed. Approxi-
mately 90 percent of the Yakima income comes from the timber. This 
revenue keeps our government running. Once the prime timber van-
ishes, the Yakima will become more dependent upon the grants and 
contracts of the federal government. When the federal government 
controls the purse strings, they control your sovereignty. 
There has been too much apathy in Indian country and too much 
misunderstanding by the mainstream of society. Christians must start 
realizing their moral responsibility. It is a shame what they have done 
and what they are attempting to do to the indigenous people of this 
planet. I do not wish to be only remembered in the history books by my 
children's children. The unique indigenous people on this continent 
need to keep their identity. To have a versatile world is what the Creator 
intended. If He wanted a melting pot, He would have made it a long 
time ago. We would have been all one color and maybe the same size. 
The Yakima fought hard against the terminaton of any tribe. We 
were not out in the forefront verbally. My people always have had a 
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tendency to stay back but to speak powerfully and speak wisely. I take 
exception to the idea that there were just a few people fighting against 
termination. There were a lot of us. My family has been involved in 
politics for a long time. Influential leaders in the Pacific Northwest 
fought very hard against termination. The thwarting of termination 
would have been nearly impossible without them. The Affiliated Tribes 
of Northwest Indians are still a very influential group and a segment of 
the National Congress of American Indians. 
JOE DE LA CRUZ 
I have been involved in resisting or fighting some form of termina-
tion all my life. Ever since the European people arrived on this conti-
nent, we have been in the process of termination. But you do not learn 
much about it in books that people read. 
I often ask people, how did Public Law 280 come about in 1953? 
Only one person has given a response that I feel very comfortable with. 
After the Second World War, the United Nations was established, and 
it emphasized the need to decolonize people. The United States was 
one of the key sponsors of the United Nations. Someone in the United 
States government realized that people victimized by colonialism lived 
in their own country. From 1947 until the early 1950s, there was a drive 
to terminate the colonial rule of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
Most of us who are involved in Indian affairs know about the 
negative impact of termination. Concurrent Resolution 108 is still on 
the books. We supposedly are in another era, entitled self-determination, 
but we still have many holdovers within the various federal and state 
agencies who have the mentality of the termination era. We are battling 
today over the question of jurisdictional authority. Tribes supposedly 
retained all the powers they ever had, but we are challenged every time 
we attempt to do something. Because of Public Law 280, we had con-
flicts with the states and counties over highways. We also had confron-
tations over our children and the rights of our children. States used 
Public Law 280 to impose their educational practices on our children. 
The Department of Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs still 
have a colonial mentality. When it comes to a question of who has 
jurisdiction over Indian territory, that trustee is a very weak sister. 
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I know that because of Public Law 280. During the termination period, 
the Quinault people lost over 35,000 acres of their timberland. Some 
of that land was valued at a million dollars per 80 acre stand. 
It took several years and thousands of man hours of work to find 
out what really happened. Recently, the Supreme Court decided in the 
Mitchell case that wc could sue the United States over the misman-
agement of those lands and resources. One of the key examples of 
mismanagement that we found was that none of our people were prop-
erly informed about the disposing of Indian property. When they signed 
documents, they thought they were just selling their timber, not the 
land. We found instances where Indian people received only $5,000 
for an 80 acre stand of timber. 
We have worked on this problem since 1965. We went to the Court 
of Claims. They said we could not sue the United States. Our attorneys 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which sent the case back to the Court 
of Claims after ruling 6 to 3 that we could sue the United States for 
mismanaging Indian resources. A lot of our people thought that they 
had won. I told them it was just another hurdle. I warned that we 
might be dead before the case goes through the federal courts again. 
It is easy for a few people in the various government agencies to 
put barriers in the way when tribes start trying to move forward in a 
direction of self-determination. The Quinault nation has maintained 
that it has complete jurisdiction on the reservation. In order to uphold 
our jurisdictional rights, we had to fight the state, the federal govern-
ment, and especially the Bureau of Indian Affairs. We were challenged 
every step of the way. 
In the early 1960s, the Quinault hired some people to help zone 
our reservation. The Washington coast within our reservation was zoned 
a wilderness area. The rest of the reservation was zoned for forestry. 
It took about eight years before someone challenged our zoning ordi-
nance. First of all, the Bureau of Indian Affairs refused to recognize it. 
Then, a real estate development corporation from California challenged 
the Quinault nation zoning ordinance. We beat them in a district and 
a circuit court. 
The tribe also developed its own building code, sanitation ordi-
nance, and highway act. Again, the Bureau did not recognize these 
laws. After we took some of these cases to the Ninth Circuit Court, the 
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Bureau finally has started to work with the tribe and recognize the law 
of the Quinault nation. They also began to recognize our forestry 
practices, but in 1984, they attempted to deny our 638 contracts on 
forestry management because we required the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
the United States Forest Service, and the state to get hydraulic permits 
from the tribe any time they were doing anything around a waterway 
that supported a salmon habitat. 
Because of these problems, I do not think that termination has 
ended. It will always be with us. Indian people will continue to feel the 
impact of the termination era until policies are created that guarantee 
sovereign tribal government. 
SOL TAX 
I think that it is worthwhile for us to see urban relocation as part 
of the policy of termination. The relocation program in the early 1950s 
promoted the dispersal of Indian communities. Instead of developing 
reservations and continuing tribal identity, the government put Indians 
in cities far away from their homeland. 
When Indians came to Chicago, they received relocation assistance 
for about six weeks. Indian families came on a train with a one-way 
ticket. Once they arrived, they had no place to go. They were met by 
somebody in the Bureau of Indian Affairs who took them to a rental 
house and found them a job. When Indians returned to the relocation 
office to say they had a problem, which they all did, they were told we 
do not have any more jurisdiction over you. We have rented you a 
home; if you want to move to another one, that is your problem. If you 
do not like the job, that is also your problem. 
Over the course of the next few years, thousands of Indians relo-
cated in Chicago. The American Friends Indian Center was established 
for them. Without this center, there would have been no facility to treat 
Indians as human beings and help families in trouble. If Indians went 
back to the Bureau of Indian Affairs office, they got a scolding because 
there were no resources for them. 
At that time I was involved with the Fort Berthold Reservation. 
I know what happened there. Many Indians on the reservation could 
have made it in the city, but they were the ones who already had large 
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farms. The Indians who could not do anything on the reservation were 
the only ones that were tempted to leave and go to Chicago or some 
other place. People who had no means of making a living at home were 
taken to strange cities. 
In Chicago, we had a meeting with our senator and with the social 
agencies. Of course, the social agencies were only interested when some-
one got into real trouble. We also asked for the names of the people 
before they came and what train they were coming on, so that we 
could meet the train and tell them where the Indian Center was located. 
Relocation officials said that was impossible. It was part of the ethics 
of the government not to give out individual names. It was a public 
scandal. There was a critical article in Harper's Magazine. All it did 
was make the Bureau of Indian Affairs angry. 
The head man from the Denver relocation service came to Chicago 
more than once. We had meetings at the Indian Center. We tried to 
explain what was going on. The relocation people said, "We just want 
Indians to get jobs." We replied, "Why don't you take care of them?" 
They said, "This is not in the law. Furthermore, the Indians are being 
offered opportunities to come to the cities and get better employment 
than they could get on the reservation." There was a big discrepancy 
between what was actually going on and the notion of relocation held 
in Washington D.C. 
Many Indians were afraid that the people who relocated would no 
longer be supportive of the tribal view. This was not the case at all. 
Indians had not left their tribes. They were in the city to locate a job, 
just as they had gone off to other jobs in the past. In 1961, a large 
national Indian conference was held in Chicago. About a thousand 
Indians attended. They represented most of the tribes of the United 
States. A few individuals came from Canada and Alaska. Those in 
attendance worried that the Indians from Chicago would dominate the 
conference, but this did not happen. Indians from the city supported 
their tribes-people. That was their point of reference. One of the first 
things that came out in the conference was that no competition existed 
between urban Indians and those who had remained at home on their 
reservations. 
I saw an example of this when the Census Bureau planned the 
1980 census. I was at the meeting where the Census Bureau asked 
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Indian leaders in Chicago to help with the 1980 census so their people 
would not be undercounted. The reason for an accurate head count 
was that the federal budget for different cities was based on per capita 
estimates. The Indians turned them down because they did not want 
to compete with the money that was targeted for their reservations. 
It was clear that they were associating themselves with their tribes and 
with the reservations from which they came, rather than the city. 
Meanwhile, the Indians adjusted to the city. The Indian Center 
prospered with help from many people outside of the Indian community 
but mostly with the help of Indians. This was difficult because the 
center had to get funds from many different sources. It was responsible 
for youth recreation, education, and health. The Indians did not 
like to go to non-Indian places if they could have their own Indian 
health center. 
The Indian Center had its own board of directors that made all 
the policy. Usually, social agencies have rich people on their boards of 
directors. They have outside professionals who raise money for them 
and oversee their management. There were no professionals, at that 
time, among Indians in Chicago, but they have developed their own 
professionalism in order to be able to manage themselves. They manage 
the health center, the employment center, and the business association 
that teaches people how to do things. They are making a life for them-
selves, not as city Indians, but as Indians whose loyalty remains with 
the tribe. Their children go back and forth between the city and 
the reservations. 
More than half of the Indians in the United States now live in 
urban areas where they can make a living and manage their own affairs. 
Relocation had terrible consequences while it was going on. Now that 
the Indians are settled, making their own way, and managing urban 
Indian institutions themselves, it does not look so bad. 
PART THREE 
Toward Self-Determination 
Navajo tribal delegate Scott Preston explaining the government's stock reduction 
program to people from the western Tonalea area, 1940. 
A 1936 meeting on an Indian Reorganization Act charter at the extreme northwest 
end of the Cheyenne River Reservation. 
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I am not sure that the War on Poverty weakened the integrity of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs by farming out too many programs to 
other government agencies. The strategy, at that time, was to establish 
tribal eligibility for programs that were available to state and local gov-
ernments. This underlined the fact that the Indians' relationship is with 
the entire government, with the BIA having special responsibilities. 
These other agencies had a duty to serve the Indian people through a 
tribal delivery system. Part of that strategy also involved an attempt 
to make the role of the tribes in these delivery systems so locked-in that 
a future termination in the 1950s style would be more difficult to accom-
plish. The hope was that when funds came from other agencies it would 
enable us to target the Bureau money on particular well-defined prob-
lems. We then could use the money from the other federal agencies to 
deal with more general things. That was the theory that we followed. 
Philip S. Deloria, Standing Rock Sioux, 
director, American Indian Law Center 
The NIYC evolved from the 1961 Chicago Indian Conference 
sponsored by Sol Tax. A number of Indian college students attended 
this conference. They were expected to act as pages and carry pencils 
and papers for established Indian leaders. This made the college stu-
dents mad and they decided to form their own organization. 
The National Indian Youth Council was incorporated in Albu-
querque, New Mexico, in 1961, with a constitution, by-laws and articles 
of incorporation. It was involved in the fishing rights situation in the 
state of Washington. The NIYC published a newspaper called Ameri-
cans Before Columbus. Leaders of the NIYC met on various reserva-
tions to assist tribes and to pass resolutions concerning federal Indian 
policy. Many of these individuals also were involved in the 1968 poor 
people'S campaign in Washington D.C . ... That was the first time that 
there was a sit-in at the Bureau of Indian Affairs building. We tempor-
arily took over the BIA headquarters in 1968, to publicize Indian rights 
and the needs of poor people in general. 
Edward C. Johnson, Northern Paiute, 
director/curator of the Stewart Indian 
Museum Association, tribal historian 
for the Walker River Paiute tribe 
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Self-determination was one of the political plans in the Indian 
platform of President John F. Kennedy, and the concept was given 
added impetus in the messages on American Indians by President Lyn-
don B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. The policy of self-determination 
for Indian tribes became the offical policy of the Congress of the United 
States by the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination Act of Janu-
ary 4, 1975. Once the policy of self-determination had been established 
by the Congress and the executive department of the federal govern-
ment, aided and abetted by language of the Supreme Court in certain 
landmark cases, the implementation of the policy became the responsi-
bility of the Indian tribes. 
The act authorized assistance to Indian tribes to prepare them to 
assume responsibilities such as: (a) technical assistance directly from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or grants to tribes to obtain this assistance, 
(b) detail of staff from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to tribes, and (c) 
contracts by which Indian tribes might actually provide program serv-
ices to eligible recipients. With the authority granted them and with the 
means provided for implementation of the self-determination policy, 
Indian tribes moved ahead to achieve self-stated goals based upon per-
ceived priority needs. 
At the same time, other federal agencies were already able to 
provide, or were getting into a position to provide, program responsibili-
ties to Indian tribes, implemented by grants and contracts of resources 
from those agencies. Prominent among these were various types of 
Indian housing from the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, the Comprehensive Education and Training Program (CETA) 
from the Department of Labor, and American Native Programs ( ANA) 
from the Department of Health and Human Services. From the basic 
programs of these agencies flowed a variety of programs intended to 
meet the human needs of tribal people from the cradle to the grave. 
This plethora of programs almost inundated the capability of the 
Indian tribes to administer them and also tended to affect the priority 
given to these programs. It soon became apparent that the program 
priorities would be based upon the financial resources available for the 
various programs rather than priorities established upon need. Further-
more the emphasis was placed upon grantsmanship rather than admin-
istrative management and upon employment rather than achievement 
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of goals or objectives. It soon became apparent that this hectic scram-
bling for funding shunted aside the basic purposes of some of the pro-
grams, affecting the results which might otherwise have been obtained 
from this outpouring of funds for the variety of programs on reser-
vations. 
Robert Lafollette Bennett, Oneida, commissioner of 
Indian affairs under Lyndon B. Johnson 
We were programed throughout the 1970s to write funding appli-
cations for federal grants. Most of the Indian people that had a dream 
were on their typewriters day and night writing grant applications to 
agencies that kept changing their name and moving. At some point, 
people are going to suddenly realize that no one is feeling sorry for them. 
They are going to have to fight for social justice. Desperate people do 
desperate things. I see people on their bloody knees begging for things 
that are rightfully theirs. Eventually, folks are going to get mad and 
take matters into their own hands. 
Ramona Bennett, Puyallup, former tribal 
council member, fishing rights advocate 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Era if Indian Self-Determination: 
An Overview 
Philip S. Deloria 
Indian tribes and Indian people indisputably possessed a greater 
degree of self-determination in 1976 than they did in 1960. But my 
point here is not to celebrate the progress of the modern era. We cannot 
define, let alone measure, progress until we begin to understand the 
essential conflict within this country concerning its perception of 
Indians: the United States wants to preserve a romantic ideal of the 
Indian way of life, but at the same time numerous federal and state 
forces press for a wholesale assimilation of Indians. 
It is said that the termination policy of the 1940s and 1950s is 
dead. Termination was abandoned gradually between about 1958-
when it was repudiated by Secretary Fred Seaton on a radio program 
in Flagstaff, Arizona-and 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected.* 
Despite the formal rejection of the policy by both parties, congressional 
committees kept an active interest in termination until well into the 
1960s. Many Indians will recall being told by various BIA functionaries 
throughout this period that "termination is still the policy of the federal 
government until HeR 108 is repealed" (a legal conclusion of argu-
able validity) . t 
.* Quoted in Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed), p. 182. 
t H. R. Con Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st sess., (1953). This argument assumes 
that a concurrent resolution expresses continuing federal policy until explicitly 
repealed or superceded by Congress. In fact, such resolution expresses only the policy 
of the Congress that passed it and does not bind subsequent Congresses. See, e.g. 
lA C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction (1972), pp. 337-38. Legalities 
aside, the pattern of legislation and appropriations on Indian affairs by the middle 
1960s cast strong doubt on the validity of HeR 108 as a guiding statement of federal 
Indian policy. 
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For the past two decades, people have avoided styling themselves 
as terminationsts, at least in polite company, but there are now and 
always will be those who believe it proper social and legal policy to end 
the special status of Indian tribes. Termination is out of fashion and 
dead as an announced policy, but termination with a small "t" is not. 
For tactical purposes other names might be used, but the long range 
goal will not change. For that reason it will always be important to set 
out the sources of Indian tribes' right to exist and possess a special status. 
The special status of Indian tribes and individual Indians in this 
country has three sources in law, policy, and popular attitudes. One 
source is the cultural distinctness of Indian societies. From that cultural 
distinctness flows the idea that Indians must be shielded from the com-
petitive system. Their special separate status, by this view, should 
remain intact until Indians can be either (in words of the nineteenth 
century) "civilized" or (in the modern euphemism) "prepared" to 
enter the mainstream on their own terms, combining the best of both 
cultures. Another source of Indian status is the poverty of Indian 
people. Special programs, special agencies, and special jurisdictional 
status are justified because Indians are poor and exhibit the social 
symptoms of their poverty. 
The fundamental constitutional basis of Indian status is outlined 
in the opinions of John Marshall and brilliantly explained and elab-
orated in the works of Nathan Margold and Felix Cohen.* Marshall 
established that Indian tribes have a right to a political and social 
existence and that this right is not derived from the Constitution of the 
United States. He traced it to natural law and international law, 
sources of law that could be mentioned in the same discussion without 
embarassment in Marshall's day. By acknowledging the existence of 
this right, Marshall made it a part of the law and policy of this country. 
I mention these three sources because they are intertwined in the 
public understanding of the status of Indians and in the rationales that 
* See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 
(1823). Nathan Margold hired Felix Cohen to work with him in the Interior Solici-
tor's Office and influenced his thinking. Their collaboration led to the production, 
under Cohen's supervision, of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Government 
Printing Office, 1942). A bibliography of Cohens' writing is found at 9 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 345 (1954). 
An Overview 193 
keep the present system functioning and funded by Congress. The 
failure to understand and distinguish the differences among them leads 
to constant confusion in Indian affairs. The first two-cultural distinct-
ness and poverty-find a broad base of support in the simultaneous 
humanitarian impulse and sense of cultural superiority that are the 
peculiar heritage of Anglo-American society. But anyone who wonders 
whether termination is still alive need only ask whether a separate 
Indian political and legal existence will be tolerated in this country if 
Indians are no longer poor or viewed by the majority as being culturally 
distinct. Clearly that is not going to happen. In that sense, every dollar 
that Congress and the American people spend on Indians, every pro-
gram that is authorized for Indians, is premised on the first and second 
rationales for Indian status. 
The third source, the rights of Indian tribes as distinct societies 
with inherent sovereignty, is constitutionally necessary to enable the 
society to make a legal distinction between Indian tribes and other 
cultural groups or other groups of poor people. The political status of 
Indian tribes and their relationship to the United States is, then, the 
foundation for the entire structure of policies, programs, and laws. 
Yet it is the one source of Indian status which, as a practical matter, 
probably cannot stand alone. 
Indian governments are thus subjected to a different status than 
other governments. There are not constant reviews of the demographic 
status of all the little countries in Europe that are frequently compared 
in size and population with Indian tribes. No one asks whether Monaco 
and Liechtenstein are sufficiently culturally distinct from neighboring 
countries to justify their continued existence. Unlike that of Indian 
tribes, their political status is taken for granted. 
The transition of recent federal policy from termination to self-
determination reflects only a tactical shift in the fundamental com-
mitment of the society to bring Indians into the mainstream, not a 
movement toward a true recognition of a permanent tribal right to exist. 
If Indian tribes had a relatively greater degree of self-determination 
during the period under discussion than they did during the dark days 
of the termination policy, and they obviously did, one still questions 
whether the basic issue of tribal self-determination has ever been 
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addressed. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to trace the beginnings of 
modern self-determination in Indian country. 
As the pressure for immediate termination eased, the early 1960s 
saw some of the roots of later significant developments toward self-
determination. Congress authorized the Public Works Administration 
to give grants directly to Indian tribes under the Public Works Accelera-
tion Act. At about the same time, the interior solicitor and the general 
counsel for the Public Housing Administration decided that Indian 
tribes could create housing authorities to administer federal housing 
funds. Despite the force of the Indian Reorganization Act* or the 
"Powers of Indian Tribes" Memorandum,t these were apparently the 
first examples of both the Congress and the executive branch treating 
Indian tribes as real governments-eligible for federal assistance on the 
same basis as other governments and capable of creating subordinate 
public agencies which could also be recognized. These precedents were 
greatly expanded in the Great Society. 
There were also early attempts by the BIA to contract with the 
tribes to administer programs. Commissioner Philleo Nash has men-
tioned that when a congressional committee directed the BIA to cut 
five hundred positions from the education program he contracted with 
the tribes and let them hire the people. Commissioner Robert Bennett 
also implemented a contracting policy. Commissioner Louis Bruce and 
his staff moved more deeply into contracting, but congressional com-
mittees questioned whether existing legislation authorized contracting 
to the degree and in the way it was being carried out. Agreeing in 
principle with contracting, they felt that new legislation was needed to 
bring structure and accountability. After hearings, Congress eventually 
passed the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assist-
anceAct.:I: 
Tribal resource development policy of the 1960s has not been fully 
or objectively analyzed as it relates to tribal self-determination. An 
effort was made to attract private capital to reservations by offering 
long range development deals for mineral, agricultural, and residential 
* 25 U.S.C. ss. 461 et seq. 
t 55 Interior Decisions 14 (1934). 
:I: P.L. 93-638. 25 U.S.C.A. s. 450a et seq. 
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development. It seems clear that the main impetus for this policy came 
from the federal government, but it is not clear to what extent the tribes 
resisted or were enthusiastic about it. Tribes able to sell coal in the 
1960s were viewed as putting one over on companies who failed to 
realize that coal was an obsolete and undesirable energy source. This 
shortsighted view was widely criticized during the 1970s when coal 
regained strategic importance, but the conventional wisdom has not yet 
adjusted to coal's more recent devaluation. 
Development policy provides a good example of the tension 
between tribal self-determination and the federal trust responsibility. 
There is a need for a more detailed analysis and comparison of the 
leasing of Indian resources under the management and supervision of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the U.S. Geological Survey in the 
Department of the Interior. The record of these agencies in failing to 
protect Indian resources adequately may be, in fact, comparable to the 
department's record in managing federal resources. If it is not, we 
should be able to demonstrate the differences more clearly than has 
been done to date. But if the incompetence or lack of foresight are 
evenly spread, then we should be reminded of the law which states, 
"Never attribute to malevolence that which can adequately be explained 
by incompetence." This is a good rule to adopt when dealing with the 
government, and it is more helpful to Indian people than the assump-
tion that all of their problems are due to a conspiracy on the part of 
the federal government to target Indians for bad treatment or poor 
management. 
The hindsight with which the resource development policies of the 
1960s are now viewed reveals an almost theological tendency to find a 
devil to blame, a tendency that is widespread in the scholarly com-
munity's treatment of Indian affairs. This does not help any of us learn 
from the past, and it may lead to Indians having their remaining 
resources stolen from them while they and their friends maintain vigi-
lance against people in red suits carrying pitchforks. We must, of course, 
hold the government to standards of trusteeship and identify instances 
in which it shirks its responsibility. But if that analytical role slips into 
one of invariably passing all the blame to the federal government, the 
economic system, or the society at large, then Indian self-determination 
becomes a concept of power without responsibility. We lack a clear 
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notion of the threat because we are wedded to a method of historical 
analysis in which tribes are never responsible for their mistakes and the 
government never makes an honest mistake. 
Reservation resource development issues are more complex than 
similar issues off-reservation because tribes are governments that must 
tax and regulate economic activity for the public good. At the same time, 
they are also major landowners and entrepreneurs who participate 
directly in-and benefit from-development. For non-Indians, the 
balance that is struck between economic growth and other public inter-
ests is brought about by the miraculous and impersonal workings of 
"the system." For an Indian tribe the same balance must be achieved 
within the wise judgment of the tribal council itself. 
In its turn, the federal government, even in the best of situations, 
is caught between trusteeship and self-determination. It can be criti-
cised for promoting development (and affecting Indian culture) or for 
not promoting development (and perpetuating Indian poverty). These 
issues are easier to pose than to manage, of course, but we will never 
manage them better if we remain on a simplistic good guys/bad guys 
level of analysis. 
The 1960s was above all else an Office of Economic Opportunity 
decade. Building on the PWA and Housing and Urban Development 
precedents, the Great Society programs were the first major instance in 
which Indian tribal governments had money and were not beholden 
for it to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This created an enormous 
change in the balance of power on reservations and in Washington. 
Tribes could, to some degree, set their own priorities. They could 
hire, supervise, and fire people on their own. They had telephones and 
copying machines to spread information throughout Indian country 
and the money to hold conferences to organize for the common good. 
They could go to Washington whenever they wanted to and not only 
when the superintendent or the central office of the BIA told them they 
could. These things altered the nature of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the relationship between tribes and the federal government. They 
changed the face of Indian affairs in a way that will never completely 
be reversed. 
There is a story which has been difficult to substantiate that when 
the OEO was established the Bureau of Indian Affairs wanted to 
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administer Community Action funds as part of the BIA program. 
Whatever the truth, the OEO made a policy decision at the outset to 
fund tribes directly. One of the assumptions of the War on Poverty was 
that "old established agencies" had failed to deal effectively with the 
problems of the poor, at least in part because they did not involve the 
poor in planning and administration of programs for their benefit. In 
the cities, this meant that efforts were made to bypass city governments 
and establish parallel delivery systems which rivaled the city govern-
ment and which in theory were controlled by the poor. The decision to 
fund tribes directly, bypassing the Bureau, implicity recognized the 
Bureau's historic role as the de facto municipal government of Indian 
reservations. It viewed tribal governmcnts as representing the poor 
people because most of their constituents were poor, and it recognized 
that, for the most part, the CAP funds were the first discretionary funds 
that many tribes had had. 
There were interesting side effects of the OEO. Previously, tribal 
delegations that came to Washington would spend their time in the BIA 
or up on Capitol Hill. But during the peak days of the OEO, they 
would stop by the Bureau to say hello to the commissioner on their way 
back to the airport. Remember, this is an agency that is well over a 
hundred years old and that had always been the center of attention and 
power for Indians. Certainly the impact of being virtually ignored was 
psychologically devastating; what is less certain is whether the proper 
simile is sitting on the bench eager to get in the game or sitting in a 
rocking chair dreaming of glorious days gone by. 
A generation or more of Indian leaders had made a commitment 
to working for the BIA. They wanted to help their people by fulfilling 
the intent of John Collier and the IRA to have Indians administer their 
own affairs. Many of them had spent years of frustration trying to 
implement the lofty goals of the IRA. Their sense of being bypassed by 
a major national effort, the Great Society, of being considered part of 
an "old linc established agency" (which the BIA certainly was) , created 
in some of these people feelings of rivalry, bitterness, and resentment. 
In our sometimes self-righteous zeal to criticize institutions and policies, 
we should have some compassion for the people who could not or for 
some reason did not jump from the Bureau to the bandwagon of the 
OEO to solve the problems of poverty once and for all. The OEO has 
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become a part of history; the BIA is still an old-line established agency. 
The Great Society and the OEO, in particular, did not provide all 
the necessary weapons for winning the War on Poverty. For example, 
the OEO had a legal prohibition against construction. All it could do 
was remodel-tear down a wall for a Headstart elassroom-but it 
could not build a bridge, a road, or a house. Roger Jourdain, of Red 
Lake, secured money for a training program for carpenters, plumbers, 
and electricians, with a half million dollars budgeted for "training 
materials." Remarkably the "homework" looked a lot like houses, and 
both the Red Lake people and the Red Lake sawmill benefited immea-
surably. Lacking the power to direct OEO funds to the fundamental 
causes of reservation poverty, tribes tried to deal with immediate con-
cerns of their people. The OEO was annually flooded with recreation 
program proposals, which solemnly and torturously explained how 
a summer recreation program on the reservation was going to solve 
poverty. 
Apart from the money, the most important byproduct of the 
Great Society-of which the OEO was the doyenne-for tribal self-
determination was the notion that Indian tribes are or should be eligible 
for federal services other than those specially for Indians. The Economic 
Opportunity Act did not provide for tribal eligibility for Community 
Action Programs; that was an administrative determination. But out of 
that flowed not only tribal control of funds but the practice of tribes 
calling on federal agencies throughout VVashington to do their share of 
dealing with Indian problems. 
Tribal governments have not fit neatly into this system. Tribes 
sometimes had to structure their governments so they could conven-
iently spend these federal dollars. The Economic Development Adminis-
tration required tribes to form non-profit development corporations 
chartered by the states, and HUD made tribes charter housing authori-
ties. Some people complain about that, saying that the agencies were 
making the tribes jump through a hoop to get money. But tribes in this 
era were moving away from a BIA-focused governmental structure into 
one adapted, perhaps awkwardly, to enable them to be treated con-
sistently a.<; governments. Certainly it could be argued that this was a 
price worth paying. 
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Considerable effort has been wasted over the years looking for the 
perfect structure of federal Indian programs. In fact, we must see the 
range of possibilities as a spectrum. One pole is the concentration of 
all services to Indians into one agency, meaning that no other federal 
agency need concern itself with Indians. The other pole is the dis-
persal of responsibility for Indians to appropriate agencies throughout 
the government, with none having lead responsibility for dealing with 
Indians. In reality, the structure of Indian affairs has never been at 
either pole; instead, it moves back and forth along the continuum as 
circumstances of tribes, federal agencies, and federal policy dictate. 
Between 1960 and the middle 1970s, we went from a near BIA/ 
IRS monopoly over services to the involvement of many other federal 
agencies. This caused a confusion as to relative roles and responsibilities 
of the agencies to assist in the solution of Indian problems, complicated 
by the strategic uncertainty of the Indian political leadership. The 
question was, to what degree could tribes safely become a part of the 
general governmental structure of the nation without risking their 
special status and their special relationship with the federal government 
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs? 
Many people have criticized the Great Society programs. It is true 
that the flood of federal money onto reservations drastically changed 
the nature of tribal government by creating a bureaucracy. This tribal 
bureaucracy also affected Indian community life as well. Tribal gov-
ernments became dominant employers on the reservation, dependent on 
the funding of federal social programs. These programs, by and large, 
dealt with the symptoms of poverty rather than providing the funding 
for the infrastructure development that is necessary for the permanent 
solution of reservation economic problems. 
But it is inconsistent to criticize the devastating social and cultural 
decay caused by federal money on reservations and then complain when 
the government cuts back on these programs. I have been to meetings 
that were completely devoted to a discussion of the horrendous destruc-
tion to Indian individual psyches, family life, and community life caused 
by federal, social, and educational programs. Participants at these 
meetings then proceeded to pass resolutions asking for budget increases. 
Nevertheless it was through these Great Society programs that 
Indian tribes became widely recognized by federal agencies as legitimate 
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governments. This was an historic step in the popular, legal, and gov-
ernmental conception of Indian tribes. It was a milestone of self-
determination. We moved from tribes as an administrative convenience 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, governmental only in Supreme Court 
esoterica, to the point where Indian tribes can now make a credible 
claim to federal agencies that they should be funded and treated like 
state and local governments in the federal delivery system. 
No one ever thought that the OEO programs alone could solve 
the problems of poverty, but they employed a lot of people and created 
a cash flow on reservations. Tribes acquired experience in administer-
ing federal funds, BIA contracts, and tribal income. Many present-day 
Indian leaders received their training on the job as program administra-
tors. There, they gained valuable administrative experience and learned 
the art and skill of government. 
Tribal program administrators now constitute a managerial class 
of Indians who, sooner or later, are going to create economic develop-
ment on the reservations. People who have spent years administering 
programs for the tribe are going to figure out that they can make more 
money with a hamburger franchise. There are those who think that 
capitalist society is terrible for Indians and will no doubt see the prospect 
of Indians joining the middle class as another deleterious effect of the 
Great Society programs. But just as it is inconsistent to oppose budget 
cuts in federal programs that we feel are destroying us, we cannot help 
but create confusion in· American society if we blame the system for 
Indian poverty and then denounce opportunities for Indians to get 
themselves out of poverty. If there is a real alternative, the obligation 
is on us to explain what it is and work toward it. 
Ironically, the role of tribes as relatively permanent governments--
the rationale least preferred by the society at large-was strengthened 
by the use of tribal governments as the local delivery system for the 
programs designed to implement the nations's concern for poverty-
the most popular rationale for special Indian status. This tribal role 
created for the first time, in many cases, a tribal executive branch. 
It raised tribal government aspirations to take over previously neglected 
functions of taxing and regulating reservation activities in addition to 
the service delivery functions which these programs made possible. 
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This era also brought us the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act. Initially, 
the federal courts thought that the Civil Rights Act gave them broad 
authority to review the actions of tribal governments. This ended with 
the Martinez decision, which held that the Civil Rights Act remedies 
were limited to habeas corpus, thereby effectively limiting judicial 
review to tribal court criminal proceedings.* Many people saw the Civil 
Rights Act as an imposition of Euro-American legal concepts on Indian 
systems. They complained that it lacked a provision allowing each tribe 
to consent to it despite Felix Cohen's observation that major federal 
Indian legislation had continued the form of treaty-making by condi-
tioning the legislation on tribal consent. 
The principle of Indian tribes as nations is the legal foundation for 
tribal political existence within the American system. It is also an 
article of faith among Indians and among the scholarly community. 
Whatever their fundamental rights to nationhood, Indian tribes today, 
with the exception of the Navajo nation, are still small communities 
with populations ranging between one hundred and ten thousand. Com-
munities of this size cannot always solve problems of government 
accountability by uncritically adopting national scale constitutional 
models of separation of powers. Yet present scholarship does not give us 
a basis for comparing the pre- and post-Martinez state of affairs on 
reservations. 
Thanks to the Martinez decision, tribes are on their own to develop 
systems of accountability. But to adopt wholesale a national model of 
separation of powers means to exaggerate, in the tribal context, some of 
the transitional problems of developing nations. If solutions are to be 
found, attention must be focused on tribes as they actually function. 
The creative energies of tribal people and their friends must be set on 
devising new methods of administering tribal governments. Preoccupa-
tion with unwieldy national models will not help. A blind and defensive 
adherence to the status quo, in the name of tribal sovereignty, will only 
postpone a later and more politically dangerous accounting; and emo-
tional attacks on the present system in the name of traditionalism-
without addressing the details of a traditional system which might be 
put in its place and how it would deal with the unavoidable tasks of 
* Martinez u. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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governing modern reservations--is an equal evasion of reality. In the 
long run, it does a disservice to the real strengths of Indian culture. 
From the point of view of federal policy, the high point of the era of 
self-determination is seen by many as the Nixon message on Indians of 
July 1970.t Although some complain that it was not fully implemented, 
it stands as the strongest official policy statement for Indian self-
determination. I doubt that all of the presidents since Ulysses S. Grant 
have given, collectively, eight hours of thought to Indian affairs. I doubt 
that Richard Nixon had the faintest idea of what his 1970 message 
contained. Nixon did not retire to his study and devote a long reflective 
evening to writing his message on one of his famous yellow legal pads. 
It is not important to know exactly who wrote the message, 
although nearly everyone in Indian affairs at the time claims to have 
had a hand in its drafting, but what might be important is to know how 
such a strong message made its way through the elaborate process of 
review and comment. Presidential policy statements are thoroughly 
reviewed by the Department of the Interior, Justice Department, the 
OMB, and the White House. A policy statement on Indians that finally 
reaches the president, if any does, is likely to be very different from an 
original that might have been drafted in the BIA. For that reason, it is 
not a good idea to press for an administration policy statement unless 
once has reason to be confident that the Indian position is supported by 
someone with enough power in the administration to protect it through-
out the review process. 
The Nixon message was misleading in that it encouraged the hope 
of many Indians and their non-Indian friends that the key to the solu-
tion of Indian problems is to convince someone high enough in govern-
ment to become an Indian advocate, thereby causing a miraculous 
change in Washington behavior. Having friends in high places may be 
nice, but it can only be one tactic in a much larger strategy. The scholars 
share the blame for tribal unwillingness or inability to learn how to 
understand and manipulate the process to the degree that they have 
promoted the view that Washington is a monolith hostile to tribal 
interests and that tribal problems stem largely from the willful decisions 
t u.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents (Office of the Federal Regis-
ter, 1953- ), Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 564. 
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of a few specific individuals. In fact, most tribal problems are due to 
the fact that tribal interests are not adequately articulated at key points 
in a federal process that is largely oblivious to Indians. 
Much of what passes for scholarship in Indian affairs is a simplistic 
good guys versus bad guys analysis resting on fundamental ideological 
criticisms of American culture and society. These philosophical criti-
cisms no doubt play an important role as scholarly commentary and for 
a larger social and ideological agenda, but they are of limited use as 
Indian tribes try to deal with their immediate problems. Whether it 
is good or bad in some cosmic sense, the federal government is an 
important part of the Indian environment to which, in the name of 
survival, Indian cultures must make a realistic adaptation-just as all 
cultures adapt to their environment-not by sacrificing principle but by 
having a realistic set of expectations of behavior. To refuse, in the name 
of cultural purity, to learn the skills of survival in the world as it exists 
is to perpetuate paternalism. It bases continued tribal existence, not on 
independence, but on the need for non-Indians to maintain a sterile 
buffer within which Indian cultures can be shielded from the real 
world. All the while the non-Indian protectors continue to make the 
key decisions. 
During this period, a few tribes, individuals, and organizations 
displayed considerable skill in manipulating the federal system and 
other institutions of society to achieve their goals. But there has been 
surprisingly little progress in turning these few successes into translatable 
skills that can be used universally throughout the Indian community. 
A resurgence of Indian cultural awareness also captured the nation's 
imagination during this period. The fishing rights struggle in the Pacific 
Northwest had an enormous impact on the public consciousness and on 
tribal and individual self-awareness. The Trail of Broken Treaties, the 
BIA building episode, the American Indian Movement, and Wounded 
Knee II put Indians on the world stage. These events had an impact on 
both the Indian people and American society that we still lack the 
perspective and detachment to measure. But much of it was a romanti-
cized product of the American media's preoccupation with fads. For 
example, when my brother Vine Deloria's first book was published-
a book that had a tremendous impact-an enthusiastic reviewer said 
that the American Indian had finally found his voice. Vine did not 
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claim to be saying what had not been said before or aspire to be 
America's official Indian spokesman. America had simply found its 
ears-briefly. When a LIFE magazine team came to Denver to record 
the remarkable phenomenon of an Indian author, it left in disappoint-
ment. It discovered that he had written his book with an IBM type-
writer rather than on a deerskin. 
Indians did not discover they were Indians in the early 1970s. 
We were not reborn; we were simply noticed. Somehow the publicity 
accorded our characteristic independence and determination fueled an 
even greater spirit and attracted back to the fold some who had drifted 
away when the nation did not think it was so great to be an Indian. 
There is no point in questioning the sincerity of these people, but those 
who were Indians all along can be forgiven if they feel, now that the 
nation's attention has moved to other things, that the real issues of 
Indian cultural survival were not addressed at all. We have returned 
to the time when the country contemptuously appoints as our spokesmen 
non-Indians who wish they were Indians. 
There were many good things about this surge of energy, but we 
failed to move beyond sheer exuberant self-affirmation to consolidate 
the gains made possible by several years of worldwide interest in and 
support for Indians. America did not end the era with a greater under-
standing of the complex interplay between Indian culture, Indian pov-
erty, and the practical issues facing Indian tribal governments and 
federal policy. If anything, when the nation's attention wandered, it 
carried with it an even more pronounced cultural stereotype of what 
it wanted its Indians to be. And we Indians ourselves are left manipu-
lating code words of tribal sovereignty rather than undertaking the 
more disciplined and less romantic tasks of dealing realistically with the 
issues we face today. 
To a great degree, we left this era with totally unrealistic expecta-
tions. Self-determination or tribal sovereignty cannot be absolutes for 
Indian tribes any more than they are for other nations. It is foolish to 
hope that the federal system can somehow change so that it protects 
Indian interests from non-Indian interests to the consistent degree that 
we feel we need. The principled Indian view of the tribal-federal rela-
tionship as one between nations is inconsistent with the hope that a 
structure can be found in which the federal agency dealing with Indian 
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affairs will be immune from the pressures of other federal agencies or in 
which the official who heads that agency is responsible to the tribes and 
not the federal government. Self-determination is a difficult goal to 
reach if it must include unlimited federal funding with no accountabil-
ity for funds. This is not the stuff of day-to-day tribal rhetoric; tribes 
are generally realistic and sensible about their relationship to the system. 
But these ambiguities have been a prominent feature of much of the 
national level rhetoric and as such represent a failure on the part of 
national leadership and, to a small degree, a scholarly community that 
is afraid to hold Indian strategic policy to critical and realistic standards. 
Slogans cannot alleviate every frustration in the political life of 
every Indian in this country; they cannot successfully transfer responsi-
bility to a devil. Indians must first decide what to do with their own 
lives, or risk being lulled into a self-absorbed torpor of passivity, accep-
tance, and pessimism. It does not really matter what the Indian 
Reorganization Act says: at present, we are not using to the limit the 
powers that we have to determine our own lives. 
We are still trying to adjust to the changes of the 1960s and 1970s. 
We are trying to accommodate within our cultural, social, and political 
lives our sense of status in American society and American political life. 
Much of the literature analyzing this era has created myths that do not 
help us understand reality, because they do not deal with Indians as real 
human beings. Ironically, it is most unfair to Indians themselves to 
idealize them. There must have been at one point in history at least one 
Indian who did not know what he was talking about. There must have 
been at least one person who worked for the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
who had a good idea. Why do all old Indians have to be wise? Not all 
old non-Indians are wise. 
But many scholars-who note the romantic view of Indians in 
earlier stages of Euro-American history-have themselves been blinded 
by the same romantic tradition today and deny us our political life and 
our humanity. The modern romantic tradition in Indian scholarship 
imposes on us a cultural ethic that serves as a condition on the political 
help we can expect from the scholarly community and other traditional 
sources of support and, implicitly, on our right to exist. This romanti-
cism does not help us to deal with complex problems. We have made 
mistakes, and you do us a disservice by almost uniformly shifting the 
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blame elsewhere. We need hard-nosed analysis of those mistakes so that 
we can avoid making them in the future. And above all we would like 
to have the confidence that our rights do not depend on our satisfying 
the emotional needs of a romantic tradition. 
I administer the Special Scholarship Program in Law for Ameri-
can Indians. When the program was established, in 1967, there were 
fewer than twenty-five identifiable Indian lawyers in the country. There 
are now about five hundred, due almost solely to this program. There 
has been some discussion about whether we do a disservice in sending 
Indians to law school because we make them less "Indian." Of course, 
education changes people-that is why you send them to school. 
Our job is to make lawyers, Indian lawyers, out of Indians. It is 
the job of the Indian community and the Indian family to make Indians 
out of them before we get them. If they have made Indians out of 
them-culturally and spiritually-then the changes they go through 
when they go to law school are not going to be fundamentally cultural 
and spiritual in nature. We should be aware of the values the educa-
tional process inculcates along with the skills, but our anguish over the 
destruction of Indian culture by education is a sign of a lack of confi-
dence in the vitality of Indian cultures. 
Education and history have two purposes in a society, and we 
do not distinguish them clearly enough. One purpose is to socialize, 
to teach the young how "our kind of people" see themselves and behave. 
The other purpose is to teach a set of skills and demonstrate knowledge. 
(One might note here that Indian knowledge is considered "lore," while 
Euro-American knowledge is scientific fact.) As to basic values, Indian 
law students are just going to a trade school if their identities have been 
well established already. They are learning how to work on a machine 
-the legal and political system. If prospective lawyers are worried that 
they will not be Indians any more when they finish law school, I tell 
them this: your cousin who was sent to auto mechanic school by the 
Bureau was not a car when he finished his education. 
And that is why we must return to the three sources of federal 
Indian policy. We exist in a distinct status in this society simply because 
we have a right to exist. Our rich cultural heritage is our own business 
and not the business of the federal government or the scholarly com-
munity. We do not owe an obligation--other than to ourselves-to 
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preserve or not to preserve Indian culture. But scholars can help us, 
not by romanticizing contemporary Indians, but by helping us move 
toward relevant and realistic critical standards for our own behavior. 
The period between 1960 and 1976 saw an historic and inspiring 
growth in the role of Indian tribes as governments. Ironically, this was 
due, in large part, to the society's unsuccessful commitment to abolish 
poverty throughout the nation. The country also noticed the degree to 
which Indian people really maintain their fundamental cultural com-
mitments, and by giving this cultural expression a momentary favorable 
treatment, they helped to strengthen it. But, as if chained together, the 
era's expressions of the three rationales for Indian status reacted on each 
other and as the era drew to a close, many, who were most publicly 
proclaiming their cultural commitments, blamed tribal governments 
for Indian poverty and for the weakening of Indian culture. 
I have characterized the larger developments. But many events 
and trends have been left out in this short account. We still need a more 
complete history of the period and a scholarly analysis to help our own 
efforts to understand, or the next time the cycle of interest in and oppor-
tunity for Indians comes back we are not going to benefit more than 
we did the last time. We must know more and more about how that 
machine operates. We can no longer abide the insult that to know more 
is a threat to our culture and identity. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1976 
Robert L. Bennett, Robert Burnette, 
Alexander (Sandy) MacNabb, Helen M. Schierbeck 
We were operating under the IRA. The basic economic opportunity 
that was provided for in the IRA came through the authorization to create 
federally chartered tribal corporations which could make investments, 
receive grants of funds, make profits, and take care of the business oper-
ations of the tribe. Unfortunately, we lacked funds for IRA corporations. 
The only sources of funds, at that time, were congressional appropriations 
or trust funds on tribal trust property, which under the IRA could then be 
appropriated by the councils. In OEO, I saw a source of funds for com-
munity development that otherwise would not be available. I was obligated 
as commissioner to do everything that I could to get new resources, new 
strengths, and new capabilities onto the reservations. We persuaded Con-
gress to give us considerable amounts of money. We played that game suc-
cessfully for many years. 
Philleo Nash, commissioner of Indian affairs 
under President John F. Kennedy and 
former lieutenant governor of Wisconsin 
I am not going to bad mouth the Bureau of Indian Affairs. It has 
stood off all comers for one hundred )Iears. That says something, I think, 
for the competency of the organization itself. I do not have any doubt that 
the BIA will continue. And I will tell you why. The Indians really do not 
get unusual benefits from the BIA. All they receive are the ordinary pro-
grams that everybody gets from some other place. Anyone who thinks that 
another federal agency is going to ta!-e over Indian programs had better 
think again. Nobody else wants to operate Indian schools, build roads, and 
police the reservations, least of all the states. 
Graham Holmes, former assistant commissioner of Indian affairs 
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In 1961, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall appointed the Kennedy 
Task Force on Indian Affairs. Some of the members who served on the 
task force were Francis McKinley, Philleo Nash, James Officer, and 
William Zimmerman. After a two year study, this commission recom-
mended the separation of many federal programs from the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. This led to the creation of Indian "desks" throughout 
the federal establishment. We eventually had Indian desks in the Office 
of Economic Opportunity, the Department of Commerce, Housing and 
Urban Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department 
of Labor, and many of the other federal agencies that President Lyndon 
Johnson felt had a responsibility to Indian people. 
In my opinion, self-determination is a philosophy rather than a 
goal. Within the philosophy of self-determination, tribes are able to 
work toward established goals with the assistance of all available 
resources. Tribes had been doing this for many years, prior to the 
passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance 
Act of 1975. How far tribes could go was more or less dependent on the 
philosophy of the person in charge at the reservation level. Policies 
are established in the federal government, but their implementation 
depends much on the personal philosophy of the individual who hap-
pens to be at the seat of power, whether it is at the agency, area, or 
Washington level. 
In the 1960s, people at the Bureau of Indian Affairs felt that tribes 
were in a position to make more decisions than they previously had 
done. In some tribes, decision making now extended down to the 
family itself. For example, a tribe in Colorado received a substantial 
sum of money in a settlement. Rather than pay it all out on a per capita 
basis, they set aside money so that each family had an entitlement based 
upon its size. This tribe also established the goal that their children 
should attend public schools. 
As time went on, tribes gained experience in decision making. 
When implementing the concept of self-determination, the government 
had to be very careful that tribes established their own priorities. When 
you work with tribes in the accomplishment of whatever they have 
decided, you may have a feeling that there are much more important 
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things that the tribes should be involved in; and quite often, these were 
pointed out to tribes. But they did what they wanted to do. 
One illustration of this is a tribe that had a considerable amount of 
money. They had very serious health problems, and attempts were made 
to include them in a sanitation district; but their highest priority was to 
build a racetrack and rodeo grounds. They built a racetrack and rodeo 
grounds. They now have the opportunity to bet and lose their money 
like everybody else. When you follow self-determination, the priority 
of tribal people is not always the same as you might perceive it should be. 
The policy of self-determination enabled tribes to go to many 
federal agencies. It widened their horizons. They began to look at their 
problems and went to the agencies that could help them achieve the 
goals that they had set for themselves. One thing that we need to be 
careful about, in the area of self-determination, is this matter of expecta-
tions. We have to be careful that we do not hard sell programs and 
raise expectations too high. We are dealing with people, and people 
can be easily misled. 
What is happening under self-determination is that the federal 
government is treating tribes the same way they have treated cities, 
counties, and states. The federal government has always allowed these 
entities to employ their own people to carry out federally funded pro-
grams. Tribes are now being placed in that situation. They are being 
given the responsibility of hiring their own people to achieve whatever 
goals they may set for themselves. Service functions will not be carried 
out by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Tribes need to be aware of this. 
They cannot avoid this shift of responsibility and the accountability that 
comes with self-determination. 
Tribes have always had the luxury of being able to point out the 
failures of the Indian Bureau and other federal agencies. The reality, 
now, is that if there are any problems with education, health, and social 
service programs they will rest with the tribes. Self-determination is 
going to take a great deal of effort, but I have every confidence that 
tribes can achieve the goals they set for themselves. People in the federal 
and state governments must also work responsibly with the tribes as they 
proceed toward self-determination. 
There is a major problem that we face in self-determination. Many 
Indian young people are torn between preserving their traditions and 
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looking toward the outside world and all that it has to offer. The mag-
nitude of this problem is demonstrated by the fact that one-half of the 
total tribal population is under seventeen years of age. Traditionally, 
there has been no place in their society for the so-called adolescent or 
teenager. Self-determination is a new phenomenon with which they 
will have to deal, but they do not have any experience that they can rely 
upon. This was never a part of their life. 
ROBERT BURNETTE 
Self-determination gained momentum in 1961 when Sol Tax 
convened the American Indian Chicago Conference. It was a fantastic 
meeting. The historic Chicago Conference brought together, for the 
first time, 142 tribes. We decided that we were going in one direction. 
We sought everything we could get, in so far as power was concerned, 
for Indian tribes, but tribal sovereignty was not a subject that we 
discussed. 
Out of the Chicago Conference came a message to President John 
F. Kennedy. After President Kennedy was elected, he immediately took 
action. The National Housing Act had been in existence since 1937 
without any Indian participation. The government believed that the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs was taking care of Indians, but we were not 
getting any housing at all. We were living in tents, cars, and log houses. 
President Kennedy immediately ordered the FHA to permit Indians to 
participate in national housing programs. In 1956, an heirship bill had 
passed Congress, but it turned into one of those devils that existed 
among us. In 1962, tribes used connections they had established in the 
White House: President Kennedy ordered that legislation killed. Lee 
Metcalf, who was a senator from Montana, told us what had happened. 
Indian tribes became more confident that things were going to 
change. In 1964, we met in the Mayflower Hotel. It was suggested 
that we go after a $500 million IRA revolving loan fund. Up until that 
time, $10 million had been authorized by Congress. We discussed this 
issue for a long time. It was decided not to go after a $500 million loan 
fund, because it might upset other things we were trying to do at 
that time. 
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During the early 1960s, there were several groups that supported 
Indian tribes. They included the Indian Rights Association and the 
Episcopal, Catholic, Congregational, and Presbyterian churches. Alvin 
Josephy and Betty, his wife, and members of the American Friends 
Service Committee also worked for better things for Indian people. 
We gathered a lot of momentum and before long the Office of 
Economic Opportunity was established. I had known about it because 
I had been appointed to President Kennedy's Committee on Poverty. 
Prominent Americans were involved such as Harry Truman and Pro-
fessor Walter Heller. At first, I was lost among these people, but when 
I got to know them, I felt at home. President Kennedy had his own 
method of doing things. When he was killed, the War on Poverty turned 
into the OEO. 
President Lyndon Johnson had an altogether different outlook. 
When he introduced the OEO, we were not a part of it. So, the 
National Council on Indian Affairs called a National Capitol Confer-
ence on American Indian Poverty. It met in Washington D.C. between 
May 9 and 12, 1964. It was the largest Indian gathering since the 
Chicago Conference. It really made an impression on the political 
system of this country. We were soon made a part of the OEO, and we 
all know that money flowed to the tribes. 
I believe we will not recognize Indian affairs in another ten years. 
If we permit Indian policy to proceed as it is going today, it is going to 
be used as an instrument to destroy Indian tribes. Many Indian tribes 
and leaders are too hungry for dollars. They have been contracting 
like mad with the United States government, not realizing what might 
be the end result. Some of us have dedicated our lives so they can turn 
the right corner when they come to it, instead of going over the cliff. 
Self-determination, as a goal, is great, as long as we do not try to 
legislate something that is impossible into the souls and minds of all of 
our Indian people. All of us have aspirations and directions for our own 
lives and we do not like to have somebody tell us what we can do. 
Indian people know exactly what they want. They should be given a 
chance to manage their own affairs and make their own mistakes. 
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ALEXANDER (SANDY) MACNABB 
I would like to examine the administration of Indian Commis-
sioner Louis R. Bruce between 1969 and 1973. I am going to look at it 
from three different perspectives: (1) the time when there was prep-
aration for change, (2) the period when there was license for change, 
and (3) the era after change was effected. I will begin with Alvin 
Josephy's report: The American Indian and the BIA: A Study With 
Recommendations. It laid the foundation for the later Nixon message 
on Indians. Following that report, Secretary of the Interior Walter 
Hickel traveled to Albuquerque, in 1969, to speak at the NCAI Con-
vention. His entrance was not popularly received. But at the end of 
the meeting, he was applauded after receiving some admonitions. 
Shortly after that, Louis Bruce came on the scene. Involved in the 
search for the new BIA team were Helen Schierbeck and Bill King, 
a former superintendent at Salt River. King was a close friend of Jim 
Officer. By May 1970, the new administration had achieved some 
success. A Zuni plan was developed based upon an 1834 piece of legis-
lation. It permitted the tribe to direct local federal employees' activities. 
On July 8, 1970, the Nixon message was delivered to the NCAI. 
Early in the Nixon administration, there were people in the White 
House who were sympathetic to Indian people. A few individuals were 
knowledgeable, having read one or two of Alvin Josephy's reports. 
Leonard Garment, a Democrat from New York and a member of 
Nixon's law firm, was very supportive. So were John Erlichman, 
Bradley Patterson, and other White House staff members. 
This was the period when the license for change was issued. 
In October 1971, Walter Hickel traveled to Anchorage, Alaska, and 
gave a speech to NCAL He made a number of statements. One of them 
was that people should have the "courage of their convictions." He told 
the new BIA leaders, "As long as you aim for better conditions for all 
Indians, I will back you up." 
The next time period in the Bruce administration brought about 
dramatic changes. There was tremendous frustration, not only among 
Indian people, but also among the political people in the White House 
and Interior Department, because new policies were not developing fast 
enough. Early in November 1971, a confidential memo was written by 
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the assistant secretary for public land management. It directed Com-
missioner Bruce and his executive staff to immediately prepare certain 
policies. It was a very short deadline. People were required to work 
all weekend in the BIA building. These new policies dealt with the 
reassignment and selection of BIA employees, the redefinition of the 
role of agency superintendent, and more administrative assistance to 
help tribes take over programs. There also was an inspection and 
evaluation program, a redelegation of area office functions to agency 
offices closer to tribes, and an expansion of BIA contract functions. 
After the completion of these policies, we prepared press releases. 
The Interior Department wanted Hickel to get credit. I refused to do 
that, and we had them written up so Louis Bruce got credit for the new 
policies. I was told that if I sent these news releases out I would be 
fired. This threat made me angry. I went down to the general post 
office and mailed out all of the press packets. 
On November 5, 1971, Hickel met with John Erlichman and 
Richard Nixon. President Nixon told Hickel, "We do not have mutual 
confidence in each other." That was how Hickel got fired. From my 
viewpoint, Hickel was a good person. He worked hard for Indians, and 
he was willing to take risks. His firing had nothing to do with Indian 
affairs. I think it had something to do with oil companies. 
Rogers Morton became the new secretary of the interior. Soon 
there was a movement to get some of Commissioner Bruce's executive 
staff out of circulation. John O. Crow was assigned as deputy commis-
sioner. He had thirty-two years experience in the Bureau and was a 
fine man. Crow's appointment meant that there were two popes run-
ning the BIA. 
On November 17, 1971, Commissioner Bruce attended the NCAI 
convention in Reno, Nevada, and he made statements to strengthen his 
position. He said, "As many of you know, we have been working for a 
long time on BIA reorganization, and I have just put the finishing 
touches on it." Then, he reinstated his old executive staff. He also 
promised a recommitment to protect Indian water rights and land 
resources and a new tribal economic development program. 
Shortly after that, a number of people came to Washington D.C. 
before the protest over the Trail of Broken Treaties. They wanted to 
make a citizens' arrest on John Crow for failing to carry out some of his 
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duties. At the same time, tribal chairmen were meeting with Secretary 
Morton. There was a great deal of turmoil. The demonstration to 
arrest John Crow was unfounded, and it did not materialize. 
The Trail of Broken Treaties demonstration was the next phe-
nomenon that happened. Among other things, there had been a failure 
of communication between the government and the Indians. At this 
time, the license for change was either expiring or being revoked. 
Because of damage by Indian militants, the BIA was moved to tempor-
ary office buildings in northwest Washington. 
A short time later, I received a phone call from Secretary of the 
Interior Morton. He asked me to come to Palo Alto, California, and 
talk about Indian affairs. He was getting radium treatments for a 
cancer. I spent three days with him. Morton asked me why Indian 
policies were not moving forward, and about different people and 
events. He believed that maximum authority should be provided to 
the tribes to promote self-determination. Before I left, Morton said, 
"I want somebody to know this. Nixon will get credit for a lot of 
changes in Indian affairs, and he should because he permitted them to 
happen." Morton also indicated that Nixon had only talked to him 
once about Indians during the Wounded Knee crisis. Nixon had called 
him up and asked about how much money the Indians got and how 
much money was going to Pine Ridge. Satisfied with the amount of 
government appropriations, Nixon said, "Well, what the hell are they 
making all the trouble for?" 
HELEN M. SCHIERBECK 
The first area I would like to talk about is my work with the 
National Congress of American Indians. I was the first NCAI Indian 
trainee. I called Helen Peterson and said, "I know you do not have 
much money, but I would like to come to Washington and work for 
NCAl." I was very curious to know more about why I had seen so 
much poverty and despair among the reservation Indians. I worked as 
a secretary. Because the NCAI was a struggling organization, I helped 
set up its files. 
In 1959, I saw tribal leaders who had ultimate faith in Washington 
D.C. They believed in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its ability to 
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solve their problems, even though they were going through the termina-
tion era. Mrs. Peterson and other NCAI leaders worked with Indian 
people to improve their knowledge about Washington D.C. and the 
political process. 
Eventually, I decided to get a job on Capitol Hill to see if I could 
help Indian people. I went to Senator Sam Ervin, and he arranged 
for me to join the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee. I wanted to 
respond to what I had heard tribal leaders say about termination and 
the problems they faced under Public Law 280. 
We talked about this in the subcommittee. Because there was a 
strong Indian Affairs Subcommittee in the Senate, we had to figure out 
a jurisdictional peg to hang our investigation on. That peg became 
constitutional rights. I am not going to say whether Senator Ervin 
used Indians against blacks. I do not think it is relevant, because prag-
matically speaking, in politics you do a lot of things. He did give us an 
opportunity in that subcommittee to hold hearings for five years at 
the local community level. And we heard what Indian people were 
experiencing. 
I want to illustrate two problems that we encountered. We were 
in southern California among the Mission Indians. We asked them to 
describe for us some of the problems they were having with law and 
order. They graphically illustrated the high crime rate in their com-
munity and the lack of support from the state and local police. Even 
though California had accepted state civil and criminal jurisdiction, 
it did not, at the local level, protect Indian people. In Mission, South 
Dakota, we watched one Saturday night what happened to Sioux 
Indians who came out of bars. The way they were harrassed was a 
real problem. 
After the hearings we came out with an Ervin Indian civil rights 
bill. I believe that this was necessary for a number of reasons. I had 
taken a look at all the IRA constitutions while a member of the subcom-
mittee. In my judgment, the BIA had failed to help tribes use those 
constiuttions in a benecial way. The civil rights bill also came about 
because Indian people had complained that they could not get their 
tribal attorney contracts approved without long delays. Furthermore, 
we had seen evidence on the Navajo Reservation of violations of reli-
gious freedom against the Native American Church. Finally, tribes had 
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complained about Public Law 280. So, we put in a recision clause 
about Public Law 280 in the bill. 
I feel that the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act helped focus the 
attention of the American Congress on the status of Indian tribes. Our 
goal was to begin putting in motion an Indian political system that 
could be understood like the federal, state, and local system. One of the 
problems in this field is that Indians do not conveniently fit anything. 
Americans are always trying to create a "box" for them. 
Next, I want to look at events that led to Indian participation in 
the Economic Opportunity Act. Private groups laid the ground work. 
They included the Association on American Indian Affairs, the NCAI, 
the Episcopal Church, and the Indian Rights Association. They helped 
sponsor the 1964 National Capitol Conference on Poverty. I helped 
staff that conference. We expected four hundred people and nine 
hundred people showed up. It was the enthusiasm from this conference, 
more than anything else, that helped get Indians in the Economic 
Opportunity Act. 
I helped implement one of the OEO programs to fight poverty. 
After the National Capitol Conference on Poverty, I took a congres-
sional fellowship and lived with the Menominee Indians. I worked as 
a consultant and helped the Menominee establish their first antipoverty 
program. I went to the old Menominee courthouse and met with the 
Menominee County government. I said, "We would like to get you 
funded as one of the first rural community action programs." They 
replied, "We have so many problems, Helen, we do not have time to 
worry about this." I said, "Well, let's sit down for a few minutes and 
talk about this. Tell me some of the things that are most needed on this 
reservation." We talked for three days. Out of that discussion came 
their Community Action Programs. 
It was an interesting experience. A tribe that had been terminated 
had a federal agency come in and offer once again to bring federal 
services to attack poverty on the Menominee Reservation. This par-
ticular OEO grant was most helpful to the Menominee as they tried to 
cope with being Menominee County, which was the poorest county 
in Wisconsin. 
On weekends, I traveled and talked to the other tribes in Wiscon-
sin. I spent two days trying to find a lost band of Chippewa. When 
218 Self-Determination 
I found the tribal chairman, I said, "What can we do to be helpful to 
this tribe?" And he told me that he had gone to Washington, without 
success, to get a community water system that was not poisoned. We 
were able to get the Association of American Indian Affairs to give us 
a five thousand dollar grant to help this tribe. Out of that grant, we 
also pulled together the various tribes in Wisconsin and reactivated the 
Great Lakes Intertribal Council. 
The 1963 civil rights march on Washington, and the entire civil 
rights movement, was extremely helpful to American Indians. It was 
in this decade that OEO started Upward Bound programs and Head-
start programs for Indian students. An Indian desk also was created in 
the Department of Education. The strategy was to get the elementary 
and secondary education programs to target resources a little more 
effectively through states and local educational agencies to Indian 
people. Both BIA schools and state schools received much needed 
resources to teach Indian students. 
Title 4 of the Indian Education Act was especially helpful. Credit 
for this act should be given to Robert Kennedy and the National Indian 
Education Report, National C hallenge-N ational Tragedy. The Title 4 
program was helpful in getting Indian students into public school sys-
tems and designing Indian curriculum for these schools. The Teacher 
Corps also brought Indan staff into the classroom and encouraged the 
use of bilingual aids. 
There are several things that scholars need to pay attention to 
when studying this era. Private organizations, including the churches, 
really pushed hard for the right of tribal self-government and the right 
of Indians to speak for themselves. The role of these groups in getting 
antipoverty funds into Indian communities, through Indian tribal 
groups, has not been studied carefully. Their effort forced the BIA to 
begin modernizing its procedures and its relationships with tribes. It led 
to the emergence of Indians in key policy-making positions. Indian 
people also began, more than ever, to see the importance of education 
in determining their own destiny and how to use the American system 
for their own benefit. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The War on Poverty 
Alfonso Ortiz, LaDonna Harris, Robert L. Bennett, 
Robert Burnette 
Indians under my jurisdiction really enjoyed the short but happy life 
of the Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity. We did not waste all the 
money that came to the reservation but we spilled a little bit here and 
there. We began the Rough Rock School with OED money. We also started 
the Navajo Community College, the first Indian community college in the 
world, with OED funds. Today, the government has cut back appropria-
tions, but when you rely on government programs you are going to have 
feast and famine. 
Graham Holmes, former BIA superintendent and area director 
One ot the tragedies ot OED is that it helped make the people ot 
Alaska dependent upon the non-native economy. Before OED, Alaska had 
one of the most integrated native economies left in the United States. 
I do not want to romanticize that subsistence economy. It was a very hard 
life. People lived of! the resources that were indigenous to the area. It was 
not the kind of life that I could lead. But people got by and they did not 
need outside assistance. 
What happened with OED was that the government decided that 
these "poor" people needed access to the goods and services associated with 
the non-native economy. I agree that it is not pleasant having ten people 
living in a ten by ten foot toot square log cabin when the temperature is 
thirty degrees below zero. OED made it possible to build new houses tor 
many native people. Who can argue with that? The only problem is that 
you have to have heating oil, plumbing, and electricity. That cost money 
but it did not make any difference. OED officials were determined to pro-
vide people with a non-native economy in an area that could not support it. 
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220 Self-Determination 
Today, the people in rural Alaska that are hurting the most are the 
ones that participated in that economy. OEO programs were a false 
promise because President Ronald Reagan is now trying to cut $5 million 
worth of BIA general assistance money in Alaska. Over 80 percent of that 
money was targeted to pay for heating oil bills for individual homes and 
villages. If there had never been an OEO, those people would still be liv-
ing in small cabins but they would not be freezing to death. 
Don Mitchell, Alaska Federation of Natives 
ALFONSO ORTIZ 
Whatever positive virtues there have been in various federal pro-
grams for Indians since the Indian Reorganization Act, it is clear that 
they have not lasted long enough to solve problems. This also happened 
with the Office of Economic Opportunity. By 1976, because of benign 
neglect during the administration of President James E. Carter, the 
OEO programs had come to a grinding halt. How can the federal 
government and the American people expect one or two administrations 
to solve problems that have been building up for generations? That is 
why nothing permanent happened when Indian people received $122 
million from the Economic Development Administration. 
In 1964, I was at home in San Juan Pueblo. I was appointed 
chairman of the Community Action Committee to apply for federal 
funds. We met during the late summer and into the autumn. I went 
with the executive director of the New Mexico State Commission on 
Indian Affairs from pueblo to pueblo to explain the opportunities 
under the OED. The Santa Ana Council could not believe that they 
could apply directly to Washington for funds. We offered to help them 
with the forms, and they finally agreed to start the application process. 
This was repeated in pueblo after pueblo. They were astounded that 
they could bypass the Indian agency and the area office and go directly 
to Washington. 
This was the kind of world into which OEO came. Once the 
money started flowing, Arizona State University, the University of 
Utah, and the University of South Dakota set up technical assistance 
centers. They brought tribal leaders to those universities for workshops 
in proposal writing, report filing, and end-of-year accounting proced-
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ures. The OEO took the mystique out of the white man's proposal 
writing. Indians were taught that they could do it themselves. 
The OEO funds provided for tribal program administrators. The 
relationship with the federal government was becoming so complex 
that a part time tribal chairman or an unpaid governor could not 
possibly keep up with the paper work and the accountability procedures 
that were instituted in order to obtain federal funds from a variety of 
programs. Many future Indian leaders would gain valuable experience 
working for the OEO. 
For example, two successive Navajo tribal chairmen came directly 
out of the OEO programs. Peter McDonald, who served as chairman 
for twelve years, was enticed out of a comfortable middle class existence 
in Southern California where he worked as an engineer. McDonald 
went back to Window Rock to run the new Office of Navajo Economic 
Opportunity. He used that experience as a launching pad for his first 
bid for the tribal chairmanship. Peterson Zah, the tribal chairman who 
succeeded him in 1982, started out in the OEO legal services program. 
The OEO programs bypassed the chain of command in the Indian 
Bureau. It was not necessary to worry about people who were defensive 
about keeping their jobs. The OEO created a new class of Indian leader-
ship that is still around today. These people are not intimidated by 
bureaucratic procedures. When they go to Washington, they are no 
longer afraid to wander beyond the friendly atmosphere of the BIA 
offices to ask other agencies for assistance. 
Important cabinet level agencies also began to get into the Indian 
field. The Department of Commerce ran the Economic Development 
Administration. By 1972, EDA grants and projects had completely 
overshadowed the old OEO programs. Other agencies that assisted 
Indians included Housing and Urban Development and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, which had a nutritional program for mothers 
and children. 
The Headstart program was very important. It was not only 
beneficial for kids who learned basic skills. It was also a good thing 
for Indian communities. It put the parents in the classrooms as 
para-professionals, teacher's assistants, and cooks and janitors. Long 
estranged parents no longer felt that they were giving their children 
over to another world. 
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Poor people on the reservations were truly invisible in the mid-
1960s. When they had problems with off-reservation police because 
they owed money on television sets, cars, and trucks, they would not go 
to lawyers. Instead, they would suffer quietly and have their goods 
repossessed even though they actually had rights to them. The OEO 
put idealistic young attorneys right in the midst of those communities. 
These poor people finally had a recourse for their legal problems. 
Another legacy of OEO was vocational training. In the South-
west, there was a vocational training program for silversmiths. About 
one hundred silversmiths were trained in the eight northern pueblos. 
These people now derive all or a good portion of their income from 
making silver jewelry. All of this happened because of the training they 
got under the OEO programs. 
There is also a thriving adobe plant that turns out adobe bricks 
for homebuilding. It is always behind in orders. The plant employs 
about fifteen people from the eight northern pueblos. It was started 
under OED and helped along by HUD. The pueblo home improve-
ment program is another positive benefit of OEO. 
LADoNNA HARRIS 
Initially, Oklahoma was not eligible for OEO funds, because the 
state did not have Indian reservations. But everyone in Oklahoma knew 
that the tribes were not integrated into the community and that they 
should belong to the local Community Action Programs, so those of us 
who had been organizing over the western part of the state immediately 
decided to meet and talk about the problem of segregation. 
A short time later, we raised this issue with Washington and could 
not get an answer. One of the unique qualities of OEO was that people 
would not let regulations stop them. We persuaded the University of 
Utah to write us into their OEO program so we could bring both eastern 
and western Oklahoma tribes together to talk about their concerns. 
The outcome of this effort was the creation of Oklahomans for Indian 
Opportunity. It was the first time in the history of the state that the 
plains tribes got together with the civilized tribes. We discussed how 
Indian people in Oklahoma could become eligible under the law to take 
advantage of the OEO program. 
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We started with Headstart programs. The Kickapoos outside of 
Norman developed an excellent Headstart program. The Indian Head-
start programs were some of the best in the country. They were very 
unique. When the whole Headstart program was threatened during the 
Nixon administration, the influence of Indian communities saved it. 
We also started a youth program under OEO. People such as 
Sargeant Shriver and Bobby Kennedy visited the state and this created 
a lot of consciousness raising. We developed programs for high school 
dropouts. This was extremely important because 75 percent of the 
Indian children, which made up 50 percent of the total population, 
were dropping out of high school. 
Lyndon Johnson was the first president to make a major address 
on Indian affairs. He also created the National Council on Indian 
Opportunity. President Johnson appointed me to this council because 
of my interest in urban Indians. We met with every member of the 
cabinet other than the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. 
The vice-president was our chairman. It is hard to imagine today that 
the eight Indian members of the council met as equals around the table 
with seven cabinet members from all those different executive depart-
ments. Unfortunately, this experiment was short lived. 
When Richard Nixon was elected, in 1968, the momentum that 
had been built up from OEO continued. President Nixon advocated 
self-determination but he also wanted to dismantle OEO. The curious 
thing is that he did not dismantle the Indian program. Community 
services continued to exist after the Indian desk was transferred over to 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
I will stand up and defend OEO as long as I live. Indian leader-
ship developed out of that program. The only people that you could 
communicate with in the Carter administration were community organ-
izers that came out of OEO. One of the reasons that all of the advocacy 
groups collapsed was that President Carter co-opted them and brought 
them into the administration on the second and third level. 
Under the Indian Reorganization Act, tribal governments never 
really functioned. But when OEO was established, tribal governments 
had the funds to begin Headstart programs and reservation economic 
development. Tribal governments also established human services pro-
grams to help their people. 
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OEO taught us to use our imagination and to look at the future 
as an exciting adventure. It taught us that there are other ways of doing 
things. Today, we must go forward in the same spirit and try to link up 
with all those other entities that do business with the federal govern-
ment, to get money and to insure our survival. 
ROBERT L. BENNETT 
Economic poverty has been very pervasive in Indian communities 
for a long time when compared with the rest of the country. Most tribes 
have accommodated themselves to this situation and learned to live 
with it. For example, in 1924, the trust period on all the allotments on 
the Oneida Reservation in Wisconsin were not extended. Most of the 
land was lost when the allottees could not pay their taxes. Because 
there were no social services, they had to develop a system to accommo-
date the disaster that had befallen them. The old people were taken 
care of by the younger people, and bartering was commonplace. It was 
not unusual for a family to bake a couple of extra loafs of bread and 
send them next door. People, more or less, took care of themselves. 
Poverty is going to remain with tribes for a long time. We have two 
kinds of poverty. One is where people do not have anything. The 
other kind is where people cannot manage what they have. I am espe-
cially concerned about the latter situation. Tribes that received per 
capita claims settlements frequently did not invest these funds. I know 
from experience that tribes placed these funds in local banks when they 
should have bought the bank. The amount deposited was more than 
the assets of the bank. These kinds of opportunities were not taken 
advantage of, and poverty lingers on. 
Poverty also is pervasive because of the dysfunction of the capital 
market within the Indian community. When a million dollars is invested 
in most communities, it generates approximately ten million dollars of 
cash flow. But in Indian communities, one million dollars generates 
just one million dollars of cash flow. Furthermore, in most Indian 
societies profit making is not a part of their economic system. Most 
tribes engage in barter. These are basic problems that are related to 
poverty. Tribes are going to have to come to grips with them. 
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Today, the government is cutting back poverty programs. The big 
question is whether people on reservations can reinstitute a way to take 
care of each other. IRA tribal constitutions and bylaws need to be 
rewritten to revitalize the district or community system. 
There are some real mitigating circumstances in connection with 
poverty on reservations. Indians had lived with poverty so long they 
did not know they were poor until the poverty programs came along. 
The War on Poverty did a lot of good things. I am not arguing that 
point. But I am suggesting that reservation communities will have to go 
back to old ways of dealing with these problems now that federal gov-
ernment is dropping programs. 
The lack of funding has created a dangerous situation on some 
reservations. For instance, one tribe had a $150,000 shortfall in their 
law and order program because of cutbacks in funds. People went 
to the tribal council and got an appropriation of tribal money for 
$150,000. How long will tribal funds last, if tribes have to constantly 
make up for the shortfall in federal programs? Tribes must look at these 
programs and develop a system of priorities. 
Furthermore, if the Congress finds out that a tribe is spending 
$150,000 on a program, they are going to say, "We do not have to give 
them any more money." Tribes will have to project their income over 
the next several years. They must determine how much of their money 
will be needed to make up for shortfalls as the cost of these programs 
Increases. 
We are now in a period of readjustment. Hopefully the managerial 
experience that Indians received in operating OEO programs will serve 
them in good stead. It takes good management to retrench, just as it 
does to expand. When termination was implemented, the tribes were 
able to marshal a great deal of support because the public concluded 
that the government was not carrying out its treaty obligations. But you 
cannot marshal the same support for additional funds that you can to 
fight oppression. Tribes are going to be forced, more and more, to rely 
on their own resources. They will have to use their leadership and 
managerial skills to make a readjustment. 
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ROBERT BURNETTE 
When John F. Kennedy flew into Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 
in 1960, I met him at the airport and had the privilege of introducing 
him to the entire state. He put a war bonnet on his head, and he left it 
on for a few minutes. This encounter set the stage for the future, and 
I was asked to attend secret meetings of President Kennedy's committee 
on pockets of poverty. This committee was the beginning of OEO. 
We were able to get OEO enacted on the reservations so quickly 
because we had a lot of friends, not only in government, but out of 
government. We had the AFL-CIO, the National Council of Churches, 
and other groups. We were able to pay the travel expenses for many 
tribal leaders who came to Washington, setting the stage for a show of 
power up on Capitol Hill and at the National Cathedral. All of these 
things were well planned and executed. 
An unforeseen problem was that OEO diverted the attention of 
Indian people from their sacred land. People ran over each other to get 
jobs at $2.50 an hour. They forgot all of the things that they had learned 
as Indian people, because they were so eager for employment. Every-
body wanted to go to work and move off their land. People forgot 
their gardens, and they even gave up their range units to participate in 
OEO programs. But the OEO did do a lot of good in the field of educa-
tion and in the social service areas. We have many Indian leaders today 
that are products of OEO. 
Hardly any of the OEO funds that went to tribes were audited by 
the United States government. Audits of this money will make us all 
look very bad in the management of funds. It will appear that an awful 
amount of corruption existed on the reservations. It is true that tribal 
councils sometimes did not handle this money correctly, but it was not 
an indication of outright criminal acts. It was simply mismanagement. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs did not help us. The BIA was ignored by 
the people who rushed around to get OEO money. This grantsmanship 
business became a disease. We need to document and justify how this 
money was spent. 
During the OEO era, many of our leaders forgot who they were 
and why they were elected. They were obsessed with getting federal 
grants. For example, there was, for a short time, a $5 million fund from 
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which tribes could borrow money to start cattle and farming associa-
tions. This was exactly what Indian people needed. Pine Ridge BIA 
policemen organized and bought $120,000 worth of cattle. But this 
fund was eliminated one year later, and tribes accepted this action 
without protest. 
I do not remember any tribe, individual, or organization recom-
mending amendments to the OEO act. It faded away and nobody went 
to battle for it. There were no organizations set up to fight for the 
improvement of OEO. The same thing happened to the Indian 
Reorganization Act. There is always room for improvement and we 
ought to do that with future legislation. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Activism and Red Power 
LenadaJames, Ada Deer, Ramona Bennett, 
Gerald Wilkinson, Hank Adams 
In 1966, Dick Gregory joined members of the Puyallup-Nisqually 
tribes in fighting for treaty fishing rights. Until fairly recently, Dick 
Gregory had one of the highest sentences ever given for an arrest on fishing 
rights. At the time, there was some question of backlash against black 
involvement with Indians. When Dick Gregory joined us, I was in the 
army in Washington D.C. I received a telephone call from the fishermen 
asking if they should allow Dick Gregory to join them. I told them that a 
black man could recognize injustice just as much as Marlon Brando, who 
all Indians had welcomed on the rivers two years earlier. 
At that time, a number of Indian people, primarily older Indians past 
their fifties, joined in the National Poor People's Campaign with Martin 
Luther King and Ralph Abernathy. Few people realize how much the 
Indian involvement in the 1964 Civil Rights Act caused Hubert Humphrey 
to fight within the Lyndon Johnson administration for independent Indian 
programs under OEO, which the Indian Bureau was trying to defeat. 
Hank Adams, Assiniboine leader and writer 
In the years after Wounded Knee, AIM stopped supporting purely 
Indian issues. Instead of adhering to the American concept of democracy, 
it turned to the extreme left and sided with everything from Eastern Bloc 
countries. Much of AIM's teaching and philosophy was clearly Marxist . ... 
I did not think that the Sioux should become involved in the political 
affairs of other countries. So I wrote editorials in The Lakota Times which 
brought up this point. I never wrote editorials that insulted the American 
Indian Movement. I simply tried to examine philosophically and ideolog-
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ically the things that AIM was espousing on the television, radio, and in 
their own newspaper. 
I quickly learned that members of AIM could not tolerate criticism. 
Rather than exchange ideas, they reacted in a very violent way. My news-
paper became a target for shotguns, Molotov cocktails, and threats in the 
middle of the night. It was an experience that lasted for almost a year. 
Tim Giago, editor and publisher of The Lakota Times 
LENADA JAMES 
My father interpreted the Indian Reorganization Act to both the 
Bannock and the Shoshone tribal members. He explained the good 
things that were supposed to come out of the IRA. He was also a 
tribal chairman for a number of years and the Bannock and Shoshone 
Reservation was prospering. We had good farmers and they raised a 
lot of cattle. But government regulations and incompetent BIA adminis-
tration pushed the Bannock and Shoshone into poverty. 
I helped my father write letters to senators, congressmen, and the 
Bureau of Indian affairs, but we could never get any help. The federal 
government did not carry out its trust responsibility. There was no 
enforcement of the laws. The superintendent continued to lease Indian 
lands on the reservation. 
Frustrated by these conditions, I participated in the BIA relocation 
program and went to San Francisco. There, I met people from other 
tribes. We refused to assimilate. Instead, we got together and held 
powwows. We also pushed the BIA to help us get a higher education. 
We did not want to go to trade schools and become beauticians, 
plumbers, or carpenters. Those are good skills, but we hoped to become 
professionals. 
I was the first Indian student to enroll at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley under the Equal Opportunity Program. I helped 
recruit other Indian students. I was the chairman of the Indian student 
club. About that time, blacks were demanding a black studies depart-
ment. So, we decided to push for an Indian studies department. 
We wrote our own proposal and the university agreed to establish 
an Indian studies department so our education would become relevant 
to the communities that we were going to go back to someday. I spent 
a lot of time working on Indian curriculum with different educational 
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groups in California. We implemented the first university-level Indian 
studies department in the nation. 
Next, we turned our attention to Alcatraz Island. This abandoned 
prison site was being turned over to the city of San Francisco. We 
believed that, under treaties, federal surplus property was supposed to 
revert to Indians, if they claimed it. The Indian student groups at San 
Francisco State and Berkeley went out and occupied the island. We 
really did not know what we were doing. We were mad because we could 
not sing and dance anywhere we wanted to on the university campus. 
Nevertheless, we were working for an important goal. We were 
trying to get the issue that Indians had the right to retrieve federal 
surplus property litigated in the courts. I spent a whole year on the 
island. I commuted back and forth to the university with my two-year-
old son. We would hitchhike and then catch a sailboat or a speedboat 
to the island. I wrote all the public relations proposals that were released 
from the island. I then turned in some of this material for the work 
that I was doing in my classes. 
The protest movement at Alcatraz had positive results. Many 
individuals were not ashamed to be Indian anymore. People who had 
relocated in the cities were reidentifying themselves as Indians. But 
there was riff raff on the island. Many people were using drugs and 
getting drunk. That was not the kind of image we wanted to project 
to the press or to the world. We hoped to project a positive image of 
Indian people. We wanted to show what the federal government was 
doing to destroy our people. Throughout the United States, Indian men 
were being sent to prison, people on reservations were starving, and 
Indian family units were being destroyed. I call this systematic anni-
hilation. 
After I graduated, I went to law school in Washington D.C. At 
that time, a group of Indians took over the BIA. I was not a part of 
that. I thought that the BIA had good leadership under the direction 
of Louis Bruce, Sandy McNabb, and other individuals. The occupation 
of the BIA put a damper on the progress that they were making. 
After I lost my scholarship to law school, I went back home to the 
reservation and started a legal project to enforce tribal laws. I also 
served on the tribal council. I think that the Indian Reorganization 
Act, and everything after it, resembled a big rat maze. The Indians are 
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the rats in this maze experiment. I do not want to deal anymore with 
this problem. I intend to get my feet back on the ground and start 
looking at things from another direction. 
ADA DEER 
I would like to comment on my background. I am the oldest of 
five children. I grew up on the Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin, 
except for about five years when I received an elementary education in 
Milwaukee. My mother was a white woman from the eastern establish-
ment who came from a long line of missionaries. She was a nurse on the 
Rosebud Reservation before being transferred to the Menominee Reser-
vation, where she met my father. On my father's side, I have a medicine 
man and various other traditional people. When we were going through 
many of our difficulties over the years, I always felt strengthened 
because I was covered from both ends. 
I have always had a strong sense of self. I did not receive the 
damaging experiences that many Indian children were exposed to early 
in life. This has had a substantial effect on my life and the life of the 
Menominee. I was very fortunate in winning the tribal scholarship to 
attend college. From my freshmen year in college, I felt a great debt of 
gratitude for my tribe, because I did not want to be poor. I was ready 
to do anything to get an education. I attended and graduated from the 
University of Wisconsin in Madison with a liberal arts degree. Then, 
I decided to become a social worker. I received graduate training in 
social work from Columbia University. 
The "missionary gene" in my mother's family was transformed 
into a "social work gene." From the time I was a teenager, I thought 
about the life of people on the reservation. I wondered why people were 
so poor and why there was so much drinking. Then I started reading 
and learned about the injustices that had been forced on the Indian 
people. I became very angry. Fortunately, at that time, I had a 
number of interesting experiences as a teenager and as a college student. 
I graduated from the Christian Leadership Training Camp in Michi-
gan. It was an American Indian based camp. I also attended the 
Encampment for Citizenship in New York and the American Friends' 
Service Committee International Students' Seminar. I have had won-
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derful experiences with interesting people, who have constantly encour-
aged and motivated me. 
After my education and work in New York was finished, I returned 
to the Midwest. I spent eight years in Minneapolis and worked in a 
number of agencies as a social work program supervisor. I also worked 
in a neighborhood house, at the University of Minnesota, in the 
Minneapolis public schools, and for three years with the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. 
I decided to go back to Wisconsin because there were no jobs in 
Minneapolis that I was interested in taking at the time termination 
occurred. I tried to understand what the Menominee termination bill 
meant, and I was always conscious of the great suffering that it had 
caused on my reservation. I started going to tribal meetings, and it was 
a very interesting experience. People looked around at me and said, 
"Who are you?" I replied that I had been away to school for a while, 
but I was still a member of the tribe. The product of my mother's sense 
of activism, I sat on the front row and asked lots of questions. 
After I learned what was going on, I became very angry. I decided 
that we were involved in a complex legal situation and needed a lawyer. 
I found Joseph Preloznick, who was the director of Judicare for an 
OEO legal services program. He said that other Menominees had 
talked with him about termination, but they had been pressured to not 
take action. He also said that he needed more than one client. I prom-
ised him two other people. They were my brother and sister. 
I want to correct for the record the misinformation that I started 
the fight against Menominee termination all by myself. There were 
many people and small committees, over a number of years, that wanted 
to do something. But they did not quite get it all together to proceed. 
Once these individuals became better informed, they too could do 
something to combat termination. I want to emphasize that both 
Indians and their non-Indian friends have a lot of individual power 
they can use to correct many of the injustices in the world. 
We started to meet with other Menominees that had expressed an 
interest in opposing termination. Once Menominee land was sold, our 
strength began to grow. It was an exciting but very hard time. Both 
Indians and whites that were in power did their best to discourage us. 
We were called agitators and Communists. In 1973, we published a 
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book that explained our struggle to save the Menominee people and 
their land. 
We started the grass roots movement called Menominee Drums. 
I had heard of Saul Alinsky but had not studied him. He would have 
been proud of us because we held strategy sessions. We did not wait 
to get permission from people to do things. I told our lawyer that if 
Congress had passed a law terminating us they could pass another law 
"unterminating" us. We held strong convictions and were compelled 
to work and fight against social in justice. 
I have been accused over the years of being a publicity hound. 
I knew instinctively that we had to get our message out. I also knew 
that press reporters were often lazy. They liked catchy titles and slogans. 
They would not focus on abstractions such as freedom and termination. 
So, a number of the stories focused around my activities. But our long 
range goal was to stop the land sales and restore federal recognition of 
the Menominee tribe. 
We held meetings and drafted restoration legislation. Preloznick, 
our lawyer, was a compassionate, knowledgeable and resourceful person. 
He was aware of the Native American Rights Fund. He called this 
group, and they provided us with two excellent lawyers for three years. 
Then, we started succeeding. We had a tremendous march from our 
reservation down to the state capitol. 
We had a very disciplined kind of activism. There were a number 
of other things going on across the country, and we were certainly 
aware of this. It was important to be aware of external events, but it 
was also important to be single minded and proceed with our restora-
tion struggle. We had a number of problems within our group, but our 
goals prevailed. We succeeded in getting our legislation drafted and in 
getting the lobbying process completed. 
Indians are involved in a love/hate relationship with the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs. I decided early in life that I was going to be an 
optimist. It is much easier on your psyche to be an optimist than to be 
a pessimist. I feel that everyone is a potential friend that can be influ-
enced. I can also intimidate people and use white guilt feelings to my 
advantage, and I can manipulate the media just as well as other people. 
There are good bureaucrats and there are bad bureaucrats. Ernie 
Stevens, Sandy MacN abb, and Louis Bruce were some of the very good 
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people in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They were sympathetic and 
helped us in our struggle, but not everybody was that way. We encoun-
tered entrenched bureaucrats. Every time I had to meet them, they 
would always ask, "Who are you?" and "Where are you from?" In 
social work, we have a phrase "the conscious use of self." So I decided, 
if you want to playa game, I can playa game. I told them, "I have a 
B.A., a M.S.W., and I have ten years experience. Now let's get down 
to brass tacks." Of course, they were not accustomed to Indians march-
ing in like this, looking people straight in the eye, and proceeding with 
business. 
I feel that too many American citizens feel isolated from their 
government, especially during the Reagan administration. But my 
point is that you can influence people. I want to tell everybody, you can 
do it. All you have to do is to carefully examine the problem and do 
your homework. With the excellent legal help that we had, with the 
wonderful press that we generated, and with the climate of opinion that 
was created, we went in a very short period of time through a very 
complicated piece of legislation. 
What do we need today in the area of Indian activism? First of 
all, we need individuals who are going to decide to do something. Then, 
you have to do your homework. You have to analyze the situation. 
You have to look at the political climate and social climate. You have to 
proceed. You cannot be intimidated. The fact that the Menominee 
achieved an historic reversal of American Indian policy is a concrete 
demonstration that we can work within the system. 
I want to caution people that we now have a very negative 
administration, but we can all vote. I hope that some of you will run 
for office. There are many injustices confronting people all across this 
country. We need good, strong people working to change the system. 
We have five hundred Indian lawyers and many other professional 
people. The challenge is there. Do not agonize: organize! 
RAMONA BENNETT 
About sixteen or seventeen years ago, I was involved with volun-
tary programs sponsored by the American Indian Women's Service 
League in Seattle. I met many Indian people who had moved to Seattle 
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because of the BIA relocation program. They had all come to the city 
to secure improved educational opportunities and find good jobs. 
But I discovered that these families had lots of problems. One time, 
I went to a powwow and met a pretty little girl. She wore a buckskin 
dress that was sewn with the sinew from a deer. That little girl had 
rickets and she could not dance. But the dress revealed that her family 
had at one time been proud and independent. I started to think about 
that. I wondered how a race of people had become so impoverished 
that they could not even feed their children. 
A short time later, I attended a Puyallup tribal meeting to find out 
what was going on with my own tribe. I discovered that my tribe had 
been unofficially terminated by the failure of the federal government to 
maintain services. The Bureau of Indian Affairs had set up a land 
office and had alienated the land. Then, the BIA folded up its carpet-
bag and moved on down the road. The Puyallup tribe did not have a 
recognized reservation nor any fishing rights. 
I had the opportunity to serve on the .tribal council. We inherited 
a broken typewriter and a broken filing cabinet. There had not been an 
updated enrollment in forty years. Only about twenty out of a thousand 
people in the tribe received Indian health services. The tribe was in 
pretty bad shape. 
I worked with Hank Adams, who lived with a family at Frank's 
Landing. Adams was an idea person. He was a very creative, innova-
tive, and slightly madcap individual. When we would go to tribal 
general meetings, we would encounter a negative attitude. Previously 
entrenched tribal representatives would say: "No, we tried that in the 
1920s and the 1930s. That idea will not work." We started doing 
research to combat this state of lethargy. We found out that many 
Puyallup people had been murdered. Their death certificates stated 
that they had fallen asleep on railroad tracks. We also discovered that 
the reservation had been taken, literally, at gunpoint through a whole 
series of thefts. That was why the Puyallup people were scattered around 
Tacoma and elsewhere without much organization. 
I had an opportunity through the Puyallup tribe to meet people 
who had occupied Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. I read some 
of the press releases that came out of Alcatraz. One statement indicated 
that Alcatraz was perfect for Indian purposes. Like many reservations, 
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it had no schools, roads, jobs, or economic opportunities. During that 
period of time we closely followed the events at Alcatraz, and all kinds 
of light bulbs started flashing. 
We concluded that it was not an accident that Indian people were 
living in poverty. The federal government had planned the alienation 
of Indian land. For over ninety years it had been responsible for pre-
venting Indian fishermen from supporting their families with dignity. 
Because of my increased awareness of social injustice, I attended a 
National Indian Youth Workshop that was being held in Washington 
D.C. At this time, President Richard Nixon's self-determination state-
ment was released. We finally realized that we were going to have to 
defend Indian fishing rights. It was clear that the federal government 
would not use troops to save our fishermen from the game wardens 
hired by the state of Washington. 
I went back home and joined an armed camp that was set up to 
protect our fishermen. We were defending the fishermen on our river 
under a treaty right. We encountered 550 enforcement agents from all 
of the state agencies. They threatened and physically attacked us. The 
federal government had an obligation to protect Indians. Instead, it 
called us radicals. We were only upholding our tribe's treaty right to be 
self-supporting. When we tried to protect ourselves, they attacked our 
group, which consisted of only 60 people. 
Indians had come from Canada and all over the country. One 
young Canadian boy was there because white men had raped and 
murdered his mother. The people would sit around and tell stories 
about why they were there. Very few of the people had come for the 
purpose of opening the river so our tribe could safely fish again. They 
were simply angry because of something horrible that had happened 
in their lives. 
I was part of the Trail of Broken Treaties caravan. I was in the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs building when the war drums came out. We 
literally faced death for many nights in that building. We expected 
federal forces to kill us because the government did not want to abolish 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, institute a national Indian government, 
or address the other issues that we raised. 
The most beautiful pictures were drawn in the BIA building. It 
was fantastic. For a week, Indian artists from all over the country 
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decorated that building. Brave people were involved in this protest 
movement. They were prepared to sacrifice themselves so that the next 
generation of Indians could live a better life. I was blessed and fortu-
nate to associate with those people. 
This era of Red Power and activism was a very special time. The 
people that engaged in protest were misunderstood. Hopefully, the 
well-established and secure reservation Indians will never know what it 
felt like to be a Puyallup. We looked death in the eye and were threat-
ened with termination. I feel that as long as there is one acre, one fish, 
or one Indian child remaining in our care, we are always going to be 
under attack. If we ever forget this, white people will have us for 
breakfast. They are out to get us. I do not think that is paranoia. To 
me, that is a conditioned reflex. 
GERALD WILKINSON 
Indian activism and Red Power, as movements within the Indian 
community, have changed. Ten years ago, when there was an issue 
before Congress that affected the lives of Indian people, everybody 
would get involved. Indians in Washington would gather around the 
Xerox machine at the National Congress of American Indians before 
trooping in to see their congressmen. This kind of activity also happened 
on many different levels outside of Washington D.C. 
Today, one of the basic problems is that Indian organizations have 
become highly specialized groups. We used to have people who were 
generally involved in education. Now, we have people involved with 
the education of handicapped Indians. When an omnibus bill is intro-
duced in Congress that affects Indians, only those people interested 
in a specific aspect of it are there. Indian people are not to blame for 
this kind of specialization. The nature and the direction of the country 
has forced Indian groups to become more specialized. 
One of the consequences of specialization is that almost no one 
thinks holistically about Indian problems anymore. Very few people 
relate what they are doing to a broader context or develop some kind of 
vision about where Indian people are going and what should be done. 
Another consequence of specialization is that the market place of ideas 
has dried up. We have made tremendous progress in many areas, but in 
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terms of intellectual growth, our people have not advanced much over 
the last ten years. 
It was quite a contrast when I recently attended a meeting of 
Indian organizations in Mexico. There were Indians from Mexico, 
Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru. We sat around and talked about things 
of a philosophical nature. We discussed ideas such as the relationship of 
Indians to Christianity and the nation state. We also examined the 
relationship of peasant Indians in Mexico to tribal Indians in the United 
States. That level of discourse was much different than the kinds of 
discussions that Indian people have in the United States. 
Contact with Indian people in other countries is absolutely essen-
tial if we want to intellectually reinvigorate the Indian community. 
In order to move again, as we did in the 1960s and 1970s, we must have 
an Indian intellectual revolution. It is essential that we think about 
who we are as a people and where we are going as a people. 
I want to refer to a political study that we did in the Third Con-
gressional District of New Mexico because it illustrates at least one point 
that is related to what I have said. On the Navajo Reservation, there 
is a community called Crown Point. During the tribal council election, 
we went up to Crown Point to pretest our survey and obtain political 
information about the people. We assumed that the people at Crown 
Point, for the most part, were concerned about being exploited by the 
big energy companies and about combating racism from the white 
ranchers in the area. We also assumed that they agreed with tribal 
leaders about the need to expand the medical clinic and refurbish the 
high school. 
In our survey, we discovered that those things were not really on 
many people's minds. The most important issue at Crown Point was 
dogs. On the Navajo Reservation, ten thousand people a year are 
treated by the Public Health Service for dog bites. The people also were 
concerned about clean water and improved roads. 
The point is that, even though you are intimately involved with 
Indian people, you can lose track of what they are thinking. The biggest 
task before Indian intellectuals is to relate to the common people. 
We are entering a new era. The development and implementation of 
ideas is absolutely essential, if we are going to have another Red 
Power revolution. 
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HANK ADAMS 
The central promises of the Indian Reorganization Act, as stated 
by John Collier in 1934, were complete economic independence and 
self-determination for Indian tribes. A half century later, Indian people 
remain far removed from either goal. One of the basic reasons is that 
we have never been talking about self-determination, but about self-
administration. 
As I look back at John Collier's writing, I find that his intent in 
the Indian Reorganization Act was to provide a mechanism for indirect 
administration of federal policies and programs. In the last fifty years, 
an unbelievable number of different policy proposals and policy objec-
tives have been "self" hyphenated. The goal of termination was self-
sufficiency. It sounded similar to John Collier's self-rule. In the last 
month, one of the members of the Indian Affairs Committee stated 
that he was going to continue his fight against Indian treaties because 
they violated his concepts for self-fulfillment. In recent years I have 
almost come to believe that it does not matter what the particulars or 
details of a policy are so long as you do not divest the Indian leadership 
of their capacity for self-congratulations. 
How far have we fallen from that day in 1830 when Blackhawk 
was taken prisoner in chains to Washington D.C. to see President 
Andrew Jackson? Blackhawk told Jackson, "Even in chains, sir, I am 
your equal." Indians have fallen very far from that day. If there would 
be a return to the introspective capacities that Indian people possess in 
analyzing problems, there also would be a return to some measure of 
respect. That is really essential to have before you ever achieve self-rule, 
self-government, and something other than self-administration. 
When you realize what the good guys have done to Indian people, 
then you cannot accept the way things are now and how things are 
moving toward the future. President Dwight D. Eisenhower has been 
held accountable for carrying out the termination policy, but termina-
tion was well under way before Eisenhower entered office. In 1949, 
the Interior Department met with its created organ, the National 
Congress of American Indians, to ask it to take the lead in planning 
termination. The NCAI, at that time, did not object to this request. 
The lawyers for the NCAI helped write up some of the termination bills. 
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The Menominee first wrote a termination bill in 1947. They con-
sented to it at a rapid hearing schedule in 1954, when some two dozen 
tribes and several states were subject to termination. At that point, 
lawyers led the Menominee toward termination. They did not object 
until later when there were slight modifications in that termination bill. 
I have read in a number of publications that termination ended 
in 1958. Termination was going strong in the 1960s under Philleo 
Nash, James Officer, Stewart Udall, and President John F. Kennedy. 
Another hated policy is the Relocation-Vocational Training Act. Relo-
cation started in 1948 under President Harry S. Truman. I twas 
expanded into a national program in 1950 and received its first statu-
tory authority in 1956. 
When James Officer's task force went around the country and met 
with Indians, it found out how much this program was hated. So, the 
task force decided that the name of the program should be changed 
to Employment Assistance. Today, you can hear Indian leaders con-
demn the relocation policy of the 1950s under Dwight Eisenhower. 
But in the 1964 Democratic platform, it was proudly proclaimed 
that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had doubled the enroll-
ment in the program. Indian leaders did not object because it was 
called Employment Assistance. Commissioner Philleo Nash, the cham-
pion of many Indians, had the authority to stop Menominee termina-
tion when he came into office in 1961. But he did not do that until 1964 
when a majority of Menominees submitted a petition against this policy 
to the government of the United States. In 1962 and 1963, both Philleo 
Nash and James Officer threatened to administratively terminate tribes 
in the state of Washington. And the Congress of the United States 
threatened to terminate every tribe that submitted a claims judgement 
distribution bill in 1965. It took some behind the scenes maneuvering 
to stop termination from being reinstituted more aggressively than it 
had been carried out in the 1950s. 
Congressional termination ended in March 1965, when Melvin 
Laird, a conservative Republican from Wisconsin, and Congresswoman 
Julie Butler Hansen made strong floor speeches in the House of Repre-
sentatives. They condemned this policy, not only for the Menominee, 
but for all Indians. They also worked behind the scenes to prevent the 
Senate from reinstituting this policy. 
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In 1966, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall and Commissioner 
Robert Bennett threatened termination in a confrontation with the 
NCAI at Santa Fe. It took two more years before Lyndon Johnson 
issued a presidential message against termination. Beyond that, Indian 
tribes such as the Colville supported termination. 
President Richard M. Nixon proclaimed the policy of self-determi-
nation on July 8, 1970. Most of the measures that were proposed in 
the Nixon message grew out of the work that had already been under-
way through the National Council on Indian Opportunity and various 
Indian organizations. The good guys in the BIA created the National 
Tribal Chairmen's Association. They decided that the NTCA would 
have ten people on its board of directors. The three members of the 
executive board were supposed to be the voice of the Indian people. 
Now that is not self-determination when you are talking about several 
hundred tribes. 
The Nixon administration had already committed itself in favor of 
the Indian Financing Act and the Self-Determination Act. So, why 
did they need the NTCA? One reason was that they were trying to 
consolidate a force against commitment to urban Indians. The Nixon 
administration also used the NTCA to demand an assault on the eight 
hundred Indians who had occupied the BIA building. 
The NTCA requested a police action to "take those people out" 
of the BIA building. They meant kill them, because members of the 
American Indian Movement and other activists were in there. Some of 
the good guys such as Ernie Stevens, Sandy McNabb, LaDonna Harris, 
and Louis Bruce were even talking about assaulting the building. 
John Collier's philosophy was that all power flows to organization. 
He had a philosophy that the common people, the unwashed people, 
should look to the experts and enlist their help and assistance. One of 
the most scandalous things that the experts have done for Indian people 
in the twentieth century is the claims policy. At first, the NCAI was 
organized to make the IRA applicable to all tribes, even those who had 
rejected it. It also had a second goal: to get behind the passage of an 
Indian Claims Commission Act that Collier had been pushing. On 
October 30, 1978, the Indian Claims Commission, in its final report, 
stated that its problem had been a matter of giving the Indian his due 
while at the same time severing federal relations. 
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The discussion of Red Power surfaced in the 1930s when John 
Collier used it to subjugate Indian people. Red Power as a form of 
activism, was not something that the National Indian Youth Council 
originated in the 1960s. Every generation of Indian people has fought 
valiantly against what has been happening to them. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Traditionalism and the Reassertion if Indianness 
Oren Lyons, Virginia Beavert, Francis McKinley, Sol Tax 
How do we make permanent the understanding that tribes are poli-
tical entities and a part of the American system? We are more than just 
unique little cultures. But I do not think that most people or the federal 
government believe that we are a permanent part of the system. We are 
tired of the burden of constantly educating the Congress and the govern-
ment about this basic relationship. We are not like the blacks, Hispanics, or 
any other ethnic group. We are a permanent part of the political structure 
of the United States. 
LaDonna Harris, Comanche, 
Americans for Indian Opportunity 
After the termination era the Southern Paiutes revived their culture. 
They held powwows, and a number of them were involved in a July Sun 
Dance held at Whiterocks, Utah. To me, that is a sign of cultural together-
ness. Before they were terminated, they were fragmented and did not pay 
too much attention to their culture. After the restoration legislation, they 
came back together again. Life is an up and down thing. It is recycling 
from periods of almost nothing to periods of reformation, change, and 
adaptation. The Southern Paiutes are in such a cycle. After restoration, 
they have had a renaissance 
Francis McKinley, Ute, former tribal chairman 
at Uintah-Ouray Reservation 
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OREN LYONS 
I am not a religious or a spiritual leader. I am a runner for the 
Six Nations. That enables me to be a spokesman at many gatherings. 
I am also one of the Onondaga Council members. Our first duty is to 
oversee ceremonies. Then, we sit in council for the welfare of the people. 
It is my perception that scholars often have problems in defining 
contemporary Native Americans. A leading anthropologist from New 
York State has attacked the Six Nations directly by saying that we do not 
exist, because there are no chief systems. I also have been told by 
anthropologists and other people that the medicine masks located in 
various museums all over the country belong there. I strongly disagree 
with this attitude. I still belong to that ceremony. It is my job to see 
that it continues to function. Our religious society is in a painful situa-
tion because those masks are still in museums. I am not afraid to speak 
up about this, because it is important to the continuation of our culture 
that we have the respect of the people who now occupy our lands. 
We will determine what our culture is. It has been pointed out 
that culture constantly changes. It is not the same today as it was a 
hundred years ago. We are still a vital, active Indian society. We are not 
going to be put in a museum or accept your interpretations of our cul-
ture. I hope that what I have said will be taken with the respect with 
which it was presented. 
Sam Deloria said something that is very relevant. He has warned 
that when we cease to be poor and when we cease to be discernible by 
our cultural differences, then you are not going to allow us to exist as 
a separate nation. We have never agreed to this. We have the right to 
exist as a people and a culture, and how that goes on in the ceremonies 
is our responsibility. 
When people refer to traditionalist Indians all of a sudden every-
body says: "Oh, well, there must be some teepees around here. Let's 
look for the people that have got all the blankets on." That is not a 
proper way to view traditionalism. Traditionalism is the representation 
and continuum of a culture that has been here from time immemorial 
and that demands respect. If you think you can talk us out of existence, 
you cannot. 
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You perpetuate your culture, your way of life, by insisting that all 
of your people speak English and go to English schools. What about our 
language? It is the soul of the Iroquois nation. Without it, we do not 
have a nation, because there is knowledge in a language that does not 
translate into English. The English language is quite restrictive in its 
definitions. It is not a picture language. It is a technical language. 
I have been called again and again an unrealistic fellow because 
of my contention that our people really believe that they are an inde-
pendent and separate nation. I sit in a council that has been continuous 
for hundreds of years. We do not have the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 
our nation. We do not have a federal agent. We do not have anything 
but Indians. And, in our unrealistic manner, we do not have fed-
eral programs. 
Nevertheless, we continue to survive. Our chief council is com-
posed of respectable and dignified men. They are profoundly endowed 
with the spirit of nationhood, freedom, and self-determination. When 
we travel about and meet with the elders from the other different 
nations and peoples, we find our friends. 
I cannot speak for anybody but the Six Nations of Iroquois, but 
I can tell you that we have children who believe that they are Onon-
dagas. We have long houses that are full of our young people. We have 
a lacrosse team called the Iroquois Nationals that competes with Can-
ada, the United States, England, and Australia. 
It is a fact that a small group of people in the northeast have 
survived an onslaught for some 490 years. They continue their original 
manner of government. They also drive cars, have televisions, and ride 
on planes. We make the bridges that you cross over and build the 
buildings that you live in. 
So, what are we? Are we traditionalists or are we assimilated? 
If you can get away from your categories and definitions, you will per-
ceive us as a living and continuing society. We believe that the wampum 
and the ceremonial masks should be at home. We will continue our 
ceremonies. We have the right to exist and that right does not come 
from you or your government. 
We are a very friendly and peaceful people. But we will stand up 
for principle even if that entails confrontation. I am proud of my 
people. I am always humble and honored to sit in our council. It is 
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made up of dignified and simple men that know who they are and 
where they are going. 
VIRGINIA BEAVERT 
It is difficult to discuss traditionalism when you are speaking in the 
English language. The native language is very important in Yakima 
life because from childhood through adulthood you completely depend 
on your language. 
The ritu~ls and taboos that were performed even before a child 
was born are still observed today. And when the child is born, there is 
a certain period that is very important to it. Most Indian people know 
that the umbilical cord that connects the child to somebody that he 
respects is preserved. We Yakimas do not flush it down the toilet, and 
we do not throw it in the incinerator. Instead, we put it in a little piece 
of buckskin. Then, we sew it into a little heart shape and bead it and 
put it around the child's neck. Some people carry their umbilical cord 
to their graves. 
Adolescence is the most important part of a child's life. There are 
different things for boys and girls to learn. My grandmother always 
told me certain things I could not do. This tradition helped me a lot 
from adolescence to adulthood. My great-great-grandmother taught me 
to respect religion and all living things. Sunday was a day I could not 
pick flowers and berries or kill an animal. I was even afraid to step on 
the grass because that was the day that every living thing worshipped 
God. It was very difficult when I joined the army because there were 
certain foods I could not eat. Pork was considered an unclean food. 
All the boys in our family were taught how to hunt in the proper 
way. It was necessary to perform a ritual after shooting a deer. You 
could. not shoot a deer and skin it without thanking the Creator or the 
deer for the life that he had given for you. 
We were thankful for everything. When I went to the mountains 
during springtime to dig for food, I found the ground where everything 
was brknd new. We observed our religion in the spring. We had to 
perform rituals when we dug for food. There were certain words that 
we said, and songs were sung. Wc always turned counter clockwise 
when we picked food out of the ground, and we thanked the Creator 
for this sustenance. Then we went to a longhouse where the tribe waited 
Traditionalism 247 
for the first food of spring. Nobody could go up in the mountains and 
dig any food until after they had this communion. 
The water, salmon, deer, and grouse were the foods that the men 
took care of. Unfortunately, some of the roots we dug have disappeared. 
All of the rituals that we performed taught young people how to respect 
nature. They learned that you do not go out and desecrate what God 
has created. 
After you matured you were responsible for teaching all the 
knowledge that you had acquired. It was very important that you 
learned as much as possible about being an Indian. Then you would 
be able to teach the young the way you were taught. The training was 
severe and there are a lot of things that we do not observe anymore. 
How did religion ever come into our lives? When I was in Mexico 
City a few years ago at an anthropology seminar, I met some people 
who were discussing canoe sites that had been found in a few areas 
around the world. We have one on our reservation. According to my 
great-grandmother, the people held ceremonies at certain times when 
something happened in the sky. Nobody seemed to know what it was. 
The people danced on their knees for days and days, and they fasted 
and prayed and sang around a particular area that was supposed to 
have been an overturned canoe. 
Our longhouse religion began when Indian people died and in 
seven days rose again. There were a few choice people who did this. 
They did not have to have led a clean life. These people would die and 
rise again and bring back a message. There were women who rose from 
the dead, too. These people brought back all of the predictions that 
have happened up to now. 
We were told that we will not be destroyed by water but by fire. 
Certain things would happen to give us the sign. Those things are 
happening now. I do not want to mention them because it is a very 
sensitive area, especially where sexuality is involved. 
I would like to stress, once again, that it is important to preserve 
Indian languages. I have made several trips to Washington, D.C. to get 
programs on our reservation in bilingual education. I am always met 
by non-Indians who say that there is not money available for Indian 
bilingual education. But I have been fortunate enough to acquire some 
funding through Dr. Dave Warren to complete an Indian language 
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dictionary. I hope that someday we will be able to train Indian 
teachers to teach the Native American language to our children in both 
public and Indian schools. 
FRANCIS McKINLEY 
In my childhood days, I lived in an era when it was very difficult to 
be overt about being Indian if you wanted to be successful in school. 
My parents constantly stressed that, first of all, I had to get an education 
to become equal or even superior to the average white man. Then, 
I would be able to preserve my identity and the culture of my people. 
My father used to say, "You know, we always think that white 
people are superior because they have more things, can read and write 
better, and are more aggressive. They seem to have more freedom than 
we have. So, we think they are better people, but they are not. They 
are stupid and ignorant like we are sometimes. Do you think a smart 
man would go and destroy everything he touches? Do you think a smart 
man would try to accumulate a lot of things that he is not going to use, 
and that he cannot take with him when he dies? That is stupidity." 
My father believed that if I received a little education I would be better 
than 90 percent of the people, including the white people. That was 
the kind of philosophy that was drilled into me as I was growing up. 
Our culture and traditions have remained intact over the last fifty 
years. We are still very proud of ourselves. And we are talking about 
planning alternatives for the future. 
There are some other topics that I want to discuss. When you look 
at the population, the average age of Indians is about seventeen years, 
contrasted to twenty-nine years for the rest of the American people. 
If you examine the Indians tribe by tribe, you will see a gap between 
the ages of forty and sixty. 
In a few years, we are not going to have very many old people. 
Why has this happened? The death rate of Indian men is particularly 
high. The men have died from diabetes, alcoholism, and alcoholic 
related accidents. I have examined the population statistics of a number 
of Indian tribes, and this high mortality rate concerns me very much. 
The handing down of values and traditions of Indian culture has been 
the responsibility of our elders. What is going to happen when we do not 
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have any elders left? Maybe a forty-year-old person will have to become 
an elder of the tribe. 
When I was a young boy, our leaders did not separate secular and 
religious life. Religion was holistic and part of everyday life. People 
were taught to be generous, truthful, and have respect for one another. 
There was a very profound spiritual life. People recognized their 
creator. These Indian values permeated our life. 
When we became associated with the American way of life, we 
separated secular and religious matters. The leaders of our government 
under the Indian Reorganization Act do not get involved very much 
in traditional or cultural life. They are mainly concerned with dispens-
ing money to pay for tribal expenses. 
I am not a social scientist, and that is why it is difficult to address 
the topic of Indian culture. But the one thing that sustains us is lan-
guage. When I speak the Ute language there is something that occurs 
psychologically. Indians do not swear like whites, because they have 
their own kind of slang. Our native language has something to do with 
the way we look at the world. 
We have a symbol system in our language. When we discuss 
spiritual matters, we cannot touch and taste the things that we are 
talking about. Yet, we know that we experience them. When we used 
to talk about those things, we would say: Well, you know we are a very 
religious and very spiritual people. We live with nature and we are 
sensitive to nature. We know that nature, in its own way, is alive and 
that it is has its own communication. It has its own curative and heal-
ing power. It also has its own happiness, sadness, and joyfulness. If we 
intend to live in this life as the Creator wanted it, then we have to love 
and respect all living things in nature. 
SOL TAX 
I would like to report an exciting development that has occurred 
recently in the city of Chicago. It is the successful beginning of the 
Native American Educational Services College. This institution is the 
first four-year degree-granting private college by and for American 
Indians. The college is headquartered in Chicago but it has three other 
campuses at Fort Peck, Northern Cheyenne, and Santo Domingo 
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Pueblo. We hope that the NAESC will gain a new campus every year 
in the immediate future. 
The creation of this college was a remarkable achievement. It is 
characteristic of what happens to American Indians when you let them 
invent things. Indian leaders planned the NAESC without anybody 
telling them what to do. 
It was founded eight years ago to deal with a special problem. 
In Chicago there are representatives of several different tribes. Many 
of these individuals preferred Indian services to general city services. 
They demanded and received an elementary school as part of the public 
school system so their children could go to an Indian school with 
Indian teachers. A separate Indian health center also was estab-
lished. Furthermore, an Indian businessman's association was trying 
to organize. 
Innumerable other Indian organizations developed. It was dis-
covered that Indian people required special training to successfully 
operate these organizations. Out of this need grew the Native American 
Educational Services College. As soon as the college started to train 
people for urban services, it became apparent that the same sort of thing 
was needed on reservations. 
The students at the NAESC are all adults. In order to enroll, 
a student must be at least twenty-five year old. The college is interested 
in older people who are serious and have had work experience. 
The NAESC has a new headquarters building in Chicago, but it 
still needs additional funding. The college had operated out of a church, 
but the church needed the space. So, it was necessary to buy a building 
that is mortgaged. 
The college has been accredited since it was founded by Antioch 
College, which gives the degree. We are also candidates for accredita-
tion by the North Central Association of American Colleges. Their 
accrediting team has been to the college a number of times and exam-
ined its curriculum. We think that by next spring they will be ready 
to accredit the school. 
The NAESC is important because it symbolizes the contemporary 
reassertion of Indianness. The students who come out of the college are 
all working with and for Indians. They will never forget that it was 
Indians who were involved with them in their higher education. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Contracting Under the Self-Determination Act 
Earl Old Person, Russell Jim, Gerald One Feather, 
Joe De La Cruz 
PL 638 has had a tremendous impact on our Indian community. 
When people have a problem with services they do not have to go to 
Muskogee, the service unit at Tahlequah, and the area health unit at 
Oklahoma City. They simply come to Okmulgee and straighten it out with 
their tribal officials. More people are getting services although our resources 
are still limited. But tribal officers are now making the choices about how 
to distribute those inequities instead of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. When 
it is time to cut a program, tribal officers decide what their priorities are 
and make those cuts. 
We should not confuse PL 638 with the issue of self-determination. 
P L 638 is not really a self-determination act. All it does is to allow us to 
operate programs that had been run by the federal government. The goal of 
PL 638 is not self-sufficiency. It is to increase our management capabilities. 
Robert Trepp, member of the Creek tribe of Oklahoma 
Prior to the establishment of the policy of self-determination, tribes 
could externalize their criticism of programs administered for their benefit, 
but now having assumed this responsibility themselves, tribes need to 
internalize their criticism if programs are not properly administered. The 
reason for this is that the basic responsibility for service providers has 
shifted from the various federal agencies to the tribes . ... 
I believe administrative management is the key to successful imple-
mentation of the self-determination policy. There is no question but that 
the leadership and other human resources are available, in most cases, 
for tribes to emerge fully capable of implementing the policy of self-
determination. Some are already doing so, and others are getting their act 
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together for that purpose. It must be anticipated that organizational and 
other changes in administrative methods will need to take place as this 
great transitional effort moves forward. Planning is, therefore, becoming 
an essential part of tribal management . ... 
As self-determination takes root in the minds and hearts of Indian 
tribes, it can be expected that the'y will become more aggressive in asserting 
their sovereignty. Strong tribal leadership, buttressed by a sound adminis-
trative management system, is capable of achieving goals and objectives 
not contemplated even when the policy of self-determination was estab-
lished by the Congress. Indian tribes will face the challenges of the future, 
confident in their own capabilities to make the right decisions. Self-
determination as a concept, now developed into policy, is here to stay, and 
the Indian tribes are glad of it and will make the most of it. 
Robert Lafollette Bennett, Oneida, 
fonner commissioner of Indian affairs 
EARL OLD PERSON 
I first became a member of the Blackfeet tribal council in 1954. 
I have been on the council since then, and I have watched things that 
have taken place. Prior to that time, I had listened to some of our elderly 
people. They were very cautious about new federal programs and 
alerted the council. They said, "You are going to be engaged in wars. 
But these wars will not be fought with guns, bows, and arrows. You are 
going to be fighting over documents." 
The Blackfeet tribe has been very careful. We have not contracted 
for very many federal programs. In fact, when we talked about con-
tracting for self-determination, we asked whether those programs would 
continue to be funded once the tribe took over. The federal government 
refused to guarantee funding in the future to back up the tribe. There 
is more to tribal self-sufficiency than merely declaring that you are self-
sufficient. When self-determination was first talked about back in the 
early 1970s, I was president of the NeAl. Even at that time, I began 
to question self-determination, because we were not given the oppor-
tunity to actually get into policy making, and we were not given the 
chance to utilize and develop our own resources on a permanent basis. 
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We faced threats, time and again, that specific programs would be 
cut or phased out. We never had the assurance that we could rely on 
federal funding. I certainly agree that we have the kind of people today 
that can help take over and contract for programs, but they need 
sustained support from the government. 
Two years ago, we were told that we could take over our child 
welfare programs. This sounded awfully good to us. We started a tribal 
child welfare program last fall. Six months later we were told that it 
would not be refunded, because the tribe supposedly failed to comply 
with federal requirements. The Blackfeet people are discouraged by 
these events. I do not think that we differ with many of the programs 
that have been set up by Congress, but we are concerned about how 
they are implemented. 
Tribal leaders today are trying hard to work with contracting 
under PL 638, but once they set program priorities, they are told by 
the government that there is not enough 638 money to go around. 
It is an awful difficult thing to go back to your people and say, "We are 
going to have to cut programs." Tribal leaders receive criticism but it 
is not their fault. The higher-ups are calling the shots. 
On my own reservation there are a lot of needy people that are not 
really being provided with help. I can take you to any reservation and 
show you that kind of poverty. We need much more support to make 
638 contracting work for these backwoods people. 
The government offered to give the Blackfeet boarding school back 
to the tribal council, if we wanted to take it over. We agreed, if they 
would guarantee funding of the school. They only promised to help 
us a year at a time, which was not a guarantee. Contracting was used 
as a way of getting rid of that boarding school. It finally ended up in 
the public school system before it was phased out. Today, the govern-
ment has it back. It is used as a place to put children who are without 
homes. It is no wonder that my people are very skeptical about so-called 
self-determination. 
There are dangers within these kinds of government programs. 
When Community Action was first introduced to the Blackfeet people, 
they were skeptical. Some of the people believed that it would lead to 
termination. You cannot blame them. So, we ended the discussion. 
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Later, we showed a film of an area where a Community Action Pro-
gram had already started. The same people that feared termination, 
after they saw this film, said, "Why cannot we have this program here 
on our reservation?" When they saw the actual operation of the pro-
gram, they wanted it. 
RUSSELL JIM 
I would like to give you a Yakima perspective with regard to self-
determination and Public Law 638. We tried to instigate the contract-
ing of our timber management on the Yakima nation a few years ago. 
We felt that the Bureau of Indian Affairs was mismanaging our timber 
resources. The BIA had fashioned its management policy after St. 
Regis, Boise Cascade, Louisiana Pacific, and Weyerhauser. It was only 
interested in economic efficiency which meant growing trees as fast as 
possible. There was a major thinning program. Trees were staged 
18 feet apart. It was almost like an orchard setting. This policy harmed 
the animals and the environment. Futhermore, certain natural foods 
and medicines would not grow properly. 
In 1977, the Department of Interior informed us that $5 million 
would be available for reforestation. Many of the timber tribes of the 
state of Washington went to Billings, Montana. They were told that 
the $5 million would be divided among them in proportion to the size of 
their reservations and timber stands, but they had to utilize this money 
for reforestation and accept Public Law 638 in its entirety. The Yakima 
Indian nation said, "We do not want to implement all of PL 638, just 
the portions we would like to use." A government spokesman said, 
"We brought an expert with us. What are your questions?" There were 
many questions that even the expert could not answer. 
The Yakima proposed that this money be routed through the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs for forest management. We did not need 
reforestation. Our forests were already self-propagating to a point 
where we needed a thinning program. The government refused to 
accept our suggestion. A short time later, that money mysteriously 
disappeared back into the treasury. It was not utilized by anyone. 
I suspect that it was because we would not accept PL 638 in its entirety. 
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I tried to bring a lawsuit against the Indian Bureau because of the 
mismanagement of the Yakima's forest and the outright giving away 
of our trees. We had caught them red-handed. But the old guard down-
stairs in the Bureau got hold of the old guard upstairs on the council 
and warned that "If you sue the Bureau, you are going to lose your trust 
responsibility and set yourself up for termination." There was also a 
fear that if we instigated contracting of our timber and pushed away 
the Bureau we would set ourselves up for termination. I spent the next 
two years going to the intertribal timber conferences and picking out 
the highest officials in the audience at a general meeting. I asked them, 
"Can you contract away your trust responsibility?" The answer was 
always "No." In order to justify its existence, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs was playing little games. 
There is another worry among all of us. It is this vicious cycle that 
is imposed upon us in regard to self-determination and self-sufficiency. 
In the past, when you were a member of a federally recognized tribe, 
you were deemed incompetent. You became a ward of the government, 
which had a trust responsibility. This incompetency prevented IRS 
from imposing taxes upon your land. Incompetency was a degrading 
term, but it seemed to protect you. 
Today, if you become, in some sense, self-sufficient then you are 
competent. You do not need wardship anymore, and you set yourself up 
for termination. Many of our people do not wish termination. They 
want the trust responsibility and treaty rights to remain intact as long 
as the sun shall shine. 
GERALD ONE FEATHER 
I have been involved with approximately seven different tribal 
administrations on the Pine Ridge Reservation since 1961, and I have 
seen a lot of changes throughout the years. Beginning in 1968 or 1969, 
the tribe went through a series of confrontations in the field of educa-
tion. People felt that they were not getting a quality education. They 
insisted that Indian culture be included in the school. Rogers Morton 
was secretary of the interior at the time. The tribe went to the federal 
court over this issue because the Sioux wanted to have a voice in their 
256 Self-Determination 
own education and affairs at the local level. A new concept was born 
in the tribal government. It was called local control. 
Most IRA tribes now have local units of government just like the 
states. On Pine Ridge, when the constitution was organized, they 
allowed communities to have certain authority within the tribal system. 
The communities were allowed to exercise a concurrent tax authority 
with the tribal council. They also determined who were the members 
of their communities, and they could set up an economic enterprise and 
run it without going back to the tribal council. 
We have had a law and order program for many years. The tribe 
paid part of the budget for law enforcement, and the Indian Bureau 
financed the rest of it. We had a dual police system. This went on until 
after Wounded Knee, when the tribe decided to take over all of the 
police jurisdiction. At the present we have contracted for six functions 
in police work. 
For a long time, the tribe would pass legislation and then turn right 
around and have the BIA enforce that particular law. Then a case 
arose at Rosebud where the defendant said, "Where does the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs get their authority to enforce tribal law? Who gave the 
authority to allow the BIA police to enforce the tribal code?" There 
was a lawsuit, and it was discovered that nothing in the tribal records 
gave the Bureau authority to enforce the tribal code. The defendant 
won his case. The tribe began to question its dependency on the federal 
government. When the tribe assumed more control of its police powers, 
it gained a lot of respect from both the state and federal agencies. 
I would like to return to the issue of local units of control on the 
reservation. The Oglala tribe allowed different boards to act as entities 
of the tribal government. We have a housing authority, park and health 
boards, community college board, a law enforcement agency, and a 
public safety commissioner. All of these entities deal directly with both 
the federal and state authorities. The tribe has institutionalized the 
functions of its government. This is very important because it allows 
more people to make decisions in the tribal system. The tribal council 
is the legislative body that formulates the laws to govern the administra-
tion of these functions. 
The public safety commission, which I have been involved in, sets 
standards for police officers. A sergeant on the police force has to have 
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a two-year college degree. Most of our lieutenants have four-year 
degrees. We also consult with the people about what goals they want to 
enforce in their local communities. 
The actual operation of the law enforcement system lies with the 
community. Each community selects a five man board. Local people 
hire and fire their own policemen. They approve all expenditures that 
are delegated to them at the local level and they set up enforcement 
priorities. 
In July 1983, the tribe asked the FBI to get approval from the 
tribal chairman before its agents came onto the reservation. The FBI 
protested this tribal law and refused to come on the reservation. In the 
meantime, somebody had to investigate murders and burglaries. So our 
police officers ended up doing the major crime work in conjunction with 
the United States Attorney's Office. We now carryon the services that 
were left vacant by the FBI. 
The people at Pine Ridge are really advocates of self-determination. 
They want to run their own affairs. There are several schools that are 
locally controlled, and we have jurisdiction over law and order. But we 
are still dependent on federal funding. This fiscal year it was decided 
to eliminate $425,000 of law and order money. The Indian Bureau 
set up this priority without consulting with the tribal police commission. 
I had to go to Congress and ask them to restore that money. This 
budget cut would have crippled the entire law and order system on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation. 
Because of the diversity of tribal government, the people running 
programs have to fight for their own survival, but the tribe always backs 
them up. So, PL 638 has changed the tribal form of government as we 
know it on the Pine Ridge Reservation, but it also raises questions for 
the future. At the present time we have a group of young people that 
say, "You are not bona fide tribal self-government, because everytime 
you take an action, the secretary of the interior has a right to veto you." 
These people want to reaffirm the tribe's treaty authority. 
JOE DE LA CRUZ 
I would like to provide some background information before ana-
lyzing Public Law 638. Direct federal aid to tribal governments to 
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develop programs began under the Office of Economic Opportunity. 
The OEO programs evolved into economic development programs, 
HUD programs, and eventually PL 638. Some of these federal adminis-
trative programs are now being challenged by the states. Tribes have 
to go through the statcs for 701 planning money and other types of 
money. During this same time period, there was also contracting with 
the Bureau for Indian health services. 
Tribes started to worry about the fragmentation of their relation-
ship with the United States government. It was a horrendous responsi-
bility to contract with the various federal agencies because each of them 
had their own guidelines for transferring money to tribes. Tribal 
leaders advocated the Indian Self-Determination Act because of the 
burdens that some of these programs put on tribes. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service set up 
task forces to develop the guidelines for PL 638. They picked tribal 
people with administrative knowledge to be on those task forces. Both 
the national Indian organizations and the tribes tried to pressure the 
Indian Health Service and the Bureau to develop simple guidelines. 
A meeting was held in Port Angeles, Washington, with the Indian 
Health Service and the Bureau to see if it was possible to develop satis-
factory guidelines to administer 638 contracting. Regional hearings also 
were held in every region of the United States. 
I was on the Bureau task force. Tribal program and technical 
people gave their input, but when the final guidelines were drafted, the 
tribes were under the complete control of the federal bureaucracy. The 
Bureau and Indian Health Service contracts were the worst to admin-
ister because they were cost-reimbursable contracts. Most tribes did not 
have the necessary cash flow to maintain these contracts, and they did 
not have adequate administrative systems to implement the terms of 
their contracts. 
Pressure was put on the Bureau and Indian Health Service to 
develop a process for fund transfers other than cost reimbursement. 
They finally agreed to letters of credit. Even with letters of credit, 
many tribes got into trouble. The Reagan Administration eventually 
drafted guidelines to simplify the 638 process, but they are still sitting 
on a shelf. 
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The second year after 638 was in existence, there was quite a bit 
of money for training people because this was a new law. But the money 
for training never reached the tribal level where it was needed to 
develop administrative systems. This was unfortunate because tribes 
had to go through twenty-six steps in the contracting process. 
Since PL 638 passed, tribes have complained to Congress and the 
Bureau about indirect administrative expenses. It cost tribes 34 percent 
of their own dollars to contract work from the Bureau, Indian Health 
Service, or other federal agencies. We wonder where this will lead us. 
The Indian Bureau under PL 638 has made tribal governments 
an extension of the federal bureaucracy, but when Congress decides to 
cut money or programs, the Bureau is not blamed. Instead, tribal gov-
ernments are criticized. 
After PL 638, tribal leaders and organizations worked on two bills 
to better the lives of Indian people. Congress responded by passing the 
Health and Improvement Act and the Child Welfare Act. But there 
were never any appropriations that came with the Child Welfare Act. 
Tribal people favored this legislation because various religious institu-
tions had taken Indian children away from their homes and raised them. 
Because Indian people were determined to take care of themselves, 
they now have child welfare responsibilities under a 638 contract. 
It is amazing that some of the tribes still exist when you look at 
the burdens and responsibilities they took on under PL 638. They 
started with inadequate funding and no expertise to properly administer 
the technical help that they needed. When I carefully looked at the 
Quinault programs, I discovered that we had eighty contracts. They 
were all under separate bank accounts and bookkeeping procedures. 
Our efforts to centralize these accounts only led to further problems. 
It is my feeling that tribal governments and the national Indian 
organizations need to take a strong position on self-determination. They 
should insist on direct grants in the area of federal services. Only then 
will the government begin to honor its various trust obligations. 
PART FOUR 
Indian Self-Rule 
In the Past and the Future 
The dedication of the Fort Defiance Hospital. In front are Navajo 
medicine men who have gathered from throughout the reservation to 
participate in the dedication. 
A Fourth of July celebration at Kyle on the Pine Ridge Reservation. The Indian 
Reorganization Act encouraged traditional activities, such as dances, 
that often were prohibited before its passage. 
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The Indian Reorganization Act had two basic purposes: self-
determination and complete economic independence. The IRA was 
supposed to reverse the loss of millions of acres of Indian land that had 
occurred under the Dawes General Allotment Act. Beginning in 1934, 
land allotment was ended and Indian land holdings increased to over 
53 million acres. This did not include Alaska" which under the Claims 
Settlement Act added another 40 million acres of land. Today, approxi-
mately 95 million acres are collectively held by the poorest people in 
the United States. 
Since 1934, there has not been a conversion of these resources to 
the economic benefit of Indians. The dissipation of Indian resources 
has continued at an alarming rate. One of the clearest examples of the 
failure of the IRA is on the Pine Ridge Reservation. There, you have 
11,500 people on a 225 million acre reservation. Fifty-eight percent of 
the reservation is Indian owned. In 1976, Indians on that reservation 
who were one-half degree or more of Indian blood were using only 
25,000 acres of leased land, even though there are 900,000 acres of 
tribal land. And one tribal member has been allowed to lease and 
manage 95,000 acres. This lease system has accelerated the diversion 
of land away from Indian people. 
Another example is a reservation in Arizona where Ira Hayes, the 
Marine who raised the flag at Iwo jima, was born. On this reservation, 
Indians with their own hands and without financing had constructed 
irrigation systems. As soon as they got the irrigation in, the bidding and 
lease system operated against them. They were put off the land that 
they had developed because they were outbid on leases by very marginal 
amounts. They eventually lost all their farming equipment. 
Hank Adams, Assiniboine, activist and writer 
The total sovereignty that a lot of people are espousing these days 
is out of the question. It really does Indians a great disservice to try to 
claim complete sovereignty for Indian nations, because they are not able 
to protect their sovereign rights. It also arms our enemies. And we 
do have many enemies who would like to destroy Indian tribes. In 
South Dakota, we can identify these people. 
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In my estimation) there are only two jurisdictions in the United 
States. They are state and federal jurisdiction. Indian tribes happen to 
be under federal jurisdiction) which is superior to state jurisdiction. 
If people keep claiming tribal jurisdiction to be a fact) they are bound 
to lose to states) rights because tribes do not have the population or 
power to maintain their sovereignty. 
Robert Burnette, Rosebud Sioux, former director, 
National Congress of American Indians 
Our natural resources are finite . ... The United States is like a big 
octopus. It has tentacles that are sucking up valuable resources so 
everybody can live a beautiful life. Indians throughout the West have 
been subjected to that philosophy. Los Angeles is pulling all the water 
out of the Owens Valley for its development. And the Indians in Nevada 
are relegated to a few colonies with no water rights and no land. 
Edward C. Johnson, Northern Paiute, director/curator 
of the Stewart Indian Museum Association 
The National Indian Youth Council is deeply involved in the issue 
of Indian religious freedom. We have filed several lawsuits over the 
right of Indians to use peyote and possess eagle feathers and the right of 
Indian prisoners to have sweat lodges and consult with their medicine 
men. The NIYC was involved in helping get the Indian Freedom of 
Religion Act passed by Congress. Recently) there has been an adverse 
court decision dealing with this legislation. The court ruled that the 
Indian Freedom of Religion Act had no legal force because it was only 
an advisory memo from Congress to the Department of the Interior. 
So) we have formed a national coalition of churches) civil rights organi-
zations) and Indian groups to get legislation introduced to guarantee 
Indian religious freedom. 
We are also interested in protecting Indian voting rights. We have 
finished an in-depth political information poll for the Third Congres-
sional District of New Mexico. Indians constitute about a third of that 
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district. We have carried out voter registration drives. We have regis-
tered 37,000 Indians in Southern Arizona and New Mexico. We encour-
age Indian people to run in local elections. School board and county 
commission elections often impact Indian life more than electing a 
congressman or even a president. 
Gerald Wilkinson, Cherokee, executive director, 
National Indian Youth Council 
CHAPTER ONE 
Self-Rule in the Past and the Future: An Overview 
w. Roger Buffalohead 
In our time, thoughtful people cannot search for a reasonable past 
without wondering if there will be a future in which to make use of it. 
In the scary times in which we live, with, to mention only two examples, 
the nuclear holocaust weighing on our minds and life-threatening 
chemicals and industrial waste polluting the air, the water, and the land 
we breathe, the future does look rather bleak. To many of us and to a 
growing number of young people in this country, a usable past seems 
like a frill when what we desperately need is a usable future. 
There are a number of ways in which we can rethink the past and 
the future of Indian policy. For complex historical and contemporary 
reasons, the Indian Reorganization Act, indeed John Collier and the 
entire so-called Indian New Deal program, appear in a very different 
light today than fifty or even twenty-five years ago. Historians call this 
hindsight, the ability to see historical events through a different perspec-
tive than that of those who made or participated in the great and small 
events of history. 
History is really nothing more than the present taking a look at 
itself through the past. Indians have two ways of doing this-through 
the oral tradition and through the written record. The problem is that 
the two ways of understanding the past seldom agree, making Indian 
history a kind of contest. To add to the problem, most Indian com-
munities are kind of like Blanche DuBois in "A Streetcar Named 
Desire." They rely on the kindness of strangers to interpret their history. 
[265] 
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In the case of John Collier and his Indian New Deal policies, the 
result is a split perspective which we must reconcile if we are ever to 
get a handle on the meaning of tribal self-government, tribal sover-
eignty, and self-determination. John Collier cannot be, at one and the 
same time, the patron saint of Indian self-determination and the man 
who disguised assimilation as self-government to make it easier for the 
federal government and white exploiters to manipulate Indians into 
signing away their last resources. In the belief that the big picture of 
tribal self-government's history might enable us to see more clearly the 
significance of the IRA, I am going to: (1) suggest a way of looking at 
the history that preceded the Indian Reorganization Act, (2) review 
some of the literature which followed, and finally, (3) look at what has 
been a developing consensus around the idea or the philosophy of 
Indian self-determination since the 1960s. 
First, the big picture before 1934: contemporary tribal govern-
ments are the heirs of two historical and cultural traditions that fused 
together over time into distinct legal, political, and sociocultural systems 
within American society. Out of the tribal past came sovereign powers 
which pre-date the existence of the United States, and a way of life with 
ancient roots that make the five centuries of Indian-white relations only 
a brief moment in the history of this part of the world. At various times 
in the last five hundred years, trade, warfare, peaceful coexistence, and 
creative culture change have characterized Indian-white relations, but 
the larger and more powerful society eventually imposed its will, prin-
ciples, and ideas on tribal societies. While self-serving, arrogant, and at 
times careless, this imposition came with restraints which acknowledged 
the sovereignty and land rights of native tribes. Such rights were based 
on the theory of natural laws and on the international agreements which 
existed between sovereign nations and they found their way into the 
United States Constitution. These legal rights with the apparatus estab-
lished to carry out government-to-government relations form the cor-
nerstone of Indian affairs. 
From the beginning, tribal and American people saw their rela-
tionship very differently. Tribal societies thought in terms of a sharing 
and cooperative relationship-one which would let them live as they 
wanted to, with minimum interference from outsiders. Members of 
the larger society tended to see in the relationship a means to secure 
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land and resources. When white settlement engulfed tribal societies, the 
relationship was transformed into a weapon or tool to remove, isolate, 
and eventually assimilate the native population into American society. 
By 1871, treaties were no longer made with Indian people, and the 
federal government exercised what we now know as plenary power over 
the lives of Indian people. 
Earlier in some tribal groups, but by the last half of the nineteenth 
century in all Indian societies, American growth and development 
shattered the traditional competence of tribal people to make a living 
and sustain their own way of life. When traditional competence breaks 
down without an acceptable alternative, human tragedy fills the vac-
uum. When that tragedy is misunderstood, as it was in the larger society, 
and attributed to racial and cultural inferiority it can result in the 
psychological destruction of the people. 
By the late nineteenth century, the economic and psychological 
resources of tribal societies were badly eroded, and Americans con-
cluded that the Indian people were a dying or a vanishing race. The 
Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 was a Christian and humanitarian plan 
for a disappearing people. Still land rich in the eyes of non-Indians, 
tribal folk might be rescued from total oblivion by using their land to 
transform them into farmers with enough white ways, at least among the 
younger people, to save the nation from the embarrassment of a "savage 
and demoralized people" in its midst. In addition to being a Christian 
or humanitarian thing to do, the allotment policy had the happy effect 
of transferring an average of two million acres of Indian land per year 
to white ownership during the next forty-five years. 
When the twentieth century began, most Americans who thought 
about Indians at all did so in the past tense. Like a photograph, the 
image of Indian culture was frozen in time. Yet, for Indians, the 
twentieth century was to become a time of recovering. Instead of a 
photograph, Indian life and culture was like a motion picture and the 
story line moved on, transcending the ending which American history 
seemed to have confirmed for Native Americans. 
If we are going to understand the twentieth century and the role 
of the Indian Reorganization Act in it, we must realize that three 
different philosophies have attempted to guide and shape Indian affairs 
in this century. Underlying each of these philosophies is a set of con-
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trolling assumptions about the past, present, and future of Indian 
people. We have already examined the main features or outlines of 
the so-called assimilation policy. While it is fashionable these days to 
count coup on John Collier and to chip away at the philosophical views 
and principles underlying the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier did 
have a different view of Indians. It was taken from what he read 
about the British concept of indirect rule and what he knew about the 
Canadian government's use of that process among some tribes in that 
country. He was smarter than the Canadian authorities. When they 
went in to implement indirect rule among the Iroquois, they used the 
Royal Mounties to organize the councils and to oversee the elections. 
The simple idea that Collier brought into Indian affairs was lim-
ited self-government. To understand how the Indian Reorganization 
Act has affected the last fifty years, one must understand that it was an 
attempt to strike a compromise between two competing philosophies-
the idea of assimilation and the idea of limited self-government. As it 
wended its way through Congress, the Indian Reorganization Act had 
its wings clipped, but it emerged with enough momentum to be declared 
a New Deal for Indians. It was a piece of compromise legislation that 
satisfied neither side. The Indian Reorganization Act was immersed in 
controversy from the beginning. 
John Collier failed to develop a strong consensus around limited 
self-government, or self-rule, in tribal America. The inability of Collier 
to develop such a consensus generated support for an older philosophy. 
Indian assimilation reemerged in the 1950s as the termination policy. 
It continues, down to the present time, to appear in certain forms and 
fashions as the final solution for Indians in this country. The Indian 
Reorganization Act also encouraged the development of another philo-
sophical direction, this among Indian people themselves, which we now 
call the tribal sovereignty or the traditional government movement. 
If we now take a brief look at the literature on the Indian New 
Deal, we will not find much consensus. There is widespread agreement 
that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ranks along with the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830 and the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 as a major 
turning point in national Indian policy. During the last fifty years, 
however, the Indian Reorganization Act has been called a New Deal 
and a raw deal for Indians, a Magna Charta and a classical case of 
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internal colonialism, a communist plot and a conspiracy of capitalistic 
Jewish lawyers. It also has been characterized as a responsible, thera-
peutic promotion of democracy, and an anti-American, anti-Christian 
attempt to turn the clock back and preserve Indians as living museum 
pieces. 
Viewpoints about tribal constitutions and tribal governments 
organized under the act have been just as contradictory. Depending on 
whom you read, the IRA constitutions and governments are either a 
compact, or covenant, with the federal government based upon Indian 
consent or instruments of cooptation and control by the secretary of 
interior. To other writers these same constitutions and governments 
are depressingly uniform and ignore Indian political traditions and 
values, or they are the modern tools for responsible representative 
democracy in tribal communities. Finally, tribal governments, both 
IRA and non-IRA, have been described both as puppets of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs and as the true voice of Indian people. 
The same sort of contradiction surrounds the general assessments 
that have been made of the IRA record. On the success side, one finds an 
impressive list of achievements, ranging from reversing the allotment 
policy to bringing Indian consent back into Indian affairs after the 
sixty-year hiatus that followed the discontinuance of treaty making in 
1871. These successes are offset by an equally impressive list of failures, 
ranging from Collier's difficulty in relating to Indians to his inability 
to implement constitutions that reflected tribal values and traditions. 
What can be made of all this contradiction? There are at least four 
things which can be made of it. From the perspective of the 1980s, it is 
clear that the Indian Reorganization Act had too little faith in Indian 
people and too much faith in the concept of limited self-government. 
There was disbelief that Indians could even organize constitutions 
without the BIA there to help them and to provide the model which was 
copied over and over again across the country. There also was a belief 
that Indian political values and traditions, Indian ways of decision 
making, were not as valuable as the representative democratic method. 
What do I mean by suggesting that the IRA had too much faith in the 
concept of limited self-government? Collier probably believed that his 
leadership and his team could in fact change the BIA and they did not. 
We are experiencing the same thing in Central America now with our 
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government trying to impose a form of government on those countries 
that they apparently do not want and will not pursue. Indians were not 
numerous enough nor important enough for their wishes to matter very 
much, until recent times. 
The second thing we can make of all this contradiction is that the 
Indian Reorganization Act faltered on the stumbling block of all 
national Indian policy-Indian political, economic, and cultural diver-
sity. Those considering future policy should remember that we have 
never been able to come up with legislation which deals with more than 
two hundred tribes who do not see their future destiny or their present 
life in the same way. They each have unique histories. They each are, 
whether tiny or large, separate little communities within this society, 
and it requires years of research to even begin to understand the diversity 
among Indian people. 
What else can we conclude from the contradiction? The IRA 
reconfirmed the nation's commitment to Indian treaty rights but found 
no acceptable way to exercise federal trust responsibility, except at the 
expense of Indian sovereignty. That has been and remains the central 
problem of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
The fourth and final thing that we might conclude about this 
contradiction is that the Indian Reorganization Act was both a success 
and a failure. It was a success because it did some important things for 
Indian people. It reversed the allotment policy and moved the federal 
government into the position of land restoration and conservation. It 
also provided a cultural and educational framework which is pretty 
close to the one that we would like to have more fully implemented 
today, and it brought many lasting benefits to Indian people through 
economic and educational programs. It was a failure because the 
program that Collier presented and implemented did not really provide 
Indian people with the basic and fundamental thing that must support 
tribal sovereignty: economic self-determination. That, too, remains a 
central problem of our time. 
Since the early 1960s, tribal governments have been attempting 
to work out a new consensus around the philosophy of Indian self-
determination. Currently the consensus provides only a thin veneer 
over reservation communities deeply divided by competing groups who 
often work at cross purposes. In the last two decades, the Indian 
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self-determination consensus has become dangerously dependent upon 
the federal dollar for its power and survival. It also has fought to 
enlarge the treaty rights and powers of tribal governments through 
court decisions, new federal Indian legislation, and negotiated Indian 
land settlements. Furthermore, this consensus has fended off anti-Indian 
thrusts at the local and national level and worked out compromises or 
stand-offs with confrontational groups, at home or in the broader Indian 
community, who are distrustful of tribal government and tribal leaders. 
The genius of the self-determination consensus is that it has sur-
vived some very turbulent times in Indian affairs, enhanced the role and 
respectability of tribal governments in national and state policy decision 
making, and made some progress in developing the institutional struc-
tures for tribes to exercise greater control over their political, economic, 
and social life. The tragic flaw in the Indian self-determination con-
sensus is that there is so little actual Indian self-determination in Indian 
country because the consensus rides on the destiny of national political 
and economic trends rather than on the will or needs of Indian people. 
The fundamental dilemma created by tribal sovereignty or self-
government within a dependency relationship with the United States 
government may always condition the relationship between Indian 
tribes and the federal government. But as Hartley White, a sage mem-
ber of the Leech Lake Reservation business community in Minnesota, 
has put it, it is hard at times to tell whether Indian tribes are friendly 
or enemy governments to administrations in Washington, D.c. The 
purpose of looking at the Indian Reorganization Act and its effect on 
the last fifty years is to gain a better perspective on this fundamental 
problem in Indian affairs and to use our imagination, like John Collier 
did, to challenge the dogmas of our time and envison new ways for 
tribal governments to deal with the choices and challenges confronting 
Indian people and the larger society in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century. 
When we consider that the flash of nuclear holocaust seems to be 
in our future and that life-threatening chemicals, overpopulation, and 
basic shortages in the resources needed to sustain life stalk the world, 
we might fairly ask what are the "wisest and ablest" in Indian country 
doing discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934? When we add 
to that gloomy picture the contemporary philosophy that selfishness is 
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a virtuous way to live in an absurd and uncontrollable world, the 
whole iceberg rather than the tip of 1980s American society floats into 
clear view. When we further add the Reagan administration, its pref-
erence for guns over butter, and the dear price that Indians and poor 
people in this country are paying for the frenzied restoration of the 
military-industrial complex, there does seem to be something out of 
focus or amiss in our reflection on the past. 
Of all the people I have read in preparing for this paper, only John 
Collier seemed to have an answer. Collier believed that there was 
something special about Indian people. Their approach to life offered 
an alternative to the destructive effects of western culture on the human 
condition and on the earth upon which we live. For his views, Collier 
was charged with the sin of romanticism, a longing in urban industrial 
society for simpler times and the supposed virtues of small tribal societies 
left behind in the march of civilization and progress. 
There were few people then, and there are few people now who 
took Collier's views about Indians very seriously. As pragmatic realists, 
with a stake in unlimited progress, they wrote his views off as romanti-
cism. Yet it is interesting today, when the fruits of economic and 
technological progress seem to offer the possibility of human extinction 
and the ultimate ruin of the earth's ecology, that some thinking about 
how to save human life and the earth from destruction harks back to 
Collier's vision of Indian people and to some of the principles under-
lying the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Whether you agree or disagree with E. F. Schumacher's economic 
theory, small is beautiful, there is a striking resemblance between 
Collier's economic program for Indians and what Schumacher has 
proposed as an alternative to gigantic economic enterprise. We should 
all recall that Collier encouraged cottage industries centered around 
arts and crafts, cooperative grocery stores, fishing enterprises, cattle 
associations, and other economic activities that, one might say, took as 
their priority the quality of Indian life on the land in which they lived. 
Collier's economic policies have always gotten a bum rap because of 
what happened among the Navajo, although what happened there was 
probably a fair assessment of Collier's failures as an administrator. 
It was not Collier but later commissioners of Indian affairs and 
reservation Indian leaders looking for a quick fix to economic poverty 
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who brought uranium mines and polluting coal development and many 
other economic enterprises to Indian reservations. These initiatives 
were supposed to have rescued tribal communities from chronic unem-
ployment. Yet by no stretch of the truth do economic enterprises on 
reservations make up the reservation economy. The reservation economy 
is the welfare state, which the Reagan administration is now rolling 
back and which, until recently, provided the illusion that everything 
was getting better and better on Indian reservations when it was not. 
In my state, I check in with the Minnesota Chippewa tribe and the 
Red Lake Reservation band and the Sioux communities quite fre-
quently. On all those reservations, except the Sioux community which 
now has a world famous bingo parlor, the unemployment rate is any-
where between 50 percent and 80 percent. Many of the people there 
are demoralized by the lack of jobs. It is a critical time for those com-
munities. In the state of Minnesota alone, 38 percent of the Indian 
households are headed by single females who make less than $8,000 
a year. 
There are several things we might consider as we look for guide-
lines for future policy. Tribes cannot have political self-determination 
without economic self-determination, and the federal government must 
realize that for most tribes the idea of self-sufficiency has not been 
achieved and will not be achieved without massive support from the 
federal government. Another problem that exists today is the so-called 
government-to-government relationship between the United States and 
all the different tribes. How is that to be carried out? How is the gov-
ernment to accept advice and recommendation from all of these tribes? 
Should we not be looking at some kind of forums, some kind of con-
gresses, some way in which tribal views or advice that is bona fide and 
comes from those tribal communities, that reflects the needs of Indian 
people within those communities, can reach that vast bureaucracy in 
Washington, D.C.? 
What about the matter of tribal constitutions? If the current tribal 
constitutions do not reflect Indian political beliefs and values, the 
question is whether the Department of Interior and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs would approve amended constitutions for the IRA tribes. 
At last count, the Indian tribes organized under IRA totaled 127 in the 
United States exclusive of Alaska, and those who were not organized 
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under IRA totaled 143. In Alaska, 70 groups were organized under IRA 
and 143 were not. These figures would not include those Indian groups 
which have won recent recognition from the federal government under 
the federal acknowledgement process. They would presumably have 
the right to organize uner Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, if that was their choice. 
The point on tribal constitutions is that most of the tribes do not 
have IRA constitutions. If they want, they can change them any way 
they want them. The Red Lake Reservation has had a constitution 
since 1918. It has served the reservation very well in the twentieth 
century. Many tribes have constitutions or informal unwritten prin-
ciples through which they operate. For those tribes who are organized 
under IRA, the ballgame is really in their court to change their consti-
tutions and to force the Bureau to recognize those things that might be 
usable to them. 
Information and communications are critical to tribal people in the 
1980s. In considering the future, we must realize that tribal communi-
ties deserve and should seek the best technical information available to 
them. They must have adequate communication facilities to carry out 
modern tribal government. The whole information and communica-
tion system that now exists on reservations and in urban communities 
is based on the theory that the more information you have and can 
withhold from other groups, the more power that you will have over 
what goes on in Indian affairs. 
Many problems surround 638 contracting, not the least of which 
is that unless tribes can find some way to negotiate better indirect cost 
rates they are going to go broke carrying out tribal contracting. There 
are at least twenty-six steps in the Bureau for approval of 638 contracts. 
That means that twenty-six administrators are creaming off a piece of 
the money that is supposedly going down to tribes, before it reaches us. 
It is like the old days in Indian education when something like $6,000 
per child was appropriated and about $600 of that amount of money 
actually made its way to reservation communities. 
We need to take a new look at Indian preference. Most of you 
know that the Indian Reorganization Act contained an Indian prefer-
ence clause, but that has been pretty much supplanted by PL 95-56l. 
The problem surrounding Indian preference has not. There is a parable 
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about Indian preference that appeared in a book called The Gift That 
Hurt the Indian. I will let it speak for itself. 
A wealthy Indian bought a Lear jet and hired a competent pilot to go 
with it. The Indian was boss and owner; he knew it and the pilot knew it. 
The Indian knew, too, that he himself could not pilot the plane. He was 
too busy to learn. So he relied on the pilot. Everything went along fine. 
One day the Indian decided to "Indianize" his plane. He fired the pilot and 
hired an Indian, a cousin, who had been an aircraft observer in Korea. The 
new pilot was not without experience. He managed to get the plane off the 
ground. He also managed to fly it into a mountain. As the Indian boss-
owner ascended heavenward to joint the feathered choir, he thought, "The 
reason for this unfortunate turn of affairs is clear-the fault is mine. Replac-
ing the pilot was not enough, the plane itself should have been made by 
Indians." 
The final future policy consideration that we should deal with is the 
question of the quality of life on Indian reservations. It seems to me that 
tribal governments exist for the purpose of improving the quality of life 
of their members and meeting basic human needs for health, education, 
welfare, and economic security. Now we can blame the BIA or the 
Reagan administration for all of our problems, or we can blame the 
party currently in power in tribal government for what is wrong with 
the way things are going at the local level. But we should only blame 
ourselves in the long run if we allow politics, misunderstanding, petty 
jealousies, personality conflicts, and all the other business that goes on 
in Indian affairs to rob the people in our communities of the best 
quality of life that we can provide them. 
There is one final thing which needs to be discussed. Most of you 
know, and if you do not you should know, that thirty years ago a sym-
posium to assess the Indian Reorganization Act was held in conjunction 
with the American Anthropological Association meeting in Tucson, 
Arizona. There are some interesting similarities and differences between 
the earlier symposium and the conference we held at Sun Valley-
contrasts which seem to be worth pondering for a moment. The earlier 
symposium occurred in 1953, under the auspices of the American 
Anthropological Association, with students of Indian culture, including 
the famous Indian scholars Edward Dozier and D' Arcy McNickle, 
playing prominent roles in the proceedings. John Collier, of course, 
delivered the keynote address. Among the other distinguished people 
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there were Ted Haas, Clarence Wesley, Joseph Garry, and several others 
whom you should all remember. 
The 1983 conference was sponsored by the Institute of the Ameri-
can West, with a philosophical orientation toward humanistic studies. 
This change in sponsors is not entirely happenstance. It reflects a strain 
in relations between Indians and anthropologists which has deepened 
during the last thirty years. This falling out between old friends and 
allies is not unique to this country. It is part of a worldwide phenomenon 
where tribal and other colonial people have challenged academic 
experts' role as interpreters of non-western culture. In the rollback of 
colonialism across the world, anthropologists, rightly or wrongly, have 
been accused of lowering an ivory tower curtain around the exploita-
tion and injustice suffered by subject or colonial peoples. 
While too much can and has been made of what anthropologists 
did or did not do in Indian affairs, it is important for Indian people 
to consider how their own intellectual traditions might conflict with 
such traditions of the larger society. It seems to me that the anthropo-
logical reliance upon the scientific deductive method leads to a way of 
understanding reality through its fragments. The Indian intellectual 
tradition, on the other hand, has reflected a more holistic, integrative 
knowledge of the past. It may be that the scholarly differences that we 
need to explore have more to do with our ways of thinking, our intel-
lectual traditions, and our ways of perceiving than with deliberate 
exploitation of one group by another. 
At the symposium in 1953, the great philosopher, lawyer, and 
architect of the Indian Reorganization Act, Felix Cohen, died shortly 
before the meeting, and his presence was sorely missed. Theodore H. 
Haas, who had served as a chief counsel in the BIA and as an attorney 
and community government advisor for the Colorado River Relocation 
Camp for Japanese-Americans, took Cohen's place. He provided an 
historical background and analysis of the IRA which is still useful. 
There were no, or few, Indian lawyers in 1953, none who were of 
that stature of Cohen and Haas or even working in the field of Indian 
affairs, and a big difference between then and now is that we have over 
two hundred Indian lawyers presumably working on the legal rights of 
Indian people. I think that the assessment today and the assessment 
then are going to remain pretty much the same, although there will be 
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some difference in details. The rcally important thing is that tribes have 
to believe in themselves and kecp a strong conviction that they can undo 
the tangled wcb of federal-Indian relations in such a way that it releases 
them to improve the quality of Indian life, allowing Indian people to 
rise up once more and fulfill their destiny in American culture. Perhaps 
if Collier had been right and had succeeded in what he set out to do, we 
Indian scholars and intellectuals would be discussing how we could 
help western culture save itself from destruction, rather than how we 
can save ourselves from western culture. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Federal Indian Policy Yesterday and Tomorrow 
Suzan Shown Harjo, Russell Jim, Hazel W. Hertzberg, 
Joe De La Cruz, Oren Lyons 
The fundamental failure of American Indian policy throughout the 
twentieth century has been the continuing diversion of Indian property 
away from the economic benefit of Indian people. On the Quinault Reser-
vation, people who own hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of timber 
cannot work their allotments themselves. They are obstructed by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs. It will not provide them with the names and addresses 
of all the surrounding owners from whom they have to secure rights-of-
way. The Bureau invoked the Federal Privacy Act as a basis for not tell-
ing them. But the BIA would contact those people if the land was bid to a 
non-Indian contractor. You cannot have sovereignty without some measure 
of underlying economic independence. 
Hank Adams, Assiniboine, activist and writer 
If a presidential commission is set up to study land claims, it has got 
to be a commission that is picked by tribal people. A short time ago, another 
commission to study economic development on reservations was established 
by President Reagan. The members of this commission had no interest in 
listening to the recommendations of Indian people. They set the agenda 
and wanted to talk about the realignment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The National Congress of American Indians and the National Tribal 
Chairman's Association refused to cooperate under those conditions. 
Joe De La Cruz, Quinault, president of the 
National Congress of American Indians 
[278] 
Indian Policy Yesterday and Tomorrow 279 
SUZAN SHOWN HARJO 
I am a member of the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe of Oklahoma, 
which drafted an IRA constitution. This constitution has resulted in 
many drawbacks for the Cheyenne-Arapaho, but it has been most 
helpful in certain practical matters. When I served in the Department 
of the Interior during the Carter administration, I had the privilege of 
working with the Northern and Southern Cheyenne people in an effort 
to keep Bear Butte, a very important holy place, from being sold. Secre-
tary Cecil Andrus was able to purchase this acreage for the Cheyenne 
and Arapaho tribes of Oklahoma because they were an IRA consti-
tuted entity. 
When used as a tool, the IRA is very useful. As a law, the IRA 
can be changed if we decide that is desirable. So far, the fear of accep-
table alternatives has prevented us from changing the IRA. The tragic 
lessons of history also make us cleave to whatever it is we have now. 
We have historic inhibitions about change. It will be very difficult 
to alter the Indian Reorganization Act. Timing and strategy will be 
important. We will have to consider who is in Congress, who is in the 
executive branch, and who is in charge of our Indian governments. 
We will have to decide how to enter into coalitions that might bring us 
into conflict with other Indian people. And we do not want to be in 
conflict with other Indian people, especially on such an important issue 
as changing a major law such as the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Many of the problems that Indian people have do not relate to the 
Indian Reorganization Act. They concern politics at home and politics 
in the broader society at the state and federal level. There are also 
problems that relate to the governing documents of our Indian govern-
ments, which we can change. After a full assessment on a nation by 
nation basis of whether or not we need the IRA and how we are going 
to change it if we do not, we may decide to scrap the whole project 
because we have other priorities. 
Indian people have not really seen tough times yet, because we are 
not at war with other neighbors to the south who are engaged in Indian 
revolutions. We will have a terrible time when the first successful Indian 
revolution occurs. Then, we will have an Indian policy crisis in this 
country that will put termination to shame. We must develop our 
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policies, internal structures, and directions and reestablish suitable 
forms of government before there is massive war in this hemisphere. 
Internationally, the situation of American Indians has been, for 
the most part, a strong model for Indians in other countries. We have 
had a very strong legal position. But how will that change once we are 
in this kind of warfare? 
Not enough attention has been given to the Indian activism of the 
1960s and the 1970s. The American Indian Movement, the second 
battle at Wounded Knee, and the occupation of the BIA building 
brought about tremendous change in Indian country. These events 
altered the way Indian people are viewed and the way they look at 
themselves. We need to examine the effects of surveillance activities on 
many of us during that period-what effect it had on our lives and our 
hopes for the future. 
We need to think about the kind of Indian economic development 
that is being allowed today by the Department of the Interior. Activities 
such as bingo add a unique dimension to the term "self-exploitation." 
They are a creative interpretation of the Indian trade and inter-
course acts. 
Finally, I would like to say that John Collier was an important 
man. He helped establish significant changes in Indian policy. But 
John Collier is not the important issue before us. The important issue 
is what kind of governments work for Indians today and what kind 
of governments will work for Indians tomorrow to bring about real 
Indian self-rule. 
RUSSELL JIM 
I have no magic formula for the future. I can only speak as a 
culturally oriented person. I am one of those Indians that drives an 
air-conditioned pickup and lives in an air-conditioned house. I take 
advantage of the means of comfort in contemporary society, but I also 
speak my own language and practice what has been taught to me as a 
way of life. 
The Yakima chose not to join the IRA. My immediate family was 
directly involved in thwarting any attempts to impose this legislation 
upon the Yakima. Yet, we still survive as a tribe, people, and nation. 
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We are a sovereign people. Sovereignty is a word that shakes up com-
munities because they misunderstand its implication. Sometimes even 
the tribes misunderstand what sovereignty means. 
Many of you have read Global Report Year 2000. It is estimated 
that in the year 2000 there will be six biIIion people on this earth. 
There has never before been an onslaught on the environment such as 
there has been in the last four decades, and that environment is tied 
directly to the indigenous people of this land. We need to preserve our 
ecosystems from contamination so indigenous people can utilize those 
natural resources. 
I constantly chastise those people and organizations that have set 
up roadblocks against the furtherance of my people. I have been espe-
cially critical of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Perhaps the BIA is 
necessary to carry out the government's trust responsibility, but as far 
as I am concerned, there still is not a true definition of what trust 
responsibility means. When I look up the definitions of trust and respon-
sibility in Webster's Dictionary, I come to the conclusion that the federal 
government has a fiduciary obligation to help me preserve what is mine. 
The government has the responsibility to honor our treaty rights for as 
long as the sun shall shine, the mountains stand, and the rivers flow. 
HAZEL W. HERTZBERG 
It is important to look at Indian affairs as part of a much broader 
process in our society. When we consider the Indian Reorganization 
Act, we should be asking ourselves what is characteristic of the IRA that 
is also characteristic of the entire New Deal? We also need to know, 
if the IRA was unique, in what way did it depart from the whole 
New Deal? 
Those of you who are not historians may not realize that con-
temporary attacks on the Indian Reorganization Act were part of a 
much more general attack on the New Deal that came from both the 
left and the right. Among historians there is now a very strong reevalua-
tion of the New Deal. So, it is not surprising that the New Deal is 
being reevaluated also in terms of Indian affairs. 
When we examine termination, we ought to look beyond Indian 
affairs. We should ask ourselves what was happening in the broader 
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society that might help to explain termination. Some of the trends 
which need to be explored in more depth are: the emphasis on local 
community and local self-government, and the reaction against big 
government in that era. 
The relocation of Indians to cities was part of the movement of 
the general population in that period. When Indians were being relo-
cated, many other Americans were relocating voluntarily to the suburbs. 
The movement of Indians to cities was part of a much broader demo-
graphic change that helps us to understand relocation itself. It is also 
important for us to look at the alternatives that seemed realistically open 
to both Indians and non-Indians at the time. It is all very well for us 
fifty years or a hundred years later to be telling the people of the past 
what they should have done. But I think we need a certain humility 
when making historical judgements. 
In the period that we are in now, it is important to realize that 
tribal governments depend on some kind of conception of a public good 
that goes beyond the fortunes of individuals. And the idea of the 
public good in society as a whole is not in very good shape at the 
moment. I hope it is going to improve for both Indians and non-Indians. 
A second point I would like to bring to your attention is the ques-
tion of the criteria for success or failure in Indian policy. How do we 
tell that a policy has failed or succeeded? For a long time everybody 
said that the Dawes allotment policy was succeeding. Then, it turned 
out that it completely failed. The same thing happened with the Indian 
Reorganization Act. It is important to develop some ideas about how 
you judge whether a government policy has failed or succeeded. Do you 
know by today's standards; do you know by the hosts of people who 
sponsored the legislation? What are the criteria that you use? This 
problem is particularly difficult in Indian affairs because tribal groups 
are very different. If you look at the Navajo, you can say the Indian 
Reorganization Act failed, but if you look at the San Carlos Apache, 
maybe you can say it succeeded. So it is important in Indian policy to 
take a rather broad view. 
A third point that I would like to make is that we need to know 
more about the role of Indian organizations. Both the Dawes allotment 
era and the IRA era produced a major Indian organization and a white 
organization. The white organization in the Dawes era was the Indian 
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Rights Association which formed in 1883. The Indian organization 
was the Society of American Indians. It was founded in 1911. Both 
groups generally supported the Dawes Act but increasingly became 
critical of it. The Association on American Indian Affairs was estab-
lished in 1936. The National Congress of American Indians was 
organized in 1944 by D' Arcy McNickle and other people from the 
Chicago Area Office. All of these organizations, with the exception of 
the Society of American Indians, were important in the termination 
fights during the 1950s and beyond. 
A fourth point that I want to discuss is the relationship of religious 
groups to major Indian legislation. Missionaries have been criticized 
for their role in Indian affairs, and they are very easy targets. But a lot 
of Indian people are very active in Christian churches. We need to look 
more carefully at how organized Christian movements were involved 
with major pieces of legislation such as the Indian Reorganization Act 
and the Self-Determination Act. They played an important role in 
mobilizing public opinion. 
Another topic I want to mention is the question of what new 
forces were created by the various changes in Indian policy. It has been 
pointed out that the Office of Economic Opportunity created a mana-
gerial class which has not yet made its full impact, and there are now 
hundreds of Indian lawyers, doctors, teachers, professors, historians, 
and anthropologists. They are bound to have an important impact on 
Indian life. 
We need to pay more attention in the future to economics when 
discussing Indian affairs. It is a very neglected subject. We talk about 
Indian poverty, but there has not been enough analysis of the economic 
conditions on reservations. 
Another issue that deserves more attention and underlines almost 
all major Indian legislation, including the Indian Reorganization Act, 
is the question of assimilation versus cultural pluralism or separatism. 
This issue must be looked at much more analytically. If our grand-
parents were here, whether they were Indian or white, they would 
think that quite a few changes have taken place. We need to analyze 
those changes and what they mean for the present and future. 
Finally, I just want to say a word about the role of history in all of 
this. History gives us a sense of perspective; it is a way of living beyond 
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one's own life. But sometimes when we talk about things such as the 
Indian Reorganization Act, they seem very impersonal. We forget the 
pain and the anguish and the joy that is connected with almost all 
important events in human history. 
JOE DE LA CRUZ 
The Quinault people have had a continuing history of opposing 
United States poljcy. One topic that we have not adequately discussed 
is the fisheries dispute among the Indians in the Pacific Northwest. A lot 
of people think that this dispute started in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Actually, the federal government began pushing the Northwest 
Indians out of their fishing territories in the 1890s. When the tin can 
was invented in 1900, the American corporations and banking people 
started building canneries along the Pacific coast. The Indians were 
left with only small areas where they could fish. 
The government attempted to regulate what was left of the Indian 
fisheries in 1923. Our Quinault people resisted and took their case to the 
domestic courts of the United States. They got a ruling that neither the 
United States nor the Bureau of Indian Affairs could manage fish on 
the Quinault Reservation. In February 1974, District Court Judge 
George H. Boldt ruled that tribes in the Pacific Northwest were entitled 
to 50 percent of the harvestable fish. The Quinault nation was deter-
mined to regulate its own affairs. We have had to struggle to develop 
our own technical capabilities and information systems to take advan-
tage of the Boldt ruling and other favorable court decisions. 
I do not like to hear that it is impossible for tribes to do something. 
We now have an administration that claims it wants to establish a 
government-to-government policy with the Indian tribes and Indian 
nations. A lot of people have asked, "What does that mean? Where 
is this going to lead us?" I believe strongly that if Indian people will 
adhere to some of the principles that came out of their treaties, they will 
survive these changes. Indian people must stick with three principles: 
( 1) Indian governments and people possess original and inherent sov-
ereignty, (2) specific Indian tribes and nations possess the inherent right 
to determine their own political futures, and (3) Indians have the right 
to pursue their political, social, and cultural development without out-
side interference. 
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I feel very strongly that if tribes work collectively they can estab-
lish a government-to-government policy with the United States. Our 
forefathers made treaties that created a nation-to-nation relationship. 
Some people may feel that this idea is unrealistic. But when a small tribe 
such as the Quinault can persuade the courts that it has jurisdiction to 
regulate and manage its fisheries, you can see that it is not impossible. 
I have heard many comments about the problems and faults of 
tribal government. We do have many problems in tribal government, 
and we have many problems between tribal governments. It is up to the 
Indian people to develop their own mechanisms to resolve disputes. 
We have had some problems that came out of the Boldt decision con-
cerning the allocation of fish amongst the tribes. There are twenty tribes 
on Puget Sound and the \Vashington coast and five tribes on the 
Columbia River that have to determine how the fish are going to be 
divided. That is a difficult question. But I feel that we have the leader-
ship to work these things out. 
Since President Ronald Reagan announced his so-called policy on 
government-to-government relations, several people have advised the 
administration on how this process should be developed. Recently 
I talked to the executive director of the National Congress of American 
Indians. He read me a letter from a group of people that call them-
selves "The National Indian Republicans." Some of these people were 
Democrats a year or two ago. But if they call themselves the National 
Indian Republicans, they have the ear of key people in the White 
House. I do not believe that one of them has ever lived on an Indian 
reservation, so we know that whatever policy or change comes about 
is not going to be something that Indian people and Indian tribes want. 
Tribes need to be very fearful of what has happened in the last 
two-and-one-half years of this administration. Domestic programs and 
health services have been destroyed through the appropriation process. 
As Indian people, we must decide whether we want to be governed by 
the states, the United States, or our own tribal governments. When you 
look at the history of America, it seems clear that the states and the 
federal government, for the most part, have not made decisions that 
benefited Indian people. Therefore, I hope that Indians will try to 
resolve the disputes within their communities and work towards a con-
sensus on where Indian country should be going. 
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OREN LYONS 
What I have to say will be a reflection of my nation's point of view 
and should not be construed as speaking for other nations or people. We 
were one of those nations that did not accept the IRA. We rejected the 
IRA in a formal vote. It was one of the few times that our people voted 
in an alien process. One of the chiefs of the longhouse went from house 
to house. He said, "I know you do not like to vote. I know you are 
against voting, but if you vote once in your life, this is the time." The 
IRA was defeated by very few votes. 
I am a faith keeper and a subchief of the Onondaga nation. 
I represent the Turtle Clan in the council. The Onondaga nation is the 
fire keeper for the Six Nations of Iroquois. Our position is that we are 
sovereign and independent nations. We have the right to continue our 
life as it was given to all of our people. 
Today we have IRA governments, BIA governments, and tradi-
tional governments. The processes of Indian government are flexible. 
We have had to adapt to our white brothers and sisters or else disappear. 
We have always faced the problem of being separate and independent 
and trying to survive in a very dominating society that has interests and 
directions of its own. 
We have recognized the equal status of non-Indians because they 
are a manifestation of the creation and demand respect. But that was 
not the perspective that came from the other side. Whites felt that they 
were superior and that we were uncivilized "tribes." 
The basis of all the Indian nations, as I know them, is the family. 
At the center of the family is the woman. She is the central fire-the 
power of life. For thousands of years, Indian people developed methods 
of continuing a vibrant family life, but these methods were smashed 
and eradicated in a very short time. In their place institutions such as 
the IRA were substituted to restructure Indian society. 
At one time, a beautiful cultural and social fabric, with tre-
mendous varieties of design, was woven on this continent. Then, our 
brothers and sisters from overseas came over here and took apart that 
fabric strand by strand and restructured it. They have taken something 
beautiful and destroyed it. 
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You can tell the health and welfare of a nation by looking at its 
children and elders. If children are in despair, running about without 
control, and alienated from their families, then society is in great strife. 
If elders are separated from their families, not en joying their last years, 
then you have a very sick society. If Indians accept this kind of society 
for their people they must bear the consequences. 
Indian people should hold on to what they have. I cannot accept 
the Department of the Interior as an ultimate authority that oversees 
every decision we make. Self-determination under the federal govern-
ment is a very limited self-determination. It is defined by what outsiders 
perceive to be good for you. 
The Six Nations of Iroquois have attended international forums 
with members of other tribes. In 1977, we made a common statement 
before the United Nations at Geneva, Switzerland. The people at the 
United Nations did not know what to expect. They were very appre-
hensive when we sang songs and opened the session with a prayer, 
which is against the law of the United Nations. Then we began a very 
eloquent presentation of the history of the destruction of our people and 
culture. The people at the United Nations were profoundly moved. 
Even the interpreters stood up and clapped. That was a great occasion. 
We have a lot of friends internationally, and we are concerned 
about the policies that the United States is now following in Central 
and South America. In 1981, we advised the president of the United 
States that we would not allow our young men to be drafted. If the 
Onondaga nation does not have authority to draft our own men, how 
can the United States have that authority? Most of all, we do not want 
our children shooting other Indians. We are not going to be part of 
that, because we are a separate sovereign nation. 
The United States has many problems. There should be a forum 
where we can sit down and examine the future together. The future is 
bleak. It is going to require the counsel of our elders to help you, but 
they are dying off pretty fast as we become experts in the process of 
becoming American citizens. In that process, we are losing valuable 
knowledge of our own culture. 
The Six Nations of Iroquois advocate a position that says land 
should be held in common, we should protect our children, and we 
should protect the future. We believe that it is necessary to make deci-
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sions for the seventh generation of the future. That is not very good 
economics, but you cannot make a profit on the heads of your grand-
children. If the United States continues on its present course, it will 
destroy both Indian and non-Indian people. If we destroy ourselves by 
our own folly, it is the working of natural law. When there are too many 
rabbits, they disappear. When lemmings overpopulate, they run into 
the sea. Human beings also may disappear. And it will mean nothing to 
the natural world, which is used to cries of anguish and pain. It is 
part of life. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Tribal Sovereignty: 
Roots) Expectations) and Limits 
R. David Edmunds, Robert Burnette, Hank Adams 
John Marshall, in one of his landmark opinions, remarked on the 
arrogance of the ((doctrine of discovery" which held that one European 
ship landing on the East Coast would entitle that sovereign to ownership of 
a vast territory of land. I do not know of a clearer case on the earth of this 
than the arctic region. I cannot think of a civilized argument why the 
native people, who live in this area, should not have the right to constitute 
an independent nation if that is their desire. They are the only ones who 
have adapted to the environment of the arctic. We really need to deter-
mine if large countries are justified in keeping these people under their 
jurisdiction. 
Philip S. Deloria, Standing Rock Sioux, 
director, American Indian Law Center 
From 1951 until early 1970, the leaders of tribal governments knew 
about their treaties. They exercised as much authority and power as they 
could from those documents. But the term sovereignty was never used. 
We knew that we were part of the United States and that our people were 
subject to the plenary powers of Congress, and we knew that our constitu-
tions and bylaws and charters were issued by the secretary of the interior. 
To exert pressure to obtain total tribal sovereignty would have meant 
directly opposing the United States of America and everything that it stood 
for. Indian tribes have used sovereignty as a goal for publicity purposes 
since 1971. This has attracted a lot of attention and made Europeans and 
other people begin to ask questions. 
Robert Burnette, Rosebud Sioux, former director, 
National Congress of American Indians 
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R. DAVID EDMUNDS 
I am not as optimistic about the issue of Indian sovereignty as 
some people. It depends upon how you define sovereignty and what 
makes a people sovereign. From my understanding of the term and the 
way it is generally used it means the ability to completely control one's 
own affairs regardless of intervention by outside powers. Given that 
sort of framework, I am pessimistic about restoring tribal sovereignty. 
During the very earliest periods of Indian-white contact and surely 
before the European invasion of America, Indian people were sovereign. 
There is no doubt about it. They controlled all aspects of their lives. 
The unfortunate historical reality is that as the white frontier rolled 
westward Indian cultures were either overwhelmed or controlled to a 
certain extent by the federal government. Their sovereignty diminished. 
By 1871, the government recognized this, and it stopped making treaties 
with the tribes. The government then began to dictate to the tribes its 
decision to establish reservations and other aspects of tribal policy. 
The government of the United States is really a government of 
pressure groups. It is the groups who have political power, especially 
economic power, that run this country. Until Native American people 
have a greater economic power base from which to build, their sov-
ereignty is going to be very limited. You must have a viable economic 
base if you are going to influence a government that essentially functions 
in response to economics. That is the key issue. Sometimes, we hear 
people talk in mystical terms about sovereignty, but it does not put pork 
chops on the table. 
There are many definitions of the word sovereignty in Indian 
America. It seems to me that the majority of Indians mean "the maxi-
mum amount of self-control for the Indian people under the existing 
system" when they use this term. I doubt whether there will ever be 
complete tribal sovereignty in the United States. 
What we need to do is look at the different groups inside the 
United States who have a tremendous amount of influence on the 
federal government and on the economic structure in this country and 
at how they influence those particular structures. We are talking about 
pressure groups such as big industry, organized labor, arms manufac-
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turers, and farmers. You can even point to certain racial ethnic minority 
groups in the late 1960s. 
Blacks, for example, gained considerable sovereignty in the civil 
rights movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They gained sub-
stantially more control over their destinies than they had previous to that 
time. Now that does not mean, of course, that blacks as a group of 
people, exist free from government control. 
Indian people will probably never be divorced from those kinds 
of controls. One of the interesting things about all of the groups that 
have been able to gain political and economic power is that they have 
done it through very sophisticated and centralized political organiza-
tions. That is where Indians have been at a big disadvantage. Indian 
organizations have not been able to match the economic and political 
power of groups that have opposed them. The nature of Indian people 
and the structure of tribal governments make it all but impossible to 
develop that particular type of response. 
ROBERT BURNETTE 
The issue of tribal sovereignty has been misused and abused by 
Indian leaders in the last few years. In the period when I was the 
executive director of the National Congress of American Indians and 
president of the Rosebud Sioux tribe, I had no use for the word sover-
eignty. I believe that tribes had legal sovereignty, but they certainly 
do not en joy the benefits of sovereignty because they do not have an 
armed force with which to enforce it. If Indians had an army as big as 
the Soviet Union, they might be sovereign. But they do not have 
an army. 
We are part of the United States of America. We are within its 
jurisdiction and subject to the plenary powers of Congress. So we are 
not, in a sense, sovereign, except that we do have treaties and the United 
States has usually tried to honor those treaties. The notion of tribal 
sovereignty is wishful thinking on the part of most modern day tribal 
leaders. 
The talk about tribal sovereignty reveals the desire by Indians to 
exist in the midst of our tremendously complex nation. The United 
States is, for all practical purposes, an economic entity. If we cannot 
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exist economically, then we are not going to exist at all. We are going 
to be overrun sooner or later. Unfortunately, when economic progress 
occurs on reservations you often attract a lot more people than you 
actually need, and you are taking another chance. So economic pro-
gress is a pretty dangerous thing if that is where the tribes want to go. 
Not one tribe, in my estimation, has utilized economic progress to 
its real advantage. I believe that tribes could develop, if they wanted to, 
their coal resources and their oil and gas resources. They could joint 
venture those resources. It makes little sense to throw out a contract 
to ARCO, or whoever it may be, and let thousands of people come onto 
a reservation and establish a big town. Then, the Indians lose all the 
political powers that they have and all the rest that goes with it. 
I hope that tribes will open their eyes and begin to deal with reality 
instead of crying and moaning about something that is happening to 
them. They need to make things happen their way. If they would do 
that, then whatever happened on a given reservation, they would be 
responsible and would have to deal with it. Expecting the United States 
to come in and do all your business and protect you is like wishing that 
all the gold in the Black Hills was in your back pocket. We have to do 
those things that are practical in government. 
The War on Poverty did not just happen by accident. Somebody 
made it happen. Indians were part of that social justice movement. 
The Indian heirship bill did not lay down and die, we killed it. This is 
the way to do things. I have always tried to be one of those people who 
makes things happen in Indian country. From 1956 until 1964, I played 
a major part in deciding what was going to happen in the Indians' 
world. Expectations are one thing; achieving them is another thing. 
The IRA, in my estimation, provides tribes with limitless oppor-
tunities. They are only limited by the boundaries of what one can 
accomplish in the financial, economic, and industrial world. The IRA 
provides a platform from which many tribes could spring and enter the 
economic system of the country. But once tribes show their economic 
ability, Congress will most likely move in and start limiting their actions. 
I know this because at one time we almost reached that point at Rose-
bud. We drew back because of it. We were afraid of termination. 
We could have done a lot more things, but we decided to wait and let 
everybody else catch up. Unfortunately, OEO came along, and every-
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body forgot where they were going except to chase federal dollars. 
But I still think there are virtually no limits on any of the tribes if they 
want to really move up. 
HANK AnAMS 
The IRA, in general, has been metaphorically America's twentieth 
century Ghost Dance for American Indians. And John Collier has been 
it metaphysical Wovoka. It is not very useful to celebrate the last fifty 
years under the flawed vision of John Collier. Instead, we should shed 
the Ghost Dance shirts, which have not afforded protection to the 
Indians at places such as Wounded Knee in 1973. 
I first became involved in Indian affairs about twenty-five years 
ago. When I was fourteen years old, I went to a tribal council meeting 
with my stepfather on the Quinault Reservation. The Quinault were an 
IRA tribe from the standpoint of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but they 
were also a non-IRA tribe from the standpoint of many tribal members. 
The Quinault had held two elections, one which rejected the IRA and 
one which accepted it. Even today, it remains an unresolved dispute 
between the tribe and the BIA as to whether the Quinault are an 
IRA tribe. 
At the meeting that I first attended when I was fourteen, the tribe 
voted on the issue of extending state jurisdiction over the Quinault 
Reservation under Public Law 280. The vote was either thirty-eight to 
three or forty-two to one. There were no more than three persons in 
the tribe who favored going under state jurisdiction. The following 
Monday, the chairman of the tribe, the tribal claims attorney from 
Washington D.C., and the BIA superintendent met at the agency and 
petitioned the state of Washington to assume jurisdiction over the 
Quinault Reservation. That action was a violation of Quinault sov-
ereignty, and it revealed a fundamental problem between Indians and 
the federal government. Invariably, external forces contrive to get what 
they want at the sacrifice of Indian people, Indian rights, and Indian 
sovereignty. 
Shortly after that, the tribal chairman committed suicide. His 
suicide was caused, in part, by guilt for violating the tribe's governing 
institutions and the will of the Quinault people. He was spared the 
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problem that he had created, but his people suffered under the effects of 
that action for more than a dozen years. 
The roots of tribal sovereignty are written in antiquity, but for 
most people of the earth the concept of sovereignty is relatively new. 
Europeans and Americans formulated legal concepts of sovereignty 
during the later stages of the Enlightenment. One of its strongest 
expressions in a conceptual form came in 1758 in a book by Emmerich 
de Vattel, a Swiss jurist, called The Law of Nations. In that treatise 
were the concepts of government and sovereignty that were adopted by 
the United States in its Constitution. The Constitution also drew from 
some of the governmental forms that were employed by Indian nations 
on the East Coast, primarily the Iroquois confederacy, but also two 
tribes to the south, the Creek confederacy and the Cherokee nation. 
When Chief Justice John Marshall began defining the rights of 
Indians under the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court 
used The Law of Nations as its basic legal authority. This book had 
drawn upon universal human experiences to formulate international 
law. It took into account the development of law that was found to 
exist in Persia and South America and the law that was found to exist 
among the American Indians. 
During the Iranian hostage crisis, the Iranians said, "Why should 
we abide by international law when we had no hand in writing it?" 
They failed to recognize that they had a part in writing international 
law prior to the Enlightenment. Indians in the New World also made 
a contribution to the writing of The Law of Nations, and Indian experi-
ence played an important part in the law that the United States both 
recognized and was founded on. 
One expression of sovereignty is the notion of equality among all 
men and nations. Another attribute of sovereignty is the authority over 
one's self at the personal level, or the sovereignty of the individual. 
Sovereignty also means the authority of people over themselves as a 
society or a nation free from external direction. That is basic. Beyond 
that, one of the utilitarian values of sovereignty is in forming the rela-
tionship that exists between one sovereign entity and another. 
There is a tendency to think of sovereignty as being an absolute 
quality that exists. In reality, it is just a question of whether or not the 
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sovereignty is completely there or has drained away in some part. 
In fact, sovereignty is a dynamic concept whether it exists at the indi-
vidual level or whether it exists at some higher level, particularly at 
the level of nations. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Indian Control qf Indian Resources 
Gordy High Eagle, Edward C. Johnson 
There are 129 timbered reservations in the United States. In 1981, 
I learned, at a timber symposium in Spokane, that 580 million board feet of 
timber had been recently removed from the Colville, Spokane, Yakima, 
Quinault, and Makah reservations in the state of Washington. The tribes 
or the individual Indians on those five reservations made an $11 million 
profit. The state, in the jobs that were created and in other things, realized 
$13 million in taxes. The exploiting timber companies made $157 million. 
Yet, something is wrong when we still have 67 percent unemployment on 
those reservations. 
Joe De La Cruz, Quinault, president of the 
National Congress of American Indians 
If tribes are going to have meaningful self-rule, they must have eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. The reservations in the Dakotas have farming and 
grazing lands with few minerals. If my own reservation at Rosebud is going 
to maintain its sovereignty and identity, the people will have to sit down 
with technical experts and determine the capacity of the reservation to 
support human beings. They must find out how many people are left on 
the remaining land. I am sure there are 50 to 75 percent more people on 
the Rosebud Reservation than the resources of the land will support. 
Benjamin Reifel, Sioux, former congressman 
from South Dakota, commissioner of 
Indian affairs under President Gerald Ford 
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GORDY HIGH EAGLE 
I am from the Nez Perce tribe in north central Idaho. What we 
need most of all is respect for our tribe from the city, county, state, and 
federal governments. They should give us the opportunity to control 
our resources within the boundaries of the reservation. If that happened, 
all the other things such as economic development would fall into place. 
The Nez Perce Reservation contains approximately 750,000 acres, 
but we own only 90,000 checker boarded acres because of land allotment 
and some other things. Most people know that we are a minority within 
the reservation, and we often come out on the short end of the stick in 
court cases and other matters. 
Despite these problems we have made progress in certain areas, 
such as taxation, without having to go to court. We are trying to develop 
a track record to show that we have ability. We are weighing those 
things where we can gain control over our economic resources. We are 
farmers. We are also involved in the timber and fishing industry. The 
resources on our reservation are the same kind of resources utilized by 
all the people in the state of Idaho. We must begin to cooperate and 
work together to promote economic development. 
We have a limestone deposit on our reservation, and we could have 
had a cement plant and mined limestone for one hundred years. We 
chose not to because one hundred years is not a very long time. We 
wanted to consider the people who are still unborn. We did not want 
to act hastily and lose control of that resource. What we are now doing 
is contracting out in the pulp market. 
One of the things that the Nez Perce tribe has been working on 
is the state-wide fisheries management plan. We have used that vehicle 
to protect water quality. It takes us out of our existing reservation 
boundary into north central Idaho and the total Salmon River drainage 
area. We deal with approximately half of the state because of the 
fisheries issue. We have also looked at environmental damages in the 
national forest. We have been involved in suits against the secretary of 
commerce and the states of Oregon and Washington. 
Article three of our 1855 treaty provides the right to hunt, fish, 
and gather roots and berries. That is basically what we are doing. 
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We have not been successful in mining, but we have been successful in 
stopping projects that arc basically going to destroy the water quality 
of the streams and the spawning habitat of the salmon. 
EDWARD C. JOHNSON 
I believe that every tribe is concerned about the control of their 
natural resources. When I was the representative to the National Con-
gress of American Indians for the Walker River Paiute tribe in Nevada, 
I was introduced to a consultant in Washington D.C. We developed a 
resource management proposal for the entire Walker River Indian Res-
ervation during my two years as tribal chairman in 1978 and 1979. 
Our reservation, which consists of five hundred square miles, is the 
second largest reservation in Nevada. We have a number of resources 
such as minerals and farm land. I was determined to develop a resource 
management proposal that looked at all of our assets. 
We wanted to examine our human resources, the infrastructure of 
the reservation, business, education, and health. We were able to draft 
a resource management proposal because we were supported by the 
Equitable Insurance Company and its subsi,diary, Equitable Environ-
mental Health. 
We received a great deal of support from Congress. At the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, they said it was like a blizzard. Congressional letters 
were constantly being dumped on the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
We submitted a proposal under Public Law 93-638 to the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, the Economic Development Administration, and the 
Department of Commerce. We felt that our reservation was an example 
of where the government could really do something without saying, 
"Your reservation is too big, and it would take billions of dollars for 
economic development." \Ve proposed that these agencies operate under 
the Joint Funding Simplification Act, which Congress passed in the 
1970s. One of the problems you have in developing a reservation is 
when you go to federal agencies they say, "We do not have any funds" 
or "Our funds do not cover that area." It was our intention to obtain 
widespread federal funding. We strongly believed that it was better to do 
something on a comprehensive rather than a helter-skelter basis. 
We also asked the Colorado School of Mines to do a mineral 
resource inventory that included drilling. Previously, a number of min-
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ing companies had come on the Walker River Reservation to explore 
for minerals such as uranium, gold, and silver, but they never reported 
back to us; so we got a proposal from the Colorado School of Mines that 
we included in our resource management plan. 
We were also interested in developing our water resources. The 
Paiute tribe was given water rights on the Walker River Reservation in 
1859. In 1939, the court ruled that the Winters Right Doctrine, which 
protects treaty tribes' water rights, extended to executive order reserva-
tions. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allot us future 
water rights. Weare at the end of the Walker River. That meant that 
everybody above us had been getting water first before the 1939 decree. 
We had a reservoir built on our reservation in the 1930s to provide 
irrigation water. Before and after the reservoir was constructed was 
like the difference between night and day. As soon as the reservoir was 
finished, we could get water to our farming areas. 
We wanted the Carter administration to adopt our resource man-
agement proposal. Unfortunately, the Carter administration never 
developed a comprehensive Indian policy. I think that was indicative 
of President Carter's interest in Indian affairs. President Carter just 
allowed things to go on as usual. He did not take a great interest in 
Indian matters and neither did his high level staff. 
Ann Wexler, an assistant to the president, was the highest ranking 
woman in the Carter administration. Through Americans for Indian 
Opportunity and LaDonna Harris, we were able to convene a White 
House conference to review our resource management proposal. We met 
at the Theodore Roosevelt room in the White House. We were all sitting 
there when Ann Wexler walked in the room. Everyone stood up because 
the assistant to the president was conducting this conference. It was 
the consensus of this meeting that the federal government should fund 
this proposal and that the bureaucrats should work together. 
After we left the White House, we were not able to contend with 
the bureaucrats, who knifed our proposal. The Carter administration 
was not strong. If it had been under the Nixon administration, we might 
have implemented the proposal and shown that we could engage in 
comprehensive planning on our reservation. Instead, two months after 
the White House meeting, we received a "kiss-off" letter from the 
Carter people. It said, "Please go down and talk to the Bureau of 
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Indian Affairs about this matter." The Carter administration was not 
willing to knock the heads of bureaucrats in order to do something 
for our reservation. 
Because of our setback, some members of the tribal council are 
now proposing that individual members of the tribe stake out areas on 
the reservation and act as fronts for mining corporations who are inter-
ested in mineral exploration. Individual members of the tribe run our 
cattle association. Why not take a similar approach with the minerals? 
We have also hired an attorney to look at our future water rights. 
We have just completed a preliminary hydroelectric analysis on our 
reservoir to see whether it is possible to generate electricity. As in the 
past, we are now working on small economic projects. 
If the Indian Claims Commission had given us adequate funds for 
our claim, we could have forgotten about the trust responsibility. With 
a billion dollars we could have done something for our reservation. We 
can protect our private land. All we want are the resources to develop it. 
One of our problems is that we organized under the Indian 
Reorganization Act and drafted a constitution in 1937. The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs has to approve of everything that we do, such as amend-
ing our constitution and drawing up tribal ordinances. We accepted 
that method of government, but we do not have the funds to implement 
any kind of Indian control over the resources on our reservation. We 
can just go from one small project to another. 
We have been able to protect our hospital even though the Phoenix 
Health Service wanted to knife it. Senator Edward Kennedy personally 
intervened and saved our Indian hospital. Kennedy called the head of 
Indian health in Washington D.C. and told him that if we did not 
complete our comprehensive health plan, he was going to call him 
before his Senate committee. This kind of intervention does not come 
too often, but it helped us obtain another grant to complete our Indian 
health plan. It had to be run out of the Sacramento Area Office because 
the Phoenix Area Office refused to give us another grant. 
Indian control of Indian resources is important, but I do not 
believe that either Congress or President Ronald Reagan are willing to 
give us the necessary amount of money to adequately develop Indian 
resources. People sometimes say, "Money is not important." I disagree. 
Money is extremely important, especially when the government is 
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spending billions of dollars in faraway places such as Nicaragua. Indi-
vidual tribes need this kind of money to develop and protect their 
resources. Adequate federal funding is the key to Indian control of 
Indian resources. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Trust Obligation 
Charles F. Wilkinson, LaDonna Harris, Steven Unger, 
Helen Peterson, Benjamin Reifel 
Congress ultimately defines the trust relationship, which has changed 
over time. Early on in our republic, Congress did not use the trust relation-
ship to give courts jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reserva-
tions. Later, that became part of the trust relationship. In the 1970s, child 
welfare became part of the trust obligation. In 1976, Congress gave a clear 
statement in the area of the relationship of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
tribal self-government. It said that the BIA should give as much leeway as 
possible to tribal sovereignty. 
Benjamin Reifel, former congressman from 
South Dakota and commissioner of Indian affairs 
The trust relationship implies or results in Indian tribes being less 
than complete international sovereigns. Because the Navajo nation has a 
trust relationship with the United States, it does not have the international 
status of Mexico. The trust relationship has benefits for Indians, but it also 
has a negative aspect that means there is a subsidiary relationship to 
another sovereign. Consequently, Indian tribes have less than all the 
powers of sovereign nations. 
Charles F. Wilkinson, professor of law, University of Oregon 
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CHARLES F. WILKINSON 
By any standards, the trust obligation of the federal government 
is a sensitive and delicate issue. It seems to me that the trust obligation 
is sensitive and complex because it is so multifaceted. And we all appre-
ciate that as a concept it is poorly understood. The trust has several 
dimensions: it has a moral and political dimension, it has historical 
roots and development, and it has a legal dimension. It is very important 
to assess the way the trust obligation is perceived by informed non-
Indians who deal in Indian affairs, and the way in which it is perceived 
by Indians. Although legally the trust obligation exists between govern-
ments-the United States and Indian tribes-Indian people, properly 
in my judgment, view it as being somewhat in the nature of promises 
and guarantees being made to individual Indians. 
I am extremely proud to say that I became involved in federal 
Indian law at the Native American Rights Fund under the tutelage of 
people such as Helen Peterson. I am a lawyer and intend to give a very 
brief statement about how Indian trust law is viewed by the United 
States courts in a domestic context. I will not attempt to assess the 
international dimensions of trust law, and I do not intend to suggest 
what is right or wrong about the way our court system has analyzed 
the trust. 
There is no legitimate question that Indian lands and resources 
are held in trust and that the United States has a high fiduciary obliga-
tion. In my judgement, it is wrong to conclude that the trust does not 
extend to other areas. Beginning with the Cherokee Nation case in 1831, 
the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions indicated that the trust 
relationship extends to areas such as education, housing and health. 
If you read the early treaty negotiations, it is also clear that the content 
of the trust relationship goes beyond Indian land and resources. 
Congress has a trust responsibility under the Constitution toward 
Indian tribes, but this trust obligation is not enforceable against Con-
gress. It is impossible to sue Congress, but the courts have said that 
Congress has a moral obligation. It is most important as a matter of 
law not to denegrate the fact that Congress has a moral obligation 
towards Indians. 
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It should not matter that Congress can not be sued in court. We 
need to put the trust relationship in a broader context and realize that 
there are all kinds of areas in which Congress has obligations and duties 
that are not enforceable in court. For example, you cannot sue Con-
gress over political questions, over membership, and in some cases over 
division of authority with the executive branch, but that does not mean 
that Congress does not have the obligation to act properly. If a repre-
sentative appears with improper credentials, even though a suit cannot 
be filed, Congress has an obligation under the Constitution to act 
properly. Congress has broad authority over foreign affairs. It cannot 
be required to fund a military effort. But Congress has real obligations 
that are debatable. And lawsuits cannot be filed over national security 
issues. That does not mean they are not real issues that can be argued. 
Over the years, Indian advocates have very effectively argued in 
front of Congress that the trust is a legal obligation. Sometimes the 
argument has not worked. But that does not mean the trust doctrine 
is not there. 
When a statute is passed by Congress and authority is delegated 
to an administrative agency, the trust then becomes enforceable in 
court. We have had major decisions, particularly in the modern era, 
where courts have enforced the trust against the Indian Bureau, HUD, 
and what is now the Department of Education. Although Congress 
cannot be sued, administrative officials can be sued, and they become 
the trustee. So, the trust is definitely enforceable in court. No federal 
official can properly say that the trust is only a moral obligation that 
applies to Congress. Administrative officials have to act within the 
bounds of the trust. 
The Boldt decision in 1974 was important. It reaffirmed Indian 
fishing rights and demonstrated the seriousness of the trust obligation. 
It ultimately led the Supreme Court to find that far-ranging Indian 
fishing rights existed in the northwestern part of the United States. 
LADoNNA HARRIS 
I want to share an experience I have had in the past few months. 
Maybe it will help us understand that there are different ways of view-
ing what we feel and mean about the words trust obligation. Recently, 
Americans for Indian Opportunity held seminars on tribal governments. 
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In our first seminar we listened to a political scientist from Rutgers 
University who made a presentation on western political thought. His 
presentation and the discussion that followed convinced me that Indian 
people are philosophically more eastern than western, because we imme-
diately came into philosophical conflict with the political scientist. 
I believe that words such as trust, sovereignty, and genocide often 
mean different things to Indians and non-Indians. Indians have used 
the word trust both in a moral and political sense. For Indians, the 
trust obligation is not just with the land. We have used this concept in 
its broadest meaning to convince other federal agencies besides the 
Indian Bureau that they should serve Indians. For example, we have 
insisted that the Environmental Protection Agency has a trust obliga-
tion to Indian tribes. We are very passionate about the moral aspect of 
the trust obligation. It has become a very important political instru-
ment in our struggle with Congress. 
STEVEN UNGER 
I would like to look at the trust obligation in terms of public policy. 
We need to remember that the president, the courts, and especially 
Congress are responsible for upholding the trust obligation. I would 
like to concentrate on Congress because it is the only branch of the 
government that is really responsive to what the American people want. 
The trust obligation began when Congress acquired Indian land 
with treaties. A trust obligation also has evolved to provide health, 
education, and welfare services to Indian people. These services are 
mostly provided through the Snyder Act of the 1920s. This act simply 
says that the BIA shall use such moneys as Congress may from time to 
time appropriate, but there is no mention of any federal obligation to 
appropriate funds for Indian people. 
In the mid-1970s, Congress carefully examined its obligations to 
American tribes. It set up the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission which looked at the federal government's historical and special 
legal relationship with American Indian people. Congress took this 
action because it wanted to formulate new policies and programs for 
the benefit of Indians. 
In the mid to the late 1970s, there was a substantial innovation in 
the "Findings and Declaration of Policy" sections of bills passed by 
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Congress. For example, in Public Law 93-638, the Indian Self Deter-
mination and Educational Assistance Act ( 1975) , Congress said that the 
prolonged federal domination of Indian services had served to retard 
rather than advance Indian progress. Congress also recognized the 
obligation of the United States to promote self-determination for Indian 
people by assuring maximum Indian participation in federal services 
such as education. 
In 1976, Congress passed the Indian Health Care Improvement 
Act. In this legislation, Congress declared that special federal health 
services were required by the federal government's unique historical 
relationship with Indian people. Congress also declared as policy the 
legal obligation to provide the highest possible health care to American 
Indians. 
Two years later, in legislation dealing with Indian child welfare, 
Congress provided an even more expansive view of its trust obligation. 
It assumed a general responsibility for the protection and preservation 
of Indian tribes and their resources. Congress also noted that no resource 
was more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes 
than their children, and it promised as a trustee to protect children who 
were eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. 
The Indian community colleges bill, which Congress passed, had 
language in it declaring that education was a trust responsibility, but 
President Reagan vetoed this bill. It is unlikely that Reagan's veto 
meant that there was no federal trust responsibility for education. 
Instead, the veto indicated that there was no trust responsibility for the 
Congress to provide community colleges on Indian reservations. 
The concept of a trust responsibility played a major role in two 
other bills during the late 1970s. The first bill created the Department 
of Education, which President James E. Carter had proposed. This bill 
would have moved Indian schools out of the BIA into the new Depart-
ment of Education. The bill was opposed by over ninety percent of the 
Indian tribes. They feared that moving the schools would weaken the 
government's trust responsibility for Indian education. The members of 
Congress were incredulous when tribes defended the BIA on that bill. It 
was a common perception in Congress that the BIA was the most incom-
petent agency in the American government. Tribal leaders produced 
some very interesting figures to demonstrate that the BIA did not have 
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such a terrible record. For instance, the absentee rate in BIA schools was 
less than the absentee rate in New York City. One of the most critical 
arguments that Congress responded to was the new role of community 
controlled contract schools, which gave Indian communities, for the 
first time, the chance to control the education of their children. 
The concept of the trust also can be seen in the various sunset bills 
that were proposed in the late 1970s. These bills basically said that 
every federal program would be allowed to run for periods of from five 
to ten years. After that specified period ended, no program would be 
reauthorized unless it could specifically justify itself. Several arguments 
were made before Congress concerning those bills. One of the most 
important was that Indian programs were different because of the 
trust obligation. 
The trust is part of a moral obligation that the United States has 
assumed. We have to look at it in terms of congressional support for 
Indian programs. There is widespread agreement that the trust obliga-
tion pertains to Indian land and natural resources. There is also non-
Indian support for doing charitable good works. Until about 1950, 
Congress used the term "gratuity appropriations" when it funded 
Indian health, education, and welfare programs. The Reagan admin-
istration has expanded this old Christian view of charity and extended 
it to corporations. 
Another way that the people through Congress support programs 
for Indian tribes is in the sense of reparations. Because terrible wrongs 
have been done to Indian people, they believe that the United States 
has the responsibility to help these victims. This is analogous, in some 
ways, to the German nation paying reparations to Israel. There also 
are people who see a more liberal role for the government. They feel 
there is a governmental responsibility to help Indians under the social 
contract. 
The moral obligation is more compelling, in many cases, than the 
legal obligation in terms of the way non-Indians can be moved to sup-
port Indian tribes. Congress is more willing than the courts to take a 
holistic view of the trust obligation. If the trust obligation protected 
only Indian land, would the trust be adequately discharged if the land 
survived and the Indian people died? 
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HELEN PETERSON 
The manner in which the BIA and all the other federal agencies 
carry out the trust obligation depends a good deal upon how much 
money Congress is willing to appropriate. It is important that the gen-
eral public understands the trust obligation, because the general public 
sends men and women to Congress, and they hold the trump cards. 
I have struggled over many years trying to explain the trust obliga-
tion to other people. I have found it helpful to compare the BIA to the 
trust department of a bank. Americans know about the trust depart-
ments of banks, and they seem to understand that in the government of 
the United States there is a Bureau of Indian Affairs which corresponds 
to a bank's trust department. 
It is important that potential friends of Indians understand very 
quickly what the trust relationship is and the BIA's responsibility for 
carrying it out. I do not think it is as important to separate out the 
moral, political, and legal aspects of the trust obligation, as it is to 
understand the Indians' dependence on the Congress of the United 
States. The vulnerability of Indians became apparent during the early 
1950s when Congress adopted the policy of termination in House Reso-
lution 108. Termination was above all else the ending of the trust on 
Indian land. 
We hear a good deal about both genocide and the cultural survival 
of Indians. The general public is often confused about this. But a few 
things are crystal clear. People find it difficult to survive as a distinct 
culture without a land base. This explains the tenacity of the Jews and 
their determination to establish and maintain a homeland. It is not 
unique to Indians to know that it is important to hold on to a piece 
of this earth. We need to concentrate on making these simple truths 
and facts better understood among both Indian people and the gen-
eral public. 
There is also the question of tribal versus individual interests and 
ownership. I recall that during Glenn Emmons's administration, a 
memo was written which said that, since the passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, tribal interests had been held paramount to indi-
vidual Indian interests. Emmons then promised that he would consider 
individual interests to be paramount or equal to that of the tribe. This 
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is a delicate, painful, tough, and persistent issue that needs constructive 
resolution. But it is also important to realize that there is a clear trust 
responsibility under the IRA. This legislation indefinitely extended the 
trust on the land of IRA tribes. And the secretary of the interior peri-
odically extends the trust periods on land owned by non-IRA tribes. 
BENJAMIN REIFEL 
The trust responsibility includes the legal obligation to protect 
Indian land resources. It also involves political and legislative areas. 
If the trust obligation is not met and a tribe loses all of its land, it may 
still be sovereign because the people are working together to obtain 
federal services on a government-to-government basis. 
There have been instances where the government has increased 
Indian landholdings. I went around on the Pine Ridge Reservation 
with a tribal lawyer. We convinced the director of the Farmers Home 
Administration to loan the Pine Ridge Sioux $1 million to increase the 
amount of tribal land. That was important because all of the allotted 
land on the reservation will someday disappear. Most of these allotted 
lands are inherited on the basis of state law. There are pieces of land 
that have as many as 150 heirs in one quarter section. 
The Indians should be united about the importance of having the 
government carry out its trust obligation, but we fight and fuss among 
ourselves on our own reservations. If we cannot cooperate at home, 
how do we unite regionally or nationally? 
Why does the nation feel a moral obligation to provide us with 
services? I think there is a latent sense of guilt in the American white 
community. When I was in Congress, one of my colleagues said, "Why 
don't you appropriate enough money to take care of this problem?" 
We must find a way to take advantage of the latent sense of guilt that 
exists in the United States. 
We are less than 1 million out of 220 million people. That means 
we have to cite the factual content of treaties instead of giving diatribes 
against the government. And we have to make an effort to find our 
friends. When I was in Congress, I got on the Interior and Insular 
Affairs Appropriations Committee. The first thing I did was get 
$5 million added to the budget for our school on the Rosebud Reserva-
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tion. You have to know who you can go to in the House and Senate to 
get this kind of support. People such as Senator Barry Goldwater are 
important. Recently, Goldwater sent a letter to President Ronald 
Reagan. It said, if you are spending all these billions of dollars for other 
people, why don't we spend a little here at home for our first Americans. 
If Indians want to preserve the trust obligation, they must discuss 
ways to keep their tribes together. We need to keep up our tribal enroll-
ment so that we are more united as a people. It is a mistake to have full 
bloods fight mixed bloods and try to kick them off the rolls. This kind 
of factionalism goes on all the time. 
You are an Indian no matter where you live. It is important that 
tribes adopt everybody who has some right because of blood ties. There 
are a lot of people from all over the United States who are not enrolled 
because of tribal politics. Once they are on the roll, they can say, "I am 
an Indian." And they can help persuade Congress to maintain its 
trust relationship. 
Indians cannot depend on the Interior Department to uphold its 
moral trust obligation. A secretary of the interior may come along who 
does not feel obligated to extend the trust status on certain Indian lands. 
I would admonish all triballcaders to help their people understand that 
it is important to maintain the political aspects of the trust obligation. 
We must persuade Congress to continue education, health, and other 
federal services. If we do not do that, gradually our sovereignty will 
erode, and at some point we will be ineffective. 
Fifty years ago, when I was employed by the Indian Bureau, 
Indians were dying like flies from tuberculosis, trachoma, dysentery, 
and malnutrition. Now we are in good health. We have a breathing 
spell. Our young men and women are students in universities and col-
leges. There are hundreds of Indian lawyers to look after our interests. 
We must get together with our white friends, stop quarreling among our-
selves, and examine the purpose of life in the United States of America. 
CHAPTER SIX 
What Indians Should Want: 
Advice to the President 
Joe De La Cruz, Philleo Nash, Suzan Shown Harjo, 
Oren Lyons, Philip S. Deloria 
Existing tribal income simply can not maintain the standard of living 
to adequately maintain our culture. What should we do? If a recom-
mendation is made to the president, it should ask for enough money for 
each reservation to honestly provide a standard of living that will support 
tribal sovereignty and self-rule. Then, we can proudly say, this is our cul-
ture and we are taking care of ourselves. 
Benjamin Reifel, Sioux, former commissioner of 
Indian affairs under President Gerald Ford 
If a president wanted to do the right thing, he would set up a five or 
ten member staff in the Office of Management and Budget. It would 
coordinate all federal budgets insofar as they served, or failed to serve, 
Indian communities. In addition, this staff would enforce responsibility on 
all federal agencies to provide services to Indian communities. It would 
review the actions of all federal agencies and propose legislation if they had 
an impact on Indian tribes and on the federal tribal relationship. 
I would recommend that the president implement a system where 
individual tribes plan budgets with the federal government over a ten to 
fifteen year span rather than the eighteen month projection that they now 
have. Then, discussions of funding capital investments on reservations 
would be in the context of when and not whether they take place. 
Gary Orfield, Brookings Institution, professor of 
political science, University of Chicago 
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We are suffering under cultural imperialism. In our schools, we have 
to use books that tell us how the Indians impeded progress, justice, and 
civilization. We are viewed as savages because we protected our country. 
1 would like an entirely new curriculum developed for our schools, so our 
children would not have to read those kinds of things. 
Edward C. Johnson, Northern Paiute, 
tribal historian for the 
Walker River Paiute Tribe 
Looking back at the 1930s, I sometimes feel there is a legacy that 
comes from one of the major cultural events of that era. It is the Wizard's 
response in the Wizard of Oz. When the cowardly lion needed courage, 
he got a medal. When the tin man needed a heart, he got a watch. When 
the scarecrow needed a brain, he was given a diploma. Recently, I heard 
a conversation by an Indian staff member in the House of Representatives. 
It was suggested that "What Indians need now is to build their own 
bureaucracy." This is in the same vein as if Indians went to a Wizard of 
Oz known as the commissioner of Indian affairs and said, "We need our 
future." He would say, "You do not need a future, you just need a budget." 
Indian people do have a future. With each new birth among us, we 
will have a child of promise. We must make certain that all of our children, 
born and unborn, fulfill their destiny. 
Hank Adams, Assiniboine, activist, leader, and writer 
JOE DE LA CRUZ 
A few years ago, we asked for a meeting with former President 
James E. Carter. Indian people, with expertise in technical matters and 
federal Indian policy, had developed papers that we were going to carry 
to the president. Unfortunately, President Carter never showed up for 
this meeting, and it seemed that the people he sent in to represent him 
did not want to listen to us. 
I doubt whether any president is interested in listening to the view-
points of Indians. But Ronald Reagan recently has made an important 
statement regarding Indian affairs. One of the things he promised was 
to honor the concept of Indian self-determination. I believe that there 
are some things in Reagan's statement that we can pursue to get a 
proper perspective on federal Indian policy. It is up to the Indian people 
to take this initiative. 
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For the last year and a half, as president of the National Congress 
of American Indians, I have been working with tribal leaders who are 
members of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association. We have 
attempted to cooperate with this administration, and it has been very 
frustrating. At times, we have felt like fighting with all of our strength. 
It is very apparent that the president of the United States, even though 
he signs his name on policy statements, probably does not know that 
there are still Indians in America. It is very obvious that he does not 
know that there are Indians in Central America who are human beings. 
It is my strong feeling that we have to establish a formal process 
where Indian people can develop an agenda that defines their relation-
ship to the United States. These formal discussions would also enable us 
to see where we are going in the future. If President Reagan is truly 
interested in government-to-government relations, we will be able to 
make progress. 
Not too long ago, people who resided on islands in the Pacific 
Ocean held talks aimed at redeveloping their relationship with the 
United States. They have managed to alter the paternalistic relation-
ship that they once had with this country. These people are now in a 
commonwealth situation. We need to see if we want to go in that 
direction. 
The Reagan administration has issued a statement on self-determi-
nation. We need to find out whether the federal agencies that deal with 
Indian affairs are following this policy. We also must ask Congress, 
"This is what the President has said; why are you not carrying it out?" 
Finally, Indians need to educate Congress and the American public 
about international convenants that focus on the rights of indige-
nous people. 
PHILLEO NASH 
I have advised presidents. Some of them took my advice and 
some did not. My principle advice to Harry Truman was that he should 
veto the Navajo-Hopi rehabilitation bill unless Congress took out sec-
tion nine which would have put the Navajo and Hopi Indians under 
state jurisdiction in three states. President Truman agreed and he 
vetoed this bill. Congress later passed similar legislation without sec-
tionnine. 
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In the 1960 election, a rather interesting thing happened. Both 
candidates were asked a series of penetrating questions about Indian 
affairs by both the National Congress of American Indians and by the 
Association on American Indian Affairs, and both candidates, in that 
year, committed themselves to improving federal Indian policy. 
President John F. Kennedy was committed to appointing an 
Indian to head the Bureau of Indian Affairs. And he wanted to honor 
the provisions of Indian treaties. President Kennedy may have made 
some campaign promises that were inadvisable. He may have promised 
more than he could deliver, given the political reality of the country. 
Indian people do not want campaign promises. They want commit-
ments that are obtainable. 
We must recognize the symbolic importance of Indian treaties and 
the fact that they are part of organic law. Treaties are documents of 
great importance. They represent historical tradition and remind us of 
previous commitments. Presidents, Congress, and the courts are obliged 
to deal with the numerous and important organic acts in Indian affairs 
as serious documents. 
President Kennedy did not give Congress a special message on 
Indian affairs. Instead, he had Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall 
create a Task Force on Indian Affairs. I was a member of that task 
force. In our report, we recommended that termination should be 
ended. President Kennedy gave his stamp of approval to this recom-
mendation, and subsequent presidents have not altered this policy. 
I do not think that it is appropriate any longer for non-Indians to 
offer advice on behalf of Indians. But presidents that think they can 
get along without advice on Indian affairs will find out that they have 
made a serious mistake. It is a very important matter to listen to the 
viewpoints of other people. Presidents of the United States, for a long 
time, have been tested by where they stand on Indian affairs. It is an 
acid test, because other great moral and ethical issues are connected 
with the guilt that Americans feel about Indians. Indian people have 
traditionally looked to their "Great White Father." This is something 
that we can make fun of, especially when we watch western movies, but 
it had profound implications in the past, and it still does. I believe every 
president of the United States knows that. 
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I believe that there have been significant changes in Indian affairs 
in the last few years. The take-over of the Bureau of Indian Affairs was 
important. The politics of confrontation by what had been a docile and 
passive minority group was a considerable eye opener, shock, and 
awakening. Not long after the episode, the OEO began to strengthen 
its funding. 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission's report was 
historic. It was similar to the Presidential Commission on Civil Rights 
set up by President Truman. The commission dealt with the issue of 
sovereignty directly and confrontationally. It resulted in a loss to Con-
gress of both chairmen on the Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. 
It should not be too surprising, after the occupation of the BIA 
headquarters and the political aftermath of the commission report, that 
we do not have any chairman of the Interior Subcommittee on Indian 
Affairs. This committee goes back to the early days of the Congress. 
It has been a hard hitting committee that dealt with significant issues. 
Today, nobody wants to be chairman of the committee. This gives me 
an ominous feeling with regard to the future. 
For better or for worse, I think the situation now exists where there 
could be the termination of the Indian Bureau. Historically, the com-
missioner of Indian affairs, the secretary of the interior, and the presi-
dent have been instrumental in forming executive leadership in Indian 
affairs. Today we do not have a strong head of the BIA. We also lack 
the congressional leadership on Indian affairs committees that is neces-
sary to formulate policy with the president and his staff. There is a 
floundering going on, and I do not see how it could be otherwise. 
Indian tribes may be already a little further along than they think 
they are towards self-determination. This comes at a time when a 
weakened, demoralized, and nearly all Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs 
is more ineffectual and disappointing than it has ever been in its history. 
Indian people, their leaders, and their organizations must decide what 
to do about this situation. I wish you well. But I have a feeling of 
chaos, indecision, and fragmentation. I think 1986 is going to be a 
watershed year. I hope that you are successful. 
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SUZAN SHOWN HARJO 
The only president who has ever known me was James Carter. 
I gave him advice concerning the advisability of having a meeting with 
traditional Indian elders and leaders. Instead, we met with Vice-
President Walter Mondale. I promised that this meeting would last 
one-hour-and-a-half. It lasted three-and-a-half hours, and that was 
the last advice I ever gave a president. 
My advice to President Ronald Reagan is to get out of town quick 
and do not fire any of the dim bulbs on your one-watt administration. 
Otherwise, we might have some light rather than heat brought to Indian 
policy, and we do not want that to happen. I believe that it would be 
very helpful to end the war against poor people that is underway by this 
administration. The president should also stop the confrontational 
policy towards our neighbors to the south and the destructive activities 
in relation to the environment and should adopt a positive public policy 
toward women. Furthermore, Reagan should halt the campaign from 
his office to convert the nation to Christianity. The president should 
follow the advice of Mark Twain who asked the missionaries to "leave 
the heathens alone and convert the Christians to Christianity." 
President Reagan should also attend to other matters. He should 
adopt a conciliatory posture toward nuclear disarmament even though 
the reservations are not targets for annihilation. It would be nice for the 
president to set aside a day to honor Martin Luther King, especially as 
we approach the twentieth anniversary celebration of the poor peoples' 
march on Washington. I hope that the president will become serious 
about his policy to consult with Indian governmental leaders. I would 
order his staff to implement the part of the Indian Reorganization Act 
that requires the secretary of interior to advise tribal governments about 
the budget. President Reagan should call a moratorium on the budget 
cuts that are being proposed for Indians. He should stop trying to force 
Indians into negotiations on resource issues that need not take place at 
this moment. Finally, the president should issue a proposed executive 
order on Indian religious freedom. 
I would like to comment on a point that has been made regarding 
the jurisdiction of the Indian Affairs Committee in Congress. For many 
years there were Congressional standing committees for Indian affairs. 
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Since the 1940s, the House Indian Affairs Subcommittee has handled 
these matters. In the early 1970s, serious problems arose because a 
chairman of the subcommittee had abused his position. Morris Udall, 
the chairman of the Interior Committee, talked to a number of us. 
He proposed a plan to handle Indian affairs within the committee as 
a whole rather than have an irresponsible subcommittee. Udall per-
suaded a number of people on the Interior Committee to floor manage 
individual bills, which relieved him of the burden of handling all Indian 
legislation. 
For about ten years, I have advocated the idea of having a joint 
Senate and House committee that would not legislate but oversee Indian 
affairs. This would be successful only if there was a comparable juris-
dictional set-up within the executive branch of government. As long as 
there is confusion in the executive branch, there will necessarily be 
jurisdictional confusion within Congress about how to handle Indian 
affairs. On the other hand, we do not want a committee that oversees 
Indian policy that is made up of people who do not really like Indians. 
OREN LYONS 
I am not afraid of a direct discussion of Indian affairs. Our tradi-
tional people have been giving advice to various presidents for sometime. 
We are concerned about the process of termination. Treaty rights have 
been ignored, and jurisdiction for Indian matters has moved down from 
the federal to state level. If this process is not stopped Indian tribes 
eventually will wind up as a municipality of some county government. 
The Iroquois always talk about their treaties. There are 371 
treaties. Today, we are faced with legislation that attempts to serve 
all the interests of these different entities. It is obvious that this 
approach does not work, because there is too much variety in tribal 
self-government. 
There are serious problems today associated with economic devel-
opment on Indian land. Many Indian nations look like Las Vegas. Why 
does Indian economic development have to revolve around gambling, 
bingo, and the sale of cigarettes and firecrackers? This kind of negative 
economic development results in twenty or thirty people fighting for a 
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piece of the pie. Itis based on quick profit with no concern for the effect 
it will have on Indian communities. In my judgement, this kind of 
tribal economy has harmed the Seneca and other close relatives. People 
have become very angry. There are bitter discussions about who is to 
get money. This is the unfortunate reality today on Indian land. 
President Reagan has proposed that we should welcome further 
economic development. From past experience, what he means is "Open 
up your door and we will step in. Then, we will show you how it is 
done." Before long the house is empty, and the Indians are standing 
there wondering what happened. 
The development of nuclear power threatens Indian people. In 
New Mexico and Arizona, where mining has taken place, Indian people 
are dying from exposure to radiation. My good friend, Larry Redshirt 
died of a broken heart and overwork when his wife aborted because she 
lived in an area where nuclear waste got on rabbits, the food, and 
everything else in the open pits. She twice delivered malformed children. 
That is another reality today on Indian land. 
The Iroquois believe that a high level presidential commission 
should be created so Indians can sit down and really talk about a fair 
settlement of their land claims. The American people must understand 
that Indian people are not going to take money in lieu of lost lands. 
What Indians want is some of their land back. 
Why are the American people so apprehensive when Indians talk 
about land claims? It is because they know they are all sitting on original 
Indian land. But would not everyone be happier if we resolved this 
issue? Given the international problems that we face, it would be much 
better to be allies than adversaries fighting on our home front. 
Indian nations are intelligent. They can hold their own in any 
discussion of how to settle land claims. So, let us find a way to expand 
Indian territory. Indian nations would then be secure and their children 
would have a future. Our chiefs worry about what its going to happen 
when they are dead. They wonder, who is going to protect our children 
when we are gone? 
The Iroquois want to continue as separate nations. We do not want 
to be like other Americans. We are proud of our culture and think that 
we can enhance your life. Indians and non-Indians can be friends and 
work together. We must talk to our congressmen. We have to tell the 
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president of the United States, "This is enough!" Let us clean up our 
own house before trying to save the world. 
I am worried when President Reagan says, "Well, the devil made 
me do it." We have faced this philosophy before. The pilgrims talked 
about the same thing. They said, "You Indians are devils!" So, when 
I hear a president calling the Russians "devils," I ask what does that 
mean? We have had experience with that kind of rhetoric. It means 
trouble, and we must get beyond that kind of thinking. The future is 
in the hands of the American people. 
PHILIP S. DELORIA 
I would like to identify some issues that might be worthy of con-
sideration by Ronald Reagan or any other president. From my brief 
experience in helping to found the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, I learned that a fundamental issue is the relationship between 
industrial societies and tribal peoples. All around the world, village and 
tribal people are seeking to hold on to their land and their identity, but 
they are being forced off the land and into cities because of the needs of 
industrial societies. The economic promises that are implicit in plans 
for world development simply do not have the artithmetic to back 
them up. There are not going to be enough jobs created in light industry 
to employ everybody in Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, or other large 
cities that are absorbing tribal and village people. In many respects 
there is a time bomb that is ticking. 
That leads to some fundamental issues that have to be clarified for 
American society. In America, as I see it, the conflict has never really 
been between cultures. Those clashes have been only surface manifes-
tations of a deeper problem. The real issue in this country has been 
over the control of land and natural resources and the relationship of 
Indians to the economy. 
Historically, Indian policy has been largely bipartisan. For exam-
ple, both termination and self-determination received bipartisan sup-
port. It is not going to be enough for both candidates in the next 
election, or the election after that, to make the same kind of campaign 
promises about self-determination and respect for treaties. 
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From recent Supreme Court opinions, it appears that the funda-
mental view of this society is that Indians do not belong in this economic 
system and their resources should be used and developed by somebody 
else. The Supreme Court has now invented the notion that federal 
agencies have a trust responsibility to their constituent groups that is 
comparable in the law to the federal trust responsibility for Indians. 
This is an astounding and drastic judicial viewpoint. It deserves a great 
public outcry. 
The tools for the solution to many Indian problems already exist. 
The will and the spirit of Indian tribes must be harnessed to bring about 
political and economic advancement. And Indian communities have 
to realize that they are the only ones that can decide how to do this. 
The federal government also has the tools to coordinate the federal 
resources available to tribes, in order to achieve economic results. But 
the bipartisan will to do this has been lacking. Neither political party 
has had its feet held to the fire. They still think that Indians are willing 
to settle for platitudes. 
The Carter administration, in my experience, was constantly in a 
state of public embarrassment. Whatever it did with respect to Indians 
simply added more embarrassment to an already humiliating four years. 
The Reagan administration seems to lack the capacity for embarrass-
ment. This indifference to criticism greatly effects our strategies for 
changing the policies of this administration. 
I agree that we should ask President Reagan to stop his war on 
poor people. But he did not stumble into that war and the poor people 
did not attack him. Officials in the Reagan administration made a 
calculated decision to follow this course of action, and they are not 
embarraseed about it. Until there is a strong public consensus in this 
country which says that the nation will no longer tolerate such a public 
policy, Indians will continue to pay the price of poverty for continuing 
to be Indians. Reorganizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs is not going 
to have the slightest effect on ending this war. 
The basic issue that Indians face is are we going to use our own 
resources, or is somebody else going to use them? The answer, for the 
last two hundred years, has been very clear. Somebody else is going to 
use our resources. I do not see the slightest indication that there is any 
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demand for this process to change except from Indians and a few of 
our friends. 
We showed, in response to the termination policy, that we can 
lobby very effectively against something. Our record since that time 
of demonstrating that we could lobby effectively for something has been 
less dramatic. There is an apparent absence of a will in the American 
political community to find a solution to our problems. So we must 
define the answers ourselves and keep pushing until something begins to 
happen. But we still will need public support. I am not ready to say 
what Indians want in specific details. But, in general, it is clear that 
Indians do not want to be poor anymore. The economic and political 
issues involved in the control of our resources are paramount and are 
most often ignored in the federal policies. There are still vast resources 
in the government to help us, but they are not being mobilized and 
targeted by federal officials. 
Since the early 1970s, tribes have begun to face the need to act as 
governments that regulate and tax. In the process, we have created a 
set of issues with respect to federal, state, and municipal governments 
that were beyond the wildest imagination of people twenty years ago. 
A whole new set of issues has to be confronted. It involves the develop-
ment of institutions and the implementation of political philosophies in 
a very short time. That is an almost impossible task, but we are going 
to have to do it. In order to be successful, we must stave off attempts to 
interfere with and abolish our governments. 
Nobody went in and abolished the city of Cleveland when it almost 
went bankrupt under the direction of a youthful mayor. But tribes are 
constantly faced with the reminder, that in the view of much of the 
society, we are transitional governments. This makes it very difficult 
for us, over the long haul, to implement plans. We can not make even 
one percent of the false starts and the mistakes that every other govern-
ment in this country is entitled to, as a matter or right, because they 
have a permanent existence. 
Most people are not aware of the enormous growth and power of 
the Office of Management and Budget in the federal government. It no 
longer just deals with management issues or adding up numbers and 
giving them to the president. The OMB is a major policy-making force 
in America. Every person that works for OMB, in theory, speaks for 
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the president. The levels at which Indian policy questions are decided 
in the OMB are so low that no one who is appointed by the president 
even knows they take place, unless they are very major issues. 
The OMB is an unaccountable bureaucracy that essentially has 
the freedom to impose its policy preferences on Indians. There is no 
due process or access to policy formulation on the part of Indians. This 
situation happens in every administration. 
We must find a way to break through that bureaucratic barrier and 
establish the permanency of Indian societies and governments in this 
system. This must not be done at the price of our continued poverty. 
We have to discover how to work our way out of poverty and still be 
permanent. That involves a conceptual framework that simply has not 
been developed, and we have to do it very quickly. 
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